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INTRODUCTION
1.1 Subject of study
Since decades, economists and policy makers recognise that the market
provides too little incentives for ﬁrms to invest in research and devel-
opment (R&D). Imperfect appropriability, uncertain outcomes and large
sunk set-up costs are examples of factors that characterise R&D activi-
ties and drive a wedge between private and social beneﬁts of R&D, and
thus between private and social incentives to invest in R&D. One of the
instruments that economists and policy makers have devised and used
to tighten this gap, next to, for instance, the patent system and subsidy
policy, is the stimulation of research joint ventures (RJVs) or other co-
operative agreements related to R&D between competing ﬁrms. Indeed,
competition laws of Western countries have provided an exception for
such agreements given the potential social beneﬁts (see, for instance, the
National Cooperative Research and Production Act in the US and Ex-
emption 81(3) of the EC Treaty in the EU).
In the industrial organisation (IO) literature much attention has been
paid to the identiﬁcation of circumstances under which R&D coopera-
tion, deﬁned as coordination of R&D activities so as to maximise industry
proﬁt, is social-welfare-improving compared to R&D competition. It is,
for instance, generally accepted that one of the important conditions for
cooperation between similar ﬁrms of the same size to be social-welfare-
enhancing, in the sense that producers ´ and consumersgain from R&D co-
operation, is the existence of important knowledge ﬂows between ﬁrms,
often referred to as technological spillovers.
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The same models predict that ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in R&D co-
operation do not depend on the level of technological spillovers, under
the assumption that ﬁrms cannot control knowledge ﬂows. Indeed, it is
always more proﬁtable for symmetric ﬁrms to engage in R&D coopera-
tion, although theory predicts ﬁrms to behave according to the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium if no binding commitment to R&D cooperation
is possible1. If, on the other hand, binding R&D agreements can be made,
theory predicts R&D cooperation, irrespective of the level of technologi-
cal spillovers. With high enough spillovers R&D cooperation implies that
ﬁrms bundle their forces to internalise the (positive) externalities gener-
ated by R&D investment such that the ﬁrms will invest more in R&D
compared to when they would not cooperate. In the case of low spill-
overs, R&D of a ﬁrm has negative externalities because it generates a
competitive advantage compared to competitors. Under these circum-
stances R&D cooperation can be used as a device to internalise the nega-
tive externality and will lead to a reduction in R&D by both ﬁrms.
The above and other conclusions are made on the basis of relatively
simple game-theoretic models of ﬁrms engaged in product market com-
petition in an oligopoly context. The basic models have been extended on
several grounds so as to incorporate more features of R&D and product
markets that have been found to be empirically important. Despite of the
existence of a huge theoretical literature motivated by these basic mod-
els, empirical researchers have been reluctant to question or examine the
basic models’ assumptions and predictions. A large empirical literature
on the determinants and consequences of RJV formation exists, but this
research is mostly not motivated by IO theory.
It is likely that the scarcity of econometric analyses motivated by IO
theory is partly due to a lack of ﬁrm-speciﬁc data, or better of adequate
ﬁrm-speciﬁc data. In the ﬁrst place, R&D and related data are known to
suffer from some speciﬁc problems, such as, for instance, discontinuities
in time series and ambiguous deﬁnitions on what R&D actually is. Fur-
thermore, it is also difﬁcult to ﬁnd or calculate empirical equivalents for
a theoretical variable as the level of technological spillovers, and it is not
1A Nash equilibrium for a game is a combination of actions for which each player
maximises her own utility (payoff) with respect to her own action, given the other play-
ers’ actions (based on Nash, 1951). A combination of actions is a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of a larger game (see Selten,
1975; Friedman, 1989, for more formal deﬁnitions).
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clear whether proxies capture the same features as in theoretical models.
And ﬁnally, the interrelatedness of R&D investment and other variables
as market structure, ﬁrm size, proﬁt etc., gives rise to econometric prob-
lems of simultaneity.
In the context of mainstream models of R&D cooperation and product
market competition, one could raise the question whether ﬁrms’ actual
R&D decisions correspond to theoretical predictions. In other words, one
could test whether the behavioural assumptions of the models are cor-
rect. For instance, do ﬁrms actually cooperate in R&D when they have
possibilities to commit to a binding R&D contract, and does theory pre-
dict well what ﬁrms do without binding R&D contract possibilities? Sup-
pose that there is no option to engage in an R&D agreement in a binding
way, may tacit R&D cooperation then be sustainable under some condi-
tions? And more importantly, are conclusions regarding R&D behaviour
the same for different levels of technological spillovers?
An open question, which has recently been examined on the basis
of ﬁeld data and which we will deal with in part II of this thesis using
laboratory methods applied to duopoly markets, is the following.
Research question 1 What is the effect of technological spillovers on the ten-
dency to cooperate in R&D?
Laboratory methods have the advantage—compared to econometric
analyses based on ﬁeld data—that one is able to focus exclusively on the
relation between technological spillovers and R&D cooperation without
being forced to deal with inﬂuences of other economic variables. Simul-
taneity problems cannot arise because technological spillovers are de-
ﬁned to be fully independent. Moreover, the strategic features of R&D
as deﬁned in the underlying theoretical model can be accurately copied
in the laboratory and are hard to determine on the basis of ﬁeld data. It
turns out that the basic R&D game has features similar to the well-known
prisoner’s dilemma game, a game that has undergone many types of labo-
ratory tests.
The main ﬁnding of our laboratory experiments is that the tendency
to tacitly cooperate in R&D in a noncooperative R&D game is generally
higher when R&D has high technological spillovers than when R&D has
no spillovers.
Motivated by this ﬁnding, we analyse whether certain strategic fea-
tures of R&D, which are present in the majority of IO R&D models, have
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been at the basis of observed experimental behaviour (see part III). More-
over, we examine what role the sign of externalities and the type of strate-
gic interaction play.
When there are no technological spillovers, R&D of a ﬁrm generates
a negative externality in the sense that it reduces proﬁt of the other ﬁrm
in the market. A positive externality is generated by R&D with high tech-
nological spillovers as it increases proﬁts of the other ﬁrm in the market.
Indeed, by doing R&D, a ﬁrm reduces its production costs. When little
of the knowledge gained by doing R&D ﬂows to the other ﬁrm, the other
ﬁrm’s costs are not, or not enough, reduced to compensate its relative
proﬁt loss. When there are substantial knowledge ﬂows, the other ﬁrm
also gains a production cost reduction, thereby increasing its proﬁts.
Moreover, not only the effect of a ﬁrm’s R&D investment on proﬁts of
the other ﬁrm depends on the level of technological spillovers, but also
the effect of R&D on marginal proﬁts of the other ﬁrm. Indeed, when
there are no spillovers, an increase in R&D investment of a ﬁrm reduces
marginal proﬁtability of the other ﬁrm. The R&D game is one of strategic
substitutes under this condition. With strategic substitutes, a ﬁrm’s incen-
tive to invest in R&D decreases the more the other ﬁrm invests in R&D.
In other words, the best a ﬁrm can do in order to maximise its proﬁts is
move in the opposite direction of the other ﬁrm. With high enough spill-
overs, R&D exhibits strategic complementarities, implying that an increase
in a ﬁrm’s R&D investment increases marginal proﬁts of the other ﬁrm.
Under this condition, ﬁrms move in the same direction. A ﬁrm’s incen-
tive to invest in R&D now increases the more the other ﬁrm invests in
R&D.
An important question is whether the higher tendency to tacitly coop-
erate in R&D with high spillovers is due to the type of externality R&D
generates or to the type of strategic interaction, or to both. This is the
main motive for our second research question (see part III).
Research question 2 What is the effect of the type of externality and the type
of strategic interaction on the tendency to cooperate in social dilemmas?
The noncooperative R&D games without and with spillovers have a
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium that is Pareto-dominated and are
examples of social dilemma games with a continuous action space. As
pointed out by Kollock (1998), “in a social dilemma, individually reason-
able behaviour leads to a situation in which everyone is worse off than
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they might have been otherwise.” A prisoner’s dilemma is an example of
a social dilemma but only has two possible actions (defect or cooperate).
We examine the second research question in a laboratory experiment
based on general versions of social dilemmas without a speciﬁc frame.
Social dilemmas classiﬁed on the basis of the sign of externalities and the
type of strategic interaction, as suggested by Eaton (2004), have a variety
of applications outside of the R&D context2. Think for instance of Cour-
not quantity-setting and Bertrand price-setting games. A Cournot game
where demand is linear and goods are (imperfect) substitutes is a game of
strategic substitutes and negative externalities. Under Bertrand compe-
tition with imperfect substitutes, prices behave as strategic complements
and have positive externalities. With complementary goods and linear
demand, quantities behave as strategic complements and have positive
externalities, while prices as strategic substitutes with negative external-
ities. Other applications are, for instance, common pool resource games
and public good games with de- or increasing returns to scale or de- or
increasing marginal utility of the public good.
We ﬁnd that it is foremost the type of strategic interaction that inﬂu-
ences cooperation: cooperation seems to be easier with strategic comple-
ments than with strategic substitutes.
The third research question which is dealt with in this thesis is again
directly motivated by mainstream IO models of R&D cooperation.
Research question 3 Does R&D cooperation facilitate tacit product market
collusion?
An important factor that is mainly ignored in typical IO models of R&D
cooperation is the possible link between cooperation in R&D and tacit
collusion in the product market. It is mostly assumed—based on the as-
sumption of perfect functioning of anti-trust laws—that ﬁrms compete in
the product market, irrespective of how they behave in the R&D stage.
An intuitively appealing question is whether cooperation in R&D may
translate into tacit collusion in the product market. If this would be the
case, welfare-enhancing effects of R&D cooperation are not that straight-
forward any more because product market collusion harms consumers.
2Note that in the social psychology literature, prisoner’s dilemma games are viewed
as a special case of social dilemma games (see e.g. Kollock, 1998). Eaton (2004), however,
distinguishes a prisoner’s dilemma from a social dilemma and describes the latter as “a
prisoner’s dilemma in a continuous strategy space.”
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We examine the research question in the laboratory and ﬁnd support
for the intuitively appealing idea that R&D cooperation facilitates tacit
product market collusion (see part IV).
Toourknowledge, experimentaleconomistshavenotyetinvestigated
the above issues although laboratory methods have become a widely ac-
cepted research methodology in economics in general and the ﬁeld of
IO in speciﬁc. Especially as a test for (the validity of certain assumptions
of) simple theories, where strategic interactions are important, laboratory
methods are a useful and additional tool because (part of) the simplifying
conditions can be enforced in the lab.
LaboratoryR&Dexperimentsandotherexperimentsonstrategicdeci-
sion-making should be viewed as complementary to empirical research
based on ﬁeld data and can serve as an important basis for the formula-
tion of guidelines on how to further improve theoretical models.
1.2 Laboratory methods in economics
Although experimentation has gained growing acceptance as a research
methodology in the ﬁeld of economics, we ﬁrst address some method-
ologicalissuesthatareoftenraisedbyscepticsofexperimentaleconomics
and discuss how laboratory experimentation can contribute to economic,
including IO, research3.
An important critique against experimentation in economics is the
argument that interactions in the real world are much more complex than
interactions in controlled environments such as a laboratory. Therefore,
the real world cannot be replicated in a laboratory. This critique relates
to the issue of external validity, commonly known as the extent to which
research ﬁndings may be generalised to the ﬁeld.
Note that terms as the real world or real-life decision-making are rather
inappropriate to distinguish the natural economic environment from the
laboratory environment. Interactions and decision-making in the labora-
tory may be simple but not unreal. In well-designed experiments real
people make real decisions and earn real money (see e.g. Plott, 1982,
1991).
According to Plott (1982) the argument that naturally occurring inter-
actions are much more complex than laboratory interactions is not an ar-
3See appendix A for deﬁnitions of terms which are widely used in the experimental
economics literature.
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gument against experimentation in economics. Rather it is an argument
to increase the complexityofthe experimental environment suchthat lab-
oratory processes become more similar to naturally occurring processes.
Yet, we rather support the idea that economic experiments should not
be aimed to capture as many aspects as possible from the complex nat-
ural economic environment (see e.g. Plott, 1991; Loomes, 1999; Vissers
et al., 2001). To clarify this we ﬁrst provide an overview of basic pur-
poses listed in the literature of applying laboratory methods in economic
research (based on Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Davis and Holt, 1993;
Roth, 1995; Holt, 1995).
First, experiments may be aimed at evaluating a model’s behavioural as-
sumptions. In a laboratory setting it is possible to provide a minimal test
of the model (’s behavioural assumptions), as the model’s structural as-
sumptions can be enforced in the lab. Since it is usually unclear whether
the simplifying structural assumptions of a model are satisﬁed in the
ﬁeld, this type of test is difﬁcult to achieve with uncontrolled ﬁeld data.
In fact, in a laboratory setting theoretical models are given a best chance.
Itisimportanttonotethatwhenwerefertotestingamodel, weactually
mean testing the behavioural assumptions of a model. In this context we agree
with Rubinstein (2001) who argues that when experimental economics
is motivated by theory, “experiments serve as a test of the plausibility
of assumptions and not conclusions”. This idea is based on the logic
that the validity of a model’s conclusions and predictions hinges on its
underlying (behavioural and structural) assumptions.
A second type of experiments are stress tests for theory. Experiments
may be important in providing information on whether theoretical pre-
dictions still hold when a less realistic structural assumption of the model
is violated. Suppose e.g. that a model assumes that agents have complete
information. Experiments may then be used as a test of the model’s pre-
dictions when agents e.g. have incomplete information.
Third, experiments may also be aimed at searching for empirical reg-
ularities in areas not well covered by existing theory. Given that data
generated in laboratory markets have little measurement error, it may be
easier and more straightforward to ﬁnd regularities in relationships be-
tween observable variables than on naturally occurring markets.
Next, experiments may serve as a ‘wind-tunnel’ in order to test cer-
tain new institutions or decisions before implementing them in the ﬁeld.
Falkinger et al. (2000) e.g. provide a series of experimental tests that serve
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as a wind-tunnel for a mechanism developed to overcome the free-rider
problem in public good games. Experiments have also been designed
with the aim of providing advise to policymakers or other (economic)
agents on how to make ‘good’ decisions. And experiments may be aimed
at teaching economics in the classroom and may thus have a pedagogical
purpose.
The experiments reported in this work fall into one or more of the ﬁrst
three categories and therefore we only consider these in what follows.
According to Rubinstein (2001), “economic theory is an abstract in-
vestigation of the concepts and considerations involved in real life eco-
nomic decision making rather than a tool for predicting or describing real
behaviour” and experimental economics can be an important tool to test
economic theory. The argument of sceptics that processes occurring in
the ﬁeld are much more complex than laboratory processes then becomes
irrelevant with respect to experiments motivated by theory. Indeed, nat-
urally occurring processes are also much more complex than economic
models. But if accepted that the aim of economic theory is not to capture
all aspects of real-life economic decision-making, it should neither be the
aim of economic experimentation motivated by theory to do so. This ar-
gumentalsogoesforexperimentsthat arestress-testsofatheoreticmodel
with the difference that stress-testing brings a model closer to the ﬁeld by
abandoning some of its unrealistic structural assumptions.
With respect to experiments aimed at ﬁnding empirical regularities, a
similar argument may be used. Obviously, it is not useful for the labora-
tory environment to be identical to the environment surrounding natu-
rally occurring processes. In that case, laboratory processes are naturally
occurring processes. The aim of this third type of experiments is rather
to focus on certain speciﬁc relations uncovered by theory that are poten-
tially important in economic decision-making in the ﬁeld, without taking
all aspects of the ﬁeld into account. The ceteris paribus condition applies,
as it does for economic theory.
With these considerations we do not intend to reduce the importance
of the issue of external validity. Rather we want to show that accepting
theoreticalmodellingasavalideconomicresearchmethodologylogically
implies accepting experimentation as an economic research methodol-
ogy.
We now turn to some more speciﬁc problems related to the lack of
external validity that sceptics of experimental economics as applied to
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IO often refer to. Mostly, subject pools in economic experiments consist
of students: students can perform comprehensive tasks relatively easily,
a large pool of student subjects is available at universities, students are
convenient to recruit and do not cost much compared to business people.
One concern is whether student subjects and business people behave in
the same way in experiments, or better, with respect to experiments mo-
tivated by IO theory, whether student subjects follow the set of economic
principles that underlies theory.
Most experiments that have explicitly tested for differences in behav-
iour between students and professionals do not ﬁnd any differences, and
if a difference is found, professionals seem to be less rational, in the way
deﬁned by economic theory, than students (see e.g. Friedman and Sun-
der, 1994; Camerer and Fehr, 2004). In other words, using student sub-
jects is not less conservative than using professional subjects in the sense
that game-theoretic (behavioural) predictions are not more easily rejected
in the lab. Furthermore, Friedman and Sunder (1994) argue that it may
be more difﬁcult to establish salience with professionals in the sense that
they may implement institutional rules from their experience that are dif-
ferent from the desired rules used in e.g. the model that is tested in the
laboratory.
A related concern is whether students’ incentives are elicited enough
in experiments compared to incentives that exist in the ﬁeld, or in other
words, whether the absolute stake size makes a difference for behaviour4.
Smith and Walker (1993) provide an overview of related studies and con-
clude that with respect to oligopoly experiments, higher monetary stakes
do not change the central tendency of behaviour but reduce the variance
in behaviour. In some studies with other experimental settings, higher
monetary rewards tend to render people more rational. Forsythe et al.
(1994) report that doubling rewards does not affect behaviour in so-called
ultimatum and dictator games. The ﬁnding of Hoffman et al. (1996a) that
multiplying awards by ten does not affect ﬁrst movers’ behaviour in ulti-
matum games but renders second movers more rational based on an in-
4Note that this concern is related to but different from the question whether to pay
participants in experiments or not. In contrast with experiments in the psychology liter-
ature, experiments in economics are predominantly conducted with monetary rewards
depending on the subjects’ actions as to induce incentives in the lab to be as close as
possible to incentives in the ﬁeld. We refer to Smith and Walker (1993); Forsythe et al.
(1994); Cameron (1999) for examples of experiments yielding that it mattered for behav-
iour whether subjects were paid or not.
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formal analysis is conﬁrmed by Cameron (1999), based on a larger-scale
study with much larger stakes.
Some sceptics further concern about whether individuals reach the
same decisions as ﬁrms, which may be viewed as groups of decision-
makers. This issue has currently been studied in a series of pricing and
quantity experiments. Bornstein et al. (2002) and Bornstein and Gneezy
(2002) provide evidence in favour of groups being more rational than
individuals, while Raab and Schipper (2004) do not ﬁnd any difference
in behaviour5.
The latter three concerns apply mostly to ﬁndings based on single
treatments in experiments and are less important when conclusions are
based on between-treatment comparisons. Often, no a priori reasons exist for
interaction effects between one of the above mentioned factors, such as
the type of subject pool or the height of stakes, and between-treatment
effects.
Moreover, these concerns are not necessarily arguments against ex-
perimentation in economics but rather plead for running more exper-
iments with e.g. different subject pools, different stake sizes, different
compositions of decision-makers. In this respect, we agree with Starmer
(1999) who argues that “(...) while you cannot infer much with conﬁ-
dence from a single experiment, you can learn valuable things from a
programme of experimental research”. Indeed, we believe that it would
be hard to defend that single experiments score high on external validity.
Yet, external validity may and should be increased by running different
sets of experiments with different sets of parameters, with different sub-
ject pools and stake sizes, in different contexts, performed by different
researchers, etc..
1.3 Thesis outline
The ﬁrst part of the thesis consists of a literature review covering three
chapters. The main aim of this review is to give the reader an idea of
the large gap between the overwhelming theoretical IO literature on the
topic of R&D cooperation and spillovers and the scarce empirical and
experimental evidence motivated by this theory.
5For other experimental evidence on differences between group and individual
decision-making and an overview of the related literature we refer to Kocher and Sut-
ter (2005).
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In chapter 2 an extensive overview of IO models that deal with R&D
cooperation, after having situated these models in the more general the-
oretical R&D literature, is provided.
Chapter 3 surveys empirical nonexperimental analyses of R&D co-
operation and spillovers, which mainly consist of econometric analyses.
This section does not survey the more extensive empirical literature on
R&D cooperation and RJV formation in general, but rather focuses on
research related to the link with spillovers as motivated by theory.
In chapter 4 we give an overview of past laboratory research on R&D
and related games. We also summarise the main ﬁndings of the experi-
mental literature on quantity- and price-choice experiments, and on pub-
lic good and bad games, since interactions in R&D are much related to
interactions in those games.
In the second part of the thesis titled ‘spillovers and R&D coopera-
tion’ we deal with research question 1. This part contains two chapters,
both reporting on different experiments aimed at answering the research
question.
In chapter 5 the relation between spillovers and the tendency to co-
operate in R&D is studied in a cooperative context. This approach closely
follows theory on R&D cooperation by reproducing a cooperative R&D
game in the laboratory, where the joint proﬁt maximising R&D level can
be credibly committed to.
Chapter 6 reports on results that follow from two experiments where
the question whether spillovers inﬂuence the degree of R&D cooperation
is studied in a noncooperative context. Many previous oligopoly, public
good and prisoner’s dilemma experiments have yielded that cheap-talk
signaling or communication often enhances the degree of cooperation.
Therefore, it is examined whether tacit R&D cooperation is sustainable,
and whether it is inﬂuenced by the level of spillovers, when nonbinding
communication possibilities are available.
In part III titled ‘strategic interaction and cooperation’ we deal with
research question 2 and aim at providing rationales for the main ﬁnding
of chapter 6 that there is more R&D cooperation in the laboratory with
than without spillovers. Findings of a new experiment are discussed
in chapter 7 and theoretical and behavioural rationales are provided in
chapter 8.
More speciﬁcally, in chapter 7 a general experiment is designed and
executed where the type of strategic interaction and the type of external-
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ity are disentangled. The effects of the type of strategic interaction and
of the type of externality, and their interaction, on the degree of coopera-
tion in a general dominance-solvable game with a unique Pareto-inferior
Nash equilibrium are examined.
Chapter8providesjustiﬁcationsmotivatedbynonstandardgamethe-
ory for the ﬁndings of chapters 6 and 7. In this chapter, behavioural dif-
ferences between scenarios with strategic substitutes and scenarios with
strategic complements are also examined in detail.
Research question 3 is tackled in the fourth part of the thesis titled
‘R&D cooperation and price collusion’. Chapter 9 deals with the ques-
tion whether R&D cooperation facilitates tacit product market collusion
in a laboratory experiment without price signaling possibilities, and chap-
ter 10 examines whether price signaling possibilities have an additional
effect.




IO MODELS OF R&D COOPERATION
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter an overview is given of the mainstream theoretical IO lit-
erature on cooperative R&D behaviour of ﬁrms. In contrast to the trans-
action cost and strategic management literature, where scholars are tra-
ditionally more concerned about the internal organisation of ﬁrms1, the
(recent) IO literature concentrates on strategic interactions among ﬁrms,
mainly by applying a game-theoretic approach, and on the effects of
ﬁrms’ actions on variables as industrial structure, proﬁt and welfare. A
framework of multiple decision stages, with at least an R&D stage and
a pricing or production stage, has become a widespread procedure to
model R&D decisions of ﬁrms and especially to examine issues of R&D
cooperation.
Before turning to an overview of the cooperative R&D literature, we
situate this type of models in the general IO literature on R&D in section
2.2. In sections 2.3 and 2.4 overviews are given of basic models with cost-
reducing R&D and other types of R&D, respectively. Section 2.5 gives
an overview of important issues that are not (thoroughly) treated in the
basic models. As is very common in this literature, it is mostly assumed
that ﬁrms remain competitors in the ﬁnal goods market, irrespective of
whethertheycooperateinR&D,ormoregeneral, howtheybehavebefore
entering the ﬁnal goods market. Section 2.6 gives an overview of the few
1For overviews of the strategic management and transaction cost literature on R&D
cooperation we refer to Hagedoorn et al. (2000), Alm and McKelvey (2000) and Calaghi-
rou et al. (2003).
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papers that investigate the hypothesis—related to multimarket contact
hypotheses—that cooperation in the R&D market can enhance coopera-
tion in the ﬁnal goods market2. Section 2.7 concludes the chapter.
2.2 IO models of R&D: a general overview
Initially, IO models of R&D were mainly set up to investigate Schum-
peterian hypotheses that R&D and innovative activities are very much
related to market structure and that innovative ﬁrms have some form of
market power. As such, in the elder literature much attention has been
paid to the relation between innovation(s) and (the evolution of) mar-
ket structure. We distinguish two basic modeling approaches that have
served for this and other analyses, i.e. tournament and nontournament
modeling.
A basic feature of tournament models is that the ﬁrst ﬁrm that suc-
ceeds in innovating ends up to be the innovator which mostly comes
down to winning a (patent) race. As such, in most of these models the
timing of an innovation plays a central role in the sense that it is impor-
tant to be the ﬁrst to innovate (or to get a patent). Tournament models
have been mainly but not solely used to investigate the above mentioned
issues of market structure and market power. Gradually, as the literature
began to focus more on R&D cooperation, especially after the publica-
tion of the paper of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), nontournament
models were more and more turned to.
Indeed, R&D cooperation is mostly dealt with in the context of a non-
tournament model where ﬁrms are not engaged in a race but can all suc-
ceed at the same time in ‘producing innovations’. A tournament setting
may be associated with the existence of only one R&D path for ﬁrms to
ﬁnally end up with an innovation, while in a nontournament setting sev-
eral R&D paths, either closely related or not, may drive a ﬁrm towards
innovating.
In what follows we give an overview of noncooperative R&D models
and distinguish between tournament and nontournament settings, with-
out claiming that this is the only way of structuring this extended strand
of literature3.
2We refer to Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Matsushima (2001) for theoretical
analyses of the link between multimarket contact and collusion in the ﬁnal goods market.
3Another option would be to add a category with ‘grey zone’ models that contain




needed to produce a practically relevant innovation is assumed, and sto-
chasticraces, wheretherelationshipisstochastic4. Inadeterministicrace,
the ﬁrm with the largest R&D investment today wins the race.
The very ﬁrst contributions that contain equilibrium models based
on single-stage stochastic patent races are Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde
(1980) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980b)5. Typically, the probability of
winning the race depends on the R&D investment of a ﬁrm at a certain
point in time. The model of Loury (1979) has ﬁxed R&D costs while Lee
and Wilde (1980) assume that part of R&D costs is variable and disap-
pears as soon as a successful innovation is implemented. This difference
in assumptions on costs of R&D investment yields opposing conclusions
regarding the effect of rivalry in the product market on proﬁt-maximising
R&D expenditures. If R&D investment mainly consists of ﬁxed (variable)
costs, rivalry in the product market would reduce (enhance) R&D. Das-
gupta and Stiglitz (1980b) also provide an analysis based on a determin-
istic race.
The stochastic as well as the deterministic models predict that ﬁrms
overinvest in R&D compared to what is socially optimal, given a ﬁxed
marketstructure. Welfare analysessuggestthat perfectcompetitionisnot
the socially optimal market structure but rather some form of imperfect
competition.
A tournament setting is not necessarily based on issues of timing of
innovation but can naturally result from other model characteristics. E.g.
in Futia (1980) and Rogerson (1982), the innovator is randomly chosen
with the probability of becoming the innovator depending on the amount
of R&D undertaken. Overinvestment in R&D is also predicted by these
models. Furthermore, Sah and Stiglitz (1987) posit a stochastic relation-
ship between R&D effort and ﬁnal innovations (instead of becoming the in-
novator). Firms are allowed to engage in more than one R&D project and
characteristics of both tournament and nontournament settings.
4For an extended overview of the literature on timing of innovation we refer to Rein-
ganum (1989). She uses the terms deterministic auction models and stochastic racing models.
5These contributions should be seen as extensions of models examining the effect
of exogenous market structure on innovation. For overviews we refer to Kamien and
Schwartz (1975) and Loury (1979).
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the market is characterised by Bertrand competition. The model is of a
tournament kind since a ﬁrm only gets a rent if she is the only success-
ful innovator, as all proﬁts are ‘Bertrand-competed’ away when several
ﬁrms turn out to be successful. The model predicts that many asymmet-
ric Nash equilibria exist and that ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures are unaffected
by market structure. Another result that contrasts with ﬁndings of mod-
els with timing is that market expenditures on R&D are less than socially
optimal.
The racing models with timing have been extended or adjusted on
several grounds. First, there is the issue of appropriability. In the orig-
inal contributions it was assumed that patent protection was complete
while ‘newer’ models allow for imperfect patent protection. In Stewart
(1983) a unique value of a winner’s share in total industry proﬁt exists
that maximises proﬁts and that leads to a choice of R&D strategies by
the other ﬁrms similar to strategies that cooperating ﬁrms would choose.
Increased competition would lead to a fall in the ﬁrm’s R&D investment
as long as spillovers are too high, and the winning ﬁrm thus receives a
lower proﬁt from its innovation than the proﬁt she would receive un-
der the optimising share parameter. Mortensen (1982) comes to a similar
conclusion in a tournament framework without timing. The main con-
clusion of Reinganum (1982), who assumes that the ﬁrms that are not
the ﬁrst to innovate still receive a positive payoff, is that when patent
protection is ineffective, ﬁrms do not have incentives to invest in R&D.
Clearly, when taking into account issues of appropriability, overinvest-
ment in R&D does not occur.
Instead of assuming symmetry among all ﬁrms in an industry, some
models have started from a market with one incumbent ﬁrm and several
potential entrants. The main interest now goes to ﬁrms’ incentives to en-
gage in innovative activities rather than to how market structure and in-
novative activities are related. Reinganum (1983) and Reinganum (1985)
provide models with one ﬁrm and one possible innovation and several
ﬁrms and a sequence of innovations, respectively. The latter model is a
multi-stage model where all proﬁts accrue to an innovator only as long
as nothing new is invented. As elaborated on by Reinganum (1989), this
‘incumbent-versus-challenger(s)’ set-up yields differences in R&D incen-
tives between both types of ﬁrms. The main ﬁnding is that in a Nash
equilibrium, the incumbent monopolist invests less in R&D than the out-
side challengers as he anticipates future (drastic) innovations of the chal-
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lenger(s) that reduce the present value of his proﬁts. This is in contrast
to ﬁndings from deterministic race models, such as e.g. Gilbert and New-
berry (1982), where the incumbent turns out to be the largest spender of
R&D and thus persists as a monopolist6.
Another application of asymmetries among ﬁrms is to let the prob-
ability of winning the patent race depend on accumulated knowledge
by interpreting an R&D project as a multi-stage game where the win-
ner is the ﬁrst ﬁrm that completes all stages. Examples of models where
ﬁrmsproceedtofurtherstagesinadeterministicwayareFudenbergetal.
(1983)7 and Harris and Vickers (1985). In Grossman and Shapiro (1987)
the time before entering a following stage is stochastic while in Harris
and Vickers (1987) there is a stochastic relationship between the amount
of R&D and winning a stage. A general result is that a typical response
for a ﬁrm having success in the ﬁrst stage(s) is an increase in R&D effort
of the leading ﬁrm and a decrease for the lagging ﬁrm. If ﬁrms’ accu-
mulated knowledge is sufﬁciently close, i.e. if the ﬁrms remain tied, they
will choose to invest in R&D at a high rate. Results of the deterministic
models are even stronger since if one ﬁrm is only slightly ahead, the other
simply drops out of the race.
ArecentfurtherimprovementbyDoraszelski(2003)tocaptureknowl-
edge accumulation in a dynamic R&D race yielded other conclusions. In
his model, the distribution of success times depends on current R&D ex-
penditures and the accumulated (depreciated) knowledge stock. Simu-
lations yield that pure knowledge gathering dominates strategic consid-
erations as R&D incentives decline with an increase in the knowledge
stock. Consequently, the ﬁrm that lags behind, and thus has a relatively
low knowledge stock, may invest more in R&D than the leader who has
a large knowledge stock. As such, lagging ﬁrms not necessarily drop out
of the race but may be engaged in catching-up.
Summarising, most symmetric tournament models predict overin-
vestment in R&D compared to what is socially optimal when appropri-
ability is perfect. Without perfect appropriability, ﬁrms have less or no in-
centives to invest in R&D. In an asymmetric setting where an incumbent
6According to Reinganum (1989) both type of models are not mutually exclusive. Sto-
chastic races would be better suited to model uncertain basic research, while determinis-
tic races more apply to development and new product introduction.
7In Grishagin et al. (2001), a patent race similar to Fudenberg et al. (1983), is consid-
ered where ﬁrms do not know their relative position during the race.
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or leading ﬁrm faces a challenger or lagging ﬁrm, either the incumbent
or challenger invest more in R&D depending on the type of race.
2.2.2 Nontournament models
As already mentioned, most theoretical contributions on R&D coopera-
tion are of a nontournament kind where several ﬁrms can have success-
ful R&D projects at the same time. On the other hand, nontournament
R&D models also concentrate mostly on comparing modes where ﬁrms
cooperate in R&D with more competitive modes. The emergence of (pre-
dominantly nontournament) models on R&D cooperation is closely con-
nected to the general recognition of knowledge spillovers. Due to public
good characteristics of R&D, ﬁrms cannot always reap all beneﬁts of their
R&D. R&D cooperation would then be a natural candidate to solve this
problem by internalising the spillovers.
In the beginning of the eighties much attention in the IO literature
went to the relation between innovation and market structure. On the
basis of Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980a), where symmetric ﬁrms choose
R&D and output simultaneously, similar conclusions as in 2.2.1 regard-
ingsomeformofimperfectcompetitionbeingthesociallyoptimalmarket
structure are made. Brander and Spencer (1983) argued that in a simulta-
neous single-stage game with cost-reducing R&D an implicit assumption
is that the exclusive aim of R&D investment is to reduce marginal pro-
duction cost. They raised the issue that ﬁrms most likely have also more
strategic considerations, such as gaining market share, and take into ac-
count decisions that are to be made in the product market when they
invest in R&D. If this is the case, R&D should be modelled in a two-
stage game. In a ﬁrst stage, the R&D decision is simultaneously made
by all ﬁrms, and in a second stage, output or price levels are chosen. If
it is assumed that ﬁrms are rational, the solution concept of the game is
subgame perfect Nash (SPN) equilibrium and the appropriate solution
method is backward induction. This approach is mostly used in nontour-
nament models of R&D.
Within this strategic setting one can also distinguish between deter-
ministic and stochastic models. In deterministic models R&D investment
automatically yields an innovation while in stochastic models (see e.g.
Reynolds and Isaac, 1992; Choi, 1993; Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998) a sto-
202.2 IO models of R&D: a general overview
chastic relation is assumed between R&D effort and outcome8. Decisions
in the R&D stage affect either unit production cost (see e.g. Katz, 1986;
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992) or product qual-
ity (Motta, 1992) and are usually characterised by knowledge spillovers
that result in costless advantages for the competitor.
TheanalysisofSpence(1984)isoneoftheﬁrsttoformallytakeintoac-
count the issues of knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies in a strategic
R&D model with n ﬁrms. In his paper unit production cost is a declin-
ing function of the knowledge stock of a ﬁrm, which grows with current
R&D expenditures and spilt over R&D expenditures of other ﬁrms. He
does not explicitly model the product market but assumes that at any
point in time an equilibrium in quantities exists. It is found that R&D
incentives decrease as appropriability is lower (or spillovers higher) and
as concentration declines (given low appropriability). Therefore, accord-
ing to the author, government should subsidise R&D, especially when
spillovers are high. Moreover, welfare is highest in markets with high
spillovers and appropriate subsidies. Further, it is also suggested that
cooperative R&D may be suitable to raise welfare.
A nonstrategic model where the effects of spillovers are included is
Levin and Reiss (1988). Firms simultaneously decide on cost-reducing
process and quality-enhancing product R&D and on production quan-
tity. The main conclusion is that when taking into account spillovers
from process R&D to product R&D or vice versa, higher spillovers not
necessarily reduce R&D incentives.
Most strategic R&D models speciﬁcally deal with R&D cooperation
and these models are discussed in the following sections. Noncoopera-
tive models in a nontournament setting usually focus on asymmetric
situations where one ﬁrm has an advantage over the other. In Poyago-
Theotoky (1996) e.g., ﬁrms in duopoly that have different initial unit pro-
duction costs, simultaneously make R&D decisions in a ﬁrst stage and
quantity decisions in a second stage. She ﬁnds that depending on the
choice of cost function the low- or high-cost ﬁrm spends more on R&D.
8In this context we refer to the earlier mentioned ‘grey zone’. Stochastic nontour-
nament models have some characteristics of tournament models, since they allow for
the possibility of only one ﬁrm ending up with an innovation. Sah and Stiglitz (1987),
though, is an example of a model with a stochastic relation between R&D and innova-
tionthatcanbeconsideredasatournamentmodelbecauseofthewaytheproductmarket
is modelled (see 2.2.1).
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When an additive cost function is used the low-cost ﬁrm spends more
due to an incentive effect. With a multiplicative cost function the high-
cost ﬁrm spends more because of the presence of an effectiveness effect.
Some authors have also looked at another form of asymmetry, namely
asequentialequilibriumwhereﬁrmsstartwithleader/followerrolesthat
result e.g. from a pre-development race. In De Bondt et al. (1992) sym-
metric ﬁrms that sell differentiated goods play a sequential game while
in De Bondt and Henriques (1995) and Amir et al. (2000) ﬁrms start with
different initial unit production costs and/or spillovers. De Bondt and
Henriques (1995) ﬁnd that the ﬁrm that is good (bad) at absorbing in-
formation9 ends up to be the leader (follower) of the R&D game. This
leading ﬁrm is not necessarily the one that started with lower production
costs or higher R&D efﬁciency. A similar result is found in Amir et al.
(2000). Moreover, under some conditions, the endogenously emerging
sequential solution yields higher proﬁts for both ﬁrms and higher wel-
fare than the simultaneous solution.
2.3 Basic models of R&D cooperation with
cost-reducing R&D
In what is by far the largest part of the literature on cooperative R&D
games, R&D is deﬁned as cost-reducing. This is often interpreted as R&D
being process R&D. In most of these models, knowledge spillovers enter
the model and effective R&D of a ﬁrm is deﬁned as the sum of its own
R&D and R&D spilt over from other ﬁrms in the industry, where the spilt
over part is never larger than the R&D carried out by the ﬁrm itself10.
As mentioned before, most models are two-stage models where per-
fectly informed ﬁrms simultaneously decide how much to invest in R&D
in a ﬁrst stage and on prices or production quantities in a second stage.
In a ﬁrst stage ﬁrms either play a noncooperative or a cooperative R&D
game. In the cooperative game it is standard to assume that the ﬁrms can
credibly commit to the cooperative R&D level that is the level of R&D
that maximises total industry proﬁt11. The equilibrium concept of the
9A higher absorptive capacity implies that incoming spillovers are higher than outgo-
ing spillovers.
10As noted by De Bondt (1996), the earliest formal oligopoly model with spillovers can
be found in a paper of Ruff (1969).
11In Battaggion and Garella (2001) different scenarios of R&D cooperation are exam-
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noncooperative game is SPN equilibrium.
In general, the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i in an industry with n ﬁrms
engaged in Cournot competition is then deﬁned as follows
πi = piqi − ci(Xi)qi − gi(xi),
where pi is the inverse demand function of ﬁrm i, ci(Xi) the unit cost
function with Xi = xi + β∑
n
j =i xj representing effective R&D of ﬁrm i
and gi(xi) the R&D cost function with xi representing R&D investment
ofﬁrmi. β isthespilloverparameter. Thedecisionvariableintheproduct
market is qi representing production quantity of ﬁrm i12.
The model is solved by backward induction. In the second stage πi
is maximised with respect to qi for all i, which yields a ﬁrst-stage proﬁt
function in terms of the R&D investment of ﬁrm i and the other ﬁrms in
the industry. In a scenario without R&D cooperation, the ﬁrst-stage proﬁt
function of ﬁrm i is maximised with respect to xi, yielding a symmetric
equilibrium prediction for xi. In a scenario with R&D cooperation, on the
other hand, total industry proﬁt is maximised with respect to xi, yield-
ing a cooperative outcome for xi that is usually assumed to be symmetric
across the industry. Most of the literature focuses on comparisons be-
tween R&D predictions, welfare, industry proﬁt, etc. in noncooperative
and cooperative R&D scenarios.
A model that has received much attention in the game-theoretic R&D
literature and has stimulated further research on the topic is in the pa-
pers of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990)13. In the model the in-
dustry is a duopoly with Cournot-competing ﬁrms, homogenous goods
and a linear demand function. Decision variables in the ﬁrst stage are
unit production cost reductions and spillovers are thus output spillovers.
A quadratic R&D cost function is introduced as to guarantee diminish-
ing returns to own R&D, although this does not guarantee that returns to
effective R&D are also diminishing, as shown by Amir (2000). As such,




. Findings are that R&D coopera-
tion only enhances R&D investment and welfare when spillovers are
ined in a model with unveriﬁable R&D efforts.
12In the case of Bertrand price competition in the second stage, prices are decision
variables in the product market and the demand function is qi.
13Henceforth AJ.
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large enough and that ﬁrms always underinvest in R&D compared to
the welfare-maximising solution.
A two-stage model where the ﬁrst-stage decision variable is R&D in-
vestment and spillovers are input spillovers is developed by Kamien et al.
(1992)14. The industry consists of n ≥ 2 ﬁrms that produce differenti-
ated products and are either engaged in Cournot or Bertrand competi-
tion in the second stage. Demand is linear and unit cost consists of a
constant part minus ‘R&D production’, where the R&D production func-
tionisconcave ineffectiveR&D.Intheirmodel, ci(Xi) = c− fi(Xi) where
fi(Xi) is twice differentiable and concave in Xi, fi(0) = 0, fi(Xi) ≤ c and
f ′
i(Xi) > 0, and gi(xi) = xi. Four possible organisation types, i.e. R&D
competition, R&D cartelisation, RJV (research joint venture) competition
and RJV cartelisation are compared. The ﬁrst mode, R&D competition,
implies that each ﬁrm individually decides how much to invest in R&D
so as to maximise individual proﬁt, while R&D cartelisation implies that
ﬁrms coordinate their R&D activities in order to maximise the sum of
their proﬁts. In the case of RJV competition ﬁrms also operate individu-
ally and spillovers are complete, while the forming of RJV cartels implies
coordination of ﬁrms’ R&D decisions and complete spillovers. In other
words, if ﬁrms form an RJV, they fully share information about their R&D
activities. Findings are that RJV cartelisation is the most desirable type of
organisation, as prices are lowest and technological improvement high-
est. On the other hand, RJV competition yields highest product prices.
This means that only if ﬁrms form a cartel, they should be encouraged to
fully share information and form an RJV.
In the same tradition Suzumura (1992) sets up a model with gen-
eral demand and cost functions with ﬁrms producing a homogenous
good and competing in quantities in the second stage. It is found that
in the presence of large spillovers, there is always underinvestment in
R&D compared to the socially optimal level15. Cooperative R&D invest-
ment is closer to welfare-optimising R&D than noncooperative invest-
ment though. In the absence of spillovers the level of R&D in the non-
14Henceforth KMZ.
15Simpson and Vonortas (1994) argue that suboptimal investment in cost-reducing
R&D under R&D competition is not only more likely the larger the degree of spillovers,
but also the greater the convexity of the demand curve. They further ﬁnd that when
demand is concave, R&D cooperation with a single research lab always improves social
welfare, while when demand is convex it only does when there are sufﬁcient spillovers.
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cooperative equilibrium may overshoot the socially optimal level, when
the number of ﬁrms in the industry is relatively large and demand is con-
cave.
A general ﬁnding of the above models is that when spillovers are be-
low a certain threshold, R&D investment and social welfare are higher
when ﬁrms choose their R&D noncooperatively, compared to when they
choose their R&D so as to maximise total industry proﬁt (see also Hin-
loopen, 2000b). For spillover levels that are above the threshold the op-
posite is true. In that case R&D investment and welfare are higher under
R&D cooperation than under R&D competition. These conclusions are
based on the assumption that ﬁrms compete in prices or quantities in
the second stage. Collusion in both stages of the game yields lower wel-
fare than R&D cooperation combined with price or quantity competition.
These results are often interpreted as a rationale for government to allow
and even stimulate the formation of RJVs in industries characterised by
large knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, they advocate leniency in anti-
trust policies towards R&D cooperation provided that the cooperation
does not extend to the product market.
As established by Amir (2000), the AJ and KMZ models differ with
respect to some key conclusions and policy descriptions. The AJ model
seems to be of limited validity for large spillover levels, as for these val-
ues industry R&D investment has increasing returns to scale, while in-
dividual R&D has decreasing returns. Equilibrium predictions of both
models can be made equivalent by using a steeper cost function in the AJ
model.
A further generalisation is found in Ziss (1994). His analysis is based
on general demand and cost functions that satisfy conditions for a sym-
metric and unique equilibrium to exist in the product market. Ziss (1994)
also allows for product differentiation and price as well as output compe-
tition in the product market. A thorough analysis of the strategic effects
of R&D investment, referring to how second-stage actions are affected
by R&D, is also provided in his paper. He ﬁnds that—due to a nega-
tive strategic effect—the existence of large spillovers in an industry does
not guarantee that RJVs improve welfare compared to a situation where
ﬁrms choose R&D noncooperatively.
Summarising, only if technological spillovers are high enough, R&D
cooperation may be preferred on welfare grounds in a symmetric indus-
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try while otherwise R&D competition is preferable.
2.4 Other models of R&D cooperation
The bulk of the literature on R&D cooperation is based on models with
cost-reducing R&Dactivities orprocessR&D and only few have analysed
R&D cooperation in the context of other models. We further discuss
models where the R&D stage is a patent race and models where R&D
improves product quality or enhances product differentiation.
2.4.1 Patent race
Reinganum (1981) examines knowledge spillovers and R&D cooperation
in a stochastic patent race framework. In her model, although perfect
patent protection is assumed, imperfect appropriability is incorporated
by allowing for knowledge spillovers between rivals in a similar way
as in (later) nontournament models. R&D cooperation also refers to joint
proﬁt maximisation. Conclusions on whether cooperation is socially ben-
eﬁcial are very similar to conclusions of nontournament models. Without
knowledge spillovers, innovation of competing rivals occurs on average
sooner than innovation of cooperative ﬁrms while with complete knowl-
edge spillovers, cooperating ﬁrms are the ﬁrst to innovate. Consequently,
the degree of spillovers is a critical value in determining under which
R&Dmodeinnovationoccursmostrapidly. Similarconclusionsaremade
by Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002) where the critical threshold relates to the
speed of spillovers. More speciﬁcally, with slow (fast) spillovers, R&D
cooperation lowers (increases) R&D investment.
Silipo (2001) introduces R&D cooperation in the model of Fudenberg
et al. (1983). He deﬁnes R&D cooperation as a situation where ﬁrms share
costs and beneﬁts (in this case a prize) of their research activities. It turns
out that ﬁrms undertake an RJV if they have the same amount of accu-
mulated knowledge in the beginning of the race. If the gap between a
leader and a follower is too large, no RJVs are formed. Furthermore, co-
operative agreements are broken up at the end of the race if competition
is expected in the subsequent market, while they are not if a possibility
to collude exists. As such, at the end of a race incentives to reduce costs
are replaced by incentives to become a monopolist. As in the situation
without spillovers in Reinganum (1981), cooperation tends to reduce the
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speed of innovation.
2.4.2 Product R&D
Motta (1992) was the ﬁrst to present an analysis of R&D cooperation
where R&D is aimed at improving the quality of a product. For this pur-
pose, it is assumed that consumers incorporate product quality in their
utility function, which yields non-linear (inverse) demand curves. Only
verticalproductdifferentiationistakenintoaccount. BydoingR&D,ﬁrms
are able to increase the quality of their product above a minimum level.
The model has three stages, in a ﬁrst stage ﬁrms decide whether or not
to enter the market, in a second stage they invest in R&D and in a third
stage they choose outputs. Findings are very similar to the ones obtained
in the basic models of R&D cost reduction. R&D cooperation—where it is
assumed that spillovers between cooperating ﬁrms are higher compared
to when no cooperation occurs—enhances welfare, compared to non-
cooperative behaviour for spillover levels that exceed a certain threshold.
An additional result is that when spillovers are not too high, more ﬁrms
enter the market under R&D cooperation than under R&D competition.
Poyago-Theotoky (1997) models product R&D in a different way and
also takes horizontal product differentiation into account, which yields
other demand functions than in Motta (1992). It is further assumed that
the market consists of two ﬁrms that are specialised in improving one out
of two characteristics of the product and two ﬁrms that are specialised in
the other characteristic. By doing R&D individually, ﬁrms can improve
their product only in their characteristic16. By forming an RJV, ﬁrms can
improve their product in both characteristics and develop as such a super-
product which is sold at a common price. Innovation is an uncertain event
and becomes more probable as investment in R&D increases. The main
conclusion is that cooperation in R&D (that extends to the product mar-
ket in a natural way) is welfare enhancing when the quality improvement
of the resulting new product is high or when R&D is relatively inefﬁcient
and has high decreasing returns.
Examples of oligopoly models where R&D enhances product differ-
entiation are Lambertini and Rossini (1998) and Cellini and Lambertini
(2002). If all ﬁrms decide not to invest in R&D, products remain ho-
16Note that this model has some characteristics of a tournament model, because only
one patent is granted per characteristic of the product.
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mogenous and the more ﬁrms invest, the more differentiated products
become. In the former model, it is shown that ﬁrms may end up pro-
ducing homogenous goods and that R&D incentives are higher under
Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. The main ﬁnd-
ing based on the latter, dynamic, model is that in the steady-state equilib-
rium, R&D investment and thus also product differentiation are higher
under R&D cooperation than under competition.
2.5 Important issues related to models of R&D
cooperation
2.5.1 Information sharing
As argued in AJ and KMZ, it is unlikely that the formation of cooperative
R&D agreements is only restricted to joint proﬁt maximisation and not
related to the sharing of information. Obviously, we would expect that if
ﬁrms make agreements on their R&D investment, more information will
be shared than without an agreement. This section gives an overview of
papers that deal with information sharing and endogenous spillovers.
We ﬁnd two distinct ways of dealing with the issue of R&D cooper-
ation with information sharing in the literature. The ﬁrst is to keep the
spillover exogenous and assumes that, as ﬁrms cooperate in R&D, the
level of spillovers increases, compared to a situation without R&D co-
operation (Kamien et al., 1992; Choi, 1993; Brod and Shivakumar, 1997;
Miyagiwa and Ohno, 2002; Hinloopen, 2003). The second approach is to
endogenise the spillover parameter and thus to treat the level of spillover
or information sharing as a decision variable.
Brod and Shivakumar (1997) allow for n ≥ 2 ﬁrms and product dif-
ferentiation in the AJ model. They assume that the spillover parameter
becomes 1 under R&D cooperation. R&D cooperation in their model thus
combines joint proﬁt maximisation with respect to R&D and full informa-
tion sharing. They ﬁnd that cooperative R&D always yields more proﬁt
and is always preferred on welfare grounds. Miyagiwa and Ohno (2002),
who make a similar assumption in a patent race framework, ﬁnd that
information sharing does not always yield more proﬁt (e.g. if there are
many ﬁrms in the market), but is preferred on welfare grounds. Hin-
loopen (2003) ﬁnds that in a two-stage duopoly with homogenous goods
based on KMZ, even if the pre-cooperative spillover level is small, R&D
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cooperation could be preferred on welfare-grounds, i.e. when coopera-
tion yields high enough post-cooperative spillovers.
We now turn to some examples of models where the spillover level
is endogenous. Kultti and Takalo (1998), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998),
Poyago-Theotoky (1999) and Lambertini et al. (2004) simply introduce
an additional stage in the basic duopoly model with Cournot competi-
tion between the R&D and the production stage. In Kultti and Takalo
(1998), in the ﬁrst, R&D, stage there are no spillovers and in the second
stage ﬁrms have to decide on whether they would or would not exchange
their R&D results. The ﬁnding is that ﬁrms have incentives to share in-
formation. Poyago-Theotoky (1999) and Lambertini et al. (2004) let ﬁrms
decide on the height of the spillover after having made an R&D decision.
The outcome is that under R&D competition no information will be dis-
closed while under R&D cooperation information is fully shared. Similar
results are found in Amir et al. (2003) on the basis of a two-stage model—
with possible exogenous spillovers—where cooperative ﬁrms make R&D
and within-RJV information sharing decisions simultaneously in the ﬁrst
stage17.
In a stochastic framework Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) ﬁnd that ﬁrms
in the same industry will not disclose more information than the mini-
mum level of already existing exogenous spillovers, while under R&D
cooperation at least one ﬁrm will fully share information, provided that
R&D of both ﬁrms is successful18. Information-sharing under R&D co-
operation is not always maximal nor symmetric, due to anti-competitive
reasons.
An additional stage that precedes the R&D decision stage has been
added to a basic two-stage model by Kamien and Zang (2000). Firms
choose the extent of spillovers their R&D activities generate (outgoing
spillovers) before deciding on R&D, and at the same time allow for in-
voluntary(exogenous)spillovers. Theyalsoassumethatﬁrmsneedsome
absorptive capacity, by doing R&D themselves, to be able to take advan-
tage of knowledge ﬂows from competitors (see also 2.5.6). Like in many
other related studies, they ﬁnd that if ﬁrms cooperate in R&D, these will
choose to fully share their knowledge. If R&D budgets are set noncoop-
17They also discard the assumption of ex post asymmetry of R&D decisions of ﬁrms in
an R&D cartel, but the consequences of this are discussed in the section 2.5.2.
18In complementary industries information-sharing with and without cooperation is
identical and may be maximal even without R&D cooperation.
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eratively, ﬁrms choose to keep at least part of their knowledge private.
Only when no exogenous spillovers exist, would they disclose all their
knowledge. What the consequences are for welfare is however not clear.
2.5.2 Asymmetry
There are two forms of asymmetries; ex ante asymmetries and ex post
asymmetries. Ex ante asymmetries are related to initial assumptions on
models’ parameters, while ex post asymmetries refer to outcomes of a
model which is not necessarily ex ante asymmetric. Within the literature
on ex ante asymmetries we make a further distinction between models
where the asymmetries are related to production or R&D cost parame-
ters and models that build on the assumption of asymmetric spillovers.
R¨ oller et al. (1998) introduce the possibility of asymmetric initial unit
costs in a duopoly model with allowance for complementary and substi-
tutable products, where it is assumed that without (with) R&D cooper-
ation there are no (complete) spillovers. They ﬁnd that the higher cost
ﬁrm always has an incentive to participate in an RJV, while the low cost
ﬁrm only has an incentive when products are enough differentiated and
when the cost asymmetry is not too large19. In Lukach and Plasmans
(2000) asymmetry with respect to unit cost and R&D cost functions is in-
troduced in the AJ model. It is assumed that the larger ﬁrm has a smaller
unit production cost and a lower marginal R&D cost. An important result
of their model is that in a welfare-maximising scenario, levels of R&D are
asymmetric and that only the larger ﬁrm produces output, while both
ﬁrms remain active in R&D. In general, conclusions on industry R&D,
output and total welfare are similar to the original AJ ﬁndings.
Petit and Tolwinski (1999) consider asymmetries in initial unit costs
andratesatwhichunitcostsdeclinewithaccumulatedR&Dinadynamic
duopoly framework with general nonlinear demand and cost functions.
When the assumption of ex ante symmetry is kept, conclusions regarding
R&D and welfare of the dynamic model are similar to the ones reached in
earlier models such as the AJ model. When asymmetries are introduced,
the ﬁrm that starts with the high unit cost or has a lower innovation rate
gets driven out of the market, unless there are knowledge spillovers that
make the ﬁrm reduce its cost for free. Furthermore, incentives to form
19The authors do an empirical test of the model’s predictions in the same paper. We
refer to the second chapter for details on this.
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RJVs can be very low in asymmetric markets while for consumer surplus
the existence of technology sharing and the formation of RJVs is advan-
tageous.
In Amir and Wooders (1999, 2000) the effects of one-way spillovers on
equilibrium predictions for symmetric ﬁrms are examined. The set-up of
these models is the same as the basic set-up except in the way R&D spill-
overs are modeled. R&D spillovers are stochastic and only ﬂow from
the more R&D active to the other ﬁrm. The model only yields asym-
metric R&D equilibrium levels whereby the innovator—i.e. the ﬁrm that
does the most R&D—sometimes conducts more R&D than an RJV car-
tel would. Under these conditions proﬁt under R&D competition is also
higher than in the RJV cartel. Spillovers in Lambertini et al. (2004) are
not assumed to be one-way but simply asymmetric. Another source of
asymmetry in both papers is related to a ﬁrm being a leader. In Lam-
bertini et al. (2004) it is assumed that one ﬁrm takes a Stackelberg leader
position in the ﬁnal goods market. In the case of exogenous spillovers,
if the outgoing spillover of the leader is sufﬁciently low, the leader in-
vests more in R&D than the follower. With endogenous spillovers, the
leader invests less and the follower more than under the Nash equilib-
rium. Welfare implications are not discussed in their paper but they do
ﬁnd larger industry R&D effort under the Nash equilibrium than under
the Stackelberg equilibrium when spillovers are endogenous.
Finally, we look at ex post asymmetry. First, the issue of ex post asym-
metry arises in the context of stability of R&D equilibrium predictions.
As argued in Henriques (1990) and Amir and Wooders (1998), the sym-
metric equilibrium under individual proﬁt maximisation with respect
to R&D, assuming competition in the product market, is unstable for
small spillover values and speciﬁc choices of the model’s parameters.
In this situation, the stable equilibrium predictions can be corner solu-
tions where only one of the two ﬁrms invests in R&D. Under certain
conditions—i.e. initial unit costs being high compared to demand—total
industry proﬁt that corresponds to these asymmetric noncooperative so-
lutions is larger than under R&D cooperation with full information shar-
ing (Amir and Wooders, 1998).
Assuming that equilibrium predictions are stable, it has been shown
in, amongst others, Amir et al. (2003) that the R&D equilibrium decisions
in the ﬁrst stage of a noncooperative R&D game with product market
competition in the second stage are unique and symmetric. So, not only
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are ﬁrms ex ante symmetric (by assumption) but the resulting ex post out-
come is also symmetry. In the cooperative game this ex post symmetry
is not guaranteed as argued in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) and more
formally proved in Salant and Shaffer (1998)20. Katsoulacos and Ulph
(1998) ﬁnd, in a model that includes uncertainty about R&D results, that
an RJV may close a lab for anti-competitive reasons, i.e. to avoid compet-
itive pressures that arise when both ﬁrms innovate.
Salant and Shaffer (1998) use the AJ model to prove that members of
anRJVcangainhigherproﬁtsbymakingunequalR&Dinvestmentscom-
paredtowhentheywouldinvestthesameamountinR&D.Animportant
implication of their analysis is that in the speciﬁc framework they use it
cannot be concluded that welfare is reduced by allowing ﬁrms to cooper-
ate in R&D when spillovers are sufﬁciently small. For certain parameter
combinations, thedeclineinconsumersurplusismorethancompensated
by a rise in total industry proﬁt21.
Finally, ex post asymmetries can also appear if the deterministic R&D
process is replaced by a stochastic one (as e.g. in Hauenschild, 2003). If
e.g. only one ﬁrm succeeds in innovating, unit cost reductions and the re-
sulting product market outcomes naturally are asymmetric across ﬁrms,
given that they do not cooperate in R&D.
2.5.3 Uncertainty
Models of R&D cooperation are often based on the assumption of a de-
terministic relation between R&D investment and production cost reduc-
tionsorproductinnovation, whileitisgenerallyacknowledgedthatR&D
and in particular basic research is a highly uncertain activity. Naturally,
when incorporating uncertainty about R&D results in models of R&D co-
operation, it cannot be avoided that the resulting game has tournament
features. Indeed, when the success of R&D is uncertain, it is not sure that
all ﬁrms succeed in ending up with innovations such as e.g. production
cost reductions or product improvements22.
20In Salant and Shaffer (1999) this issue is discussed in a more general two-stage Cour-
not framework where ﬁrst-stage actions affect marginal costs.
21In a more general framework Dakhlia et al. (2003) identify conditions under which
cooperative asymmetric R&D decisions and the resulting increase in industry concentra-
tion are welfare-reducing.
22For examples of models of R&D cooperation that incorporate uncertainty regarding
the date of innovation (stochastic patent races) we refer to section 2.4.1.
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Abstracting from spillovers that may generate incentives to cooper-
ate in R&D, Marjit (1991) deals with uncertainty in a duopoly model of
cost-reducing R&D. He ﬁnds that cooperative R&D tends to be proﬁtable
when the probability of success of R&D is either very high or very low,
i.e. when both ﬁrms are not likely to gain a monopoly position by suc-
ceeding alone in the R&D project.
In Choi (1993), Combs (1993) and Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), the
probability of success of R&D is higher the more a ﬁrm invests in R&D.
Choi(1993)assumesthatunderacooperativeR&Dagreement, bothﬁrms
(a duopoly is considered) have access to any innovation that is made and
that the probabilities of success remain independent among the mem-
bers. He further assumes that total industry proﬁt decreases as the level
of spillovers increases, due to more intense product market competition.
Findings are that under perfect monitoring23 proﬁts from cooperative
R&D are higher compared to the noncooperative mode when the nat-
ural spillover level is ‘high enough’, while they may be higher or lower
for low spillovers. Conclusions regarding the gap between private and
social incentives to cooperate in R&D are very similar to earlier ﬁndings.
Finally, Hauenschild (2003) compares stochastic versions of the AJ
and the KMZ model with the original deterministic versions (see also
section 2.5.4).
2.5.4 R&D input versus R&D output
As pointed out by Amir (2000) and suggested on the basis of empirical
evidence (see chapter 3), it is important to distinguish between input (as
in KMZ) and output spillovers (as in AJ) and as such between R&D input
and R&D output as decision variables. Input spillovers are more related
to the free access to e.g. basic research results in an industry, scientiﬁc
publications or general information on what research is going on in the
industry. Martin (2002) provides the example of the pharmaceutical in-
dustry, where ﬁrms’ scientists generally have “... a quite accurate idea of
the nature of research conducted by their competitors ...”. Output spill-
overs rather refer to the appropriability of new technologies that result
from research, which can be e.g. patented.
For the same level of spillovers, effective total cost reductions are al-
ways higher in the AJ model with output spillovers compared to the
23Each ﬁrm can observe the other’s R&D investment and outcome.
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KMZ model with input spillovers, when only symmetric solutions are
considered, unless there are no spillovers. This is not surprising because
in the AJ model (with output spillovers), only own R&D investment has
decreasing returns and R&D output of the other ﬁrm is additively avail-
able.
Based on a comparison by Hauenschild (2003) of stochastic versions
of the AJ and KMZ models with homogenous goods and Cournot com-
petition, where R&D yields a unit cost reduction with a probability lower
than 1, this relation is somewhat modiﬁed. Indeed, with output spill-
overs expected cost reductions tend to be reduced by uncertainty, while
increased with input spillovers. As such, for some parameter combina-
tions, effective total cost reductions with input spillovers are expected to
be higher than with output spillovers.
Martin (2002) incorporates input and output spillovers in a stochastic
patent race model with two ﬁrms. It is assumed that under R&D cooper-
ation the two ﬁrms carry out R&D independently and R&D input spill-
overs are complete. Findings are that R&D cooperation always yields
higher total welfare, but not higher proﬁt if either natural input spillovers
are high and/or output spillovers are low (high appropriability).
Another way of distinguishing between input and output spillovers
is to split up the R&D process into two stages (see e.g. Beath et al., 1998);
one stage that maps R&D input into R&D output and one stage that maps
R&D output into unit cost reductions. This approach not only makes
it possible to distinguish between input and output spillovers but also
between different characteristics of both mapping functions. Beath et al.
(1998) show that it matters at which stage diminishing returns of R&D
set in for predicting how many R&D labs an RJV would operate.
2.5.5 Complementarity of R&D
It is clear that in the models of R&D cooperation overviewed so far, the
spillover parameter (often referred to as β) makes it possible for a ﬁrm to
reduce unit production costs or enhance product quality without doing
R&D itself, i.e. by the R&D investment of other ﬁrms. Moreover, the
standard assumption is that R&D input (in the case of KMZ-type models)
or R&D output (in the case of AJ-type models) of other ﬁrms in the same
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market is additive to a ﬁrm’s own R&D input or output24. The ‘degree’ of
additivity depends on the height of the (exogenous) spillover β. When,
for instance, β = 1 other’s R&D is perfectly additive to own R&D.
The height of the spillover parameter is also related to the strategic
properties of R&D decisions. It is standard in the duopoly literature that
with ‘low’ spillovers, R&D decisions are strategic substitutes. The best
response of a ﬁrm to an increase in the other’s R&D investment, is to
decrease its own R&D investment. Under these conditions, R&D invest-
ment has negative externalities and R&D cooperation has an R&D-effort-
saving effect in KMZ-type models and reduces R&D output (unit cost
reduction) in AJ-type models. Think, within this respect, of ﬁrms that fol-
low closely related R&D paths, but, given the low knowledge ﬂows, only
learn from the other to a limited extent which paths are promising and
which ones yield no innovation (see Kamien et al., 1992). Consequently,
R&D efforts will partly be duplicates25.
With ‘high’ spillovers, on the other hand, R&D decisions are strategic
complements and have positive externalities. Under this condition, R&D
cooperation enhances R&D investment or R&D output in KMZ-type and
AJ-type models, respectively. Firms have learned through knowledge
ﬂows which R&D paths to avoid, making the ﬁnally chosen R&D paths
more complementary. In this way duplication is avoided.
Anyway, the spillover parameter in standard models is highly related
to complementarity properties of R&D investment. Beath et al. (1998)
make different assumptions on the height of the spillover parameter de-
pending on whether ﬁrms follow a single research path or complemen-
tary research paths. Findings are that only one lab will be operated with a
single research path and one or two with a complementary research path,
depending on the stage of the R&D process at which diminishing returns
set in.
Examples where spillovers and properties of R&D related to the de-
gree of complementarity26 are formally disentangled are Katsoulacos and
24For an extensive comparison of additivity in AJ-type and KMZ-type models, we refer
to Hinloopen (2003).
25Note that if ﬁrms would follow a single R&D path resulting in a single possible in-
novation (R&D output), they would be engaged in a tournament.
26Note that complementarity of R&D should not be confused with complementarity
of ﬁnal products. E.g. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) also distinguish between same and
complementary industries. R¨ oller et al. (1998) is another example where complementary
industries are also modelled.
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Ulph (1998) and Anbarci et al. (2002).
While the standard assumption in AJ- and KMZ-type models is that
under R&D cooperation both ﬁrms in duopoly keep doing R&D, Kat-
soulacos and Ulph (1998) examine whether an RJV would operate one or
two labs depending on whether R&D outputs are (technical, not strategic)
complements or substitutes. When R&D outputs are very close substi-
tutes, cost considerations dominate, such that an RJV would keep only
one lab open. When R&D outputs are very strong complements, an RJV
may prefer to keep two labs open.
Anbarci et al. (2002) adjust the KMZ model by taking into account
whether R&D inputs are complements or substitutes. Only competitive
modes (i.e. R&D and RJV competition27) are looked at. The authors ﬁnd
that when complementarity between R&D inputs is high, RJV competi-
tion dominates R&D competition in terms of technological improvement,
industry proﬁt and social welfare, irrespective of the level of exogenous
spillovers. With low complementarity the conclusions of KMZ apply and
R&D competition is preferred over RJV competition. For moderate de-
grees of complementarity, RJV competition is likely to be preferred on
social welfare grounds for all levels of spillovers, but on grounds of tech-
nological improvement only when spillovers are low.
2.5.6 Knowledge stock and absorptive capacity
Most previously discussed papers have ignored the possibility that cost-
reducing R&D expenditures and spillovers build on a pre-existing stock
of technological knowledge. First, one could distinguish between pre-
competitive research and competitive R&D (Vonortas, 1994). Pre-compe-
titiveorgenericresearchgeneratesabasic, imperfectlyappropriablestock
of knowledge and competitive R&D draws from this knowledge stock
and ﬁnally results in more appropriable and ﬁrm-speciﬁc cost reductions
or product improvements. In the model of Vonortas (1994) both result in
unitcostreductions. Focusisoncooperationinthepre-competitivestage.
Conclusions are very similar to the ones of models where the spillover
parameter is set to one under R&D cooperation.
Second, in the tradition of Cohen and Levinthal (1989), the knowl-
edge stock is often interpreted as a necessary condition for ﬁrms to be
27Under RJV competition the spillover parameter is set to one and proﬁt is individually
maximised.
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able to assimilate external knowledge. In other words, ﬁrms need absorp-
tive capacity by doing R&D itself in order to reap beneﬁts from incoming
knowledge spillovers. Kamien and Zang (2000) redeﬁne spilt over R&D
through a Cobb-Douglas function that incorporates absorptive capacity
effects. If a ﬁrm chooses to follow a narrow, ﬁrm-speciﬁc R&D program
that does not generate spillovers to other ﬁrms, it also has no absorptive
capacity. On the other hand, a basic approach yields a maximum level
of outgoing spillovers and absorptive capacity. They ﬁnd that absorptive
capacity effects increase R&D investment.
Somewhat different conclusions are made by Gr¨ unfeld (2003) who
introduces absorptive capacity effects in the AJ model by letting the in-
coming spillovers of a ﬁrm depend on its own R&D expenditures. He
ﬁnds that R&D incentives of noncooperating ﬁrms are only increased by
absorptive capacity effects when the market is small. Furthermore, the
critical spillover level at which cooperative R&D investment increases
above noncooperative R&D investment is higher than in the original AJ
model.
2.5.7 Subsidies
Another topic that has been studied in the context of multiple stage mod-
els of R&D is the provision of government subsidies of R&D. Hinloopen
(1997, 2000a,c, 2001) are examples of models that incorporate an analysis
of R&D subsidies in the familiar two-stage models of R&D by adding a
stage in which government decides on the height of an R&D subsidy. To
cover the costs of the subsidies ﬁrms are taxed in the product market. The
main ﬁnding is that optimally subsidizing noncooperative R&D leads to
a higher level of R&D and welfare than other modes, including R&D
cooperatives with full information sharing, provided that spillovers are
high enough. The highest welfare is reached when ﬁrms make their R&D
decisions individually and fully share information (spillover of one). Fi-
nally, optimally subsidizing noncooperative R&D without spillovers and
cooperative R&D without spillovers yields the same outcomes for R&D
and social welfare.
The study of Leahy and Neary (1997) provides a general28 oligopoly
model of R&D on the basis of which conclusions about optimal technol-
28Generality in this context refers to non-linearity of demand functions and allowance
for Cournot quantity-choice or Bertrand price-choice competition in the product market.
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ogy policy are made. Outcomes of different scenarios where ﬁrms either
set their R&D in a ﬁrst and their price/output in a second stage (strategic
behaviour) or set their R&D and price/output simultaneously (nonstra-
tegic behaviour) are compared and ﬁrst- and second-best optimal sub-
sidies are calculated29. The results conﬁrm earlier results that stress the
importance of the degree of spillovers when considering the desirability
of R&D cooperation from a welfare point of view, assuming that ﬁrms
behave strategically. Without strategic behaviour, R&D cooperation is
always preferred and does not mandate government subsidies so as to
obtain maximal welfare. Moreover, for most scenarios nonstrategic be-
haviour is preferred on welfare grounds and requires lower subsidies.
2.5.8 Endogenous R&D cooperation
In the part of literature discussed so far, the methodology that is used to
investigate the issue of R&D cooperation is to compare outcomes (R&D
decisions, proﬁt, quantities, prices, social welfare, etc.) of an industry
consisting of ﬁrms that do not cooperate in R&D with outcomes of an
industry where all ﬁrms cooperate in R&D. Little attention is paid to
whetherR&Dcooperativesareactuallyformedinequilibrium, howmany
are formed and how many ﬁrms they contain30.
In the ﬁrst place, the issue of RJV formation has been addressed as-
suming that only one RJV could be formed by two or more ﬁrms in the
industry. Inthemodelsofe.g.Katz(1986)andCombs(1993), ﬁrmsdecide
whether to participate in an RJV. In Katz (1986) ﬁrms also decide which
R&D cost and information sharing rules to follow in the RJV, whereby
within-RJV spillovers are assumed to be larger than spillovers between
members and nonmembers. The author proves that an equilibrium mem-
bership size exists that may be equal to all ﬁrms in the industry31. Form-
inganRJVissociallybeneﬁcialwhenrivalryintheproductmarketislow,
29The instrument of government policy to stimulate R&D is in this context subsidis-
ing. First-best subsidies cover both R&D and output subsidies, as two targets are to be
controlled in the ﬁrst-best solution (i.e. R&D investment and output), while second-best
subsidies only cover R&D subsidies.
30Stability of RJVs has been addressed by Veugelers and Kesteloot (1994) and Kesteloot
and Veugelers (1995) in a repeated-game framework, where it is assumed that ﬁrms can
cheat on the part of knowledge sharing.
31E.g. if spillovers between nonmembers are zero and R&D investment of members
is higher than investment of nonmembers, the equilibrium RJV contains all ﬁrms in the
industry.
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when research is rather complementary, when important spillovers exist
and when the formation of the RJV yields a high degree of information
sharing. Combs (1993) develops a stochastic model where the probabil-
ity of becoming an innovator can be increased with the amount of R&D
expenditures and by joining an RJV. Within an RJV R&D is chosen co-
operatively and the innovation can be accessed freely by all members.
Findings are that as the probability of innovating increases, more ﬁrms
enter the RJV, but the number of RJV members never exceeds the socially
optimal number. Product market competition increases with the rate of
research success, resulting in higher consumer surplus and total welfare.
Atallah (2003) assumes that higher within-RJV information sharing
also yields more leakage to nonmembers. He ﬁnds that R&D spending of
RJV members is reduced when the degree of outside leakage increases.
Furthermore, with high outside leakage, the size of the RJV is also re-
duced ´ and RJV members share less information, while with low outside
leakage, the RJV gets larger and full information sharing is maintained.
Poyago-Theotoky (1995) ﬁnds that, for small rates of spillovers and R&D
being a strategic substitute for noncooperating ﬁrms outside the RJV, the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms that form an RJV is lower than the socially
optimal number which is all ﬁrms in the industry.
In other models the number of RJVs that arises is endogenous. A
ﬁrst strand of literature, sometimes called the coalition formation litera-
ture, allows for exclusive groups of any size between a subset of ﬁrms
in an industry where exclusive refers to the assumption that a ﬁrm can
only participate in one coalition. An example of a model where cost re-
ductions are exogenous, meaning that they are an immediate result of the
coalition that is formed, is Bloch (1995). In a ﬁrst stage ﬁrms decide in a
noncooperative and sequential game whether to form or enter in a coali-
tion32. If all ﬁrms agree, a coalition is formed. It is assumed that marginal
production costs decrease linearly with the size of the coalition. In a sec-
ond stage the ﬁrms are assumed to be Bertrand or Cournot competitors in
amarketofdifferentiatedproducts. Theequilibriumprediction(basedon
the Markov-perfect equilibrium concept) in the context of a linear model
is that ﬁrms form two asymmetric associations, one containing 3/4 ﬁrms
and the other containing the rest of the ﬁrms while the socially optimal
32One ﬁrm ﬁrst proposes to a chosen set of ﬁrms to form a coalition and only if all the
other ﬁrms agree, the coalition will be formed. The ﬁrst ﬁrm that does not want to enter
the proposed coalition, becomes the next initiator.
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outcome is one coalition that consists of all ﬁrms in the market. Further,
it is found that ﬁrms form larger coalitions as products are more differ-
entiated.
An implication of the assumption of exogenous cost reductions is that
ﬁrms that are outside coalitions are unable to reduce costs by doing R&D.
In Yi and Shin (2000) cost reductions are endogenous in the sense that all
ﬁrms make R&D decisions, either outside or within a coalition. Findings
are that on welfare grounds, an exclusive membership rule is preferred
over an open membership rule for high spillovers33. On the other hand,
the equilibrium RJV structure is mostly not the socially efﬁcient outcome
which is as in previous models an industry-wide RJV. Greenlee and Cas-
siman (1999) ﬁnd similar results for high spillovers and relatively low
R&D costs, given competition in the product market. For very high spill-
overs and low R&D costs, product market collusion may even be desir-
able on welfare grounds.
At the same time a related but different approach to model R&D col-
laboration has evolved, i.e. the literature on networks34. Here, coalitions
between ﬁrms are pairwise and nonexclusive (a ﬁrm can be in more than
one coalition, therefore the term network is more appropriate). Goyal and
Moraga (2001) were the ﬁrst to investigate the issue using a network ap-
proach with endogenous cost reductions. Firms have to decide in a ﬁrst
stage whether they will form collaborative links with other ﬁrms or not.
If a coalition is formed, spillovers are complete within the coalition. In
the second stage ﬁrms choose their R&D effort individually, as in a non-
cooperative game, and in a third stage ﬁrms make their familiar produc-
tion decisions. Within this framework the effects of the formation of sym-
metric as well as asymmetric networks on R&D behaviour are examined
for ﬁrms that compete on a homogenous goods market and for ﬁrms that
operate on independent markets35. Findings are that, irrespective of the
market setting, the formation of a complete network is strategically sta-
ble. Only when markets are independent, this network is the unique
strategically stable network. In homogenous goods markets, the level of
33Under the exclusive membership rule, existing RJV members have to agree for an
outsider to join the RJV, which is not the case under the open membership rule.
34See Goyal and Morago-Gonz´ alez (2002) for a literature overview that incorporates
models of vertically related ﬁrms.
35In an independent market individual R&D decisions do not inﬂuence the level of
competitiveness.
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collaboration in the complete network may be too high from a social wel-
fare and industry-proﬁt maximising perspective, and a partial network
is optimal then. In the independent markets, it is socially optimal ´ and
industry-proﬁt maximising to form a complete network.
In Goyal and Joshi (2003) a similar model is developed to investi-
gate the link between ﬁrms’ incentives to cooperate and the nature of
market competition. Cost reduction in the model is exogenous which im-
plies that only ﬁrms that enter a coalition can reduce marginal produc-
tion costs. Additionally, costs of forming links can be low or high. With
small linking costs, the complete network is uniquely strategically stable
and welfare-maximising under quantity competition. With high linking
costs, asymmetric networks are stable, but it is unclear which networks
are welfare-maximising. Under price competition, the unique stable net-
work is an empty one, independent of the level of linking cost, while an
asymmetric network is welfare-maximising.
2.6 R&D cooperation and price collusion
In the models that are overviewed so far, a crucial assumption on which
most ﬁndings are based, is the assumption of independence between the
decision to cooperate in R&D or to enter an RJV and the decision to co-
operate in the product market. Indeed, by using the backward induc-
tion rule the equilibrium prediction that always results is competition
in prices or in quantities. The question naturally arises whether this as-
sumption is a valid one, whether cooperation in the R&D stage does not
spill over to collusion in the product market36. This question has been
looked at in some of the above papers (see e.g. Hinloopen, 1997) but for-
mal modeling has been left for others37.
A ﬁrst way of dealing with the topic is to simply assume that coopera-
36An interesting overview of the existence of multi-R&D-project and multimarket con-
tact between ﬁrms in RJVs that are formed under the National Cooperative Research Act
in the US is provided by Vonortas (2000). The author suggests that the scope for collusive
play in the product market is enlarged by the combination of multiproject and multimar-
ket contact.
37In Kline (2000) conditions are derived for a cost paradox to occur at the noncoopera-
tive equilibrium, which refers to industry-wide cost-reductions that enhance competition
such that proﬁt ﬁnally falls. Under these conditions and when spillovers are less than
perfect, cooperative ﬁrms reduce their research and may use the RJV to reduce product
market competition.
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tion in R&D automatically extends to cooperation in the product market.
An example of this approach is Poyago-Theotoky (1997)38 who sets up a
model with product innovation and without cost sharing between ﬁrms.
The underlying assumption that cooperation in R&D also extends to the
product market by the setting up of a common price for the ‘superprod-
uct’ that results from the RJV formation is necessary for ﬁrms to have
incentives to form an RJV. As already mentioned, the main conclusion is
that cooperation in R&D (that extends to the product market) is welfare
enhancing when the quality improvement of the resulting new product
is high or when R&D is relatively inefﬁcient and has high decreasing re-
turns.
An inﬁnitely repeated-game framework is another approach to exam-
ine the relation between the two forms of cooperation. In Martin (1995)
e.g., the effects of R&D joint ventures on the pervasiveness of tacit collu-
sion in the product market are examined in a patent race model without
spillovers. The author uses a noncooperative repeated-game framework
and assumes that ﬁrms follow a trigger strategy with product market
collusion being an equilibrium strategy when the present value of proﬁts
gained from colluding is larger than the present value of proﬁts gained
from defecting. It is found that forming an R&D joint venture makes it
more likely for tacit collusion to be sustained in the product market.
Another example of the second approach is van Wegberg (1995). His
analysis is based on an extension of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
to a model with three ﬁrms and products that are imperfect substitutes.
In the paper some speciﬁc cases are identiﬁed in which the formation
of an R&D alliance of two out of three ﬁrms could lead to collusion in
output in an inﬁnitely repeated noncooperative game context.
Further, in Cabral (2000), interactions between R&D and price deci-
sions are examined in an inﬁnite duopoly framework where ﬁrms are to
make R&D and price decisions simultaneously. Only if R&D is success-
ful, higher proﬁts are gained. The ﬁndings are that self-enforcing R&D
agreements that increase R&D towards an efﬁcient level decrease prices
while R&D contracting results in increased prices.
Finally, Lambertini et al. (2002) examine the interplay between prod-
uct R&D and pricing decisions in a noncooperative framework and ﬁnd
that joint product development decreases horizontal product differenti-
38See also the previous section 2.4.2.
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ation and thereby destabilises collusion. When ﬁrms keep developing
their products independently, there is more horizontal product differen-
tiation which can facilitate price collusion.
2.7 Conclusion
R&D behaviour of ﬁrms in oligopoly has attracted a great deal of at-
tention of IO theorists. The issue of R&D cooperation has mainly been
examined in the context of nontournament models where R&D is often
assumed to be cost-reducing. A general result, whether the underlying
model is symmetric or asymmetric, of a tournament or nontournament
kind, related to process or product R&D, etc., is the ﬁnding that the level
of knowledge spillovers is important in determining whether ﬁrms’ R&D
incentives, proﬁt and social welfare are higher if ﬁrms cooperate in R&D
compared to when they do not cooperate. If either pre-cooperative or at
least post-cooperative spillovers are above a certain threshold, R&D co-
operation is preferred on social welfare grounds in a symmetric industry
while otherwise R&D competition is preferable.
Consider next ﬁrms’ incentives to engage in industry-wide R&D co-
operation. In an ex ante symmetric duopolistic industry where the coop-
erative R&D level can be credibly committed to, ﬁrms prefer to credibly
commit to the cooperative R&D level irrespective of the size of spillovers
since proﬁts they then gain are higher than under R&D competition. In
a noncooperative context, where the cooperative R&D level cannot be
enforced, the SPN prediction in the R&D stage is R&D competition (indi-
vidual proﬁt maximisation) although tacit R&D cooperation (joint proﬁt
maximisation) yields more proﬁt for both ﬁrms.
Clearly, there exists a conﬂict between private (ﬁrms’) and social in-
centives to cooperate in R&D: society only wants ﬁrms to cooperate in R&D
when pre- or at least post-cooperative spillovers are high enough, while theory
predicts that—irrespective of the size of spillovers—ﬁrms cooperate (compete) in
R&D if the cooperative R&D level can(not) credibly committed to. An empir-
ically relevant question is whether ﬁrms’ tendency to engage in binding
R&D cooperation corresponds to the game-theoretic predictions in the
sense that it is not dependent of the spillover level. Another empirically
relevant question concerns the relation between technological spillovers
and ﬁrms’ tendency to tacitly or implicitly cooperate in R&D39: does the
39Tacit R&D cooperation and implicit R&D cooperation are used as synonyms in this
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level of spillovers inﬂuence the likelihood of tacit R&D cooperation in a
noncooperative context? These are questions we deal with in this thesis
using economic experimentation.
Other factors have been identiﬁed in the IO literature that may in-
crease or decrease the desirability of the formation of RJVs on welfare
grounds. First, a low degree of rivalry in the product market seems to
make the formation of RJVs more desirable. Allowing for ex post asym-
metry of cooperative R&D decisions may also improve total welfare ef-
fects of R&D cooperation since a noncooperative regime no longer pre-
vails for low spillovers. Further, if ﬁrms do not behave strategically in the
R&D stage and thus decide simultaneously on R&D and product market
actions, R&D cooperation is always preferred, irrespective of the size of
spillovers. R&D cooperation is also desirable if it implies full information
sharing.
If RJVs are mainly created to reduce competition in the product mar-
ket, on the other hand, they may not be welfare-improving, even for in-
dustries with high spillovers. An empirically relevant question is whether
theprobabilityoftacitproductmarketcollusionincreaseswhencooperativeR&D
agreements are formed40. This is another question we deal with in this the-
sis. The hypothesis that R&D cooperation may translate into product
market collusion ﬁnds theoretical support. Yet, under some conditions,
collusion in the product market does not always reduce welfare com-
pared to a fully noncooperative context. It does not, for instance, when
product quality has sufﬁciently increased as a consequence of the RJV
formation.
In asymmetric industries, ﬁrms do not always have incentives to co-
operate in R&D. If initial unit production costs or spillovers are ex ante
asymmetric or if R&D decisions are ex post asymmetric because of the
symmetric equilibrium being unstable, proﬁts are sometimes higher if
ﬁrms do not coordinate their research activities. As such, ﬁrms would
naturally prefer not to cooperate in R&D, while R&D cooperation may
still yield a higher consumer surplus. In the case of cost asymmetries, if
productsaresufﬁcientlydifferentiated and asymmetriesarenottoolarge,
incentives to form an RJV may be high enough.
In an oligopoly, industry-wide R&D cooperation is usually the most
thesis.
40Geroski (1993) provides this type of ‘cooperation spillovers’ as an example of envi-
ronmental externalities.
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socially beneﬁcial mode, but it is not necessarily the equilibrium predic-
tion. Conclusions depend on whether a ﬁrm can participate in only one
cooperative R&D project or in several. But again, the degree of product
differentiation positively affects incentives to form and welfare effects of
a wide R&D agreement.
Based on the theoretical ﬁndings one can argue that a government
should have an idea of the characteristics of the sector before deciding
whether to promote R&D cooperation in a certain sector. The extent of
exogenous knowledge spillovers, the number of ﬁrms in the sector, the
size differences between ﬁrms, the willingness of ﬁrms to share informa-
tion, the (difference in) R&D costs, the degree of product differentiation
etc., are important factors that should inﬂuence this decision.
Empirically relevant questions concern the relation between techno-
logical spillovers and ﬁrms’ tendency to (tacitly) cooperate in R&D and
the relation between R&D cooperation and tacit product market collu-
sion.
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EMPIRICS OF R&D COOPERATION
AND SPILLOVERS
3.1 Introduction
It became clear in chapter 2 that knowledge spillovers play an important
role in game-theoretic models of R&D cooperation. First, under the as-
sumption that ﬁrms cannot control the information ﬂows between them-
selves and other ﬁrms, spillovers are important when comparing R&D
cooperation modes with R&D competition modes with respect to the
level of R&D investment, total industry proﬁt and social welfare. Sec-
ond, with spillovers being under control of ﬁrms, they are naturally also
important because in that case they represent a decision variable in the
model. Given the importance of spillovers in the theoretical framework
and the empirical evidence for the existence of important knowledge
ﬂows between ﬁrms (see e.g. Griliches, 1992), it would be a logical next
step to ﬁnd empirical regularities on the relation with R&D cooperation.
In the empirical literature on R&D investment, R&D cooperation and
spilloversweﬁndtwodistinctapproachesrelatedtotwodistinctresearch
questions. The ﬁrst approach closely follows (speciﬁc models discussed
in) the theoretical literature surveyed in the previous chapter as to pre-
dict whether or not spillovers among ﬁrms in an industry are low or
high. Spillovers are expected to be low (high), if R&D cooperation has
decreased (increased) R&D investment. An overview of papers where
this approach is followed is given in section 3.3.
The second approach motivated by theory is to examine the effect of
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spillovers on the likelihood of R&D cooperation. There exists a strand
of empirical literature on the determinants of R&D cooperation and on
proﬁtability of R&D cooperation but focus has been mainly placed on the
effects of ﬁrm size, R&D effort or intensity and market structure variables
in general1. The relation between R&D spillovers and the tendency to
enter into cooperative R&D agreements has only recently been studied
empirically. We provide an overview of this approach in section 3.4.
Before having a closer look at these empirical analyses, we present in




to as technological spillovers. After having excluded the externalities that
result from R&D inputs being purchased at a price less than their ‘full
quality’ price, which are sometimes called rent spillovers (Griliches, 1992)
orpecuniaryspillovers(Vonortas,1997), theseﬂowscanarisethroughmany
different channels such as e.g. the movement of R&D personnel, the exis-
tence of formal and informal networks and meetings2, publications re-
lated to research output, patent applications and reverse engineering.
Consequently, technological spillovers are unmeasurable and ﬁnding the
most appropriate proxy is a complicated matter3.
Nadiri (1993) distinguishes two basic methodologies that have been
used in the literature to proxy spillovers. First, there is the technology
ﬂow approach where ﬁrms and/or industries are positioned in a matrix
with technological or other linkages. It is assumed that the total incoming
spillovers of a ﬁrm or industry are equal to a (weighted) sum of knowl-
edgestocksofotherﬁrmsorindustries, wheretheknowledgestockiscal-
culated on the basis of e.g. R&D investment, R&D personnel, number of
patents or any other innovation variable. The calculation of the weights
1Clear overviews are in Veugelers (1998) and Belderbos et al. (2004). See also e.g.
Vonortas (1997).
2Dahl and Pedersen (2004) report results of a survey that provide evidence for the
existence of important knowledge ﬂows through informal contacts between employees
of ﬁrms within networks.
3Vonortas (1997) further distinguishes network spillovers that are present when the suc-
cess of a new R&D project and as such the incentives to start a new R&D project strongly
depend on other complementary R&D projects or technologies.
483.3 Relation between R&D cooperation and R&D effort
is often based on a measure of technological distance (developed by Jaffe,
1986) and sometimes on a measure of geographical distance given the as-
sumption that the closer ﬁrms or industries are in their technologies or
in their geographical location, the higher the probability of knowledge
ﬂows. Measures of technological distance are often based on patent data
in the assumption that spillovers between ﬁrms or industries are higher
when patent activities overlap, but other measures, such as e.g. the share
of scientists in total personnel (Kaiser, 2002b) or the number of coopera-
tive R&D ties (Dumont and Tsakanikas, 2001), have also emerged. Since
the emergence of new surveys such as e.g. the Community Innovation
Survey (CIS) which includes questions on appropriability of research re-
sults and on usefulness of outside sources of knowledge, the weights can
also be calculated in a direct way (Kaiser, 2002b).
Another approach to measure spillovers is the cost or production func-
tion approach4 (see e.g. Bernstein, 1989; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Capron
and Cincera, 1998; Rouvinen, 2002). Basically a cost or production func-
tion is estimated where next to the usual right-hand side variables, i.e.
output and relative factor prices of variable and ﬁxed inputs including
R&D in the case of a cost function approach or stocks of variable and
ﬁxed inputs including the R&D stock in the case of a production func-
tion approach, similar variables that represent other ﬁrms’ R&D stock are
added to the equation. The estimated coefﬁcients of these other ﬁrms’
R&D stock variables give an indication of the degree of spillovers be-
tween the ﬁrms.
In any case, irrespective of the approach used, the general conclusion
that can be made on the basis of empirical studies is that knowledge spill-
overs between ﬁrms and industries exist and are potentially important.
3.3 Relation between R&D cooperation and R&D
effort
When closely following the standard theoretical IO literature, R&D co-
operation would stimulate R&D expenditures of the participating ﬁrms if
spilloversamongtheseﬁrmsarehigh. Themainaimofenteringthecoop-
erative R&D agreement can be assumed to be internalising spillovers by
eliminating free-rider effects. On the other hand, when R&D cooperation
4For literature overviews we refer to Nadiri (1993) and Cincera and van Pottelsberghe
de la Potterie (2001).
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would decrease R&D expenditures, the formation of the R&D coopera-
tive can be assumed to be aimed at cost-sharing. In this case, spillovers
among the participating ﬁrms will be low.
In Vonortas (1997, chapter 7) industry- and ﬁrm-level analyses are
performed of the effect of RJV formation based on the US National Coop-
erative Research Act (NCRA) on R&D intensity. Only for some industries
ithasbeenfoundthatRJVparticipationdecreasedR&Dintensity, thereby
providing support for cost-sharing motives to be important for ﬁrms en-
gaged in R&D cooperation. For other industries, and in general, effects
are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Based on micro-aggregated data of the ﬁrst CIS on four manufactur-
ing industries Lambertini et al. (2004) derive some empirical evidence on
R&D behaviour of ﬁrms in general, and of Stackelberg leaders and fol-
lowers (see their model in sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2). By employing simple
analyses of variance, the authors ﬁnd that R&D investment of cooperat-
ing ﬁrms is higher than of noncooperating ﬁrms. When following theory,
this indicates that pre- and or post-cooperative spillovers are high. Other
statistical tests indicate that spillovers5 are indeed larger among ﬁrms
that cooperate in R&D than among ﬁrms that do not cooperate, except in
the textiles industry.
Furthermore, if in each industry Stackelberg leaders are characterised
(based on the Linda index), the authors ﬁnd that these leaders invest
more in R&D than the followers. Following their model, this indicates
that control over spillovers is relatively low and that spillovers from the
leaders to the followers are low.
R¨ oller et al. (1998) also partly6 apply this approach and ﬁnd—on the
basis of data coming from US NCRA ﬁrms—that within and between
some industries cost-sharing is more important while for other indus-
tries, internalising the free-rider effect seems to be more important. In
general, the cost-sharing effect dominates though. Results also indicate
that RJVs among ﬁrms of similar size (symmetric ﬁrms) and large RJVs
are better in internalising spillovers.
5Measured as the product of R&D intensity and the sum of R&D investment of other
ﬁrms in the same industry and the same country.
6They also estimate whether cost-sharing motives or motives of internalising spill-
overs are important for RJV formation. See section 3.4 for their results on this.
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3.4 Spillovers and the likelihood of R&D
cooperation
An established result in the IO literature where spillovers are assumed to
be exogenous is that in general, R&D cooperation is only welfare-enhan-
cing if(eitherpre-and post-cooperativeoratleastpost-cooperative)spill-
overs between ﬁrms are above a certain threshold level. But since in these
models proﬁts of ﬁrms are higher under R&D cooperation compared to
R&D competition, irrespective of the spillover level, it would ceteris pari-
bus always be advantageous for ﬁrms to cooperate in R&D. An empirical
question is whether the probability that ﬁrms cooperate in R&D is inﬂu-
enced by spillovers.
As mentioned in section 3.3, R¨ oller et al. (1998) examined whether
motives of cost-sharing or motives of internalising spillovers (eliminat-
ing free-rider effects) are more important for US NCRA ﬁrms, where
cost-sharing and internalising spillovers are approximated by a measure
of how ﬁrm-level R&D changed. They further examined to what extent
product complementarities and asymmetries are important for the for-
mation of RJVs7.
The dependent variable was created by matching all ﬁrms in pairs
and is equal to one if the pair participated in an RJV and equal to zero
otherwise. Control variables that enter the equation are the size of the
RJV, the number of RJVs the pair participated in, industry dummies that
indicate whether both ﬁrms are in the same industry and dummies that
indicate the different industries of the ﬁrms.
On the basis of the results of their probit estimation procedure the
authors conclude that RJVs among ﬁrms of similar size (symmetric ﬁrms)
and large RJVs tend to be formed more often. In general, the cost-sharing
effect is more important in explaining the probability of RJV formation
than the free-rider effect. Finally, for some industries the existence of
product complementarities can stimulate the formation of RJVs.
Recently, econometric analyses have been carried out that identify the
effects of spillovers on R&D cooperation. Examples are a study of Bel-
gian ﬁrms on the basis of the European CIS (Cassiman and Veugelers,
2002), a study of German service ﬁrms (Kaiser, 2002a), a study of Eu-
ropean ﬁrms that participated in EU Framework Programmes and Eu-
7The empirical part in their paper is based on a model they developed in a ﬁrst part.
We refer to section 2.5.2 in the previous chapter for more details of the model.
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reka projects (Hern´ an et al., 2003) and a study based on Dutch CIS data
(Belderbos et al., 2004). In the papers cross-sectional probit or logit esti-
mations have been carried out of an equation with the dependent vari-
ablebeingtheprobabilitythataﬁrmentersacooperativeR&Dagreement
with at least one other ﬁrm. The econometric issue of possible simul-
taneity between the decision to cooperate in R&D and right-hand-side
variables as R&D intensity has been dealt with in different ways.
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) have distinguished between the ef-
fects of incoming and outgoing spillovers on the probability of entering
a cooperative R&D agreement. Incoming spillovers are ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
are measured on the basis of CIS questionnaire ratings of the importance
of publicly available information of different types for ﬁrms. On the basis
of similar ratings of the effectiveness of methods for protecting products
and processes, a proxy for outgoing spillovers (or appropriability) has
been created. In the same questionnaire ﬁrms were asked whether they
have participated in a cooperative project, which provides a basis for the
(binary) dependent variable. Other variables added to the econometric
equation are ﬁrm size, a permanent R&D dummy, industry level legal
protection and cooperation, proxies for cost- and risk-sharing motives
and a proxy for access to complementary knowledge.
The most important ﬁnding of the two-step estimations is that the
probability of ﬁrms cooperating in R&D is higher when incoming spill-
overs are high and outgoing spillovers are low8. Further, cost-sharing
is found to be an important motive for cooperation in R&D while risk-
sharing is not. Note that these results are based on data of ﬁrms that are
mainly vertically related or cooperate with research institutes or univer-
sities. Only about 10% of the ﬁrms in the data are horizontally related
competitors. This naturally makes it difﬁcult to evaluate theory—which
is mainly based on models of horizontally related ﬁrms—by their empir-
ical results.
Kaiser (2002a) takes simultaneity issues into account by estimating
in a ﬁrst step an equation of cooperation choice and in a second step
an equation of innovation expenditures9. A distinction between vertical
8Two-step estimations were done to correct for possible endogeneity of the spillover
and permanent R&D variables.
9The author also models the decision of the type of partner to cooperate with, by mak-
ing a distinction between vertical cooperation and horizontal and mixed cooperation. For
results on this, we refer to the paper.
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and horizontal spillovers was directly derived from survey data. Further
variablesrelatedtothegeneralityofR&D,researchproductivity, ﬁrmsize
and sector dummies are added to the cooperation choice equations.
Estimations indicate that horizontal spillovers increase the probabil-
ity to cooperate in R&D, while vertical spillovers are insigniﬁcant. Re-
search productivity, generality of R&D and ﬁrm size also increase the
propensity to cooperate. In the innovation equation, a positive impact of
joint research, horizontal spillovers and research productivity has been
found, and an inverse U-shaped impact of research generality.
Also in Belderbos et al. (2004) different types of R&D agreements and
spillovers are considered. The decision to enter three types of R&D agree-
ments (horizontal, vertical and institutional) is jointly determined. Spill-
overs are subdivided into ﬁrm-speciﬁc horizontal and vertical spillovers
and industry-speciﬁc outgoing spillovers. Next to control variables as
R&D intensity and ﬁrm size, variables from the management literature
that inﬂuence the probability to cooperate in R&D, such as cost, risk and
organizational capability constraints and the rapidness of introduction of
new products, are added to the equation. Dummies for being part of a
group, for being a multinational ﬁrm, for being part of the service sec-
tor and for receiving an R&D subsidy are also included. As to mitigate
problems of endogeneity, all time-dependent right-hand-side variables
are lagged by two years. Furthermore, similar estimations are done for
a group of ﬁrms that have been part of a cooperative R&D agreement in
1998, but not in 1996, as to check the robustness of the ﬁndings.
The authors ﬁnd that horizontal spillovers are not signiﬁcant in ex-
plaining horizontal cooperation, but vertical spillovers positively inﬂu-
ence vertical cooperation. Incoming spillovers from universities and re-
search institutions have a positive impact on all forms of cooperation.
In the study based on data of European ﬁrms done by Hern´ an et al.
(2003)theprobabilityforbusinessunitstoparticipateincooperativeR&D
projects is explained by variables that are similar to the ones in previous
studies. An important characteristic of their analysis is that they use a
large control group that is representative for the whole population of Eu-
ropean ﬁrms10. Spillovers are measured on the industry level and are
proxied by the average number of months before the diffusion of an in-
10In Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Kaiser (2002a) the samples only consist of
ﬁrms that are expected to be innovative in a certain period.
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novation in the industry11 and the effectiveness of patents in the indus-
try, both based on previous analyses. Also R&D intensity at the industry
levelisincludedtocontrolforpossibledifferences inpotential costreduc-
tions across industries. Other variables that are included are the market
concentration in the industry, ﬁrm size, the market share of the ﬁrm, the
cumulated number of past participations to measure experience in R&D
cooperation and country dummies. Problems of endogeneity, are, as in
Belderbos et al. (2004), dealt with by lagging all time-dependent right-
hand-side variables by two years.
A ﬁrst important ﬁnding is that, contrary to what has been found
by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), outgoing spillovers have a positive
effect12 on the probability that ﬁrms cooperate in R&D. RJVs are also
morelikelyinindustrieswheretechnologicalknowledgediffusesrapidly,
in more concentrated industries, among large ﬁrms and among ﬁrms
that have past experience with participation in European cooperative
projects. With respect to differences between countries, the authors ﬁnd
that mainly ﬁrms in smaller countries participate in projects funded by
the EU, according to them because ﬁrms in large countries can easier ﬁnd
partners in their own country.
3.5 Conclusion
Empiricalinvestigationshaverecognisedthattechnologicalspilloversbe-
tween ﬁrms in the same industry and ﬁrms in different industries exist
and are potentially important. Whether spillovers inﬂuence the decision
to enter into cooperative R&D agreements is less clear. In general, incom-
ing spillovers are found to increase the probability of R&D cooperation
while the effects of outgoing spillovers are ambiguous.
It is not surprising that empirical regularities on the relation between
spillovers and R&D cooperation are hard to ﬁnd given the differences
in data sets that underlie econometric estimations, in estimation meth-
ods and in ways of deﬁning or computing proxies that should represent
spillovers and R&D cooperation. Moreover, results are often industry-
speciﬁc.
11The authors classify this as a spillover variable, but the variable rather measures the
time lag before technological knowledge is actually diffused.
12Effectiveness of patent protection has a negative sign.
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Some results based on uncontrolled ﬁeld data seem to be more gen-
eral than other. First, R&D cooperation is more probable among larger
ﬁrms and in more concentrated industries. Furthermore, evidence has
been found for cost-sharing motives to be important for ﬁrms when de-
ciding to cooperate in R&D. And ﬁnally, especially general and basic
R&D seem to be the subject of cooperative agreements.
Clearly, empiricalanalysesontherelationbetweentechnologicalspill-
overs and R&D cooperation have a number of difﬁculties that may be
overcome by using laboratory experimentation as a complementary re-
search method. In the ﬁrst place, R&D and related data are known to
suffer from some speciﬁc problems, such as e.g. discontinuities in time
series and ambiguous interpretations of R&D activities. Furthermore, it
is also difﬁcult to ﬁnd or calculate empirical equivalents for theoretical
variables as e.g. spillovers and it is not clear whether these capture the
same features as in theoretical models. A consequence is that empirical
ﬁndings are often hard to compare with theoretical predictions.
In the laboratory, (part of the) structural features of theoretical mod-
els are implemented. With respect to the relation between technological
spillovers and (explicit or implicit) R&D cooperation, this would imply
that R&D decisions and spillovers are implemented in the laboratory in
the way deﬁned by theory. This makes it possible to analyse the relation
in a general and straightforward way. A similar argument may be used
with respect to the relation between R&D cooperation and tacit product
market collusion.
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LABORATORY RESEARCH ON R&D
AND RELATED GAMES
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of experiments that are
related to the R&D models as examined in chapter 2. In section 4.2 we
overview the scarce literature on R&D experiments that are mostly based
on noncooperative R&D games. The experiments are either mere tests of
theoretical predictions or they serve to gain further insight on the R&D
decision process. We have not found examples of experiments on stan-
dard cooperative (process) R&D games as they exist in the IO literature.
The likelihood of tacit cooperation has been studied in the context of
pricing and quantity games (oligopoly games) and in the context of pub-
lic goods/bads games. All games are examples of social dilemmas with
a continuous action space (Kollock, 1998; Eaton, 2004). These games are
noncooperative and have a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto-dominated.
OligopolygamesarerelatedtotheR&Dmodelsintwoways. First, strate-
gic interactions in R&D and in product markets have similar characteris-
tics, and second, the second stage of R&D models mostly is a pricing or
quantity decision stage. The link between R&D decisions and decisions
in public goods/bads games concerns externalities of actions. In section
4.3 some of the most important conclusions that are based on these re-
lated experiments are put together.
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4.2 R&D experiments
In Isaac and Reynolds (1986, 1988) results of a static experiment on a sto-
chastic invention model where the probability of producing a practically
relevant innovation depends on the amount of R&D investment are re-
ported. The R&D decision was operationalised by letting subjects choose
anumberofdrawswithaconstantcost. Theunderlyingmodelisactually
a single-period model of a tournament type where the emergence of sev-
eral winners is not excluded by the model or by assumption. If the race
had several winners, they simply shared the prize. As such, the under-
lying model is not one of (continuous) timing. An experimental environ-
ment without perfect appropriability was compared with a winner-take-
all environment. Partial appropriability was exogenously determined by
the experimenters and was introduced by allowing each subject to re-
ceive a positive proﬁt, as long as at least one of the subjects innovated (as
e.g. in Stewart, 1983). Another treatment variable was market structure.
Treatments were run with four and nine sellers.
The authors found strong support for most of the conclusions of tour-
nament models (as in 2.2.1). First, they found that without spillovers,
subjects strongly overinvested in R&D compared to the social optimum.
A second result was that an increase in the number of ﬁrms reduced indi-
vidual R&D investment but increased total industry investment. Finally,
experimental evidence also indicated that with spillovers R&D invest-
ment was lower than without spillovers.
Hey and Reynolds (1991) and Zizzo (2002) are examples of experi-
ments on dynamic multi-stage patent races. The former experiment is
based on the deterministic patent race in Fudenberg et al. (1983), and
the latter on the stochastic patent race in Harris and Vickers (1987), but
in both models ﬁrms go through a pre-speciﬁed number of steps before
‘winning an innovation’. In Hey and Reynolds (1991) subjects simulta-
neously and independently had to choose whether to invest nothing in
R&D (going zero steps) or to invest in R&D at a low (going one step) or
high rate (going two steps), where going two steps costs more than go-
ing two times one step. Both subjects that reached the winning state at
the same time shared the prize1. In Zizzo (2002) ﬁrms could choose to
invest a number whereby the cost of investing was calculated according
to a quadratic cost function. The winner of each period was randomly
1As such, the underlying model is not a ‘pure’ tournament.
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chosen with the probability of winning depending on the rate of R&D
investment.
Both experiments failed to provide evidence for the underlying mod-
els that predict that if ﬁrms are tied, they invest in R&D at a high rate
and that if they lag behind, they invest less or nothing at all. Zizzo (2002)
did ﬁnd evidence for the theoretical prediction that tied competitors in-
vest more the closer they are towards the end of the race. Since the Nash
equilibrium of their game might have been too complex to understand,
Hey and Reynolds (1991) performed a verbal protocol analysis in a later
experiment so as to have a better idea on the decision processes of the
subjects. Their main conclusion still was that Nash equilibrium strate-
gies were not always followed.
A somewhat different approach is used in Sbriglia and Hey (1994)
who stress the complexity of an R&D decision problem rather than focus-
ing on a comparison of experimental behaviour with theoretical (Nash)
predictions. In their experiment subjects had to ﬁnd an unknown combi-
nation of a number of different letters of the alphabet during an endoge-
nous number of rounds, each ﬁxed in time. At the end of each period
they could buy information at a ﬁxed cost on the amount of letters in
their proposed trial combination that were correct. High- and low-cost
treatments were included and in part of the treatments the information
was noisy. To gain full information on the amount of correct letters, addi-
tional costs were necessary. At the end of each period subjects were also
informed on the performance of their competitors.
Main results are that winners applied a successful search strategy and
generally invested more than losers. Losers used similar search strate-
gies, but invested not enough or were not lucky. Furthermore, competi-
tion resulting from joint discovery enhanced investment and decreased
the number of rounds before completion of the task2. In the noisy infor-
mation treatments, the number of incompetent and random players was
higher than in the deterministic information treatments and experiments
lasted more rounds.
Examples of dynamic experiments where subjects were to make R&D
and price/quantity decisions are Isaac and Reynolds (1992) and Jullien
and Rufﬁeux (2001). None of the two examples is based on a speciﬁc
2These results seem to correspond to some of the predictions of multi-stage patent
race models as tested in Hey and Reynolds (1991) and Zizzo (2002), but are based on
descriptive rather than statistical analyses.
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theoretical model. Isaac and Reynolds (1992) simulated a posted-offer
market by the computer. In the ﬁrst ﬁve periods, subjects were only to
make price and maximum-selling-quantity decisions and beginning with
period 6, subjects could also make R&D decisions which resulted in last-
ing cost reductions according to a stochastic invention mechanism (as in
Isaac and Reynolds, 1986, 1988).
The experimental results of four-sellers markets give support to be-
haviour that the authors classify as Schumpeterian competition, charac-
terised by a combination of engagement in costly innovation and falling
prices and by rising concentration. Market prices under monopoly de-
creased more slowly than under oligopoly. As such, the beneﬁts ﬂew
more to consumers under oligopoly than under monopoly. Oligopoly
R&D investment was generally lower than the social optimum, except in
the last rounds, but it is unclear whether it was close to an equilibrium
prediction.
In Jullien and Rufﬁeux (2001) the market is characterised by a dou-
ble auction with human buyers. They introduced spillovers by letting
R&D decisions of a ﬁrm yield industry-wide cost reductions with a time
lag. Treatments with deterministic innovation were run, with certainty
over the outcome of the R&D investment, and treatments with stochastic
innovation, as in Isaac and Reynolds (1992).
Market prices generally converged towards their competitive level.
When all oligopolists simultaneously gained a cost reduction that shifted
the aggregate supply curve downwards (cf. spillovers), adjustment of
market prices to their new competitive level in the deterministic games
was slower and beneﬁts of the innovations initially solely accrued to pro-
ducers. Uncertainty caused more heterogeneity in R&D decisions and
yielded a categorisation of leaders, challengers and followers. Leaders
invested and kept investing, challengers tried to catch-up the closer they
were to the leader of the race and followers mainly stopped investing,
whichisconsistentwithpredictionsofsomemulti-stagepatentracemod-
els. Uncertainty also yielded prices that are further away from equilib-
rium predictions. Finally, only R&D decisions with uncertainty were re-
duced by spillovers.
Finally, we consider two recent but unpublished experiments on the
formation and evolution of RJVs in a patent race framework (i.e. Silipo,
2001, 2003). The experiment of Silipo (2001) is based on a dynamic patent
race model with two ﬁrms, developed in the same paper (see 2.4.1). In
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some treatments subjects were assumed to collude in the ensuing prod-
uct market while in others they were assumed to compete, with collusion
yielding higher proﬁts. Coinciding with theory, in the high-proﬁt (collu-
sive) treatment more RJVs were formed than in the low-proﬁt treatment.
Also coinciding with theory, RJVs were not formed when there was a
large gap in knowledge between subjects at the beginning of the race.
With a smaller gap, theory predicts that they are not formed, but in the
experiment they were formed. Finally, experimental evidence also sup-
ports the theoretical prediction that R&D effort with cooperation is lower
than without cooperation.
The experiment of Silipo (2003) is less related to a speciﬁc theoretical
model. In markets with four and seven producers, it has been investi-
gated how endogenous RJV formation and breaking down evolved in
time. In a dynamic patent race, subjects had to propose in each period
with whom to cooperate, following an exclusive membership rule (as in
2.5.8) and how much to invest in R&D. It turned out that winning a race
was more probable if being part of a wide R&D coalition. But only in
four-player races there was industry-wide cooperation. Another result
was that players with an initial advantage started to cooperate among
themselves, which was mostly maintained in the four-player races. In




Many IO experiments have concentrated on identifying conditions under
which prices or quantities of oligopolists correspond to theoretical bench-
marks. As in a noncooperative R&D game, these theoretical benchmarks
usually correspond to, on the one hand, a Nash equilibrium prediction
and, on the other hand, a cooperative level of prices or quantities, where
thecooperativeoptionyieldsmoreproﬁtthanthenoncooperativeoption.
An overview of oligopoly experiments is given by Holt (1995).
A ﬁrst general result is that in oligopoly experiments with more than
two ﬁrms, behaviour is usually not anti-competitive and Nash equilib-
rium predictions often perform well. In duopoly experiments, on the
other hand, there is a larger probability that prices or quantities are above
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or below their predicted equilibrium level. Tacit collusion3 has already
been observed in duopoly experiments, especially in multi-period ex-
periments that consist of the repetition of single-stage games (see also
Davis and Holt, 1993; Keser, 2000). Full efﬁciency is not always obtained,
though.
According to Holt (1995), tacit collusion is more probable in duopoly
experiments because a defecting ﬁrm is identiﬁed and can be immedi-
ately punished. Furthermore, in experiments with only two sellers, it is
easier to monitor the decisions of the other ﬁrm. Experimental evidence
for this hypothesis has been found by Huck et al. (2004). In Cournot mar-
kets with two ﬁrms, some collusion resulted, in markets with three ﬁrms,
output was often at the Nash level while four-ﬁrms markets were even
more competitive.
Another factor which has extensively been examined is nonbinding
communication. Effects of communication on pricing behaviour in ex-
periments are not unambiguous though. Holt (1995) concludes that the
effect depends on the type of communication, the trading institution and
incentives to defect at the margin. With posted prices and differentiated
products, the effect is the largest. In Holt and Davis (1990) evidence is
found that prices initially increase after price announcements but in the
end return to their initial lower levels. On the other hand, Harstad et al.
(1998) ﬁnd that the announcement of prices leads to higher prices than
the Nash equilibrium level, although not as high as the joint proﬁt max-
imising level. Cason (1995) comes to a similar conclusion but adds that,
when it is optional to send a signal, there is more tacit collusion than
when one signal is sent in each repetition of a pricing game. This implies
that the simple sending of a signal indicates a willingness to cooperate.
As such, communication may be important to build trust among the sell-
ers (see e.g. Muren and Pyddoke, 1999). Thus, with an appropriate form
of nonbinding communication, tacit collusion may arise in experimental
markets.
Other factors that may enhance cooperative behaviour in duopolies are
ﬁxed matching (Holt, 1985; Huck et al., 2001), symmetry in payoffs or
costs (Mason et al., 1992; Keser, 2000), the availability of information on
theotherﬁrm’sproﬁtwithﬁxedmatching(MasonandPhillips,1997)and
the nonavailability of information on the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt with random
3Tacit collusion refers to a situation where ﬁrms collude in a market by setting high
prices or restricting quantity without having explicitly agreed on in a binding way.
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matching (Altavilla et al., 2003). In Cason (1994) and Cason and Mason
(1999) information sharing is a decision variable in the experiments in
that subjects have the possibility to share information on demand and/or
cost conditions before setting prices or choosing output. They ﬁnd that
information is often shared, even in situations where the scope for col-
luding is low, and that it may facilitate tacit collusion.
4.3.2 Public good/bad experiments
The noncooperative R&D stage of an oligopoly model, given ﬁrms’ ex-
pectations on prices or quantities in the second stage, is in a way related
to a public good/bad game. If spillovers in the noncooperative R&D
gamearecomplete, R&Ddecisionshavepositiveexternalitiesinthesense
that proﬁt of other ﬁrms increases as a ﬁrm raises its R&D investment.
This mechanism of positive externalities also works in a public goods
game, through the system of voluntary contribution.
The voluntary-contributions mechanism implies that each subject of
a group has to decide how much of her initial endowment to contribute
to the group and how much to keep for herself4. After having made their
decisions, the subjects receive a percentage of total group contribution as
areturn, ontopofwhatremainsfromtheirinitialendowment. Contribut-
ing nothing corresponds to the Nash equilibrium and contributing every-
thing to the cooperative optimum. The game can have a positiveor a neg-
ative frame. Under a positive frame, positive externalities of the contri-
bution to the group are stressed. Under a negative frame (often referred
to as a public bad game) it is stressed that the decision on how much to
keep in private has negative externalities. Public good experiments often
yield higher levels of cooperation than their public bad equivalents (An-
dreoni, 1995b; Offerman, 1996; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Park,
2000) which in this context is often referred to as a framing effect5.
It is generally found that in one-period games without repetition sub-
jects do not behave according to the Nash equilibrium but contribute
more than predicted, or in other words cooperate to a certain extent6.
4For overviews of public good experiments see e.g. Davis and Holt (1993), Ledyard
(1995) and Roth (1995).
5A recent study of Brandts and Schwieren (2004) argue that the framing effect can be
opposite.
6As to avoid confusion, we note that the cooperation meant here is comparable to the
concept of tacit collusion in an oligopoly context. Subjects have no possibilities to agree
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In experiments with repetition, it is common that subjects’ behaviour
evolves from contributing more than predicted in some ﬁrst rounds to
free-riding in later rounds (see e.g. Isaac and Walker, 1988; Ledyard, 1995;
Andreoni, 1995b). So, repetition leads to reduced contributions to the
public good.
Roughly three possible explanations for this observation exist in the
literature (see e.g. Davis and Holt, 1993; Fischbacher et al., 2001). First,
subjects may learn to play the SPN equilibrium during the experiment,
which makes initial cooperation a mistake. Evidence provided by An-
dreoni (1995a) suggests that it is not only ‘confusion’ that makes subjects
deviate from SPN play. Second, cooperation may be a consequence of
strategic play and diminish or disappear when the other in a pair cheats.
Third, some of the subjects may be conditional cooperators and only coop-
erate (contribute) if others cooperate (contribute).
Davis and Holt (1993) and Ledyard (1995) give an overview of other
factors that have inﬂuenced individual contributions to the public good.
Examples of controllable factors that increase contributions are the mar-
ginal per capita return, common knowledge and symmetry with respect
to payoffs. Factors as training in economics and experience with similar
experiments also seem to increase the probability of free-riding but are
less easy to control.
Isaac and Walker (1988) and Isaac et al. (1994) have investigated ef-
fects of group size in public good experiments and ﬁnd that an increase
in group size, when coupled with a decrease in marginal return, leads to
more free-riding7.
Finally, communication before the game is played, e.g. in the form of
a simple cheap talk treatment, signiﬁcantly increases contribution rates
and consequently total group return. Beside this, repetition with com-
munication tends to increase contributions (Isaac et al., 1985; Isaac and
Walkers, 1988; Davis and Holt, 1993; Ledyard, 1995; Sally, 1995).
on their contributions in a binding way.
7That is when groups of 4 and 10 subjects are compared. Other conclusions are made





cooperative stochastic R&D models or dynamic patent races, either with
or without a possibility to form RJVs, as benchmarks. A general observa-
tion in simple static R&D experiments is that Nash equilibrium predic-
tions of R&D decisions seem to perform well. In more difﬁcult dynamic
experiments, such as patent races, theoretical predictions are less sup-
ported by experimental behaviour. As such, subjects seem not to be able
tocalculateNashstrategiesinmorecomplex, dynamicenvironments. Re-
cent experiments on RJV formation in a dynamic patent race did provide
partial support for theoretical predictions, though.
In dynamic two-stage experiments with R&D and product market de-
cisions, the evolution of prices or quantities was the central issue and less
attention has been paid to comparisons of experimental R&D decisions
with theoretical predictions. In general, whether R&D is either stochas-
tic or deterministic, prices are found to be close to the competitive level,
which makes the beneﬁts of innovation accrue almost fully to consumers.
When spillovers are taken into account, such that all producers gain a
cost reduction, it takes more time in deterministic R&D games for prices
to adjust to their competitive level.
In some experiments technological spillovers have been introduced,
but in those experiments there were no possibilities to engage in R&D co-
operation. On the other hand, experiments where R&D cooperation was
possible, did not allow for technological spillovers, but rather focused on
the formation and evolution of RJVs. The relation between technological
spillovers and implicit (tacit) or explicit R&D cooperation has not been
the topic of experimental research before. Neither have experiments been
performed before to examine the relation between (explicit) R&D coop-
eration and tacit collusion in the product market.
Given that noncooperative R&D games of the type of AJ as described
in 2.3 have certain characteristics in common with public good/bad and
oligopoly games, and that the latter games have been extensively exam-
ined in the experimental literature, we also provided a short overview
of the main conclusions and factors that enhance (tacit) cooperation in
oligopoly and public good/bad games. Factors as number of ﬁrms or
subjects in the market or group, repetition, information conditions, ex-
perience and communication possibilities were found to be important in
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A COOPERATIVE R&D EXPERIMENT
5.1 Introduction
As shown in chapter 2, in the last decade an abundance of theoretical pa-
pers modelling R&D competition and cooperation, with allowance for
technological spillovers, have arisen. Most of these are extensions or
modiﬁcations of the AJ model, where duopolists ﬁrst decide on R&D ex-
penditures and then compete in the product market (d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin, 1988). In this type of model R&D of a ﬁrm reduces its unit
production cost and may have spillovers, reducing the unit cost of the
other ﬁrm. A general ﬁnding is that R&D investment and social welfare,
deﬁned as the sum of producer and consumer surplus, are higher under
joint proﬁt maximisation (R&D cooperation) than under individual proﬁt
maximisation(R&Dcompetition)ifthespilloverisaboveacertainthresh-
old, and lower otherwise. The results may be interpreted as a rationale
for government stimulation of the formation of research joint ventures in
industries with large knowledge spillovers.
A related and important question is whether spillovers inﬂuence ﬁrms’
R&D behaviour, regardless of the effect on social welfare. There exist a
number of empirical studies that address this issue (see also section 3.4 in
chapter 3), but these have provided mixed results. Cassiman and Veugel-
ers (2002), for example, distinguish between different kinds of partners,
of which about 10% are horizontally related competitors, and ﬁnd that
the probability of ﬁrms cooperating in R&D is lower when outgoing spill-
overs are high (low appropriability). The authors interpret these results
as being in conﬂict with most of the AJ like theoretical models, which pre-
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dict that—when spillovers are above a critical level—cooperative R&D
incentives of ﬁrms increase with the level of (incoming ´ and outgoing)
spillovers. On the other hand, the authors also ﬁnd that there is more
R&Dcooperationwhenincomingspilloversarehigh, whichcanbeviewed
as evidence in support of the theoretical prediction. Kaiser (2002a) ﬁnds
that (horizontal) spillovers increase the probability to cooperate in R&D,
while Belderbos et al. (2004) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant inﬂuence1. Evidence for a
positive relationship between outgoing spillovers and R&D cooperation
is provided by Hern´ an et al. (2003).
Given the difﬁculty in measuring spillovers, the differences in data
sets, in econometric estimation methods and in ways of deﬁning or com-
puting proxies that should represent technological spillovers2, it is not
surprising that these empirical studies have yielded different results.
Inthischapterresultsofanexperimentarepresentedthatinvestigates
whether the extent to which R&D cooperation occurs is different for dif-
ferent levels of spillovers3. The experiment attempts to reproduce the
basic AJ model as close as possible, which implies that—so as to mimic
the scenario of R&D cooperation—for different levels of spillovers, treat-
ments are included where participants can credibly commit to the R&D
level that maximises joint proﬁt (contract treatments). Behaviour in the
contract treatments is compared with behaviour in baseline treatments,
where no such interaction was possible.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 5.2 we present the AJ
model and its main implications and conclusions in detail. In section 5.3
we elaborate on the notion of incentives to cooperate in R&D and section 5.4
gives an overview of the experimental design. The experimental results
are provided in section 5.5 and section 5.6 concludes.
1They do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of vertical spillovers on vertical cooperation.
2Spillovers are difﬁcult to measure empirically because they can arise through dif-
ferent channels, such as through the movement of R&D personnel, networks, meetings,
patent applications and reverse engineering (see Veugelers, 1998).
3Findings based on the experiment in this chapter and the ﬁrst experiment of chapter
6 are summarised in the paper titled ‘Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in exper-




AJ analyse a complete information game where duopolists simultane-
ously decide on R&D in a ﬁrst stage and engage in Cournot competition
in a second stage. We consider a symmetric duopoly with ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm
2. The industry is characterised by a linear inverse demand function of
the following form:
P = a − b(Qi + Qj) (5.1)
where a,b > 0;
Qi + Qj ≤ a/b;
Qi is the production quantity of ﬁrm i.
The unit cost function of ﬁrm i is given by ci(xi,xj) = α − γ(xi +
βxj) with α < a and α > γ(xi + βxj)4 where xi denotes ﬁrm i’s R&D
and β is a spillover parameter between 0 and 1. In order to guarantee
decreasing returns to R&D investment, the R&D cost is modelled by a












The game is solved using backward induction. In the second stage
ﬁrms choose quantities to maximise proﬁt, taking ﬁrst-stage R&D invest-
ments and their rival’s quantity as given:
max
Qi
πi i = 1,2.
Solving for productionquantity gives the following expressionfor the
SPN equilibrium of Qi in terms of xi and xj:
Qi =
a − α + 2γ(xi + βxj) − γ(xj + βxi)
3b
i = 1,2; j  = i, (5.3)
and the following for the ﬁrst-stage proﬁt function:
πi =
 







i = 1,2; j  = i.
(5.4)
4AJ do not have the γ parameter in their model. We introduce it to make absolute
differences in proﬁts between R&D competition and R&D cooperation in the experiment
more similar across the spillover levels used in the experiment (see also ﬁgure 5.3). The
inclusion of γ does not change any of the conclusions of AJ.
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Welfare is deﬁned as the sum of producer surplus, π1 + π2, and con-
sumer surplus, U(q0,q1,q2) − p1q1 − p2q2 − q0. For a utility function of
the form U(q0,q1,q2) = q0 + a(q1 + q2) − b
2(q2
1 + q2
2 + 2q1q2) where the
index 0 refers to a num´ eraire good (Singh and Vives, 1984; Hinloopen,
2000b), welfare is computed as follows:





2 + 2q1q2). (5.5)
At this point it is necessary to distinguish between a ﬁrst stage where
a noncooperative R&D game is played and a ﬁrst stage where R&D deci-
sions are made cooperatively.
5.2.1 Noncooperative R&D game




πi i = 1,2,
yields the following reaction function for ﬁrm i with i, j = 1,2 and i  = j:
xi =
2γ(a − α)(2− β)
9bδ − 2γ2(2− β)2 +
2γ2(2β − 1)(2− β)
9bδ − 2γ2(2− β)2 xj (5.6)
and the following (symmetric) SPN equilibrium R&D level:
xSPN =
2γ(a − α)(2− β)
9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)(2− β)
(5.7)
with a second-order condition of 9bδ > 2γ2(2− β)2.
The corresponding equilibrium production level is
QSPN =
3δ(a − α)
9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)(2− β)
(5.8)
and corresponding proﬁt is
πSPN =
δ(a − α)2 
9bδ − 2γ2(2− β)2 
 
9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)(2− β)
 2 . (5.9)
For equilibrium R&D decisions to be symmetric, and not equal to
corner solutions, the stability requirement as formulated by Henriques
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(1990) needs to be satisﬁed. The requirement is stronger than the second-
order condition, as long as β  = 1/2, and is equal to5
9bδ > 2γ2(2− β)2 + 2γ2(2− β)|2β − 1|.
Welfare computed by equation 5.5 under the noncooperative mode is
WSPN =
4δ(a − α)2 
9bδ − γ2(2− β)2 
 
9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)(2− β)
 2 . (5.10)
5.2.2 Cooperative R&D game
Under the cooperative regime it is assumed that ﬁrms can credibly com-
mit to the cooperative R&D level, i.e. the R&D level that maximises joint
proﬁt. How ﬁrms ﬁnally succeed in committing to the cooperative R&D
level is treated as a black box in most of the theoretical IO literature6.






πi i = 1,2,
and results in a symmetric cooperative R&D level of
xJPM =
2γ(a − α)(1+ β)
9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)2 (5.11)
with the second-order condition “along the path of equal investments”
(Salant and Shaffer, 1998) being 9bδ > 2γ2(1+ β)2.








9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)2. (5.13)
5See appendix B.1 for details.
6For an overview of models in the coalition and network formation literature that deal
with the formation of R&D cooperatives we refer to section 2.5.8 in chapter 2.
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As argued by Salant and Shaffer (1998) an additional condition is nec-
essary for the combination of R&D decisions of ﬁrm 1 and 2 that max-
imises joint proﬁt to be symmetric. This condition is7
bδ > 2γ2(1− β)2,
and is stronger than the second-order condition and than the stability
condition for β < 1/28.
Welfare computed by equation 5.5 under the cooperative mode is
WJPM =
4δ(a − α)2 
9bδ − γ2(1+ β)2 
 
9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)2 2 . (5.14)
Comparing the outcomes of the noncooperative and the cooperative
R&D game yields two important conclusions. First, under R&D cooper-
ation R&D investment, production quantity and social welfare as mea-
sured by the sum of consumer and producer surplus are strictly higher
than in the noncooperative R&D regime only when technological spill-
overs are above a certain threshold, that is when β > 1/29. For low spill-
overs, R&D cooperation decreases R&D investment, production quantity
and social welfare. Thus, policy makers only prefer that ﬁrms cooperate
in R&D if technological spillovers are high enough.
Second, proﬁt under R&D cooperation (πJPM) is larger than proﬁt un-
der R&D competition (πSPN) for all values of β  = 1/2 and therefore ﬁrms
would—irrespective of the level of spillovers given that it is different from
1/2—prefer to play a cooperative over a noncooperative R&D game (see
also Kamien et al., 1992; Hinloopen, 2000b). And if for one reason or the
other, ﬁrms cannot play the cooperative game but play the noncoopera-
tive game, then theory predicts that ﬁrms behave according to the SPN
equilibrium, irrespective of the level of spillovers.
The main conclusion that we draw from the model is that there exists
a conﬂict between what ﬁrms prefer and what society would prefer. The
main aim of the experiments discussed in this and the following chapter
is to shed more light on whether differences in R&D behaviour arise for
different levels of spillovers in a strictly controlled but real environment
where interactions are based on the AJ model.
7See appendix B.2 for details.
8See appendix B.3 for comparisons of the different conditions.
9Given the second-order conditions it can easily be shown that WJPM > WSPN for
β > 1/2 and that WJPM < WSPN for β < 1/2.
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In this section we elaborate on the deﬁnition and measurement of incen-
tives to cooperate in R&D. If the AJ model and its assumptions are strictly
followed, ﬁrms can only have incentives to cooperate in R&D in the coop-
erative R&D game. In the noncooperative R&D game ﬁrms do not have
an option to bindingly commit to the JPM R&D level, and can therefore
not cooperate in R&D, according to the deﬁnition of R&D cooperation
used by AJ.
On the other hand, empirical analyses based on experimental data
have shown that behaviour in noncooperative games often signiﬁcantly
deviates from the SPN prediction towards joint proﬁt maximisation10. In
a product market context this behaviour is often referred to as tacit collu-
sion or simply collusion (see e.g. Tirole, 1995; Potters et al., 2004). In the
context of prisoner’s dilemma, public good, ultimatum or trust games,
for instance, the terms cooperative behaviour or cooperation are often used to
refer to JPM behaviour (see e.g. Andreoni, 1995a; Axelrod, 1984; Brosig,
2002; Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Fehr and G¨ archter, 2000a,b; Selten and
Apesteguia, 2005)11.
Terms as R&D cooperation and incentives to cooperate in R&D, which
are often used in this and the following chapter, cover a different type of
‘cooperative’ behaviour depending on what game is played. In a coop-
erative R&D game, the terms refer to explicit R&D cooperation, implying
that binding R&D agreements are made. In a noncooperative R&D game,
on the other hand, the terms refer to tacit or implicit R&D cooperation,
implying that ﬁrms’ R&D decisions deviate from the SPN equilibrium
towards the JPM level although no binding agreements can be made. In
what follows we provide an overview of possible interpretations of incen-
tives to cooperate in R&D in noncooperative and cooperative R&D games.
10See 4.3 in chapter 4 for details on conditions under which this behaviour occurs in
experiments.
11The term conditional cooperation, which is used in a noncooperative context, has
started to appear in the recent literature on experimental and behavioural economics
(see e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001; Bohnet and K¨ ubler, 2005). A conditionally cooperative
player only contributes something to a public good (or cooperates) if the other player(s)
contribute something (or cooperate).
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5.3.1 Noncooperative R&D game
In the one-shot noncooperative R&D game assuming Cournot competi-
tion in the product market, traditional game theory predicts that ﬁrms
behave according to the SPN equilibrium and thus have no incentives
to cooperate in R&D as long as β  = 1/2. For β = 1/2, proﬁt under
R&D cooperation and R&D competition are the same. If the same game
is ﬁnitely repeated the backward induction rule can be followed which
gives the same prediction for each stage-game (see e.g. Friedman, 1989;
Bierman and Fernandez, 1993).
Interpretation 1 There exist no incentives to cooperate in R&D in the one-shot
or ﬁnitely repeated noncooperative game.
When following the above interpretation, incentives to cooperate in the
noncooperative R&D game are the same for all spillover values.
On the other hand, experimental evidence on related ﬁnitely repeated
duopoly games such as quantity and pricing games, public good games
and prisoner’s dilemma games suggests that players in these games of-
ten deviate from SPN towards joint proﬁt maximising behaviour, and
as such cooperate at least to some extent12. This may indicate that in a
ﬁnitely repeated game, strategies are followed as if the game were inﬁ-
nitely repeated. Selten and Stoecker (1986) and Normann and Wallace
(2004), for instance, ﬁnd that in a prisoner’s dilemma experiment the ter-
mination rules, where a ﬁxed termination rule mimics a ﬁnitely repeated
game and a random termination rule an inﬁnitely repeated game, do not
signiﬁcantly affect cooperation rates. In other words, players have the
same incentives to cooperate under both types of rules.
Therefore we have a look at spillovers and incentives to cooperate in
an inﬁnitely repeated noncooperative R&D game, where players may fol-
low a trigger strategy as discussed by Friedman (1971) (see also Martin,
2001, at page 299). Under a trigger strategy a player starts to cooperate
and keeps cooperating as long as the other does. Once the other defects,
the player defects in all subsequent periods which implies that both play
the SPN equilibrium from the subsequent period onwards.
The expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm that cooperates in R&D at each stage is




12See section 4.3 in chapter 4 for an overview of oligopoly and public good experiments
and e.g. Colman (1982) for an overview of prisoner’s dilemma experiments.
765.3 Note on incentives to cooperate in R&D
with α representing the discount rate and πJPM the proﬁt under R&D
cooperation.
The expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm that always plays best-reply is




where πSPN is the proﬁt under R&D competition and ˆ π the proﬁt from
defecting while the other maximises joint proﬁt.
The trigger strategy is a noncooperative equilibrium if
Vtrigger ≥ Vbest reply, or α ≥
ˆ π − πJPM
ˆ π − πSPN.
In other words, the discount rate α should be high enough.




ˆ π − πJPM (5.15)
and is always satisﬁed if r is close to zero (Martin, 2001). We call the right-
hand side of equation 5.15 the Friedman index. The higher the Friedman
index, the more probable that r is below it and the higher the possibility
that the above trigger strategy is a noncooperative equilibrium13. The
interpretation of incentives to cooperate in R&D in an inﬁnitely repeated
context may be summarised as follows.
Interpretation 2 IncentivestocooperateinR&Dintheinﬁnitelyrepeatednon-
cooperative game are measured by the Friedman index.
Figure 5.1 gives the Friedman index for the AJ and the KMZ model
as a function of technological spillovers. For both models incentives to
cooperate in R&D, measured by the Friedman index, increase for β < 1/2
and decrease for β > 1/2. In the AJ model, incentives to cooperate in an
inﬁnitely repeated game context are the same for β = 0 and β = 1 while
in the KMZ model it is easier to sustain R&D cooperation when β = 1
than when β = 0.
13Martin (1995); van Wegberg (1995); Potters et al. (2004) e.g. use this approach. Alter-
natively, one could look at optimal penal codes based on a stick-and-carrot strategy as
formalised by Abreu (1986) (see also Martin, 2001). It is straightforward to show that op-
timal stick-and-carrot punishments in the AJ model are associated with degrees of R&D
cooperation (deﬁned by 5.5.1) that are the same for β = 0 and β = 1.
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Figure 5.1: Friedman index for AJ and KMZ
Thus, either interpretation of incentives to cooperate in R&D predicts
that incentives to cooperate are the same for β = 0 and β = 1 in the AJ
model.
5.3.2 Cooperative R&D game
Based on theory, incentives to cooperate in R&D in the cooperative R&D
game assuming Cournot competition in the product market should be
interpreted as a dichotomous variable that indicates whether ﬁrms earn
more proﬁt under R&D cooperation than under R&D competition.
Interpretation 3 Incentives to cooperate in R&D in the cooperative game are
maximal if proﬁt under R&D cooperation is higher than proﬁt under R&D com-
petition.
Since as long as β  = 1/2, ﬁrms earn more proﬁt under R&D cooperation
than under R&D competition (πJPM > πSPN for β  = 1/2) they always
have maximum incentives to cooperate, whether the R&D game is one-
shot, ﬁnitely or inﬁnitely repeated. For β  = 1/2 ﬁrms are indifferent
between R&D competition and R&D cooperation. Thus, when following
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the above interpretation, incentives to cooperate in R&D in the coopera-
tive R&D game are the same for all spillover values14.
In some empirical studies on the relation between spillovers and in-
centives to cooperate in R&D (overviewed in chapter 3, section 3.4) we
ﬁnd the following statements that refer to the ﬁndings of AJ- or KMZ-
type models: “These models would predict that ﬁrms are more likely
to form cooperative agreements in R&D when the appropriation regime
is loose.” (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002, page 1179) and “These mod-
els thus predict that spillovers are an important positive driver of R&D
cooperation.” (Belderbos et al., 2004, page 4). These authors may have
interpreted incentives to cooperate in the cooperative R&D game as fol-
lows.
Interpretation 4 Incentives to cooperate in R&D in the cooperative game are
measured bythe relation between proﬁtunderR&Dcooperation andproﬁt under
R&D competition, provided that β is high enough.
Indeed, if we look at the relation between proﬁt under R&D coopera-









< 0 if β < 1/2. This implies that—when spill-
overs are above a critical threshold—ﬁrms engaged in R&D cooperation
are increasingly more proﬁtable the higher the spillovers. Figure 5.2 il-
lustrates this point for the parameter values used in the experiment dis-
cussed later in this chapter, but the same argument goes for other pa-
rameter values. The ﬁgure gives
πJPM
πSPN as a function of β for the same
parameter values for the AJ- and the KMZ model15.
For the benchmark cases β = 0 and β = 1,
πJPM
πSPN is the same for AJ-
type models, but not for KMZ-type models.
If incentives to cooperate in R&D in the cooperative game may be
measured by the relative difference in proﬁt between R&D cooperation
14The same conclusion goes for models of the KMZ-type. Note that when products
are differentiated the threshold is not 1/2 but a function of the product differentiation
parameter.
15Amir (2000) has shown that to obtain the theoretical predictions of the KMZ model,
δ in the R&D cost function of the AJ model should be substituted by δ(1+ β).
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Figure 5.2: Relative proﬁt differences for AJ and KMZ
and R&D competition, these might as well be measured by their absolute
difference.
Interpretation 5 Incentives to cooperate in R&D in the cooperative game are
measured by the absolute difference between proﬁt under R&D cooperation and
proﬁt under R&D competition.
Figure 5.3 illustrates this point by plotting the absolute difference in
proﬁt between the two R&D scenarios, πJPM − πSPN, as a function of β
for the AJ and KMZ models. In the KMZ model, πJPM − πSPN is higher
for β = 0 than for β = 1. On the other hand, if the same rationale would
be applied on the basis of the AJ model, where πJPM − πSPN is higher for
β = 1 than for β = 0, the prediction would be that spillovers tends to
increase incentives to cooperate in R&D16.
In the empirical study of Kaiser (2002b) we ﬁnd that “an increase in
spillovers (...) tends to reduce incentives to collaborate in R&D” referring
to the predictions of KMZ (p. 752). The author has either used one of
the two previous interpretations assuming that β is below a threshold or
16Note that the same conclusions may be made on the basis of any other combination
of parameter values.
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Figure 5.3: Absolute proﬁt differences for AJ and KMZ
compared a scenario where β = 0 with a scenario where β = 1. Indeed,
for the KMZ model
πJPM
πSPN and πJPM − πSPN are lower for β = 1 than for
β = 0 (see also ﬁgure 5.2).
5.4 Experimental design and hypotheses
The experiment concentrates on the R&D stage that is nested in the more
general two-stage game. The quantity decision is controlled by setting
production quantity at its Nash-Cournot equilibrium, as a function of the
ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures (see equation 5.3). By controlling quantity in
this way we assume that anti-trust policy works perfectly and that coop-
eration in the ﬁrst stage does not translate into cooperation in the product
market which is a standard assumption in the majority of AJ-type mod-
els. Furthermore, this enables us to avoid testing for optimisation in both
stages (R&D stage and product market) and for backward induction.
Treatments have been run for the most widely separated levels of
spillovers, i.e. no (β = 0) versus full (β = 1) spillovers, to sharpen possi-
ble contrasts in the results (Friedman and Sunder, 1994). Moreover, as is
shown in ﬁgure 5.1, the Friedman index is smallest for β = 0 and β = 1
making tacit R&D cooperation in the baseline treatments (and later on in
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the signaling treatments in chapter 6) less likely than for other values of
β.
While e.g. Amir (2000) suggests that the KMZ model (see Kamien
et al., 1992), where spillovers are input spillovers, may be of more general
use than the AJ model with output spillovers, we chose to base the exper-
iment on the AJ model for three reasons. First, the AJ model has received
much more attention in the literature and has been extended on several
grounds. Second and more importantly, the relation between proﬁt un-
der SPN behaviour in the R&D stage and proﬁt under (implicit or ex-
plicit) R&D cooperation—given SPN behaviour in the product market—
as a function of β is not symmetrically distributed around β = 1/2 in the
KMZ model. We refer to ﬁgure 5.2 in 5.3.1 for an illustration of this point.
The AJ model on the other hand, does have this feature making it more
suitable for designing experiments, as relative proﬁt differences are the
same for β = 0 and β = 1. Finally, in the KMZ model, the Friedman index
is larger when β = 1 than when β = 0 such that a priori expectations in
an inﬁnitely repeated version of the KMZ R&D game are that incentives
to cooperate in R&D are larger when β = 1 (see also 5.3.1 and ﬁgure 5.1).
In the AJ model, the index is the same for both values of the spillover
parameter such that a priori expectations in an inﬁnitely repeated game
are the same for β = 0 and β = 1.
For both levels of spillovers, we ran a treatment without binding con-
tract possibilities and a contract treatment. From here on, the treatments
without contract possibilities are called baseline treatments. Four treat-
ments were run: a baseline and a contract treatment for spillovers levels
of 0 and 1.
The experiment consisted of three computerised experimental ses-
sions with 40 participants representing undergraduate economics stu-
dents and randomly divided into ﬁxed groups of two (duopolies). The
students were recruited by a public ad. Each treatment had 10 randomly
distributedparticipants. Thebaselinetreatmentscoveredtwosessionson
May 15, 2001 and the contract treatments covered one session on March
26, 2003. One could argue that this time lag between both treatments
would endanger the internal validity of the laboratory experiment17, but
given that behaviour in the contract treatments is subject to little variety
after subjects have been able to learn, this should not be a problem18.
17Actually, the time lag is a consequence of referees asking for the contract treatments.
18As is shown in section 5.5 contracted R&D of each duopoly is very close to the JPM
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Table 5.1: Theoretical R&D benchmarks
The baseline treatments were programmed in PHP and MySQL, and
the software toolkit z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (1999) was used for
the contract treatments. None of the subjects had participated in any type
of experiment before. They were not informed about the identity of their
competitor, were not allowed to talk to each other and participated each
in one treatment.
The parameters of the demand function, the R&D cost function and
the unit cost function were the following: a = 250, b = 5, α = 100, γ = 2
and δ = 519. The parameters were chosen in order to guarantee that the
SPN prediction for β = 0 (β = 1) is close to the JPM prediction for β = 1
(β = 0). Corresponding theoretical benchmarks are in table 5.1.
We have further excluded the possibility that asymmetric R&D in-
vestments maximise joint proﬁt. This implies that duopolies making dif-
ferent R&D choices in a round cannot maximise joint proﬁt in that round.
Given that for β = 1 the condition for joint proﬁt maximising investment
to be symmetric is always satisﬁed (see Salant and Shaffer, 1998), we re-
stricted the cooperative R&D level to be symmetric also for β = 0. In this
way, the experimental environment is comparable between treatments
with β = 0 and β = 1.
Subjects were told that they were sellers in a market with two sellers
of a nonspeciﬁed good20. They were told that they were all in the same
situation and subject to the same conditions as their counterpart. Subjects
were asked to make investment decisions in the interval of [0,25]21. To
level in the ﬁnal rounds, both for β = 0 and β = 1.
19The parameter values satisfy requirements of stability as proposed by Henriques
(1990).
20Translated instructions are in appendix C.1
21This interval was necessary to obtain acceptable results for variables such as unit
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allow for learning and to give the theoretical predictions a best chance,
the static R&D stage was repeated 26 times (plus an additional practice
round) and subjects knew this.
The investment decision decreased the subjects’ unit production cost
according to the linear unit cost function and induced an R&D cost, cal-
culated on the basis of the quadratic R&D cost function. The decision
inﬂuenced proﬁt also through equilibrium production quantities. In the
complete spillovers case, subjects were told that their R&D decision also
decreased unit production cost of the other producer in the market, with-
out the latter bearing any additional cost. The computer program en-
abled subjects to simulate their production quantity, selling price, unit
production cost, total R&D cost and proﬁt by ﬁlling in two investment
decisions (their own and the other producer’s).
Each decision period took around two minutes, except the ﬁrst one
which took longer to let subjects become acquainted with the instructions
and the computer program. For participating and carefully following the
instructions they received 2.5 EUR. They were told that additional earn-
ings depended on the sum of the proﬁts in the 26 rounds (decisions in the
ﬁrst round did not count). To calculate additional earnings we divided
for each pair of participants 20 EUR on the basis of the relation between
the sum of their proﬁts gained in the experiment. Average earnings were
10 EUR and each session took less than 80 minutes.
In the contract treatments subjects could propose binding contracts to
their competitor and could accept contracts proposed by their competi-
tor. As in the AJ model of the cooperative R&D game, only symmetric
contract proposals and contracts were allowed. There was no restriction
onthe numberof proposalsthat could be made as long as no contract was
already chosen and as long as one of the two subjects had not entered her
ﬁnal R&D decision22. Once subjects had proposed a contract they were
committed to their proposal when the proposal was accepted. There was
no option to deviate from an accepted contract.
Based on the theoretical predictions in the noncooperative and coop-
erative R&D game (see section 5.2) and given that the ﬁnitely repeated
production cost.
22When a subject wanted to make a contract proposal while a contract was already
established, the subject got a message on her screen saying that is useless to make another
proposal as a contract has already been chosen. A message also appeared when a subject
wanted to make a contract proposal while the other already entered her ﬁnal decision.
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R&D stage game has a unique SPN equilibrium that corresponds to the
prediction in the one-shot R&D game, standard theory-based conjectures
are that subjects will always choose to maximise individual proﬁt in the
baseline treatments and joint proﬁt in the contract treatments, irrespec-
tive of the level of spillovers. Expectations based on theory are formu-
lated in terms of between-treatment comparisons and are summarised in
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The tendency to cooperate in R&D is higher in contract
than in baseline treatments.
Hypothesis 2 The tendency to cooperate in R&D does not differ between
β = 0 and β = 1.
5.5 Experimental results
Intheexperiment, subjects’decisionsareinﬂuencedbytheircompetitor’s
decisions such that observations on R&D decisions are not independent
within duopolies. Using average R&D decisions by duopoly circumvents
this problem and creates independent observations per duopoly. Fur-
thermore, as to have a representative decision for each duopoly, we ﬁrst
calculate averages across rounds23. Reported averages per treatment are
averages of the duopoly-speciﬁc averages.
In what follows we ﬁrst examine descriptive statistics. We further
provide results of nonparametric comparisons between and within treat-
ments. In the last subsection we provide a more detailed analysis of con-
tracting behaviour in the contract treatment.
5.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.2 presents averages and standard deviations of average duopoly
R&D decisions based on all rounds, the ﬁrst ten and the last ten rounds.
The reported standard deviations only measure cross-sectional variabil-
ity, not variability in time. In the baseline treatment with β = 0, average
R&D decisions are close to the SPN R&D level. In the baseline treatment
with β = 1, average R&D in the ﬁrst rounds lies between both theoretical
benchmarks, while in the ten last rounds it is close to the SPN equilib-
rium.
23The same routine is applied in chapters that follow.
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benchmarks average R&D decisions (st. dev.)
xSPN xJPM rounds 1-26 rounds 1-10 rounds 17-26
β = 0
baseline 5.7 2.8 5.4 (1.47) 5.6 (1.75) 5.2 (1.39)
contract 5.7 2.8 4.0 (0.86) 4.7 (0.84) 3.4 (0.37)
β = 1
baseline 2.9 6.2 3.6 (0.97) 4.7 (1.42) 3.0 (1.29)
contract 2.9 6.2 4.7 (0.54) 4.4 (1.51) 5.0 (0.61)
Table 5.2: Average R&D decisions in contract experiment
In the contract treatment with β = 0, average R&D is below R&D in
the baseline treatment and lies between the SPN and cooperative bench-
marks. In the contract treatment with β = 1, average R&D in the last
ten rounds is higher than in the baseline treatment and also lies between
both theoretical benchmarks.
It can further be read from the table that cross-sectional variance in
R&D decisions is lower in the ﬁnal ten rounds than in the ﬁrst ten rounds
for all treatments, on the one hand, and generally lowest in the contract
treatments, on the other hand. A decrease in cross-sectional variability
at the end of the experiment could indicate that decisions converge to-
wards each other through a learning effect. A plausible explanation for
variation being lower in the contract treatments is that the joint proﬁt
maximising decisions are better sustainable and easier to make (simply
by proposing and committing to a contract). Joint proﬁt maximisation
in the baseline treatments is not an equilibrium strategy and thus much
harder to establish.
An alternative presentation of the experimental data is given in ﬁg-
ures 5.4 and 5.5. In ﬁgure 5.4 the evolution of the average degree of R&D
cooperation across duopolies is given per treatment. Subﬁgure 5.4(a) and
5.4(b) present the baseline and contract treatment data for β = 0 and
β = 1, respectively. The degree of R&D cooperation is a measure for the
tendency to cooperate in R&D and is deﬁned as follows for duopoly k in
round t:
ρkt =
¯ xkt − xSPN
xJPM − xSPN
where ¯ xkt =
∑i=1,2 xikt
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(b) β = 1
Figure 5.4: EvolutionofaveragedegreeofR&Dcooperationinbaselineandcon-
tract treatments
duopoly k chose on average to maximise individual proﬁt in round t then
ρkt = 0, while ρkt = 1 with joint proﬁt maximisation (R&D cooperation).
Presenting the data by degrees of cooperation has the advantage that the
degree of R&D cooperation may be easily compared across the two spill-
overs levels.
Subﬁgures 5.4(a) and 5.4(b) show that in the beginning of the exper-
iment the degree of R&D cooperation is similar in the baseline and con-
tract treatments for both spillover levels. Towards the end of the exper-
iment the average degree of cooperation becomes higher in the contract
treatments than in the baseline treatments for both spillover levels. In
the baseline treatments it is close to 0 towards the end of the experiment,
implying SPN behaviour. The ﬁgures further show that in the baseline
treatment with β = 1 the degree of cooperation decreases during the ex-
periment, which is not the case for β = 0.
A decay in voluntary cooperation in a noncooperative game is also
often observed in public good experiments (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Led-
yard, 1995; Andreoni, 1995b). Roughly three possible explanations for
this observation exist in the literature (Davis and Holt, 1993; Fischbacher
et al., 2001). First, subjects may learn to play the SPN equilibrium dur-
ing the experiment which makes initial cooperation a mistake. Second,
cooperation may be a consequence of strategic play and diminish or dis-


























(b) β = 1
Figure 5.5: Evolution of average degree of R&D cooperation within contract
treatments
appear when the other in a pair cheats. Third, some of the subjects may
be conditional cooperators and only cooperate if others cooperate.
The experimental data support the learning hypothesis because when
in the ﬁrst rounds of the experiment R&D decisions are chosen in the
middle of the action space for β = 0 and β = 1, learning to play the
equilibrium would imply that the degree of cooperation increases w ith
β = 0 and decreases with β = 1.
With respect to the difference between β = 0 and β = 1 we notice
that in the ﬁrst few rounds, the average degree of cooperation is higher
with β = 1 than with β = 0, but this difference disappears during the
experiment. In the contract treatment, behaviour is similar for β = 0 and
β = 1.
Figure 5.5 splits up experimental R&D decisions within the contract
treatment into averages taken over rounds where R&D contracts were
actually committed to, on the one hand, and rounds without any con-
tract, on the other hand. Subﬁgures 5.5(a) and 5.5(b) refer to β = 0 and
β = 1, respectively. The ﬁgures show that, for both spillover scenarios, in
rounds with R&D contracts the average degree of R&D cooperation con-
verges to 1 after some rounds. In rounds without contracts there is more
variability in the average degree of cooperation. With β = 0 it ﬂuctuates
around 0 and with β = 1 it declines from 1 towards 0. Tacit R&D coop-
885.5 Experimental results
benchmarks average duopoly R&D decisions (st. dev.)
xSPN xJPM 1 2 3 4 5
β = 0
rounds 1-26 5.7 2.8 5.4 (2.2) 2.8 (0.4) 6.4 (3.2) 6.1 (1.3) 6.1 (0.8)
rounds 1-10 5.7 2.8 4.6 (3.0) 3.0 (0.6) 7.4 (0.5) 6.3 (1.3) 6.6 (0.9)
rounds 17-26 5.7 2.8 5.9 (1.3) 2.8 (0.0) 5.9 (0.3) 5.9 (0.2) 5.8 (0.7)
β = 1
rounds 1-26 2.9 6.2 3.8 (1.5) 3.1 (0.9) 2.3 (1.7) 4.7 (2.9) 4.4 (2.8)
rounds 1-10 2.9 6.2 4.5 (2.1) 3.4 (1.2) 3.6 (1.9) 5.5 (3.8) 6.8 (3.2)
rounds 17-26 2.9 6.2 3.1 (0.7) 2.9 (0.7) 1.2 (0.9) 4.8 (2.7) 2.8 (0.1)
Table 5.3: Average R&D in baseline treatments
eration has thus not emerged in rounds where no R&D contracts were
actually committed to.
We further look at duopoly-speciﬁc data. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 con-
tain averages of R&D decisions based on all, the ﬁrst ten and the last
ten rounds for each of the ﬁve duopolies in the baseline and contract
treatments, respectively. In table 5.4 separate statistics are provided for
rounds where R&D contracts have actually been made (‘chosen’) and
rounds without contracts (‘not chosen’). Standard deviations now refer
to variation across rounds.
Table 5.3 shows that in the baseline treatment with β = 0, average
R&D decisions based on all or the last ten rounds of all duopolies except
duopoly 2 are very close to the SPN equilibrium prediction. The aver-
age R&D decision of duopoly 2 is close to the cooperative level. In the
baseline treatment with β = 1, average R&D decisions are also generally
closer to the SPN prediction than to the cooperative R&D level but in a
less obvious way than without spillovers. R&D decisions seem to diverge
more between duopolies in the baseline treatment with β = 1 than with
β = 0, when ignoring the cooperating duopoly 2.
Table 5.3 further indicates that decisions in the ﬁrst ten rounds di-
verge more from the SPN prediction than at the end of the experiment,
and are subject to more cross-sectional and temporal variation. This may
suggestthatsubjectshavegraduallylearnedtoplaytheequilibriumstrat-
egy during the experiment.
Finally, table 5.4 indicates that for the contract treatments averages of
R&D decisions based on all rounds or the last ten rounds are close to co-
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benchmarks average duopoly R&D decisions (st. dev.)
xSPN xJPM 1 2 3 4 5
β = 0
not chosen
rounds 1-26 5.7 2.8 7.0 (0.8) 6.8 (1.8) 5.9 (1.2) 5.7 (2.8) 5.4 (1.0)
rounds 1-10 5.7 2.8 6.0 (-) 7.0 (2.3) 4.9 (0.8) 4.9 (3.4) 5.2 (1.1)
rounds 17-26 5.7 2.8 - 6.7 (0.6) 8.5 (0.1) 8.3 (-) 6.0 (-)
chosen
rounds 1-26 5.7 2.8 2.8 (0.4) 3.0 (0.1) 3.0 (0.3) 3.0 (0.7) 3.0 (0.1)
rounds 1-10 5.7 2.8 2.7 (0.7) - 3.3 (0.5) 3.3 (1.1) 3.0 (0.0)
rounds 17-26 5.7 2.8 2.9 (0.1) 3.0 (0.1) 2.9 (0.0) 2.8 (0.1) 3.0 (0.1)
β = 1
not chosen
rounds 1-26 2.9 6.2 2.3 (1.3) 4.3 (2.4) 2.9 (0.6) 2.7 (3.0) 2.7 (0.7)
rounds 1-10 2.9 6.2 2.7 (1.6) 5.4 (5.8) 2.9 (0.8) 3.9 (3.9) 2.0 (0.0)
rounds 17-26 2.9 6.2 1.9 (0.8) 2.7 (0.4) 2.6 (0.6) 1.4 (1.3) 3.2 (-)
chosen
rounds 1-26 2.9 6.2 6.2 (0.3) 6.5 (1.5) 5.7 (1.2) 6.3 (0.6) 6.0 (0.3)
rounds 1-10 2.9 6.2 6.3 (0.5) 10.0 (-) 4.6 (2.0) 6.8 (1.1) 5.8 (0.5)
rounds 17-26 2.9 6.2 6.2 (0.1) 6.2 (0.1) 6.1 (0.3) 6.2 (0.1) 6.1 (0.0)
Table 5.4: Average R&D in contract treatments
operative levels when contracts are chosen, and close to SPN levels when
contracts are not chosen. This goes for both spillover scenarios. Without
spillovers, all duopolies seem to overinvest in rounds without contracts,
while with spillovers they rather underinvest then (except duopoly 5).
In the ﬁrst ten rounds decisions diverge again more from the theoretical
predictions, and their standard deviations have also decreased in the last
ten rounds, suggesting that subjects may have learned to contract coop-
erative R&D levels.
5.5.2 Nonparametric analyses
In this subsection results of nonparametric tests of differences in degree
of R&D cooperation between and within treatments are presented. A
ﬁrst important issue that needs to be addressed is the effect of allowing
contracts on the degree of R&D cooperation, referred to as the contract
treatment effects (cf. hypothesis 1). For this purpose average degrees of
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cooperation of the duopolies are compared between the contract and the
baseline treatments.
We use nonparametric statistics since the number of independent ob-
servations is small (10) and we do not want to make any assumptions
on the parameters of the underlying population distribution. The most
common tests that are used by experimental economists are the Mann-
Whitney-U test, also referred to as Wilcoxon rank-sum test, and the robust
rank-order test (see e.g. Conover, 1980; Siegel and Castellan, 1988). The
Mann-Whitney-U test, with test statistic U, is used to test whether two
distribution functions that correspond to two random samples differ in
location (mean or median). Under the alternative hypothesis it is as-
sumed that they only differ in location and not in variance or dispersion
(skewness, weight of tails). The robust rank-order test, with test statistic
` U, does not make the latter assumption and tests whether two distribu-
tion functions differ in location, irrespective of whether the higher-order
moments are different. It assumes that the two distribution functions are
symmetric. Feltovich (2003) has shown that the robust rank-order test
with use of exact critical values performs better than the Mann-Whitney-
U test when the central tendencies of the two populations are the same
and dispersions are different.
Test results for both tests are in table 5.5. The reported signiﬁcance
levelsareexact24, giventhesmallnumberofobservations, andone-tailed,
given that the alternative hypothesis is that the degree of R&D cooper-
ation is higher in the contract than in the baseline treatments for both
spillover scenarios. The null hypothesis is that the degree of R&D co-
operation does not differ between baseline and contract treatments. We
used the statistical package SPSS 12.0 to compute Mann-Whitney-U sta-
tistics and we followed Siegel and Castellan (1988) to compute robust
rank-order statistics because the package SPSS 12.0 does not offer this
type of test. Exact signiﬁcance levels for the robust rank-order test come
from Feltovich (2003).
The tests indicate that with β = 1, the degree of R&D cooperation is
higher in the contract treatment than in the baseline treatment with about
5% signiﬁcance in general and 3% signiﬁcance in the ﬁnal 10 rounds.
Without spillovers, the degree of cooperation is higher with about 8%
signiﬁcance, also in the last ten rounds. In the ﬁrst ten rounds, there is
24The package SPSS 12.0 also allows to calculate asymptotic signiﬁcancies based on the
large-sample assumption.
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rounds 1-26 rounds 1-10 rounds 17-26
β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1
Mann-Whitney-U test
U 5 4 8 11 5 3
Wilcoxon-W 20 19 23 26 20 18
1-tailed sig. 0.075 0.048 0.210 0.421 0.075 0.028
Robust rank-order test
` U 1.53 2.36 0.85 0.27 1.53 2.86
1-tailed sig. 0.048− 0.103 0.028− 0.048 > 0.103 > 0.103 0.048− 0.103 0.028
N 10 10 10 10 10 10
H1 : ¯ ρcontract > ¯ ρbaseline
Table 5.5: Contract treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation
no signiﬁcant difference in R&D decisions between baseline and contract
treatments. This may conﬁrm our previous suggestions regarding the ex-
istence of a learning effect. In the baseline treatments, subjects may have
learned to play the SPN level and in the contract treatments, subjects may
have learned to commit to contracts and to contract joint proﬁt maximis-
ing R&D. As such, experimental behaviour corresponds to the prediction
in hypothesis 1, provided that subjects have had a chance to learn.
In another series of tests, the degree of R&D cooperation in the con-
tract treatments, averaged over rounds where contracts were made, is
compared with the degree of cooperation in rounds without contracts.
Given that the observations are pairwise-dependent, a matched-pairs test
should be used instead of an independent samples test. Among experi-
mental economists, the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test is most widely used. It
is based on the assumption that the distribution of the differences be-
tween the paired data is symmetric around the median (see Conover,
1980). If one does not want to maintain this assumption, the sign test is
an alternative but has the disadvantage that information about the ab-
solute size of the differences is ignored and that it is less powerful if the
distribution is symmetric.
In table 5.6 results of Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests are reported for β =
0and β = 1andthedifferentsubsetsofrounds. Thereportedsigniﬁcance
levels are exact, given the small number of observations, and one-tailed,
given that the alternative hypothesis for both spillover scenarios is that
the degree of R&D cooperation is higher when R&D contracts are made.
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rounds 1-26 rounds 1-10 rounds 17-26
β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1
T+ 15 15 10 15 10 15
1-tailed sig. 0.031 0.031 0.063 0.031 0.063 0.031
N 5 5 4 5 4 5
H1 : ¯ ρchosen > ¯ ρnot chosen
Table 5.6: Within contract treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation
Baseline treatments Contract treatments
rounds 1-26 1-10 17-26 1-26 1-10 17-26
Mann-Whitney-U test
U 9 6 9 9 12 6
Wilcoxon-W 24 21 24 24 27 21
2-tailed sig. 0.548 0.222 0.548 0.548 1.000 0.222
Robust rank-order test
` U 0.67 1.45 0.63 0.67 0.19 1.45
2-tailed sig. > 0.206 0.206 > 0.206 > 0.206 > 0.206 0.206
N 10 10 10 10 10 10
H1 : ¯ ρβ=1 =¯ ρβ=0.
Table 5.7: Spillover treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation
All test statistics are computed using the package SPSS 12.0.
Resultsgive a clearer though similarmessage than the ﬁrst set of tests.
For both spillover scenarios the degree of R&D cooperation is higher
when subjects commit to an R&D contract with the minimum level of
signiﬁcance that is possible, and this for all subsets of rounds. Therefore
we may conclude that committing to R&D contracts is an important con-
dition for the degree of R&D cooperation to be and remain signiﬁcantly
higher in the contract than in the baseline treatments.
So far we conclude that, as predicted by theory, there is generally sig-
niﬁcantly more R&D cooperation in the contract treatments than in the
baseline treatments, both for β = 0 and β = 1. Hypothesis 1 is thus
not rejected. This conclusion hinges on the conditions that subjects have
had the opportunity to learn and that they have actually engaged in R&D
contracts in the contract treatment.
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In a second set of nonparametric tests the spillover treatment effect
is analysed so as to test whether the degree of R&D cooperation ρ dif-
fers between β = 0 and β = 1. For this purpose Mann-Whitney-U and
robust rank-order tests have again been performed for baseline and con-
tract treatments. Test results are in table 5.7. The null hypothesis of these
tests is that the degree of R&D cooperation does not signiﬁcantly differ
between β = 0 and β = 1.
For the baseline nor contract treatments there is a signiﬁcant differ-
ence in degree of cooperation between the two spillover scenarios. There-
fore, hypothesis 2 stating that the degree of R&D cooperation is the same
for β = 0 and β = 1 is not rejected.
5.5.3 Contracting behaviour
The aim of this subsection is to analyse contracting behaviour in the ex-
periment. In table 5.8 percentages or rounds in which contracts are pro-
posed and chosen, are given for each duopoly. In the ﬁrst part of the table
percentages refer to shares of rounds in which contract proposals were
made by at least one out of two subjects in a duopoly. In the second part
of the table percentages of shares of contracts that were actually com-
mitted to, are given. In the columns of the table a distinction is made
between the ﬁrst ten and the last ten rounds, as to investigate learning
behaviour of the subjects. The average shares across all duopolies are in
the last rows of both parts of the table.
The table shows that generally more R&D contracts were proposed
and agreed on in the treatment without spillovers, but the difference
between treatments with β = 0 and β = 1 is not signiﬁcant. Mann-
Whitney-U tests on the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference in the
amount of chosen contracts between both levels of spillovers, yield two-
tailed p-values of 0.413, 0.611 and 0.111 when respectively based on all
rounds, the ﬁrst ten and the last ten rounds. Two-tailed p-values should
be used here to test for differences, since theory predicts that in the con-
tract treatment, contracts are chosen, irrespective of the level of spill-
overs. With respect to contract proposals, p-values are at least 0.444. There-
fore, hypothesis 2 is also rejected when R&D cooperation is proxied by
the amount of chosen or proposed contracts.
It can further be observed that for both spillover levels more contracts
were made in the last rounds of the experiment than in the ﬁrst rounds.
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β = 0 β = 1
rounds 1-26 1-10 17-26 1-26 1-10 17-26
Contract proposals
1 100% 100% 100% 85% 80% 80%
2 73% 30% 100% 81% 80% 80%
3 92% 90% 100% 100% 100% 100%
4 96% 90% 100% 89% 90% 100%
5 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
average % 92% 82% 100% 91% 90% 92%
Accepted contracts
1 89% 90% 100% 50% 40% 60%
2 39% 0% 80% 32% 10% 50%
3 54% 40% 80% 58% 40% 80%
4 89% 80% 90% 46% 30% 70%
5 69% 40% 90% 89% 80% 90%
average % 69% 40% 88% 55% 50% 70%
Table 5.8: Percentages of proposed and accepted R&D contracts
This difference is statistically signiﬁcant with a p-value of 0.00225, which
provides evidence for the hypothesis that subjects have learned to make
contracts after having become acquainted with the contract possibility.
The learning hypothesis also coincides with the observation that subjects’
R&D decisions ﬁnally ended up to be close to the theoretical benchmarks.
Indeed, in the last ten rounds contracted R&D decisions are close to the
theoretical cooperative R&D level and R&D decisions in rounds where
no contracts were made, are close to the SPN R&D level.
With respect to contract proposals, a similar test on the difference be-
tween the amount of contract proposals at the beginning and at the end
of the experiment gives no statistical signiﬁcance, i.e. a p-value of 0.125.
Thus, it is unlikely that the increase in number of actually ﬁnalised con-
tracts is only due to an increase in the amount of contract proposals dur-
ing the experiment.
It is found that during the experiment more and more contracts were
made, but this does not imply that in the end subjects always committed
to a contract. It remains to be examined what the reasons are that in
some rounds subjects did not commit to a contract. A ﬁrst reason could
25This results from a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks test.
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β = 0 β = 1
duopoly not accepted accepted not accepted accepted
rounds 1-26
1 2.99 (0.76) 2.80 (0.40) 8.41 (6.20) 6.22 (0.26)
2 3.93 (3.31) 2.95 (0.05) 5.62 (1.47) 6.49 (1.48)
3 3.44 (0.89) 2.99 (0.29) 5.62 (1.39) 5.70 (1.18)
4 2.49 (1.75) 2.97 (0.66) 6.90 (4.11) 6.32 (0.54)
5 3.17 (0.65) 2.98 (0.06) 5.82 (0.46) 5.97 (0.31)
all 3.20 (2.72) 2.94 (0.75) 6.47 (1.47) 6.14 (0.29)
rounds 1-10
1 3.00 (0.00) 2.70 (0.65) 6.09 (2.13) 6.28 (0.51)
2 5.83 (5.97) - 4.79 (2.27) 10.00 (0.00)
3 3.86 (1.00) 3.23 (0.52) 5.08 (1.83) 4.58 (2.00)
4 2.26 (2.28) 3.25 (1.10) 6.59 (1.38) 6.73 (1.10)
5 3.29 (0.76) 3.00 (0.00) 5.67 (0.58) 5.75 (0.46)
all 3.65 (2.00) 3.04 (0.57) 5.64 (1.64) 6.67 (0.81)
rounds 17-26
1 3.30 (1.28) 2.88 (0.04) 8.79 (7.27) 6.22 (0.04)
2 2.95 (0.07) 2.94 (0.05) 6.16 (0.07) 6.49 (0.05)
3 2.90 (0.00) 2.90 (0.00) 6.07 (0.27) 5.70 (0.29)
4 2.90 (0.00) 2.83 (0.07) 8.94 (6.18) 6.32 (0.09)
5 2.90 (0.17) 2.96 (0.09) 6.10 (0.00) 5.97 (0.00)
all 2.99 (0.30) 2.90 (0.05) 7.21 (2.76) 6.13 (0.09)
Table 5.9: Average R&D in proposed and accepted contracts
be that no contract proposals were made in these rounds. But, as table 5.8
shows, the percentages of rounds in which contracts have been proposed
is high. This implies that a signiﬁcant amount of contract proposals was
not accepted in the whole, the beginning and the end of the experiment.
Further, it is unlikely that contract proposals were used as a cooperative
signal to mislead the competitor, because once a proposal was made by a
subject in a duopoly, the counterpart could always accept the contract so
that the proposer was committed to it.
Another explanation could be that the contract proposals contained
R&D decisions which were different from the cooperative level and thus
not interesting for subjects to agree to. In table 5.9 averages and standard
deviations of proposed R&D decisions divided according to whether the
contract was accepted or not, are presented for all duopolies. For nine
of the ten duopolies in the contract treatments we observe that proposed
R&D decisions that were accepted in a contract are closer to the coop-
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erative R&D level (i.e. 2.8 for β = 0 and 6.2 for β = 1) than proposed
R&D decisions that were not accepted when considering all rounds in the
experiment. Also, standard deviations of R&D proposals that were not
accepted are larger than standard deviations of accepted R&D propos-
als. Thus, the fact that in some rounds proposed R&D was too different
from the cooperative R&D level, could have been a reason for subjects
not to commit to a contract. In the last ten rounds, the difference be-
tween average accepted and not accepted R&D proposals vanishes for
most duopolies. In the ﬁrst ten rounds, proposed R&D levels that were
either accepted or not, are in general not that close to the cooperative
R&D level compared to the general averages26. Based on these observa-
tions, we conclude that in general subjects learn to propose the cooper-
ative R&D level in a contract, and learn at the same time to commit to
it. In the beginning, subjects make more mistakes when proposing and
choosing ‘good’ R&D decisions.
Finally, remark that even contract proposals that contained the coop-
erative R&D level, were sometimes not accepted, especially in the last
rounds of the experiment. Probably, subjects occasionally tried to devi-
ate from the cooperative R&D level contracted in previous rounds in the
expectation that their counterparts kept choosing the cooperative R&D
level, even when no contract was made. But the fact that decisions end
up at the SPN level in rounds where no contracts were made, shows that
such strategies were generally unsuccessful.
Summarising, there is no signiﬁcant difference in the amount of pro-
posed and signed contracts—which may be interpreted as measures for
the extent to which R&D cooperation occurs—between the contract treat-
ment without and with technological spillovers. Further, contracts did
not arise in all rounds for all duopolies. First, contract proposals did
not always contain an R&D level close enough to the cooperative level.
This is particularly noticeable in early rounds, less so in later rounds,
and suggests that subjects learned which proposals yielded better results
with experience. Secondly, even when contract proposals were close to
the cooperative R&D level, they were not always committed to. In those
26These observations are conﬁrmed in one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. The
null hypothesis that no difference exists in the absolute value of the deviation of R&D
decisions from the cooperative level, between rounds without and with accepted contract
proposals, is rejected with p-values of 0.001, 0.348 and 0.063 for all, the ﬁrst ten and the
last ten rounds, respectively.
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cases, subjectsdeviatedfromtheR&Dlevelincontractsmadeinprevious
rounds, and played a noncooperative strategy.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have investigated whether in experimental duopoly
markets the tendency to explicitly cooperate in R&D differs for two levels
of technological spillovers, assuming Cournot competition in the output
market. For each of the spillover levels (β = 0 and β = 1) the experi-
ment included a baseline treatment without contract possibilities and a
contract treatment with binding contract possibilities.
In the experiment, there was no difference in the degree of R&D co-
operation between the spillover treatments. In the contract treatments,
contracted R&D decisions converged to a level close to the cooperative
R&D level for both spillover scenarios, as predicted by theory. In the
baseline treatments, experimental R&D decisions were close to the SPN
predictions for both spillover scenarios.
R&Dcontractswerenotalwayscommittedto. Especiallyinthebegin-
ning of the experiment, many contract proposals contained R&D levels
that deviated from the cooperative level, and proposals were accordingly
not accepted. This can partly be explained by the inexperience of the
subjects in the ﬁrst rounds of the experiment. Indeed, towards the end of
the experiment, subjects were able to propose the cooperative R&D level,
which coincides with some form of learning. But still, although propos-
als were close to the cooperative R&D level in the last rounds, they were
not always accepted. R&D decisions close to noncooperative Nash equi-
librium levels prevailed in those cases.
For those who are not surprised by the ﬁnding that, after learning, be-
haviour in the experiment discussed in this chapter corresponds to the-
oretical predictions, this chapter and its experimental ﬁndings may be
viewed as a basis for comparison with experimental ﬁndings discussed





In the existing theoretical and empirical literature and in the experiment
in chapter 5, R&D cooperation and the relation between spillovers and
R&D cooperation is mostly examined in a cooperative context where
R&D contracts are or are assumed to be made. Indeed, in most of the the-
oretical models overviewed in chapter 2 the mode of R&D cooperation
is deﬁned as a joint proﬁt maximisation problem where ﬁrms can credi-
bly commit to the joint proﬁt maximising (the cooperative) R&D level1.
Also in the contract treatment of the experiment described in chapter 5,
participants could bindingly commit to joint proﬁt maximising R&D.
Furthermore, in the empirical analyses overviewed in 3.3 and 3.4 in
chapter 3, the possible engagement of ﬁrms in R&D cooperation is mea-
sured on the basis of being listed under the US National Cooperative
Research act, or having participated in EU Framework Programmes or
Eureka projects, or having answered in a Community Innovation Survey
to be engaged in one or other form of R&D cooperation. In other words,
it may be assumed that under R&D cooperation ﬁrms have committed to
some form of binding agreement where the role of each ﬁrm in the RJV
or other R&D cooperative is clearly described.
1How ﬁrms ﬁnally end up to credibly commit to the cooperative R&D level is treated
as a black box in many models. See 2.5.8 in chapter 2 for an overview of papers dealing
with the formation of RJVs.
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The question we want to answer in this chapter is whether R&D co-
operation can also be sustainable in a noncooperative context, as e.g. tacit
price or quantity collusion in oligopoly markets and cooperation in pub-
lic good experiments are under some conditions (see also 4.3 in chapter
4). More speciﬁcally, we examine whether spillovers inﬂuence the feasi-
bility of (tacit) R&D cooperation2.
In Holt (1995) some examples are given of experiments on oligopoly
gameswherenonbindingcommunicationtendstoincreasethelikelihood
of tacit collusion. Examples of other oligopoly pricing games with non-
bindingcommunicationareHoltandDavis(1990), Cason(1995)andHar-
stad et al. (1998). Harstad et al. (1998) ﬁnd that the announcement of
prices leads to higher prices than the Nash equilibrium, though not as
high as the joint proﬁt maximisation level. In Holt and Davis (1990) ev-
idence is found that initially prices increase after price announcements
but that in the end prices return to their initial lower levels. Cason (1995)
comes to a similar conclusion but adds that, when it is optional to send a
signal, there is more tacit collusion than when one signal is sent in each
repetition of a pricing game. This implies that the simple sending of a
signal indicates a willingness to cooperate. We conclude that, with an
appropriate form of nonbinding communication, collusion in prices or
quantities is at least temporarily higher than without communication.
Inpublicgoodexperimentspre-playcommunicationtendstoincrease
contributions to the public good and thus cooperation (Isaac et al., 1985;




Thus, in games related to the noncooperative R&D game, nonbinding
communication tends to enhance the likelihood of (tacit) cooperation, al-
though game theory predicts SPN behaviour. There exist a number of
explanations for this ﬁnding. It may be the case that communication
decreases the social distance among the players and increases the level
of trust, which may make cooperation more likely (based on Hoffman
et al., 1996b). Furthermore, communication may inﬂuence the beliefs of a
2Note that in this chapter, and also in chapters 7 and 8, whenever we refer to (R&D)
cooperation or incentives to cooperate (in R&D), we mean tacit (R&D) cooperation or
incentives to tacitly cooperate (in R&D) in a noncooperative context, unless otherwise
stated.
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player about other players’ preferences by providing information on co-
operative preferences. It is easier for a player to identify whether the oth-
ers prefer to cooperate, if the others can signal their intentions. This in-
formation may increase cooperation rates when players are, for instance,
conditional cooperators. Conditional cooperators only cooperate them-
selves, if others cooperate. Yet, it is unlikely that this information changes
behaviour of individually rational players (Kollock, 1998). Since experi-
ments have shown that a signiﬁcant number of people are conditionally
cooperative, the information argument may be relevant, provided that
conditional cooperators actually signal their willingness to cooperate (see
e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kurzban and Houser, 2005).
The following two explanations ﬁnd most support in the social psy-
chology literature (see e.g. Kollock, 1998; Cardenas et al., 2005): (1) com-
munication may act as a substitute for explicit commitment in the sense
thatplayerscanmakepromisesonhowtheywillbehave, and(2)commu-
nication may create a group identity, a property which has been shown
to increase cooperation rates. We believe that this ﬁnal argument is es-
pecially valid in public goods experiments, and lesser so in oligopoly
experiments. Contrary to oligopoly experiments, in public goods experi-
ments subjects are asked to contribute something to a public good that is
later on divided amongst the group members. The notions of group and
group identity are less important in oligopoly experiments.
In this chapter, we examine whether spillovers inﬂuence the degree of
R&D cooperation in a noncooperative context where only nonbinding commu-
nication is possible. We describe two experiments (experiments I and II)
that have been set up to investigate whether R&D cooperation naturally
arises under some conditions in a noncooperative R&D game—assuming
Cournot competition in the output stage—and whether R&D behaviour
differs for different spillover levels. As nonbinding communication has
already shown to be effective in raising cooperation in related experi-
ments, we allow for it in part of the treatments of both experiments. In
the baseline treatments, subjects do not have any communication possi-
bilities3.
3Experiment II has been run during my second Marie Curie stay at CentER (Tilburg
University) in 2004.
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6.2 The model
Interactions in experiments I and II are based onthe noncooperative R&D
game described by AJ (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). For the sake
of continuity we provide a short overview of the model. For a more de-
tailed description of the model we refer to 5.2 in chapter 5.
It is assumed that perfectly informed ﬁrms in duopoly simultane-
ously decide on R&D in a ﬁrst stage and are engaged in Cournot com-
petition in a second stage. An industry with two symmetric ﬁrms is con-
sidered that are of equal size, have equal cost functions and produce a
homogeneous good. The industry is characterised by a linear inverse de-
mand function of the form P(Q) = a − bQ, with a,b > 0,Q = Q1 + Q2.
Qi is the production quantity of ﬁrm i.
The linear unit cost function of ﬁrm i is assumed to be linearly de-
creasing in its amount of effective R&D (Kamien et al., 1992), which is
composed of its own R&D, xi, and spilt over R&D of ﬁrm j, βxj. The
spillover parameter β is between 0 and 1 and determines how much ﬁrm
i can take advantage of the other ﬁrm’s R&D expenditures without bear-
ing any cost. The unit cost of ﬁrm i is thus represented by ci(xi,xj) =
α − γ(xi + βxj) with α < a and γ > 0. R&D investments are assumed to
have decreasing returns, which is implemented in the model in the form




with δ > 0.
The two-stage game is solved by backward induction. In the second
stage ﬁrms individually maximise their proﬁt with respect to their pro-
duction quantity. Maximising proﬁt of ﬁrm i (deﬁned by equation 5.2) for
i = 1,2, and replacing production quantities by their maximising values











i = 1,2; j  = i.
(6.1)
In the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms maximise their own proﬁt with respect to R&D,
which yields the following (symmetric) equilibrium R&D level, provided
that the second-order condition and the stability requirement of Hen-
riques (1990) are satisﬁed:
xSPN =
2γ(a − α)(2− β)
9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)(2− β)
. (6.2)
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The SPN prediction of the one-shot and the ﬁnitely repeated static R&D
game, assuming Cournot competition in the output market, is xSPN.
Another important theoretical benchmark is the one where ﬁrms co-
ordinate their R&D activities so as to maximise the sum of their proﬁts. In
this case, the symmetric maximisation problem maxxi ∑
2
i=1 πi(xi,xj) with
xi > 0, shouldbesolvedfori = 1,2, whichresultsinthefollowingunique
outcome for R&D, assuming that the parameters satisfy the second-order
condition and the condition proposed by Salant and Shaffer (1998):
xJPM =
2γ(a − α)(1+ β)
9bδ − 2γ2(1+ β)2. (6.3)
6.3 Experiment I
6.3.1 Experimental design and hypotheses
The experiment concentrates on the R&D stage that is nested in the more
general two-stage game. The quantity decision was controlled by set-
ting production quantity at its Nash-Cournot equilibrium, as a function
of ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures (see equation 5.3). By controlling quantity
in this way it is assumed that anti-trust policy works perfectly and that
cooperation in the ﬁrst stage does not translate into cooperation in the
product market, which is a standard assumption in the majority of AJ-
type models. Furthermore, this enables us to avoid testing for optimisa-
tion in both stages (R&D stage and product market) and for backward
induction.
The parameters of the demand function, the R&D cost function and
the unit cost function were the same as in chapter 5 and equal to: a = 250,
b = 5, α = 100, γ = 2 and δ = 5. The theoretical benchmarks are in table
6.1.
Baseline treatments without signaling possibilities were run for β = 0
and β = 1 and are the same as in chapter 54. Next to this, a treatment with
nonbinding signaling possibilities (a so-called cheap talk treatment) has
been run for the two levels of spillovers. The latter treatment covered two
sessions on May 15 in 2001 and was programmed in PHP and MySQL.
The signaling treatments had 20 participants, 10 for β = 0 and 10 for β =
4See 5.4 in chapter 5 for more details on the experimental design.
1036 Noncooperative R&D experiments





Table 6.1: Theoretical R&D benchmarks for signaling experiment I
1, and also covered 26 rounds. Participants were randomly distributed
across the treatments.
In the signaling treatments, subjects were asked to send in each round
one message to their competitors with an indication of the interval—that
couldbeanythingbetweenonesinglenumberandthemaximuminterval
of [0,25]—containing their decision in the considered round5. They were
explicitly told that this interval was not binding. This treatment resem-
bles the continuous signaling treatment in Cason (1995), since subjects
always had an option not to communicate, i.e. to communicate [0,25].
Furthermore, in the same session as the contract treatment in 2003,
we additionally ran a signaling treatment for β = 1 with 6 participants
programmed in z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (1999). The difference
between the z-Tree program and the original PHP-program is that with
the z-Tree program participants could only ﬁll in numbers in the interval,
while with the PHP-program they could also communicate text, an op-
tion which was used by almost none of the participants. Given that we
do not want to jeopardise internal validity, we do not report data from
this session, implying that all data analyses are based on the original 2001
sessions. However, we note that conclusions are similar when the 2003
data are included.
Based on the theoretical predictions in the noncooperative R&D game
and given that the ﬁnitely repeated R&D stage game has a unique SPN
equilibriumthatcorrespondstothepredictionintheone-shotR&Dgame,
theory-based conjectures are that subjects will always—in baseline and
signaling treatments—choose to maximise individual proﬁt.
Expectations based on the theoretical model are summarised in the
following hypotheses:
5The instructions to the subjects, translated in English, are in appendix C.2.
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Hypothesis I1a The tendency to cooperate in R&D does not differ be-
tween signaling and baseline treatments.
Hypothesis I1b The tendency to cooperate in R&D is higher in contract
than in signaling treatments.
Hypothesis I2 The tendency to cooperate in R&D does not differ be-
tween β = 0 and β = 1.
Hypothesis I1b refers to comparisons with the contract treatments
discussed in chapter 5.
6.3.2 Experimental results
In what follows descriptive statistics and results of nonparametric com-
parisons between treatments based on average duopoly R&D decisions
are given.
6.3.2.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 6.2 presents averages and standard deviations of average duopoly
R&D decisions based on all, the ﬁrst ten and the last ten rounds. The pre-
sented standard deviations only measure cross-sectional heterogeneity,
not variability in time. The data for the baseline treatments are the same
as the data in the baseline treatments of the chapter 5. With β = 0 av-
erage R&D decisions in the baseline treatment are close to the SPN R&D
levels. With β = 1 average R&D in the ﬁrst rounds lies between both the-
oretical benchmarks, while in the last ten rounds it is closer to the SPN
equilibrium.
In the signaling treatment with β = 0 average R&D is generally close
to the SPN prediction. With β = 1 average R&D is close to the coopera-
tive prediction, especially in the last ten rounds.
The table further provides evidence for cross-sectional variance in
R&D decisions being lower in the ﬁnal ten rounds than in the ﬁrst ten
rounds for all treatments. A decrease in cross-sectional variability during
the experiment could indicate that decisions tend to converge as subjects
become more familiar with the experimental environment.
Subﬁgures 6.1(a) and 6.1(b) give the evolution of the average degree
of R&D cooperation across duopolies per treatment for β = 0 and β = 1,
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benchmarks average R&D decisions (st. dev.)
xSPN xJPM rounds 1-26 rounds 1-10 rounds 17-26
β = 0
baseline 5.7 2.8 5.4 (1.47) 5.6 (1.75) 5.2 (1.39)
signaling 5.7 2.8 6.2 (0.58) 6.6 (1.12) 5.8 (0.38)
β = 1
baseline 2.9 6.2 3.6 (0.97) 4.7 (1.42) 3.0 (1.29)
signaling 2.9 6.2 7.1 (3.12) 7.7 (3.21) 6.2 (2.78)
Table 6.2: Average R&D decisions in signaling experiment I
respectively. The degree of R&D cooperation ρkt of duopoly k in round t
is deﬁned as in the previous chapter:
ρkt =
¯ xkt − xSPN
xJPM − xSPN
and is equal to 0 (1) when duopoly k chooses on average to maximise
individual (joint) proﬁt in round t. ¯ xkt is average R&D of duopoly k in
round t.
Figure 6.1 conﬁrms that with β = 0, average R&D behaviour in the
signaling treatment is similar to behaviour in the baseline treatment: the
average degree of cooperation ﬂuctuates around 0. With β = 1 the aver-
age degree of R&D cooperation is higher in the signaling treatment than
in the baseline treatment, except in the ﬁrst few rounds. Similar to but
less clear than in the baseline treatment with β = 1, also in the signaling
treatment, the degree of cooperation gradually declines during the exper-
iment. This decline may suggest learning. In roughly the ﬁrst half of the
signaling treatment ¯ ρ is higher than 1, implying that R&D decisions are
above the cooperative level. Towards the end the degree of cooperation
is around or lower than 1, which may suggest that cooperative play has
been learned.
We further look at duopoly-speciﬁc data in the signaling treatment6.
Table 6.3 contains averages of R&D decisions based on all, the ﬁrst ten
and the last ten rounds for each of the ﬁve duopolies. We distinguish be-
tween averages in rounds where intervals have actually been communi-
cated by both subjects in a duopoly (‘signals’), and rounds without com-
































(b) β = 1
Figure 6.1: Evolution of average degree of R&D cooperation in baseline and sig-
naling treatments I
munication (‘no signals’), where either no messages or solely intervals
equal to [0,25] were communicated7. Standard deviations refer to varia-
tion across rounds.
Table 6.3 shows that without spillovers, R&D decisions are generally
close to the SPN prediction, irrespective of whether messages have ac-
tually been sent or not. This suggests that even with a communication
possibility it is difﬁcult to get to the cooperative R&D level with β = 0.
With full spillovers, experimental R&D is generally closer to the cooper-
ative level, both in rounds with and without signals, except for one of the
duopolies. The tendency to learn is less clear than in the baseline treat-
ments, but variability in R&D decisions generally declines in the ﬁnal
rounds.
6.3.2.2 Nonparametric analyses
In this subsection results of nonparametric tests of differences in experi-
mental R&D decisions between and within treatments are presented. We
use the same test procedures as in section 5.5.2 of chapter 5. Results of
7Alternatively, we could have opted to divide data on the basis of rounds where at
least one duopoly’s subject has sent an interval. Data would look similar then, but more
data would be lacking in the ‘no signals’ rows. The same goes for the nonparametric
within-signaling tests.
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benchmarks average duopoly R&D decisions (st. dev.)
xSPN xJPM 1 2 3 4 5
β = 0
no signals
rounds 1-26 5.7 2.8 6.4 (1.9) 3.0 (-) 6.5 (1.6) - 6.2 (3.1)
rounds 1-10 5.7 2.8 8.1 (2.1) 3.0 (-) 6.3 (1.8) - 9.8 (7.4)
rounds 17-26 5.7 2.8 5.2 (0.5) - 6.0 (1.2) - 5.9 (2.2)
signals
rounds 1-26 5.7 2.8 6.0 (1.4) 5.5 (0.8) 7.2 (-) 5.8 (1.2) 7.6 (2.9)
rounds 1-10 5.7 2.8 6.9 (2.0) 5.3 (1.1) - 6.2 (1.8) 7.3 (1.5)
rounds 17-26 5.7 2.8 5.4 (0.3) 5.5 (0.7) 7.2 (-) 5.8 (0.6) 7.8 (-)
β = 1
no signals
rounds 1-26 2.9 6.2 9.5 (6.2) 6.3 (0.4) 12.5 (-) 6.5 (2.8) 2.1 (1.6)
rounds 1-10 2.9 6.2 16.0 (-) 6.0 (-) 12.5 (-) 7.5 (4.0) 3.3 (1.8)
rounds 17-26 2.9 6.2 4.3 (1.1) 6.6 (-) - 5.6 (0.9) 1.2 (0.9)
signals
rounds 1-26 2.9 6.2 10.6 (3.9) 6.7 (0.6) 8.9 (2.9) 7.2 (2.7) 4.5 (2.1)
rounds 1-10 2.9 6.2 12.1 (3.1) 6.7 (1.0) 7.5 (2.6) 7.7 (2.0) 6.0 (-)
rounds 17-26 2.9 6.2 8.2 (4.4) 6.6 (0.0) 8.7 (1.0) 6.4 (3.2) 3.0 (-)
Table 6.3: Average R&D in signaling treatments
Mann-Whitney-U and robust rank-order tests to compare the degree of
R&D cooperation between signaling and baseline treatments are in table
6.4. Since both treatments do not have binding contract possibilities and
theory predicts SPN behaviour for both treatments, we rely on two-tailed
signiﬁcance levels.
Table 6.4 shows that with β = 0 there is no signiﬁcant difference be-
tween the degree of R&D cooperation in the baseline and the signaling
treatment. With β = 1 both tests provide evidence for the degree of R&D
cooperation in the last ten rounds in the signaling treatment to be differ-
ent from (higher than) in the baseline treatment, with 10% signiﬁcance.
Thus, with spillovers, the signaling possibility has elicited the degree of
R&D cooperation above the ‘normal’ level when participants had the op-
portunity to learn. These results support hypothesis I1a for β = 0 but not
for β = 1, at least not when subjects have gained experience.
Table 6.5 provides results of Mann-Whitney-U and robust rank-order
tests to compare the degree of R&D cooperation between the signaling
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rounds 1-26 rounds 1-10 rounds 17-26
β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1
Mann-Whitney-U test
U 8b 5a 8b 4.5a 12b 4a
Wilcoxon-W 23 20 23 19.5 27 19
2-tailed sig. 0.421 0.151 0.421 0.103 1.000 0.095
Robust rank-order test
` U 0.92b 1.53a 0.87b 1.89a 0.09b 2.21a
2-tailed sig. > 0.206 0.096− 0.206 > 0.206 0.096− 0.206 > 0.206 0.056− 0.096
N 10 10 10 10 10 10
aH1 : ¯ ρsignaling
>
 = ¯ ρbaseline; bH1 : ¯ ρbaseline
>
 = ¯ ρsignaling
Table 6.4: Signaling treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation in ex-
periment I: versus baseline
and the contract treatments. Here we should rely on one-tailed test re-
sults since it is expected that the degree of R&D cooperation is higher in
the contract than in the signaling treatment. Without spillovers, we can
indeed rely on one-tailed test results because the relation between both
treatments is as expected: the degree of R&D cooperation is signiﬁcantly
higher in the contract than in the signaling treatment and hypothesis I1b
is supported.
With respect to the between-signaling-and-contract treatment com-
parison for β = 1, we should rely on two-tailed test results since the
degree of R&D cooperation is higher in the signaling than in the contract
treatment, which does not accord with the theoretical expectations. Ac-
cording to two-tailed tests, there exists no signiﬁcant difference between
the degree of cooperation in both treatments. With spillovers, hypothesis
I1b is thus not supported.
Tosummarise, allowingnonbindingcommunicationdidnothaveany
effect on R&D investment without spillovers, but has elicited a signiﬁ-
cant degree of R&D cooperation in the last ten rounds with spillovers,
above the one obtained in the baseline treatment towards the R&D level
in the contract treatment. Thus, without spillovers, more bindingness
than the sending of intervals that contain intended R&D investment is
needed to move towards R&D cooperation, away from ‘baseline’ behav-
iour (cf. chapter 5). With spillovers, the possibility of sending nonbinding
messages has moved subjects towards joint proﬁt maximisation.
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rounds 1-26 rounds 1-10 rounds 17-26
β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1
Mann-Whitney-U test
U 0b 5a 3b 5a 0b 5a
Wilcoxon-W 15 20 18 20 15 20
1-tailed sig. 0.004 0.075 0.028 0.075 0.004 0.075
2-tailed sig. 0.008 0.151 0.056 0.151 0.008 0.151
Robust rank-order test
` U ∞b 1.38a 3.52b 1.53a ∞b 1.53a
1-tailed sig. 0.004 0.048− 0.103 0.008− 0.028 0.048− 0.103 0.004 0.048− 0.103
2-tailed sig. 0.008 0.096− 0.206 0.026− 0.056 0.096− 0.206 0.008 0.096− 0.206
N 10 10 10 10 10 10
aH1 : ¯ ρsignaling
>
 = ¯ ρcontract; bH1 : ¯ ρcontract
>
 = ¯ ρsignaling
Table 6.5: Signaling treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation in ex-
periment I: versus contract
In a second set of nonparametric tests we analyse the spillover treat-
ment effect so as to test whether the degree of R&D cooperation differs
between the signaling treatment with β = 0 and the signaling treatment
with β = 1. For this purpose we performed Mann-Whitney-U and robust
rank-order tests. Test statistics are reported in table 6.6. The null hypoth-
esis is that the degree of R&D cooperation does not signiﬁcantly differ
between β = 0 and β = 1.
The statistics in table 6.6 tell us that the degree of R&D cooperation is
overall higher with β = 1 than with β = 0 with 5.6% signiﬁcance. This
suggest that R&D cooperation tends to be easier with β = 1 than with
β = 0. Hypothesis I2 is therefore rejected. As in the baseline treatments
no such difference was found (see 5.5.2 in chapter 5), some form of non-
binding communication is necessary to obtain this difference under the
current experimental design. In the ﬁrst ten rounds, the difference in de-
gree of cooperation between β = 1 and β = 0 is signiﬁcant with a p-value
of 1.6%. In the last ten rounds the signiﬁcance has disappeared.
6.3.3 Signaling behaviour
In this subsection we examine what exactly has been communicated by
the subjects in order to investigate why signaling was successful in mov-
ing towards R&D cooperation with full spillovers and why it was not
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rounds 1-26 rounds 1-10 rounds 17-26
Mann-Whitney U
U 3 1 5
Wilcoxon-W 18 16 20
2-tailed sig. 0.056 0.016 0.151
Robust rank-order
` U 2.86 7.19 1.53
2-tailed sig. 0.056 0.016 0.096− 0.203
N 10 10 10
H1 : ¯ ρβ=1
>
 = ¯ ρβ=0
Table 6.6: Spillover treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation in sig-
naling treatments of experiment I
rounds 1-26
β = 0 β = 1
T+ 9b 10a
2-tailed sig. 0.250 0.625
N 4 5
aH1 : ¯ ρsignal > ¯ ρno signal
bH1 : ¯ ρno signal > ¯ ρsignal
Table 6.7: Within signaling treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation
in experiment I
without spillovers.
First we compare the degree of R&D cooperation within the signal-
ing treatments between rounds where both subjects in a duopoly sent a
message and rounds where maximum one subject sent a message. The
same statistical procedure as in 5.5 is followed and two-tailed Wilcoxon
signed-ranks tests are used. Tests are based on all rounds given that the
numberofobservationsistoosmallwhenconsideringtheﬁrstorﬁnalten
rounds separately. Results are reported in table 6.7. There is no within-
signiﬁcance for neither of the spillover levels.
In table 6.8 data are given on the communicated intervals and their
contents. The data refer to numbers of rounds where intervals have been
1116 Noncooperative R&D experiments
sent8. Although participants were asked to send one message in each
round, some sent more messages. One message has been sent in 367
(71%) out of 520 rounds of play in the signaling treatments (20 subjects
times 26 rounds), no message in 111 (21%) and more than one message
in 42 (8%) of the cases9. For subjects that did not send an interval in a
certain round, we assumed that the communicated interval was [0,25].
In the analyses that follow we only take information on the last sent mes-
sage that the counterpart was able to read when more than one message
was sent in a round by a subject.
For small intervals it is less likely that they contained either the SPN
or the cooperative R&D level, while one of the two bounds could still
be close to either of the R&D levels. An interval in the treatment with
β = 1 of, for instance, [6,6] does not contain the JPM R&D level, which is
6.2, although both bounds are very close to it, making the interval highly
informative in signaling willingness to tacitly cooperate in R&D. On the
other hand, an interval of [3,10] does contain the JPM R&D level but is
much less informative. To take into account the communicative extent of
messages consisting of small intervals, we enlarged intervals where the
difference between the upper bound and the lower bound was strictly
smaller than 2. Moreover, for these intervals, lower (upper) bounds were
recalculated by subtracting (adding) 0.5. A total of 141 intervals out of
520 were re-scaled. The original size (upper minus lower bound) of only
2 out of these 141 intervals was strictly larger than 1. This implies that
only those two were re-scaled to a size slightly larger than 2. As such, the
new size of 139 intervals was still smaller than or equal to 1.
We interpret the sending of interval [0,25] as unwillingness to com-
municate in that round. Therefore, to investigate the communicative con-
tents of the signals, we only consider rounds where at least one subject in
a duopoly has sent a communicative interval not equal to [0,25]. In table
6.8 the data in column ‘= [0,25]’ are the number of rounds where none
of the pair’s subjects has sent an interval different from [0,25] whereas
‘ = [0,25]’ refers to the number of rounds where at least one pair’s sub-
8Given the large similarity in conclusions based on separate analyses for the ﬁrst ten
and the last ten rounds, more details for these subsets of rounds are not provided.
9In two duopolies out of ten, subjects did not send the requested interval or number
in a small number of rounds but added e.g. a question mark or sent something as “ok”
or “I do 5 and you 6”. When possible, we transformed such messages into a number or
an interval.
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ject has communicated an interval different from [0,25]. For β = 0 and
β = 1, in most rounds an interval different from [0,25] has been commu-
nicated by at least one subject in a duopoly. The number of rounds where
at least one pair’s subject has actually sent an interval, is similar for both
spillover levels.
In the other columns of table 6.8, the rounds where communication
occurred by at least one subject in a pair are further subdivided on the ba-
sis of whether the communicated intervals were actually informative and
contained the SPN or cooperative prediction. We distinguish between (1)
rounds where the communicated interval(s) did not contain the SPN nor
the cooperative prediction (xSPN,xJPM / ∈ interval), (2) rounds where one
or both communicated interval(s) only contained the SPN equilibrium,
or where one contained the SPN equilibrium and the other none or both
theoretical benchmarks (only xSPN ∈ interval), (3) rounds where one or
both communicated interval(s) only contained the cooperative prediction
and the other none or both theoretical benchmarks (only xJPM ∈ interval)
and (4) the rest of the rounds where the interval(s) contained both pre-
dictions (xSPN,xJPM ∈ interval)10. Categories where xSPN,xJPM / ∈ interval
or where xSPN,xJPM ∈ interval can be viewed as less informative. The
right-hand side column of the table provides the average degree of R&D
cooperation.
For both spillover levels, the share of intervals not containing any the-
oretical predictions is quite high for some duopolies (e.g. duopoly 2 for
β = 0 and duopolies 1 and 3 for β = 1), suggesting that, for these duopo-
lies, communication often was simple ‘babbling’. For β = 1 the commu-
nicated intervals in this ﬁrst category were usually above the theoretical
cooperative R&D level. Furthermore, the intervals sometimes contained
both theoretical predictions, or were mixed (xSPN,xJPM ∈ interval).
Concentrating on informative intervals in the treatment with β = 0,
most intervals that were sent only contained the SPN R&D prediction
for all duopolies, while few only contained the cooperative level. With
β = 1 we observe the opposite. Here, the number of intervals that only
contained the cooperative level is larger than the number of intervals that
only contained the SPN prediction for all duopolies. These ﬁndings are
10This residual category refers to rounds where the communicated interval(s) con-
tainedbothpredictions, orwhereonesubject’scommunicatedintervalcontainedtheSPN
prediction and the other’s the cooperative prediction.
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duopoly = [0,25]  = [0,25] (1) (2) (3) (4) ¯ ρ1−26
β = 0
1 4 (15%) 22 (85%) 3 14 3 2 -0.17
2 0 (0%) 26 (100%) 13 7 5 1 0.12
3 16 (62%) 10 (38%) 2 6 2 0 -0.26
4 0 (0%) 26 (100%) 2 19 0 5 -0.03
5 5 (19%) 21 (81%) 11 6 3 1 -0.37
total 25 (18%) 105 (82%) 31 52 13 9 -0.14
β = 1
1 0 (0%) 26 (100%) 11 0 9 6 2.26
2 0 (0%) 26 (100%) 1 0 23 2 1.12
3 0 (0%) 26 (100%) 22 0 4 0 1.85
4 1 (4%) 25 (96%) 11 0 8 6 1.25
5 19 (73%) 7 (27%) 1 4 2 0 -0.19
total 20 (15%) 110 (85%) 46 4 46 14 1.26
(1) xSPN,xJPM / ∈ interval
(2) xSPN ∈ interval
(3) xJPM ∈ interval
(4) xSPN,xJPM ∈ interval
Table 6.8: Descriptives on signals in experiment I
supported by nonparametric test results11. This suggests that either the
ability to ﬁnd the cooperative R&D level or the willingness to cooperate
is higher with spillovers than without spillovers, which coincides with
the results in the previous subsection.
Thecorrespondencebetweensignalingbehaviourandaveragedegree
of R&D cooperation ¯ ρ may also be read from table 6.8. With β = 0 all
duopolies sent more intervals where xSPN ∈ interval than where xJPM ∈
interval and ¯ ρ is also closer to 0 than to 1. With β = 1, duopolies 2 and
4 sent more cooperative intervals than any other type of intervals and
their ¯ ρ is closest to 1. Duopoly 5 sent more competitive intervals (xSPN ∈
interval) and its ¯ ρ is close to 0. Finally, duopolies 1 and 3 sent intervals
containing R&D decisions higher than the cooperative R&D levels and
11Mann-Whitney-Utestsofdifferencesofthereporteddatainthetablefor‘only xSPN ∈
interval’ between β = 0 and β = 1, and for ‘only xJPM ∈ interval’ between β = 0 and
β = 1, respectively yield one-tailed p-values of 0.004 and 0.056. Wilcoxon-signed ranks
tests of differences between ‘only xSPN ∈ interval’ and ‘only xJPM ∈ interval’, within
β = 0 and β = 1, respectively yield one-tailed p-values of 0.031 and 0.063.
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Table 6.9: Theoretical R&D benchmarks for signaling experiment II
their ¯ ρ overshoots 1.
Summarising this section, part of the communicated intervals in the
signaling treatment did not contain any informative message. Focusing
on the intervals that contained relevant information, the sent R&D inter-
vals usually contained the cooperative level in the treatment with spill-
overs. Without spillovers, the intervals rather contained the SPN level.
This suggests that the more cooperative R&D behaviour in the signaling
treatment with β = 1 is likely due to the communication of cooperative
intervals12.
6.4 Experiment II
6.4.1 Experimental design and hypotheses
In experiment II we again set the quantity decision at its Nash-Cournot
equilibrium, which is a function of ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures. Parameter
values13 are a = 155, b = 1, α = 100, γ = 1 and δ = 2.1 and SPN pre-
dictions, cooperative outcomes and proﬁts that correspond to the most
widely separated levels of technological spillovers, i.e. β = 0 and β = 1
are in table 6.9.
For two levels of technological spillovers, β = 0 and β = 1, a base-
line treatment and a signaling treatment have been run in CentERlab at
Tilburg University. The experiment covered ﬁve sessions on April 5 and
12See section 6.5 for further suggestions on why signaling only stimulates R&D coop-
eration with β = 1.
13The parameter values satisfy requirements of stability as proposed by Henriques
(1990) and correspond to symmetric R&D solutions (see Salant and Shaffer, 1998).
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6 in 2004 with a total number of 90 participants recruited from the univer-
sity through mailing lists and a message in the university newspaper14.
The baseline treatments for β = 0 and β = 1 had 26 participants each, the
signaling treatment with β = 0 had 20 and the signaling treatment with
β = 1 had 18 participants. The sessions took about an hour and partici-
pants earned on average 14 EUR. The experiment was computerised and
the software toolkit z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (1999) was used.
Instructions were written on paper. After the participants had read
the instructions, the computer screens were explained aloud during a
trial round15. The instructions made clear that the participants repre-
sented one out of two producers in a market, subject to the same con-
ditions. Partners remained the same during the entire experiment and
participants knew this. They were asked to make an investment between
0.0 and 50.0 that reduced their (and their counterpart’s, in the case of
β = 1) production cost and involved a direct cost.
The subjects received a rough proﬁt table that contained information
about proﬁt for different combinations of multiples of ﬁve of their and
the other’s investment. The computer program also provided them with
a proﬁt calculator to calculate proﬁt in more detail for any combination
of their and the other’s investment. The participants were explicitly told
that they could invest anything between 0.0 and 50.0, not only multiples
of 516.
To allow for learning and to give theory a best chance, the same game
was repeated 20 times and subjects knew this. An additional trial round
14Because only 14 participants showed up in the ﬁrst session for the baseline treatment
with β = 0, we included an additional third session where baseline treatments for both
β = 0 and β = 1 were run. In the second session the other part of the baseline treatment
with β = 1 was run and in the ﬁnal two sessions the signaling treatments for β = 0 and
β = 1 were respectively run.
15See appendix C.3 for the instructions.
16One could argue that providing subjects with an additional proﬁt table may have
biased behaviour because Nash and JPM benchmarks based on the proﬁt table are differ-
ent. For β = 1 (β = 0) the Nash equilibrium (JPM level) in the proﬁt table is 10 (5) while
the exact theoretical Nash equilibrium (JPM level) is 7.4 (6.5). This implies that if only
proﬁt tables are looked at, the Nash (JPM) degree of cooperation according to the proﬁt
table is 0.25 (1.18) for β = 1 (β = 0). It is indeed the case that in treatments with β = 1
(β = 0) choices of 10 (5) have often been made. We checked whether a correction for this
bias would change results by replacing all choices of 10 (5) by 7.4 (6.5) for β = 1 (β = 0)
and it did not. Test statistics remain very similar and conclusions are exactly the same
(see 6.4.3.2).
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was added that did not count to calculate the ﬁnal earnings.
In the signaling treatments, an additional paragraph related to the
signaling possibility was added to the instructions. Subjects in this treat-
ment were able to send in each round an interval that contained their
intended investment decision of that round. They were not bounded to
invest what they communicated. Maximum one interval per round could
be sent and the interval could be anything between a single amount (in
that case the lower and upper bounds were equal) and the maximum in-
terval of [0.0,50.0]. When a subject wanted to send a message while the
other already entered her decision in that round, the subject was notiﬁed
that is was useless to continue the exchange.
After each round, participants were informed about their own and
their counterpart’s decision and proﬁt in experimental units. A complete
historyoninvestmentdecisionsandownproﬁtineachroundwasalways
available.
The hypotheses are the same as in experiment I, except that there is
no reference to a contract treatment:
Hypothesis II1 The tendency to cooperate in R&D does not differ be-
tween signaling and baseline treatments.
Hypothesis II2 The tendency to cooperate in R&D does not differ be-
tween β = 0 and β = 1.
6.4.2 Motivations for experiment II
In this section we motivate why another experiment based on the same
noncooperativeR&Dgamehasbeenperformedandprovideanoverview
of the differences in the experimental set-up between experiments I and
II.
An obvious motivation for performing other experiments to investi-
gate the same research question is related to robustness of results. If the
same results are found on the basis of different experiments with e.g. dif-
ferent designs, parameters or subject pools, conclusions are stronger than
on the basis of one experiment.
Further, the experimental design of experiment II is improved in a
number of ways in comparison to that of experiment I. First, the number
of independent observations in experiment II is 45 which is more than
twice the number in experiment I. Obviously, the more observations, the
1176 Noncooperative R&D experiments










Figure 6.2: Relative proﬁt differences for experiment I and II
more accurate statistical analyses can be performed on the data and the
more reliable conclusions can be made.
Second, turning from individual to joint proﬁt maximisation yields a
20.5% increase in proﬁt in experimental units for β = 0 and β = 1 in
experiment II, while only a 4.3% increase in experiment I. Arthur (1991)
ﬁnds that a sufﬁcient condition for behaviour to change, is that payoff in-
creases by at least 15% (see also Roth, 1995). The difference in sensitivity
of proﬁt between experiments I and II is shown in ﬁgure 6.2. Figure 6.2
gives the relation of proﬁt under joint proﬁt maximisation (πJPM) to proﬁt
under individual proﬁt maximisation (πSPN) for both experiments.
Third, some factors related to the experimental design of experiment
I which were not present in experiment II may have induced some un-
necessary variability and noise in experiment I:
• no exchange rate between experimental currency units was given
in the instructions: incentives of participants were instead elicited
as follows: “anything you earn (...) is calculated on the basis of total
proﬁt you earned during the 26 rounds”;
• the proﬁt calculator not only provided proﬁt but also production
quantity, return per product (selling price), unit production cost
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and total R&D costs;
• there was no control on the number of intervals that could be sent
in the signaling treatment: the instructions simply asked to send
exactly one interval in each round;
• there was no control on the contents of the message: the instruc-
tions simply asked to communicate an interval as follows: “be-
tween ... and ...”.
Other factors that differ between experiment I and II are the follow-
ing:
• experiment I was run in the computer rooms of the University of
Antwerp, where students had never participated in economic ex-
periments before, and experiment II was run at Tilburg University
in CentERlab, where experiments are run throughout the year;
• in experiment I information on both R&D decisions and own proﬁt
of round t was provided in round t + 1, while in experiment II a
separate screen with R&D decisions and proﬁt of both players was
provided at the end of round t and a history of all previous R&D
decisions and own proﬁt on the decision screens in all rounds;
• in experiment II the instructions contained proﬁt tables, while in
experiment I not;
• the number of rounds in experiment II (20) is lower than in experi-
ment I (26);
• earnings per hour are higher in experiment II than in experiment I.
6.4.3 Experimental results
In this section decisions made in experiment II are analysed. Given that
within duopolies, decisions of subjects are interdependent, the analyses
are based on averages by duopoly.
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benchmarks average R&D decisions (st. dev.)
xSPN xJPM rounds 1-20 rounds 1-5 rounds 16-20
β = 0
baseline 14.8 6.5 13.7 (2.57) 14.3 (2.04) 13.7 (4.04)
signaling 14.8 6.5 11.7 (4.23) 11.9 (4.39) 13.1 (3.58)
β = 1
baseline 7.4 20.2 10.5 (4.18) 11.4 (4.61) 9.1 (3.31)
signaling 7.4 20.2 16.6 (3.61) 18.3 (2.19) 13.8 (5.00)
Table 6.10: Average R&D decisions in signaling experiment II
6.4.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 6.10 reports for the four treatments duopoly R&D decisions aver-
aged over all rounds, the ﬁrst ﬁve and the last ﬁve rounds, when sub-
jects have gained a lot of experience. Standard deviations refer to cross-
sectional variability. The table shows that average R&D in the baseline
treatment with β = 0 is generally close to the SPN prediction. In the
signaling treatment with β = 1 average R&D in all rounds is lower than
in the baseline treatment but has a higher standard deviation, providing
evidence for higher variability across duopolies. In the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds
R&D is closer to the SPN prediction.
With β = 1 average R&D in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds in the baseline treat-
ment is somewhat higher than the SPN prediction but decreases during
the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds. In the signaling treatment average R&D is closer to
the cooperative R&D level, especially in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds. Although
R&D investment decreases in the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds, it remains substan-
tially higher than the equilibrium prediction.
Subﬁgures 6.3(a) and 6.3(b) give the evolution of the average degree
of R&D cooperation across duopolies per treatment for β = 0 and β = 1,
respectively. The degree of R&D cooperation ρkt of duopoly k in round t
is again deﬁned as:
ρkt =
¯ xkt − xSPN
xJPM − xSPN
and is equal to 0 (1) when duopoly k chooses on average to maximise
individual (joint) proﬁt in round t.
Figure 6.3 shows that without spillovers the average degree of R&D


















(b) β = 1
Figure 6.3: Evolution of average degree of R&D cooperation in baseline and sig-
naling treatments II
SPN behaviour. In the signaling treatment with β = 0, ¯ ρ is generally
higher than in the baseline treatment but sharply declines during the ﬁ-
nal rounds of the experiment. With β = 1, the difference in degree of
R&D cooperation between baseline and signaling treatment is more pro-
nounced and better sustained during the ﬁnal rounds than with β = 0. In
both treatments with β = 1, ¯ ρ gradually declines during the experiment,
just as in experiment I.
The sharp decrease in degree of R&D cooperation in the ﬁnal one
or two rounds, which is observed in ﬁgure 6.3, however, was not ob-
served in experiment I. This may be due to a difference in experience
of subjects that participated in the experiments. Indeed, experiment II
was run at Tilburg University, where subjects are more experienced in
participating in laboratory experiments, while experiment I at the Uni-
versity of Antwerp, which has no tradition in running experiments. An
end-effect is typically observed in games with experienced players (Selten
and Stoecker, 1986).
Since table 6.10 suggests that variability in R&D decisions across duo-
polies is high (cf. high standard deviations) in all treatments, we further
have a look at frequency distributions of ¯ ρ. Figure 6.4 contains these for
the four treatments, for all and the last ﬁve rounds. The horizontal ax
has seven intervals of ¯ ρ where (−0.75;−0.50) is the lowest interval and







































































































































































































































no spillovers full spillovers
Figure 6.4: Frequency distributions of average degree of R&D cooperation
(0.75;1.00) the highest. The number of scores (duopolies) in each interval
is on the vertical axis.
Figure 6.4 conﬁrms that average and modal behaviour in all baseline
treatments is close to individual proﬁt maximisation for rounds 1-20 and
rounds 16-2017. In the signaling treatment with β = 0, the histogram for
rounds 1-20 looks like one of a bimodal distribution, where one mode is
close to SPN behaviour and the other closer to R&D cooperation. Also
in the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds the histogram roughly has a bimodal structure,
but the modes are closer to each other since the second mode has moved
away from R&D cooperation. In the signaling treatment with β = 1,
the distribution of ¯ ρ is highly skewed to the left for rounds 1-20 and to
a lesser extent for rounds 16-20. The mode is in the interval (0.75;1.00),
both for rounds 1-20 and 16-20, and modal behaviour is thus close to
R&D cooperation.
17Histograms based on the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds are similar to histograms based on all
rounds.
1226.4 Experiment II
rounds 1-20 rounds 1-5 rounds 16-20
β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1
Mann-Whitney-U test
U 44a 16a 43a 13.5a 61b 23.5a
Wilcoxon-W 135 107 134 104.5 152 114.5
2-tailed sig. 0.208 0.003 0.186 0.001 0.832 0.017
Robust rank-order test
` U 1.21a 4.44a 1.28a 4.71a 0.29a 2.67a
2-tailed sig. > 0.200 0.002− 0.010 > 0.200 0.001− 0.002 > 0.200 0.020− 0.050
N 23 22 23 22 23 22
aH1 : ¯ ρsignaling
>
 = ¯ ρbaseline; bH1 : ¯ ρbaseline
>
 = ¯ ρsignaling;
Table 6.11: Signaling treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation in ex-
periment II
6.4.3.2 Nonparametric analyses
In this section, results are reported of tests comparing ¯ ρ between baseline
with signaling treatments and between treatments where β = 0 and β =
1, on the basis of all, the ﬁrst ﬁve and the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds18.
Mann-Whitney-U and robust rank-order test results of comparisons
between baseline and signaling treatments are in table 6.11. With β = 0
none of the tests ﬁnds a signiﬁcant difference in degree of R&D coopera-
tion between the baseline and the signaling treatment in rounds 1-20, nor
in rounds 1-5 or 16-20. Thus, without spillovers, signaling possibilities
have not raised the degree of R&D cooperation.
With β = 1 both tests ﬁnd that the degree of cooperation in the sig-
naling treatment is signiﬁcantly different from (higher than) the baseline
treatments at the 1% level in rounds 1-20 and at the 5% level in the ﬁnal
ﬁve rounds. Thus, the availability of signaling possibilities has elicited
the degree of R&D cooperation above its ‘normal’ level.
Therefore hypothesis II1 is not rejected for β = 0 and is rejected for
β = 1.
Table 6.12 presents results of Mann-Whitney-U and robust rank-order
18In some papers (for instance Holt, 1985; Huck et al., 2001; Potters et al., 2004) deci-
sions in the ﬁnal one or two rounds are excluded when comparing behaviour between
treatments, so as to avoid that possible end-effects disturb differences. Since in our ex-
periment, differences between treatments are strong enough to be not disturbed by end-
effects, we chose to use all data in the statistical analyses.
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baseline signaling
rounds 1-20 1-5 16-20 1-20 1-5 16-20
Mann-Whitney-U
U 56 45 70 21 18 27
Wilcoxon-W 147 136 161 76 73 82
2-tailed sig. 0.153 0.044 0.479 0.053 0.028 0.156
Robust rank-order
` U 1.45 2.21 0.67 2.26 2.62 1.55
2-tailed sig. ≥ 0.100 0.020− 0.050 > 0.200 0.020− 0.050 0.020− 0.050 ≥ 0.100
N 26 26 26 19 19 19
H1 : ¯ ρβ=1
>
 = ¯ ρβ=0.
Table 6.12: Spillover treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation in ex-
periment II
tests that compare ¯ ρ between β = 0 and β = 1 for baseline and signaling
treatment for all, the ﬁrst ﬁve and the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds. The tests point
out that in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of both baseline and signaling treatments
the degree of R&D cooperation with β = 1 is signiﬁcantly higher than
with β = 0 with about 5% signiﬁcance. As in experiment I, the difference
declines during the experiment and becomes insigniﬁcant in the ﬁnal ﬁve
rounds.
Considering rounds 1-20, the tests ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference be-
tween β = 0 and β = 1 in the signaling treatments with signiﬁcance
levels of 5.3% and 5% for the Mann-Whitney-U and the robust rank-order
test, respectively. In the baseline treatments, the difference between the
spillover scenarios is not signiﬁcant if all rounds are considered.
Thus, hypothesis II2 is rejected for the signaling treatments since the
degree of R&D cooperation is overall signiﬁcantly higher with β = 1
than with β = 0. Hypothesis II2 is less clearly rejected for the baseline
treatments although that the degree of R&D cooperation is signiﬁcantly
higher with β = 1 than with β = 0 in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds. The signiﬁ-
cance disappears in the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds.
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rounds 1-20
β = 0 β = 1
(1) T+ 36 20
2-tailed sig. 0.129 0.063
N 9 6
(2) T+ 20 20
2-tailed sig. 0.063 0.063
N 6 6
H1 : ¯ ρsignal > ρno signal
Table 6.13: Within signaling treatment effects on the degree of R&D cooperation
in experiment II
6.4.4 Signaling behaviour
As to further investigate why signaling was successful in eliciting the de-
gree of R&D cooperation with full spillovers and why it was not without
spillovers, behaviour in the signaling treatment is more closely exam-
ined.
First it is examined whether the sending of signals has inﬂuenced the
degree of cooperation. Therefore we compare (1) degrees of cooperation
averaged over rounds where at least one signal was sent with degrees of
cooperation averaged over rounds without any signals and (2) degrees
of cooperation averaged over rounds where both subjects in a duopoly
sent a signal with degrees of cooperation averaged over rounds where
maximum one signal was sent. Table 6.13 provides results of Wilcoxon
signed-ranks tests for β = 0 and β = 1 based on rounds 1-20. Tests are
only based on all rounds because there are too few observations in the
ﬁrst or ﬁnal rounds.
The test results in table 6.13 show that for β = 0, it did not sufﬁce that
one subject in a duopoly sent a signal on the interval containing intended
R&D for the degree of R&D cooperation to rise. In rounds where both
subjects sent an interval, the degree of cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher
than in other rounds at the 6.3% level. In the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds the signif-
icance disappears. In the treatment with β = 1, it did sufﬁce that at least
one subject sent a signal for the degree of cooperation to be signiﬁcantly
higher than in other rounds at the 6.3% level.
Next, we study the communicative content of the signals. Did the
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signals contain the SPN prediction or rather the cooperative level and
is there a difference between both spillover treatments? Note that it is
less likely that small intervals contained either the SPN or the coopera-
tive R&D level, while one of the two bounds could still be close to either
of the theoretical benchmarks. If ignoring these communicative signals,
the communicative extent of the signals would be underestimated. To
correct for this, the smaller intervals were enlarged. Moreover, for in-
tervals where upper and lower bounds were the same, lower (upper)
bounds were recalculated by subtracting (adding) 1. For intervals with
a difference between upper and lower bound strictly larger than 0 and
smaller or equal to 1, lower (upper) bounds were recalculated by sub-
tracting (adding) 0.519. Table 6.14 provides general and duopoly-speciﬁc
ﬁgures on the sent signals.
For subjects that did not send an interval in a certain round, we as-
sumed that the communicated interval was [0,50]. We accordingly inter-
pret the sending of interval [0,50] as unwillingness to communicate in
that round20. Therefore, to investigate the communicative contents of the
signals, we only consider rounds where at least one subject in a duopoly
has sent an interval not equal to [0,50]. In the table the data in column
‘ = [0,50]’ refer to the number of rounds where none of the pair’s subjects
has sent an interval different from [0,50], whereas ‘=[0,50]’ refers to the
number of rounds where at least one pair’s subject has communicated an
interval different from [0,50]. For each duopoly, both columns naturally
sum to 20, which is the total number of rounds in the experiment. The
ﬁnal column in the table provides degrees of cooperation averaged over
the entire experiment.
For β = 0 and β = 1, in more than half of the duopolies intervals dif-
ferent from [0,50] have mostly been communicated by at least one sub-
ject. In general, more intervals have been communicated in the treatment
with full spillovers, but the difference with the treatment without spill-
overs is not signiﬁcant according to a Mann-Whitney-U-test (p-value of
0.411). The table further indicates that some duopolies where subjects
mostly did not sent signals did not succeed in cooperating in R&D (cf.
column ‘¯ ρ1−20’). Examples are duopolies 1 and 8 with β = 0 and duopoly
3 with β = 1. A counterexample is duopoly 2 with β = 1 (we come back
to this issue later).
19A total of 298 intervals out of 405 were re-scaled.
20Only one subject actually sent the interval [0,50] in one round.
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duopoly = [0,50]  = [0,50] (1) (2) (3) (4) ¯ ρ1−20
β = 0
1 17 (85%) 3 (15%) 1 0 1 1 -0.08
2 7 (35%) 13 (65%) 6 7 0 0 -0.09
3 1 (5%) 19 (95%) 6 10 2 1 -0.44
4 1 (5%) 19 (95%) 1 1 17 0 0.86
5 5 (25%) 15 (75%) 4 0 11 0 0.87
6 18 (90%) 2 (10%) 0 0 2 0 0.84
7 17 (85%) 3 (15%) 0 0 3 0 0.77
8 19 (95%) 1 (5%) 1 0 0 0 0.00
9 2 (10%) 18 (90%) 0 0 18 0 0.83
10 0 (0%) 20 (100%) 4 6 9 1 0.13
total 87 (43%) 113 (57%) 23 24 63 3 0.37
β = 1
1 0 (0%) 20 (100%) 0 0 20 0 0.92
2 19 (95%) 1 (5%) 0 0 1 0 0.90
3 13 (65%) 7 (35%) 4 0 3 0 0.19
4 0 (0%) 20 (100%) 0 0 20 0 0.96
5 1 (5%) 19 (95%) 9 0 9 1 0.69
6 8 (40%) 12 (60%) 4 0 7 1 0.33
7 4 (20%) 16 (80%) 0 0 16 0 0.67
8 0 (0%) 20 (100%) 0 0 20 0 0.93
9 10 (50%) 10 (50%) 0 0 10 0 0.86
total 55 (31%) 125 (69%) 17 0 106 2 0.72
(1) xSPN,xJPM / ∈ interval
(2) xSPN ∈ interval
(3) xJPM ∈ interval
(4) xSPN,xJPM ∈ interval
Table 6.14: Descriptives on signals in experiment II
In other columns of table 6.14, the rounds where communication oc-
curred by at least one pair’s subject are further subdivided on the basis
of whether the communicated intervals were actually informative and
contained the SPN or contained the JPM prediction. We deﬁne the fol-
lowing categories: (1) rounds where the communicated interval(s) did
not contain the SPN nor the cooperative prediction, (2) rounds where
the communicated interval(s) only contained the SPN equilibrium21, (3)
21Including rounds where 2 intervals were sent of which one only contained the SPN
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rounds where the communicated interval(s) only contained the cooper-
ative R&D level22 and (4) rounds where the interval(s) contained both
theoretical benchmarks23.
The table shows that the category of signals most often sent is cate-
gory (3), which refers to intervals that contain the cooperative R&D level
(xJPM ∈ interval). This is the case for both spillover treatments but more
explicitly for β = 1. In the β = 0 treatment, duopolies 2, 3 and 10 mostly
sent signals referring to the noncooperative equilibrium prediction—and
do not succeed in sustaining a high degree of R&D cooperation—while
in the β = 1 treatment this type of noncooperative signals has not been
sent. A two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U test of the null hypothesis that the
number of rounds with cooperative signals (xJPM ∈ interval) is the same
for β = 0 and β = 1 is rejected at the 10% level and conﬁrms that with
β = 1 more cooperative signals were sent than with β = 0. Moreover,
the amount of sent intervals different from [0,50] is positively and sig-
niﬁcantly rank-correlated with the amount of SPN signals (xSPN ∈ inter-
val) when β = 0 and negatively with the amount of cooperative signals
(xJPM ∈ interval) when β = 1.
Another important question is whether duopolies of which the sub-
jects mostly sent cooperative signals were also able to sustain higher de-
grees of R&D cooperation. The answer is ‘yes’ if we look at the average
degrees of cooperation of duopolies 4, 5 and 9 for β = 0 and duopolies 1,
4, 8, 9, and less explicitly, 5 and 7, for β = 1. This is supported by pos-
itive Spearman rank correlations between ¯ ρ1−20 and column (3) of 0.707
for β = 0 and 0.678 for β = 1 (signiﬁcant at the 5% level). Furthermore,
duopolies 6 and 7 for β = 0 and duopoly 2 for β = 1 only sent cooper-
ative signals in the ﬁrst rounds of the experiment and nothing in other
rounds, but were still able to sustain relatively high degrees of coopera-
tion throughout the entire experiment.
Summarising, experimental evidence indicates that the higher degree
of R&D cooperation that is sustained in the signaling treatment with β =
1 may be due to the fact that signiﬁcantly more cooperative signals were
sent with β = 1 than with β = 0, and signiﬁcantly more noncooperative
level and the other no or both benchmarks.
22Including rounds where 2 intervals were sent of which one only contained the coop-
erative level and the other no or both benchmarks.
23The interval(s) either contained both benchmarks, or 1 interval contained the Nash
and the other the cooperative benchmark.
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signals with β = 0. In general, duopolies that mostly sent cooperative
signals also succeeded in moving away from the SPN prediction of R&D
towards the cooperative benchmark. On the other hand, the degree of
cooperation of duopolies that mainly sent noncooperative signals or a
mixture of different types of signals, is usually lower and closer to the
noncooperative prediction.
6.5 Situating the results
We argued before that in the ﬁnitely repeated noncooperative R&D game
xSPN is the equilibrium prediction for β = 0 and β = 1 (see 5.3.1). There-
fore, one would expect the degree of R&D cooperation in the experiment
to be the same for both spillover levels. We also argued that it is com-
mon that in experiments—also in experiments with a known ﬁnite end—
strategies are played that would be sustainable if the experiment would
be an inﬁnitely repeated game. Normann and Wallace (2004) e.g. have
recently shown that termination rules do not signiﬁcantly effect coopera-
tion rates in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game.
If the R&D game would be inﬁnitely repeated, the set of equilibrium
predictions broadens and may include a trigger strategy or a stick-and-
carrot strategy (see Martin, 2001). In the case of a trigger strategy the
Friedman index as discussed in 5.3.1 may be used as a measure of incen-
tives to cooperate. Since the Friedman index is the same for β = 0 and
β = 1, incentives to cooperate in R&D are also expected to be the same
for both spillover levels in the inﬁnitely repeated R&D game and R&D
cooperation is as likely to be a viable strategy for β = 1 as it is for β = 0.
Furthermore, optimal stick-and-carrot punishments give rise to degrees
of R&D cooperation that are the same for β = 0 and β = 1 (see foot-
note 13 in chapter 5). Thus, an explanation for the difference in degree of
R&D cooperation cannot be found by interpreting the experiment as an
inﬁnitely repeated game.
The higher willingness to send cooperative signals with β = 1 may
be at least partly due to the (small) difference in instructions between
β = 0 and β = 1. With β = 1 subjects are explicitely made aware of
their interdependency: a subject’s investment decision also reduces unit
production cost of the counterpart (see appendices C.2 and C.3).
Further, consider public good/bad games (see e.g. Andreoni, 1995b;
Offerman, 1996; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999). The effects of fram-
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ing in public good games has been the subject of a number of public
good/bad experiments. In a typical public good game, members of a
group are asked to divide an amount of money into a private good (a
public ‘bad’) and a public good which is later on divided among the
group’s members. In a public good context, the contribution of sub-
jects to the public good, generating positive externalities for the others,
is stressed. In a public bad context, stress is on the negative externalities
generated by the private investment. In many experiments, subjects con-
tribute signiﬁcantly more, or in other words cooperate more, in a public
good context than in a public bad context24.
The parallel with the R&D game is that R&D with high spillovers is
characterised by positive externalities since it increases proﬁt of the other
ﬁrm, while R&D with low spillovers has negative externalities since it
decreases proﬁt of the other ﬁrm. Indeed,
∂πi
∂xj




< 0 for β = 0.
By doing R&D, it is assumed that a ﬁrm reduces its production costs.
When none or few of the knowledge, gained by doing R&D, ﬂows to
other ﬁrms, the other ﬁrms’ costs are not, or not enough, reduced to com-
pensate their relative proﬁt loss. When there are substantial knowledge
ﬂows, other ﬁrms also gain production cost reductions, which makes also
their proﬁt increase (see also Kamien et al., 1992).
Our ﬁndings coincide to some extent with ﬁndings based on pub-
lic good/bad experiments, more speciﬁcally in experiment I and II in
the treatments with signaling possibilities and in experiment II in the
ﬁrst rounds of the baseline treatments. The effect is not a framing ef-
fect, though, since under both spillover scenarios subjects had to make an
investment. Moreover, public good and bad games both usually have—
contrary to the R&D game—a horizontal reaction curve.
Another, intuitive, explanation which gets more attention in chapters
7 and 8 would be that with β = 0, R&D cooperation may be hampered
becauseactionsarestrategicsubstitutesinthesenseofBulowetal. (1985),
24A recent study of Brandts and Schwieren (2004) questions this experimental result.
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implying that the best response of a ﬁrm to an increase (decrease) in R&D
of the competitor is to decrease (increase) its own R&D, that is to do ex-
actly the opposite as the other ﬁrm. With β = 1, actions are strategic
complements and the best response is to move in the same direction as
the other ﬁrm. Indeed, R&D with high spillovers increases not only proﬁt
but also marginal proﬁt of the other ﬁrm, while R&D with low spillovers
decreases marginal proﬁt of the other ﬁrm:
∂2πi
∂xi∂xj




< 0 for β = 0.
Bester and G¨ uth (1998) have shown that altruism is only evolutionary
stable when actions are strategic complements. Altruism or cooperative
preferences would induce higher actions when both strategic interdepen-
dence and externalities have the same sign, and decrease actions when
the signs are opposite25. Eichberger and Kelsey (2002) ﬁnd opposite ef-
fects ofambiguitydeﬁned asuncertainty abouttheactions ofothers. Am-
biguity would increase equilibrium actions when strategic interdepen-
dence and externalities have an opposite sign and decrease equilibrium
actions when strategic interdependence and externalities have the same
sign. Therefore, ambiguity helps to induce joint proﬁt maximising ac-
tions in games of strategic substitutes and individual proﬁt maximising
actions in games of strategic complements.
Given that in our experiment actions are either strategic substitutes
with negative externalities (when β = 0) or strategic complements with
positive externalities (when β = 1), altruism may have induced higher
R&D decisions—at least in the treatments with signaling possibilities—
and may have moved R&D decisions closer to the joint proﬁt maximising
level for β = 1 and to the individual proﬁt maximising level for β = 0.
The effects of altruism seem to be stronger than the effects of ambiguity
as analysed by Eichberger and Kelsey (2002).
Theoretical work of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989) suggests
that when macroeconomic interaction is characterised by strategic com-
25See 8.4 in chapter 8 for a detailed description and application of the approach used
by Bester and G¨ uth (1998).
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plementarity, agents with adaptive expectations (naive agents) have a
disproportionate impact on equilibrium compared to agents with ratio-
nal expectations (sophisticated agents)26. If in the R&D game conver-
gence to the SPN equilibrium is more difﬁcult for β = 1 than for β = 0
for the same number of agents with adaptive expectations, this sugges-
tion may be part of an explanation for our ﬁndings.
Therefore we compare the discrete adjustment processes of the aver-
age degree of R&D cooperation for the two spillover scenarios where at
least one out of two duopolists has adaptive expectations and where both
duopolists start with out-of-equilibrium play. Figures 6.5(a) and 6.5(b) re-
spectively provide these adjustment processes for β = 0 and β = 1 for
the parameter valuesused inthe experimentsin this chapter. The starting
point for both duopolists is a degree of R&D cooperation of one, which
implies that both make cooperative R&D decisions27. Two scenarios are
provided; one where both duopolists have adaptive expectations and one
where one duopolist has adaptive and the other rational expectations.
Figure 6.5 shows that the adjustment process for β = 1, when R&D
decisions are strategic complements, is not slower than the adjustment
process for β = 0, when R&D decisions are strategic substitutes. On the
contrary, with β = 0 it takes slightly more time for the average R&D
decision to converge to the SPN equilibrium prediction (average degree
of R&D cooperation of zero). With β = 1, SPN play28 is reached in round
3or4, whilewith β = 0inround3, 4or7. Thus, thetheoreticalﬁndingsof
Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985, 1989) in a macroeconomic context are
not valid for the R&D game and cannot explain our experimental results.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have contributed to the R&D literature by examining
the relation between technological spillovers and the tendency to tacitly
cooperate in R&D, given Cournot competition in the product market. For
twospilloverscenarios(β = 0and β = 1)weranabaselinetreatmentand
26Fehr and Tyran (2002) provide experimental evidence in support of this hypothesis.
They even go further and suggest that strategic complementarity renders people less
rational and forward looking.
27We tried other starting points, such as an R&D decision in the middle of the admitted
range, but all resulted in similar adjustment processes.
28An average degree of R&D cooperation of 0.00.
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Figure 6.5: Simulations of adjustment of degree of R&D cooperation with adap-
tive agents
a signaling treatment, where subjects were allowed to send nonbinding
signals on intended R&D investment. In all treatments the R&D game
was ﬁnitely repeated.
Both experiments yield that without technological spillovers (β = 0)
the possibility of cheap talk signaling is not sufﬁcient to signiﬁcantly in-
creasethedegreeofR&Dcooperationabovethelevelobtainedinbaseline
treatments.
On the other hand, in the scenario with full technological spillovers
(β = 1) the signaling possibility signiﬁcantly increases the degree of R&D
cooperation above the baseline level. This results from experiment I in
theﬁnalrounds, whensubjectshavelearnedandgainedexperience. Itre-
sults from experiment II throughout the entire experiment with stronger
signiﬁcancies.
These and other between-treatment results suggest that there is more
tacit R&D cooperation with β = 1 than with β = 0.
Combining this ﬁnding with the results obtained in chapter 5, we can
conclude that subjects need more bindingness than the sharing of inten-
tions about R&D decisions to deviate from the subgame perfect Nash
R&D or the ‘baseline’ level towards the cooperative level with β = 0.
For R&D investments subject to high technological spillovers (β = 1),
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the sending of messages containing intended R&D investment may suf-
ﬁce for R&D investment to be elicited towards the cooperative level. Yet,
commitment to binding R&D contracts guarantees that R&D levels are or
become fully cooperative for both scenarios of spillovers.
After examining the communicative content of the signals, it turned
out that for both experiments the higher degree of R&D cooperation that
is sustained in the signaling treatment with β = 1 is likely due to the fact
that signiﬁcantly more cooperative signals were sent than with β = 0.
Indeed, duopolies that mostly sent cooperative signals also succeeded in
moving away from the SPN prediction of R&D towards the cooperative
benchmark. On the other hand, duopolies that mainly sent noncoopera-
tive signals or a mixture of different types of signals, cooperate less and
rather behave according to the noncooperative prediction.
In the following chapter of this thesis we examine whether the higher
degree of R&D cooperation with β = 1 may be due to whether R&D with
high enough spillovers generates a positive externality, or to whether









In chapter 6 we found that signaling possibilities have been able to signif-
icantly increase the degree of R&D cooperation above the baseline level
with β = 1, and not with β = 0, despite the fact that standard game
theory does not predict a difference in behaviour between β = 0 and
β = 1. Moreover, between-spillover-treatment comparisons yield that
the degree of R&D cooperation is higher with β = 1 than with β = 0 (cf.
the signaling treatments of experiments I and II and to some extent the
baseline treatment of experiment II).
A relevant question is whether the higher cooperation in the R&D
game with β = 1 is due to the type of strategic interaction or to the sign of
the externality, or to both.
Consider the R&D games as depicted in ﬁgure 7.11. With β = 0, re-
action curves have a negative slope ´ and the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-
dominated by lower R&D decisions, such as the JPM R&D level. The fact
that lower (symmetric) R&D decisions Pareto-dominate the Nash equi-
librium is a consequence of the negative externality generated by R&D
1Note that the ﬁgures are representative for the noncooperative R&D games but are
not exact in the sense of corresponding to one of the parameterisations used in the exper-
iments in chapter 6. BRi represents the best-response or reaction curve of i.


















(b) β = 1
Figure 7.1: Reaction curves, Nash and JPM choices in R&D games
with β = 02. With β = 1, on the other hand, reaction curves have a posi-
tive slope ´ and the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by higher R&D
decisions. R&D decision then generate a positive externality.
We already argued at the end of the previous chapter that the ﬁndings
in the noncooperative R&D experiments coincide in a way with ﬁndings
from a number of public good/bad experiments. Indeed, experiments on
public goods where actions have positive externalities often yield higher
levels of cooperation than their public bad equivalents where actions
have negative externalities.
On the other hand, it may be possible that whether marginal utility or
proﬁt of other players is increased or decreased by actions of a player, in-
ﬂuences the likelihood of cooperation. In other words, the type of strategic
interaction may be an important factor. Within this respect, the taxon-
omy deﬁned by Bulow et al. (1985) is useful: in games with strategic sub-
stitutes (complements), a player’s choice decreases (increases) marginal
utility of the other player(s). This implies that in games with strategic
substitutes (complements), linear reaction curves or best-response curves
have a negative (positive) slope (see e.g. ﬁgures 7.1(a) and 7.1(b), respec-
2Eaton and Eswaran (2002) formally show that in a general social dilemma game with




Theoretical arguments in favour of cooperation being more proba-
ble when actions are strategic complements are provided by Rotemberg
(1994) and Bester and G¨ uth (1998)3. Rotemberg (1994) shows that rational
playerscanchoosetobecomecooperativeinaﬁrststage(referredtoasra-
tional altruism) if second-stage actions are strategic complements. Bester
and G¨ uth (1998) develop an evolutionary model and provide theoretical
evidence for the hypothesis that cooperation (referred to as altruism) is
only evolutionarily stable when actions exhibit strategic complementari-
ties.
In this chapter we set up an experiment where strategic properties
and the type of externalities of actions are disentangled4. Moreover, we
examine whether the type of strategic interaction and/or the type of externality
of actions inﬂuence the degree of cooperation in general dominance-solvable
games with a unique Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium, also referred to
as social dilemmas (see Kollock, 1998; Eaton, 2004)5.
To disentangle both properties, four treatments are run based on the
following games: a game of strategic substitutes with negative externali-
ties, a game of strategic substitutes with positive externalities, a game of
strategic complements with negative externalities and a game of strategic
complements with positive externalities. The four treatments correspond
to the games depicted in ﬁgures 7.2 and 7.3, for strategic substitutes and
complements, respectively.
It is clear that R&D decisions as modelled by AJ and KMZ can be
viewed as one application of this experiment. The experiment also ap-
plies to Cournot and Bertrand markets. Under Cournot quantity compe-
tition with linear demand, actions are strategic substitutes and have neg-
3Another line of research examines the effects of strategic complementarity in a
macro-economic context (see Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989; Fehr and Tyran,
2002). Adjustment of behaviour after a macro-economic shock seems to be slower with
strategic substitutes than with strategic complements.
4This chapter is based on joint work with Jan Potters.
5Note that Eaton (2004) uses the terms plain substitutes and complements to respec-
tively refer to actions with negative and positive externalities. In his paper, the author
provides an informative overview of social dilemmas with continuous action spaces and
their characteristics based on the taxonomy we use in this chapter. Eaton also refers to
the R&D stage of the model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) as an example of a
social dilemma. Note that social in this context does not refer to social welfare as deﬁned
by consumer and producer surplus, but only to utility (proﬁts) of the players of the game,
which are ﬁrms in this example.



















Figure 7.2: Reaction curves, Nash and JPM choices in games of strategic substi-
tutes
ative externalities when goods are (imperfect) substitutes. Under Bert-
rand price competition with imperfect substitutes and linear demand, ac-
tions are strategic complements and have positive externalities. With lin-
ear demand, actions of Cournot-competing ﬁrms selling complementary
goods are strategic complements with positive externalities and actions
of Bertrand-competing ﬁrms in duopoly selling complementary goods
are strategic substitutes with negative externalities then (see also Eaton,
2004).
PastoligopolyexperimentshavetypicallyusedCournotandBertrand
settings based on linear demand and goods that are (imperfect) substi-
tutes to examine IO issues. As we will discuss later in this chapter, a de-
tailed examination of past oligopoly experiments reveals that behaviour
is often more competitive in Cournot than in Bertrand markets, which is
in line with what we found in the noncooperative R&D experiments.
Many other applications of the types of games on which our exper-
iment is based, exist. Consider, for instance, a public good game with
decreasing returns to scale and/or diminishing marginal utility of the
public good. This is a game of strategic substitutes with positive ex-
ternalities. On the other hand, with increasing returns to scale and/or



















(b) β = 1
Figure 7.3: Reaction curves, Nash and JPM choices in games of strategic com-
plements
plements and have positive externalities (see e.g. Andreoni, 1993; Chan
et al., 1997; Eichberger and Kelsey, 2002).
For the scenario with strategic substitutes and positive externalities,
Eaton (2004) provides an example of two allied countries deciding on se-
curity (defence) spending assuming that utility is measured by the value
of security (defence). If the countries are enemies, the game played is
one of strategic complements with negative externalities. Social dilemma
situations arise in a variety of other subdisciplines of economics (inter-
national economics, intellectual property rights literature, environmental
pollution, etc.) and in real-life social interactions.
Therefore, whether behaviour depends on the type of externalities
or on the type of strategic interaction, is a relevant research topic with
many applications in different disciplines. Our experiment is the ﬁrst
that examines the separate effects of the type of strategic interaction and
the sign of externalities on the degree of cooperation.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 7.2 we provide a descrip-
tion of the set-up and ﬁndings of experiments aimed at examining fram-
ing effects in public good games. In section 7.3 we examine differences
in collusive behaviour between Cournot and Bertrand experimental set-
tings based on available data from previous experiments. Section 7.4 con-
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tains the general framework that serves as a basis for the experiment in
this chapter and section 7.5 the experimental procedure. The experimen-
tal data are described in section 7.6 and the ﬁnal section concludes.
7.2 Framing in public good experiments
Andreoni (1995b) came to the idea of examining whether cooperation is
easier when actions have positive externalities than when actions have
negative externalities on the basis of the following previous experimen-
tal ﬁndings: (1) in voluntary contribution (public good) experiments sub-
jects are typically more cooperative than predicted, and (2) in oligopoly
and common-resource experiments Nash predictions perform well. He
suggested that this behavioural asymmetry may be caused by the fol-
lowing: in public good games actions have positive externalities and in




experiments with linear demand and constant marginal cost. Moreover,
strategicinteractionsdifferbetweenpublicgood, oligopolyandcommon-
pool resource experiments. Typically, the reaction curve in a public good
game is horizontal while in quantity-choice and common-pool resource
games it has a negative slope. In price-choice games the reaction curve is
positively sloped.
Andreoni (1995b) examines whether cooperation in games with pos-
itive externalities is easier than in games with negative externalities by
comparing behaviour under different types of framing. As such, instruc-
tions are different for the different treatments.
The standard representation of a public good game is summarised in
the following proﬁt function
πi = axi − bx2
i + cgi + c∑
j =i
gj a,c > 0,b ≥ 0, (7.1)
which subjects are induced to maximise under the budget constraint xi +
gi = d. The contribution of player i to the private good is xi and the
contribution of i to the public good is gi. When formulated in this way, it
is clear that others’ contributions to the public good generate a positive
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= c > 0.
If equation 7.1 is rewritten by incorporating the budget constraint, the
proﬁt function is transformed into
πi = axi − bx2
i + c(d − xi) + c∑
j =i
(d − xj) a,c > 0,b ≥ 0, (7.2)




= −c < 0.
When b > 0 the game has an interior solution xNash = (a− c)/2b and
gNash = d − (a − c)/2b. When b = 0 the game reduces to a commonly
used linear public good game where it is optimal to contribute nothing
to the public good such that xNash = d and gNash = 0.







= 0. This implies that reaction curves are
horizontal.
Typically, participants in experiments based on equations 7.1 and 7.2
are asked to allocate an initial endowment (d) between an individual ex-
change or private activity (xi) and a group exchange or public activity
(gi). This actually implies that, at the same time, they are asked how
much to invest in the public good and how much to invest in the public
bad (the private activity). But generally, the positive frame is referred to
as a public good game and the negative frame as a public bad game. In
Sonnemans et al. (1998) subjects participating in the positive frame were
only asked how much to invest in the public good (in neutral wordings)
and subjects participating in the negative frame only how much to invest
in the public bad (as in e.g. Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003).
On the basis of a linear version of the game, Andreoni (1995b) ﬁnds
that subjects cooperate signiﬁcantly less in the case of negative framing.
Sonnemans et al. (1998) conﬁrm these ﬁndings and add that the differ-
ence grows the more rounds are played. Also Park (2000) ﬁnds a simi-
lar pattern but remarks that the difference is only signiﬁcant for subjects
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with individualistic value orientation, and not for subjects with cooper-
ative value orientation. Based on a public good/bad game with an inte-
rior solution Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999) also conﬁrm Andreoni’s
results.
Moreover, Zelmer (2003) has found in a recent meta-analysis that pos-
itive framing has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on average group efﬁ-
ciency measured as the average level of contribution to the public good.
In a recent study of Brandts and Schwieren (2004), these results are
qualiﬁed. Brandts and Schwieren (2004) ﬁnd that decisions in public
good and bad games are much inﬂuenced by other parameters chosen,
such as e.g. the incentive structure. Parameters may even be chosen in a
way such that the direction of the framing effect is opposite to Andreoni’s
original results. Also Brewer and Kramer (1986) ﬁnd more cooperation
in the public bad frame.
7.3 Cournot versus Bertrand experiments
Experiments on typical Cournot and Bertrand markets may also be con-
sidered as experiments with negative and positive externalities6. Indeed,
quantity decisions have negative externalities and price decisions have
positive externalities. An element that characterises interactions in Cour-
not and Bertrand markets and is absent in public good/bad experiments
is the type of strategic interaction: quantities typically are strategic sub-
stitutes and prices are strategic complements.
We are not aware of papers in the experimental literature that explic-
itly examine whether there is more or less tacit collusion in Cournot than
in Bertrand markets. Holt (1995) provides a discussion of oligopoly ex-
periments where either price or quantity choices had to be made and
ﬁnishes his discussion by suggesting that in price-choice experiments it
seemstobeeasiertocolludethaninquantity-choiceexperiments: “iftacit
collusion causes prices to be above noncooperative levels in price-choice
environments, then why do quantities tend to be above noncooperative,
Cournot levels; that is, why do we often see the reverse of tacit collusion
in quantity-choice environments with more than two or three sellers?”
(Holt, 1995, pages 423–424).
6Typical Cournot or Bertrand markets have the following properties: demand is linear,
goods are (imperfect) substitutes and marginal cost is constant.
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As becomes clear from Holt’s overview and discussion, most elder
oligopoly experiments were either price- or quantity-choice experiments,
with the exception of Fouraker and Siegel (1963)7 whose research project
consisted of price- and quantity-choice experiments. Moreover, in some
recentexperimentsdesignedtoexamineresearchquestionsdifferentthan
the one related to differences in behaviour between Cournot and Bert-
rand markets, the same treatments have been run for both types of mar-
kets (see Huck et al., 2000; Davis, 2002; Altavilla et al., 2003, further re-
ferred to as HNO, Davis and ALS, respectively). On the basis of these
analyses (including FS) it is possible to ﬁlter some observations regard-
ing the differences in behaviour in Cournot and Bertrand markets.
FS, HNO, Davis and ALS all examine the impact of information on
the outcomes in experimental Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies. The
main ﬁnding of FS is that under incomplete information, Cournot and
Bertrand8 predictions perform well. Under complete information actions
exhibit greater variability in both types of markets and range between the
competitive and the cooperative level.
HNO, Davis and ALS ﬁnd that in Cournot markets competition sig-
niﬁcantly increases under a full information scenario compared to an in-
complete information scenario9. In Bertrand markets the additional in-
formation does not make behaviour more competitive. HNO further ﬁnd
that in the Bertrand markets experimental decisions are more dispersed
than in the Cournot markets. Davis on the other hand ﬁnds that vari-
ability in the Cournot markets is generally higher than in the Bertrand
markets.
Since we dispose of the experimental data used in FS, HNO, Davis
and ALS10 we are able to explicitly test for differences in behaviour be-
tween Cournot and Bertrand scenarios. Before looking at the data we
summarise the theoretical framework and the experimental designs.
7Henceforth FS.
8Given the assumption of homogenous goods maintained by FS, the Bertrand price
equals the competitive price.
9Based on experimental Cournot duopolies with a ﬁxed partner design Mason and
Phillips (1997) ﬁnd opposite results: information would facilitate collusion.
10We gratefully acknowledge Luigi Luini, Hans Normann, J¨ org Oechssler and Patrizia
Sbriglia for providing us their data and Doug Davis for providing his data on his website.
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7.3.1 Theoretical framework
The following linear inverse demand function for ﬁrm i is used in all
Cournot experiments:
pi = a − b(qi + θ∑
j =i
qj) (7.3)
with a,b > 0.
With respect to the Bertrand experiments the form of the demand
functiondependsonwhetherthehomogenous-goodsassumptionismain-
tained. FS assume homogenous goods such that the (linear) demand







: pi ≤ pj
0 : pi > pj
where i  = j and L is the number of producers setting the lowest price.
Only the producer setting the lowest price will produce to meet the entire
demand and in case of a tie total production is evenly split up amongst
the tied producers.
All other Bertrand experiments are based on a setting with differenti-
ated goods. The demand function of ﬁrm i, which is a transformation of
inverse demand (eq. 7.3) provided that qi ≥ 0 for all i, is:







b[1+ (n − 1)θ]
(7.5)
β =
1+ (n − 2)θ




b(1− θ)[1+ (n − 1)θ]
. (7.7)
A general form of cost function used in the experiments is C + cqi, which
yields the following proﬁt function:
πi = (pi − c)qi − C. (7.8)
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Under Cournot competition, eq. 7.8 is maximised with respect to qi
and under Bertrand competition, with respect to pi. The parameteri-
sations used in the experiments are all based on the assumption that
0 < θ ≤ b, whichimpliesthatgoodsareeitherperfectorimperfectsubsti-
tutes. One can easily verify that under this condition, the Cournot game
is one of strategic substitutes with negative externalities and the Bertrand
game with differentiated goods, one of strategic complements with posi-
tive externalities. Suppose, for instance, that goods are imperfect comple-
ments such that −1 < θ < 0. Under this condition, the Cournot game is
one of strategic complements with positive externalities and the Bertrand
game one of strategic substitutes with negative externalities.
7.3.2 Experimental designs
FS ran duopoly and triopoly experiments with a ﬁxed partner design un-
der two different information conditions: incomplete and complete infor-
mation (which we will later refer to as BASIC and EXTRA, respectively).
Subjects received proﬁt tables based on either a Cournot or Bertrand set-
ting. Incomplete information in the Cournot experiments implied that
the proﬁt tables only contained information on own proﬁt for different
combinations of own and others’ quantity choices and that the subjects
did no know that their competitor(s) received the same proﬁt table. After
each round subjects were informed about their own proﬁt and the sum
of the others’ quantities. In the Bertrand treatments with incomplete in-
formation, own proﬁt when having the lowest price and when being tied
with one or two others, and loss when not having the lower price, was
provided in the proﬁt tables. Subjects did not know that their competi-
tors received the same proﬁt tables. At the end of each round subjects
received information about their own proﬁt.
In the Cournot treatments of FS with complete information, the proﬁt
table contained a subject’s own proﬁt and the sum of the competitors’
proﬁts for different combinations of quantities. Moreover, the individual
quantity choices of the competitors were provided after each round. In
the Bertrand treatments complete information implied that subjects re-
ceived similar proﬁt tables as under incomplete information and were
informed about the fact that the competitors received the same proﬁt ta-
bles. Additionally, they were provided with information about the com-
petitors’ price choices after each round.
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The HNO and Davis experiments were run with ﬁxed groups of four
sellers (n = 4) and contained BASIC and EXTRA treatments for Cour-
not and Bertrand markets. The static game was repeated 40 times. Un-
der BASIC, own proﬁt and aggregate information on rivals’ actions was
provided, and under EXTRA, next to information on own proﬁt detailed
information on rivals’ actions and proﬁts was provided. Note that we
concentrate on the pre-merger scenario of Davis since post-merger set-
tings are asymmetric. This is possible since subjects were not informed
that after round 40 part of the sellers would merge.
The ALS experiments were run with randomly matched groups of
two sellers. The experiment contained a treatment where only informa-
tion on own proﬁt was provided (referred to as BASIC in what follows)
and a treatment where information on individual decisions and proﬁts
was provided on request (EXTRA). As to examine whether aspiration
rulesarefollowed, they alsoranatreatment wherenexttoinformationon
own proﬁt also information on average proﬁt across all duopoly markets
was provided. In what follows, we focus on the former two treatments.
Table 7.1 summarises theoretical predictions and other important fea-
tures of the four sets of experiments distinguishing between Cournot (C)
and Bertrand (B) markets11. In the FS, HNO and ALS experiments, the-
oretical benchmarks are the same across the different information treat-
ments. Note that JPM refers to joint proﬁt maximisation.
Itisclearfromtable7.1thatnoneoftheexperimentsprovidesa‘clean’
comparison between a Bertrand and a Cournot scenario, where ‘clean’
referstobothscenarioshavingthesametheoreticalbenchmarks, thesame
proﬁts, the same absolute value of the reaction curves’ slopes and the
same incentive to cooperate in the inﬁnitely repeated static game (mea-
sured by the Friedman index in equation 5.15, discussed in 5.3.1 of chap-
ter 5). The ALS experiments are best suitable for comparisons between
Cournot and Bertrand settings because either only the slopes of the reac-
tion curves differ in absolute value, or the Nash proﬁt (and consequently
any variable related to the relation between πNash and πJPM, including
the Friedman index).
In the FS, HNO and Davis experiments most theoretical benchmarks
differ across treatments. Nevertheless, it is useful to analyse the exper-
imental data to check whether differences in behaviour occur between
11See appendix D for detailed parameter choices in the experiment.
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FS duopoly FS triopoly HNO Davis ALS
C B C B C B C B C1 C2 B
pBASIC
Nash 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 76.5 39.25 57 57 8 9.6 8
qBASIC
Nash 20 26 15 17.33 74.5 86.92 56 56 16 14.4 16
πBASIC
Nash 16 0 9 0 5550 3238 3136 1344 128 138.2 128
pBASIC
JPM 1.2 3.5 1.2 3.5 151 151 113.1 129 12 12 12
qBASIC
JPM 15 14 10 9.33 49.67 49.67 37.3 32 12 12 12
πBASIC













slope 1/2 1 1/2 1 -1/3 1/7 -1/3 1/7 -1/2 -1/4 1/4
πJPM
πNash
1.13 ∞ 1.33 ∞ 1.33 2.29 1.33 2.29 1.13 1.04 1.13
Friedman 1 0.77 0.75 0.32 0.75 0.44 0.75 0.44 0.89 0.97 0.89
Table 7.1: Summary of features of Cournot/Bertrand experiments
Cournot and Bertrand markets. Given that in the FS, HNO and Davis ex-
periments the Friedman index is higher in the Cournot markets than in the
Bertrand markets, one would expect incentives to cooperate to be higher
in Cournot markets than in Bertrand markets, based on an inﬁnitely re-
peated game context.
7.3.3 Data analysis
Table 7.2 provides averages and standard deviations referring to cross-
sectional variability of the degree of cooperation for the different treat-
ments. The degree of cooperation of oligopoly k in round t is deﬁned
as
ρkt =
¯ pkt − pNash
pJPM − pNash
(7.9)
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where ¯ pkt is the average price of oligopoly k in round t. With respect to
the Cournot treatments, the price of each oligopoly member is calculated
on the basis of equation 7.3, taking into account that pi ≥ 012.
Table 7.2 shows that in the BASIC treatments—where only a mini-
mum of information about others’ actions and proﬁts is provided—the
difference in average degree of cooperation based on all, the ﬁrst ﬁve
or the last ﬁve rounds of the FS, HNO and Davis experiments between
Cournot and Bertrand treatments is smaller compared to the same dif-
ference in the EXTRA treatments. Moreover, while under the BASIC in-
formation condition in the FS and ALS experiments average degrees of
cooperation are larger in the Bertrand treatments than in the Cournot
treatments, in the BASIC treatment of the HNO experiment degrees of
cooperation are similar in Cournot and Bertrand markets. In the BASIC
treatment of the Davis experiments, the average degree of cooperation
based on either of the sub-rounds seems to be highest in the Bertrand set-
ting. But given the high standard deviations in the Cournot setting, it is
not clear whether the latter difference is statistically signiﬁcant.
In the EXTRA treatments—where detailed information on the other
players’ actions and proﬁt was provided—we ﬁnd for all experiments
thataveragedegreesofcooperationaresigniﬁcantlylowerintheCournot
than in the Bertrand treatments, irrespective of the subset of rounds.
12Another option would be to calculate the degree of cooperation on the basis of the
quantity decisions and benchmarks (as has been done for the ALS data because we had
no information available on who was linked to who). As long as prices calculated on the
basis of equation 7.3 and quantities calculated on the basis of 7.4 are not below 0, this
gives the same result. In the Cournot treatments of the FS experiments and in the HNO,
Davis and ALS experiments zero prices and quantities had to be enforced because cal-
culated prices and quantities were sometimes below 0. This adjustment results in slight
differences in degrees of cooperation, depending on whether calculated on the basis of
prices or quantities. However, all analyses based on the degree of price or quantity co-
operation yield the same conclusions. With respect to the Bertrand treatments in the FS
experiments, largerdifferencesnaturallyoccurredwhetherthedegreeofcooperationwas
measured on the basis of the price choices or the calculated quantities, because the proﬁt
function deﬁned in terms of quantities is not a linear transformation of the proﬁt function
deﬁned in terms of prices. Yet, even with respect to these treatments, the conclusions of





































¯ ρ1 to T ¯ ρ1 to 5 ¯ ρT − 4 to T T N ¯ ρ1 to T ¯ ρ1 to 5 ¯ ρT − 4 to T T N
FS duopoly
Cournot -0.12 (0.16) 0.05 (0.36) -0.18 (0.16) 22 16 -0.24 (0.70) -0.39 (0.65) -0.11 (0.70) 22 16
Bertrand 0.24 (0.15) 0.29 (0.17) 0.19 (0.20) 15 17 0.52 (0.26) 0.61 (0.20) 0.43 (0.31) 15 17
FS triopoly
Cournot -0.24 (0.18) -0.22 (0.26) -0.20 (0.21) 22 11 -0.25 (0.19) -0.13 (0.33) -0.31 (0.26) 22 11
Bertrand 0.09 (0.07) 0.15 (0.11) 0.05 (0.09) 15 10 0.18 (0.06) 0.24 (0.11) 0.01 (0.02) 15 10
HNO
Cournot 0.01 (0.03) -0.05 (0.04) 0.00 (0.04) 40 6 -0.23 (0.15) -0.04 (0.12) -0.44 (0.15) 40 6
Bertrand 0.04 (0.07) 0.02 (0.19) 0.02 (0.03) 40 6 0.04 (0.06) 0.12 (0.22) 0.01 (0.03) 40 6
Davis
Cournot 0.14 (0.54) 0.39 (0.94) 0.13 (0.58) 40 5 -0.50 (0.09) -0.48 (0.40) -0.51 (0.10) 40 5
Bertrand -0.10 (0.02) -0.17 (0.04) -0.05 (0.06) 40 5 -0.05 (0.03) -0.09 (0.04) -0.04 (0.03) 40 5
ALS
Cournot1 -0.70 (0.82) -1.23 (1.14) -0.65 (0.67) 20 18 -1.50 (0.48) -1.40 (0.48) -2.19 (0.57) 20 20
Cournot2 -1.30 (0.47) -1.63 (0.98) -1.00 (0.62) 20 18 -2.19 (0.57) -2.55 (0.75) -1.91 (0.57) 15 22
Bertrand 0.75 (0.43) 1.44 (0.71) 0.34 (0.39) 20 18 -0.14 (0.19) 0.37 (0.31) -0.33 (0.23) 20 22
Standard deviations are in brackets.
T refers to the number of rounds and N to the number of independent observations for the FS, HNO and Davis
experiments and to the number of players for the ALS experiments.
Table 7.2: Average degrees of cooperation in Cournot/Bertrand experiments
1
5
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We performed Mann-Whitney-U tests in order to test whether dif-
ferences in the degree of collusion between Cournot and Bertrand treat-
ments are statistically signiﬁcant. Table 7.3 provides exact signiﬁcance
levels of tests of H0 : ¯ ρCOURNOT = ¯ ρBERTRAND for the different subsets of
rounds.
The expectations based on the descriptives in table 7.2 are conﬁrmed
by formal statistical tests. First, in the experimental duopoly and triopoly
markets of FS and in the duopoly markets of ALS, the average degree
of cooperation is signiﬁcantly different between Bertrand and Cournot
settings, irrespective of the informational conditions and the subsets of
rounds used to calculate the average13. More speciﬁcally, in the Bertrand
markets average degrees of cooperation are higher than in the Cournot
markets.
Furthermore, in the BASIC treatments there is no difference in degree
of cooperation between Cournot and Bertrand treatments for the experi-
ments of both HNO and Davis. On the other hand, in the EXTRA treat-
ments, the degree of cooperation is generally found to be signiﬁcantly
higher in the Bertrand treatments. In the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds, the difference
is either marginally or not signiﬁcant. In the ﬁnal ﬁve rounds, and on the
basis of all rounds, the difference is highly signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings thus point in the same direction as the ﬁndings based
on the noncooperative R&D experiments discussed in chapter 6 that with
strategic complements (or positive externalities) it seems easier to coop-
erate than with strategic substitutes (or negative externalities).
7.4 A general framework
Cournot and Bertrand games, public good and bad games and common-
resource games all have a structure that is much related to a prisoner’s
dilemma game in the sense that all are one-shot noncooperative games
with a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto-efﬁcient.
Both players can earn more by playing something else than the Nash
equilibrium. The games are social dilemma games but different from a
prisoner’s dilemma in the sense that a continuum of strategies is avail-
able. In the experiment we concentrate on such social dilemma games
with two players. The games have a unique, symmetric Pareto-inferior
13Note that the ALS data are subject-speciﬁc because of the random-matching design
and are thus not independent.
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BASIC EXTRA
rounds 1 to T 1 to 5 T − 4 to T 1 to T 1 to 5 T − 4 to T
FS duopoly
2-tailed sig. 0.000a 0.002a 0.000a 0.002a 0.000a 0.015a
N 33 33 33 33 33 33
FS triopoly
2-tailed sig. 0.000a 0.001a 0.001a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a
N 21 21 21 21 21 21
HNO
2-tailed sig. 0.394a 0.937a 0.485a 0.004a 0.093a 0.002a
N 12 10 12 10 12 10
Davis
2-tailed sig. 0.151b 0.151b 0.421b 0.008a 0.151a 0.008a
N 12 10 12 10 12 10
ALS between Cournot1 and Bertrand
2-tailed sig. 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a
N 36 36 36 42 42 42
ALS between Cournot2 and Bertrand
2-tailed sig. 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a 0.000a
N 36 36 36 44 44 44
aH1 : ¯ ρBertrand
>
 = ¯ ρCournot; bH1 : ¯ ρBertrand
<
 = ¯ ρCournot
Table 7.3: Cournot/Bertrand treatment effects on the degree of price collusion
Nash equilibrium, and the joint proﬁt maximising (JPM) choice is sym-
metric.
Since we want to examine differences in degree of cooperation be-
tween games with strategic substitutes and games with strategic comple-
ments on the one hand, and between games with positive externalities
and games with negative externalities on the other hand, we need to dis-
entangle the strategic properties and the type of externalities of the ac-
tions in the game. That is, when comparing scenarios of different strate-
gic interactions, the type of externalities should be controlled for and vice
versa.
A ‘clean’ comparison between the four scenarios further requires that
standard theoretical benchmarks are controlled. Figure 7.4 clariﬁes what
a‘clean’comparisonexactlystandsfor. Theﬁguredepictsreactioncurves,
Nash equilibria and JPM choices in the four social dilemma games, tax-
onomied on the basis of the type of strategic interaction and the sign of





























Figure 7.4: Reaction curves, Nash and JPM choices in social dilemmas
externalities.
We require the following:
• the Nash prediction should be the same in the four scenarios,
• proﬁt calculated in the Nash equilibrium should be the same ,
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• the symmetric JPM level should be the same for strategic comple-
ments and substitutes, given the type of externalities,
• proﬁt calculated in the cooperative optimum should be the same,
• the absolute values of the reaction curves’ slopes should be the
same,
• the Friedman index should be the same.
The condition referring to the absolute values of the reaction curves’
slopes implies that the speed of convergence from out-of-equilibrium
play towards the Nash equilibrium is the same for both scenarios. The
condition that the Friedman index should be the same implies that proﬁt
when deviating from cooperative play should be the same, given that
proﬁts calculated in the Nash equilibrium and in the cooperative opti-
mum are the same in the four scenarios14.
In order to guarantee these restrictions, ﬂexible proﬁt functions de-
ﬁned in terms of the actions of the players are required for the four sce-
narios. In what follows, we discuss the proﬁt functions used in our ex-
periment.
7.4.1 Strategic complements and positive
externalities
We ﬁrst consider a game where actions are strategic complements and
have positive externalities. Proﬁt of player i for i = 1,2 in this scenario is
deﬁned as follows:
πi = a + bxi + cxj − dx2
i + ex2
j + fxixj (7.10)
with b,c,d, f > 0, e ≥ 0, j = 1,2 and j  = i. This proﬁt function gives rise
to positive externalities if
∂πi
∂xj
= c + 2exj + fxi > 0,
14Alternatively, one could require that optimal penal codes suggested by Abreu (1986)
are the same for the scenarios with strategic complements and substitutes, given the type
of externalities. However, if the above requirements are met, it is straightforward to show
that the codes are the same across both scenarios.
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which is satisﬁed for xi,xj ≥ 0.
Maximising proﬁt with respect to xi for i = 1,2:
max
xi
πi s.t. xi,xj ≥ 0,
requires that the ﬁrst derivative of πi with respect to xi is set to zero:
∂πi
∂xi
= 0 i = 1,2,
and that the second derivative of πi with respect to xi is strictly negative:
∂2πi
¯ ∂xi
2 = −2d < 0 i = 1,2.







xj i, j = 1,2, j  = i, (7.11)
where the slope is strictly positive since f,d > 0. As such, xi and xj are
strategiccomplements15. TheNashequilibriumthatresultsisuniqueand





where 2d > f for xNash to be strictly positive. Proﬁt calculated in the
Nash equilibrium is equal to





(2d − f)2. (7.13)
When joint proﬁt is maximised, the following maximisation problem




πi s.t. xi,xj ≥ 0,
is solved by putting the ﬁrst derivative with respect to xi to zero:
∂∑πi
∂xi




= f > 0.
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The second derivative with respect to xi is negative:
∂2 ∑πi
¯ ∂xi
2 = −2d < 0 i = 1,2.




2(d − e − f)
(7.14)
where d > e + f for xJPM to be strictly positive16. Given that 2d − f > 0
and d − e − f > 0, it is straightforward to show that xJPM > xNash.
Proﬁt calculated in the cooperative optimum is
πJPM = a +
(b + c)2
4(d − e − f)
. (7.15)
Proﬁt for a player who deviates from cooperative play by playing the
Nashequilibriumstrategyiscalculatedbysubstituting xi inequation7.10
by the reaction curve in equation 7.11 and xj by the JPM choice 7.14. This
gives the following expression:
ˆ π = a +
b2[4d2 − 4d(e + f) + (2e + f)2] + 2bc[4d2 − 2df − f(2e + f)]
16d(d − e − f)2
+c2[8d2 − 4d(e + 2f) + f 2]
(7.16)
which we will refer to as ˆ π(a,b,c,d,e, f) in what follows. It should be
noted that ˆ π > πJPM > πNash.
7.4.2 Strategic complements and negative
externalities
Proﬁt function 7.10 can be transformed by replacing xi by m − yi for i =
1,2 where m represents a sort of initial endowment. It comes down on
assuming that xi (and yi) is bounded from above by m and transforming
the problem in a way that is comparable to the transformation of a public
good game into a public bad game as explained in section 7.2. Moreover,
16We further refer to appendix B.4.1 for a proof that JPM actions are always symmetric
with strategic complements.
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this implies that the horizontal axes of ﬁgures 7.4(d) and 7.4(b) begin at 0
and end at m. This gives the following proﬁt function:
πi = a′ + b′yi − c′yj − d′y2
i + e′y2
j + f ′yiyj (7.17)
with i, j = 1,2, j  = i and

      
      
a′ = a + m[b + c − m(d − e − f)]
b′ = m(2d − f) − b
c′ = c + 2me + mf
d′ = d
e′ = e
f ′ = f.
(7.18)
The proﬁt function in 7.17 gives rise to negative externalities if
∂πi
∂yj
= −c′ + 2e′yj + f ′yi < 0,
a condition which is satisﬁed in the entire action space [0,m] if m is de-
ﬁned by eq. 7.21.
Maximising proﬁt with respect to yi for i = 1,2:
max
yi
πi s.t. yi,yj ≥ 0,
requires that the ﬁrst derivative of πi with respect to yi is set to zero:
∂πi
∂yi
= 0 i = 1,2,
and that the second derivative of πi with respect to yi is negative:
∂2πi
¯ ∂yi
2 = −2d′ = −2d < 0 i = 1,2.











yj i, j = 1,2, j  = i, (7.19)
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where the slope is exactly the same as in the scenario with strategic com-
plements and positive externalities. The Nash equilibrium that results is
unique, symmetric and equal to
yNash =
b′




with 2d′ > f ′ since 2d > f. Proﬁt calculated in the Nash equilibrium 7.20
is equal to expression 7.13. For the Nash equilibrium yNash to be the same





In other words, m should be twice the Nash equilibrium. Note that this
is accurately shown in ﬁgures 7.4(d) and 7.4(b).
For this value of m, the reaction curve deﬁned in equation 7.19 is the








yj i, j = 1,2, j  = i. (7.22)
Replacing m in conditions 7.18 then gives the following parameter re-
quirements for the scenario with strategic complements and negative ex-
ternalities in terms of the parameters in the scenario with strategic com-
plements and positive externalities:

          
          
a′ = a +
2b[b(2e + f) + c(2d − f)]
(2d − f)2
b′ = b





f ′ = f.
(7.23)
When joint proﬁt is maximised, the following maximisation problem




πi s.t. yi,yj ≥ 0,
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is solved by putting the ﬁrst derivative with respect to yi to zero:
∂∑πi
∂yi
= 0 i = 1,2.
The second derivative with respect to yi is negative:
∂2 ∑πi
¯ ∂yi
2 = −2d′ = −2d < 0 i = 1,2.




2(d′ − e′ − f ′)
= m −
b + c
2(d − e − f)
=
b(2d − 4e − 3f)
2(d − e − f)(2d − f)
−
c
2(d − e − f)
(7.24)





2d − 4e − 3f
. Given
that 2d − f > 0 and d − e − f > 0, it is straightforward to show that
yJPM < yNash. Proﬁt calculated in the cooperative optimum is the same as
expression 7.15.
Proﬁt for a player who deviates from cooperative play by playing the
Nashequilibriumstrategyiscalculatedbysubstituting yi inequation7.17
by the reaction curve in equation 7.19 and yj by yJPM. ˆ π is the same as in
the scenario with strategic complements and positive externalities (see
7.16).
7.4.3 Strategic substitutes and positive
externalities
The following social dilemma we examine, is one of strategic substitutes.
We deﬁne proﬁt of player i with i = 1,2 in a scenario with strategic sub-
stitutes and positive externalities as follows,
πi = α + βxi + γxj − δx2
i + ǫx2
j − ζxixj (7.25)
with β,γ,δ,ζ > 0, ǫ ≥ 0, j = 1,2 and j  = i. This proﬁt function gives rise
to positive externalities if
∂πi
∂xj
= γ + 2ǫxj − ζxi > 0,
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which is satisﬁed if the parameters satisfy 7.33.
Maximising proﬁt with respect to xi for i = 1,2:
max
xi
πi s.t. xi,xj ≥ 0,
requires that the ﬁrst derivative of πi with respect to xi is set to zero:
∂πi
∂xi
= 0 i = 1,2,
and that the second derivative of πi with respect to xi is negative:
∂2πi
¯ ∂xi
2 = −2δ < 0 i = 1,2.







xj i, j = 1,2, j  = i, (7.26)
where the slope is strictly negative since δ,ζ > 0. As such, xi and xj are
strategic substitutes17. The Nash equilibrium that results is unique and





and proﬁt calculated in the Nash equilibrium is equal to





(2δ + ζ)2. (7.28)
When joint proﬁt is maximised, the following maximisation problem




πi s.t. xi,xj ≥ 0,
is solved by putting the ﬁrst derivative with respect to xi to zero:
∂∑πi
∂xi




= −ζ < 0.
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The second derivative with respect to xi is negative:
∂2 ∑πi
¯ ∂xi
2 = −2δ < 0 i = 1,2.
Resulting symmetric joint proﬁt maximising actions are equal to
xJPM =
β + γ
2(δ − ǫ + ζ)
(7.29)
where δ > ǫ − ζ for xJPM to be strictly positive. For JPM actions to be
symmetric, an additional condition, i.e. δ > ǫ + ζ, needs to be satisﬁed18.
Furthermore, xJPM > xNash if β(2ǫ − ζ) > −γ(2δ + ζ), which is satis-
ﬁed when parameters of the proﬁt function are deﬁned by 7.33. Proﬁt
calculated in the cooperative optimum is
πJPM = α +
(β + γ)2
4(δ − ǫ + ζ)
. (7.30)
Proﬁt for a player who deviates from cooperative play by playing the
Nashequilibriumstrategyiscalculatedbysubstituting xi inequation7.25
bythereactioncurveinequation7.26and xj by xJPM ineq.7.29. Thisgives
the following expression for proﬁt from deviating:
ˆ π =
α +
β2[4δ2 − 4δ(ǫ − ζ) + (2ǫ − ζ)2] + 2βγ[4δ2 + 2δζ − f(2ǫ − ζ)]
16δ(δ − ǫ + ζ)2
+γ2[8δ2 − 4δ(ǫ − 2ζ) + ζ2]
(7.31)
which we will refer to as ˆ π(α, β,γ,δ,ǫ,ζ) in what follows.
As discussed in the beginning of section 7.4 for the scenario with
strategic substitutes and positive externalities we require—compared to
the scenario with strategic complements and positive externalities—that
1. the Nash equilibria are the same: eq. 7.27 ≡ eq. 7.12,
2. the cooperative optima are the same: eq. 7.29 ≡ eq. 7.14,
18See appendix B.4.2 for a proof.
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3. the Nash proﬁts are the same: eq. 7.28 ≡ eq. 7.13,
4. the cooperative proﬁts are the same: eq. 7.30 ≡ eq. 7.15,
5. the absolute values of the reaction curves’ slopes are the same,
6. the proﬁts from deviating from cooperative play are the same: eq.
7.31 ≡ eq. 7.16.
These conditions are summarised in the following system of six equa-
tions,

                 


















2(δ − ǫ + ζ)
=
b + c
2(d − e − f)
α +
(β + γ)2
4(δ − ǫ + ζ)
= a +
(b + c)2






ˆ π(α, β,γ,δ,ǫ,ζ) = ˆ π(a,b,c,d,e, f)
(7.32)
yieldingthefollowingsolutionfor α, β,γ,δ,ǫ and ζ intermsof a,b,c,d,e
and f 19: 
                  
















(2d + f)2 .
(7.33)
19We thank Johan Springael for some good suggestions on solving this system.
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The expression for ǫ implies that even if e = 0, ǫ will always be strictly
larger than 0 because f > 0. Thus, for a game of strategic substitutes to
have the same standard theoretical benchmarks as a game of strategic
complements, there should be a quadratic term related to xj in at least
one of the two games.
Note that for the above parameterisation, not only is proﬁt calculated
in the Nash equilibria the same as in the scenario with strategic com-
plements and positive externalities, but also proﬁt on the entire reaction
curve. Proﬁt calculated in reaction curve expressions 7.11 or 7.26 is equal
to
πi = a +
b2 + 2(bf + 2cd)xj + (4de + f 2)x2
j
4d
i, j = 1,2, j  = i. (7.34)
7.4.4 Strategic substitutes and negative
externalities
We follow the same reasoning as in section 7.4.2 and assume that the
initial endowment is now n. The horizontal axes of ﬁgures 7.4(c) and
7.4(a) thus begin at 0 and end at n. Proﬁt function 7.25 is transformed by
replacing xi by n − yi for i = 1,2 into the following proﬁt function:
πi = α′ + β′yi − γ′yj − δ′y2
i + ǫ′y2
j − ζ′yiyj (7.35)
with i, j = 1,2, j  = i and

      
      
α′ = α + n[β + γ − n(δ − ǫ + ζ)]
β′ = n(2δ + ζ) − β





Proﬁt function 7.35 gives rise to negative externalities if
∂πi
∂yj
= −γ′ + 2ǫ′yj − ζ′yi < 0,
a condition which is satisﬁed in the entire action space [0,n] if n is deﬁned
by eq. 7.39.
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Maximising proﬁt with respect to yi for i = 1,2:
max
yi
πi s.t. yi,yj ≥ 0,
requires that the ﬁrst derivative of πi with respect to yi is set to zero:
∂πi
∂yi
= 0 i = 1,2,
and that the second derivative of πi with respect to yi is negative:
∂2πi
¯ ∂yi
2 = −2δ′ = −2d < 0 i = 1,2.











yj i, j = 1,2, j  = i, (7.37)
where the slope is exactly the same as in the scenario with strategic sub-
stitutes and positive externalities. The Nash equilibrium that results is
unique, symmetric and equal to
yNash =
β′




Proﬁt calculated in the Nash equilibrium 7.38 is equal to expression 7.28.
For the Nash equilibrium yNash to be the same as xNash as deﬁned by 7.12,











, n = m. Again, this conforms with ﬁgure 7.4.
Replacing n in conditions 7.36 then gives the following parameter re-
quirements for the scenario with strategic substitutes and negative exter-
nalities in terms of the parameters in the scenario with strategic substi-
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tutes and positive externalities:

          
          
α′ = α +
2β[β(2ǫ − ζ) + γ(2δ + ζ)]
(2δ + ζ)2
β′ = β







When joint proﬁt is maximised, the following maximisation problem




πi s.t. yi,yj ≥ 0,
is solved by putting the ﬁrst derivative with respect to yi to zero:
∂∑πi
∂yi
= 0 i = 1,2.
The second derivative with respect to yi is negative:
∂2 ∑πi
¯ ∂yi
2 = −2δ′ = −2d i = 1,2.




2(δ′ − ǫ′ + ζ′)
= n −
β + γ
2(δ − ǫ + ζ)
=
β(2δ − 4ǫ + 3ζ)
2(δ − ǫ + ζ)(2δ + ζ)
−
γ
2(δ − ǫ + ζ)
(7.41)
with δ′ > ǫ′ − ζ′ since δ > ǫ − ζ. yJPM < yNash holds when parameters
are deﬁned by 7.42. Proﬁt calculated in the cooperative optimum is the
same as expression 7.15.
Proﬁt for a player who deviates from cooperative play by playing the
Nashequilibriumstrategyiscalculatedbysubstituting yi inequation7.35
by the reaction curve in equation 7.37 and yj by the cooperative optimum
yNash∗ and is the same as in the scenario with strategic substitutes and
positive externalities.
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Since α′, β′,γ′,δ′,ǫ′ and ζ′ are deﬁned in terms of α, β,γ,δ,ǫ and ζ
(see 7.40), and α, β,γ,δ,ǫ and ζ are deﬁned in terms of a,b,c,d,e and f
(see 7.33), α′, β′,γ′,δ′,ǫ′ and ζ′ can be deﬁned in terms of a,b,c,d,e and f.
This gives the following relations:

                         
                         









γ′ = c +
4b[2de + f(e + f)]









(2d + f)2 .
(7.42)
Tosummarise, table7.4providesanoverviewofthetheoreticalbench-
marks in the four scenarios in terms of the parameters of the scenario
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2(d − e − f)
-
b + c
2(d − e − f)
yJPM b(2d − 4e − 3f) − c(2d − f)
2(d − e − f)(2d − f)
-
b(2d − 4e − 3f) − c(2d − f)




4(d − e − f)
a +
(b + c)2
4(d − e − f)
a +
(b + c)2
4(d − e − f)
a +
(b + c)2












4d(d − e − f)
(2d − f)2
4d(d − e − f)
(2d − f)2
4d(d − e − f)
(2d − f)2
4d(d − e − f)
(2d − f)2





In order to examine whether the type of externalities and the type of
strategic interaction inﬂuence the degree of cooperation, we ran the fol-
lowing four treatments:
1. strategic substitutes and negative externalities (SUBSTNEG),
2. strategic substitutes and positive externalities (SUBSTPOS),
3. strategic complements and negative externalities (COMPLNEG),
4. strategic complements and positive externalities (COMPLPOS).
In all treatments, subjects played a social dilemma in pairs. The following
proﬁt functions have been implemented in the respective treatments: eq.
7.35 in SUBSTNEG, eq. 7.25 in SUBSTPOS, eq. 7.17 in COMPLNEG and
eq. 7.10 in COMPLPOS.
Six computerised sessions have been conducted in the laboratory at
Tilburg University (CentERlab) on November 17 and 24, 200420. In each
of the ﬁrst four sessions, one of the four treatments has been run and in
the ﬁnal two sessions, mixtures of all treatments have been run in order
tobalancethenumberofobservationsacrossthefourtreatments. 110stu-
dents participated in the experiment and were recruited through e-mail
lists of students interested in participating in experiments. Each treat-
ment has 14 independent observations (pairs) except treatment SUBST-
NEG which has 13 independent observations.
In the four treatments participants received the same instructions21.
The treatments only differed with respect to the proﬁt function. Partici-
pants were told that their earnings depended on their own choices and
on the choices of one other participant in the session, which remained the
same during the entire experiment. They were asked to choose a number
between 0.0 and 28.0 in each round22. Their earnings in points could be
calculated by means of a proﬁt table, for combinations of hypothetical
choices that are multiples of two, and by means of an earnings calculator
on the computer screen, for any combination of hypothetical choices. The
20We used the experimental software toolkit z-Tree to program the experiment (see Fis-
chbacher, 1999).
21See appendix C.4 for the instructions.
22Choices could have one decimal point.
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proﬁt tables for SUBSTNEG, SUBSTPOS, COMPLNEG and COMPLPOS
are respectively in ﬁgures 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8. In order to show the differ-
ence in slopes of reaction curves between strategic substitutes and com-
plements, reaction curves for multiples of two are marked in grey in the
tables (which was not the case in the experiment). Note that proﬁts on
the ‘real’ reaction curves, when choices are not restricted to multiples of
two, are exactly the same for both scenarios of strategic interaction.
In each treatment, the same static game was repeated 31 times in-
cluding a trial round, which did not count to calculate earnings in Euro.
Subjects were informed on the number of rounds, which implies that the
static game-theoretic Nash prediction of the one-shot game is valid in
each round. The sessions lasted between 50 and 55 minutes and average
earnings were 9.30 EUR.
Parameter choices for the proﬁt function in the scenario of strategic
complements and positive externalities (see equation 7.10) are the fol-
lowing: 
      







which results in m = n = 28 (see equation 7.21), and the following sets
of parameters for the other three scenarios rounded at four decimals (see
equations 7.17, 7.25 and 7.35, respectively):

      






f ′ = 0.1650,

      








      


































0.0 2.0  4.0 6.0  8.0 10.0  12.0  14.0 16.0  18.0 20.0  22.0 24.0  26.0  28.0
0.0  41.27 36.50  31.91 27.50  23.27 19.22  15.36  11.68 8.18  4.87 1.73  -1.22 -3.99  -6.57  -8.98
2.0  46.88 41.91  37.13 32.52  28.10 23.86  19.81  15.93 12.24  8.73 5.40  2.26 -0.71  -3.49  -6.09
4.0  51.84 46.68  41.70 36.90  32.28 27.85  23.60  19.53 15.64  11.94 8.42  5.08 1.92  -1.05  -3.85
6.0  56.14 50.78  45.61 40.62  35.81 31.18  26.74  22.47 18.39  14.49 10.78  7.25 3.89  0.72  -2.26
8.0  59.79 54.24  48.87 43.68  38.68 33.86  29.22  24.76 20.49  16.40 12.49  8.76 5.21  1.85  -1.33
10.0  62.78 57.04  51.48 46.10  40.90 35.88  31.05  26.40 21.93  17.64 13.54  9.62 5.88  2.32  -1.06
12.0  65.12 59.18  53.43 47.85  42.46 37.25  32.22  27.38 22.72  18.24 13.94  9.82 5.89  2.14  -1.43
14.0  66.81 60.67  54.72 48.96  43.37 37.97  32.75  27.71 22.85  18.17 13.68  9.37 5.24  1.30  -2.46
16.0  67.84 61.51  55.37 49.41  43.63 38.03  32.61  27.38 22.33  17.46 12.77  8.27 3.95  -0.19  -4.15
18.0  68.22 61.70  55.36 49.20  43.23 37.43  31.83  26.40 21.15  16.09 11.21  6.51 2.00  -2.34  -6.49
20.0  67.94 61.23  54.69 48.34  42.17 36.19  30.38  24.76 19.32  14.07 8.99  4.10 -0.61  -5.14  -9.48
22.0  67.01 60.10  53.37 46.83  40.47 34.29  28.29  22.47 16.84  11.39 6.12  1.03 -3.87  -8.59  -13.13
24.0  65.43 58.32  51.40 44.66  38.11 31.73  25.54  19.53 13.70  8.06 2.59  -2.69 -7.78  -12.70  -17.43





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 
28.0  60.29 52.80  45.49 38.37  31.42 24.66  18.08  11.68 5.47  -0.57 -6.42  -12.09 -17.57  -22.88  -28.00
 



























































0.0 2.0  4.0 6.0  8.0  10.0 12.0  14.0 16.0  18.0 20.0  22.0  24.0 26.0  28.0
0.0  -28.00 -22.88  -17.57 -12.09  -6.42  -0.57 5.47  11.68 18.08  24.66 31.42  38.37  45.49 52.80  60.29
2.0  -22.39 -17.46  -12.35 -7.06  -1.58  4.07 9.91  15.93 22.14  28.52 35.09  41.84  48.77 55.89  63.19
4.0  -17.43 -12.70  -7.78 -2.69  2.59  8.06 13.70  19.53 25.54  31.73 38.11  44.66  51.40 58.32  65.43
6.0  -13.13 -8.59  -3.87 1.03  6.12  11.39 16.84  22.47 28.29  34.29 40.47  46.83  53.37 60.10  67.01
8.0  -9.48 -5.14  -0.61 4.10  8.99  14.07 19.32  24.76 30.38  36.19 42.17  48.34  54.69 61.23  67.94
10.0  -6.49 -2.34  2.00 6.51  11.21  16.09 21.15  26.40 31.83  37.43 43.23  49.20  55.36 61.70  68.22
12.0  -4.15 -0.19  3.95 8.27  12.77  17.46 22.33  27.38 32.61  38.03 43.63  49.41  55.37 61.51  67.84
14.0  -2.46 1.30  5.24 9.37  13.68  18.17 22.85  27.71 32.75  37.97 43.37  48.96  54.72 60.67  66.81
16.0  -1.43 2.14  5.89 9.82  13.94  18.24 22.72  27.38 32.22  37.25 42.46  47.85  53.43 59.18  65.12
18.0  -1.06 2.32  5.88 9.62  13.54  17.64 21.93  26.40 31.05  35.88 40.90  46.10  51.48 57.04  62.78
20.0  -1.33 1.85  5.21 8.76  12.49  16.40 20.49  24.76 29.22  33.86 38.68  43.68  48.87 54.24  59.79
22.0  -2.26 0.72  3.89 7.25  10.78  14.49 18.39  22.47 26.74  31.18 35.81  40.62  45.61 50.78  56.14
24.0  -3.85 -1.05  1.92 5.08  8.42  11.94 15.64  19.53 23.60  27.85 32.28  36.90  41.70 46.68  51.84





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 
28.0  -8.98 -6.57  -3.99 -1.22  1.73  4.87 8.18  11.68 15.36  19.22 23.27  27.50  31.91 36.50  41.27
 






























0.0 2.0  4.0  6.0 8.0  10.0 12.0  14.0  16.0 18.0  20.0 22.0  24.0 26.0  28.0
0.0  41.27 31.42  21.61  11.84 2.12  -7.56 -17.19  -26.78  -36.33 -45.83  -55.29 -64.70  -74.07 -83.40  -92.68
2.0  51.11 41.91  32.76  23.66 14.60  5.58 -3.40  -12.33  -21.21 -30.05  -38.85 -47.61  -56.32 -64.98  -73.60
4.0  58.72 50.19  41.70  33.25 24.85  16.49 8.18  -0.09  -8.32 -16.50  -24.64 -32.73  -40.78 -48.79  -56.75
6.0  64.11 56.23  48.40  40.62 32.88  25.18 17.52  9.91  2.35 -5.17  -12.65 -20.09  -27.48 -34.82  -42.12
8.0  67.27 60.06  52.89  45.76 38.68  31.64 24.65  17.70  10.79 3.93  -2.89 -9.66  -16.39 -23.08  -29.72
10.0  68.21 61.66  55.15  48.68 42.26  35.88 29.55  23.26  17.01 10.81  4.65 -1.46  -7.53 -13.56  -19.54
12.0  66.93 61.03  55.18  49.38 43.62  37.90 32.22  26.59  21.01 15.47  9.97 4.51  -0.90 -6.26  -11.58
14.0  63.42 58.19  53.00  47.85 42.75  37.69 32.68  27.71  22.78 17.90  13.06 8.27  3.52 -1.19  -5.85
16.0  57.69 53.11  48.58  44.10 39.66  35.26 30.90  26.59  22.33 18.11  13.93 9.79  5.70 1.66  -2.34
18.0  49.73 45.82  41.95  38.12 34.34  30.60 26.91  23.26  19.65 16.09  12.57 9.10  5.67 2.28  -1.06
20.0  39.55 36.30  33.09  29.92 26.80  23.72 20.69  17.70  14.75 11.85  8.99 6.18  3.41 0.68  -2.00
22.0  27.15 24.55  22.00  19.50 17.04  14.62 12.24  9.91  7.63 5.39  3.19 1.03  -1.08 -3.14  -5.16
24.0  12.52 10.59  8.70  6.85 5.05  3.29 1.58  -0.09  -1.72 -3.30  -4.84 -6.33  -7.78 -9.19  -10.55





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 
28.0  -23.41 -24.02  -24.59  -25.12 -25.60  -26.04 -26.43  -26.78  -27.09 -27.35  -27.57 -27.74  -27.87 -27.96  -28.00
 



























































0.0 2.0  4.0 6.0  8.0 10.0  12.0 14.0  16.0  18.0 20.0  22.0 24.0  26.0  28.0
0.0  -28.00 -27.96  -27.87 -27.74  -27.57 -27.35  -27.09 -26.78  -26.43  -26.04 -25.60  -25.12 -24.59  -24.02  -23.41
2.0  -18.16 -17.46  -16.72 -15.93  -15.09 -14.21  -13.29 -12.33  -11.32  -10.26 -9.16  -8.02 -6.84  -5.61  -4.33
4.0  -10.55 -9.19  -7.78 -6.33  -4.84 -3.30  -1.72 -0.09  1.58  3.29 5.05  6.85 8.70  10.59  12.52
6.0  -5.16 -3.14  -1.08 1.03  3.19 5.39  7.63 9.91  12.24  14.62 17.04  19.50 22.00  24.55  27.15
8.0  -2.00 0.68  3.41 6.18  8.99 11.85  14.75 17.70  20.69  23.72 26.80  29.92 33.09  36.30  39.55
10.0  -1.06 2.28  5.67 9.10  12.57 16.09  19.65 23.26  26.91  30.60 34.34  38.12 41.95  45.82  49.73
12.0  -2.34 1.66  5.70 9.79  13.93 18.11  22.33 26.59  30.90  35.26 39.66  44.10 48.58  53.11  57.69
14.0  -5.85 -1.19  3.52 8.27  13.06 17.90  22.78 27.71  32.68  37.69 42.75  47.85 53.00  58.19  63.42
16.0  -11.58 -6.26  -0.90 4.51  9.97 15.47  21.01 26.59  32.22  37.90 43.62  49.38 55.18  61.03  66.93
18.0  -19.54 -13.56  -7.53 -1.46  4.65 10.81  17.01 23.26  29.55  35.88 42.26  48.68 55.15  61.66  68.21
20.0  -29.72 -23.08  -16.39 -9.66  -2.89 3.93  10.79 17.70  24.65  31.64 38.68  45.76 52.89  60.06  67.27
22.0  -42.12 -34.82  -27.48 -20.09  -12.65 -5.17  2.35 9.91  17.52  25.18 32.88  40.62 48.40  56.23  64.11
24.0  -56.75 -48.79  -40.78 -32.73  -24.64 -16.50  -8.32 -0.09  8.18  16.49 24.85  33.25 41.70  50.19  58.72





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ 
28.0  -92.68 -83.40  -74.07 -64.70  -55.29 -45.83  -36.33 -26.78  -17.19  -7.56 2.12  11.84 21.61  31.42  41.27
 





SUBSTNEG SUBSTPOS COMPLNEG COMPLPOS
choiceNash 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0
πNash 27.71 27.71 27.71 27.71
choiceJPM 2.5 25.5 2.5 25.5
πJPM 41.94 41.94 41.94 41.94
slope -0.30 -0.30 0.30 0.30
πJPM
πNash 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51
Friedman 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
choicemin 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
choicemax 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0
Table 7.5: Theoretical benchmarks in the experiment
Theoretical benchmarks are in table 7.523. As ﬁgures 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 and
7.8 and table 7.5 clearly show, static Nash predictions are the same for all
treatments and so are the absolute values of the reaction curves’ slopes
and equilibrium and cooperative proﬁts. Cooperative choices in the sce-
narios with negative externalities are the mirror image of cooperative
choices in the scenarios with positive externalities24. Moreover, incen-
tives to cooperate in an inﬁnite version of the games would be the same
across the treatments, to the extent that the Friedman index is the same.
Note that we tried to maximise the absolute value of the slope of the
reaction curves so as to sharpen possible contrasts between strategic sub-
stitutes and complements. But in doing this we were constrained by the
requirement that yJPM ≥ 0. Assume that c is extremely small such that it
becomes negligible: c ≈ 0. In that case expression 7.24 reduces to
yJPM =
b(2d − 4e − 3f)
2(d − e − f)(2d − f)
(7.43)
23In the experiment earnings in points were rounded at two decimals.
24Compare proﬁt tables 7.5 with 7.6, and 7.7 with 7.8. One will see that elements in
cell (k,l) of the proﬁt tables in the scenarios with negative externalities are the same as
elements in cell (l,k) of the proﬁt tables in the scenarios with positive externalities.
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Nash JPM mean (s. d.) median
SUBSTNEG 14.0 2.5 11.3 (4.84) 12.1
COMPLNEG 14.0 2.5 8.4 (4.81) 7.0
SUBSTPOS 14.0 25.5 15.9 (4.70) 13.8
COMPLPOS 14.0 25.5 18.8 (4.09) 18.5
Table 7.6: Average choices
and the condition yJPM ≥ 0 reduces to 2d ≥ 4e + 3f since d > e + f






. In other words, the slope of the reaction function (see equation







such that the absolute value of the slope will always be
strictly smaller than 1/3.
7.6 Experimental results
7.6.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 7.6 contains an overview of descriptive statistics for the pair choices
based on all rounds. The standard deviations refer to cross-sectional vari-
ability and not to variability across rounds. From the table we learn that
average and median choices are between the Nash and the cooperative
benchmarks, and generally closer to the Nash benchmark. When exter-
nalities are negative, the average and median choice with strategic com-
plements is lower than with strategic substitutes. When externalities are
positive, the average and median choice with strategic complements is
higher than with strategic substitutes. Thus, the tables point out that
there is on average more cooperation with strategic complements than
with substitutes.
Obviously, the statistics in table 7.6 only provide a general idea of the
experimental data, where standard deviations point at an important vari-
ability in choices between pairs. In order to compare choices between the
treatments with negative and positive externalities, choices with nega-
tive externalities can be transformed into choices with positive external-
ities by subtracting the choices from 28 (indeed, m = 28). We prefer to
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rounds 1-30 1 1-10 11-20 21-30 30
SUBSTNEG 0.24 (0.42) 0.29 (0.45) 0.22 (0.39) 0.26 (0.50) 0.24 (0.58) -0.32 (0.28)
SUBSTPOS 0.17 (0.41) 0.17 (0.47) 0.00 (0.33) 0.25 (0.51) 0.25 (0.57) -0.21 (0.41)
COMPLNEG 0.49 (0.42) 0.37 (0.41) 0.38 (0.44) 0.60 (0.49) 0.48 (0.42) 0.07 (0.23)
COMPLPOS 0.42 (0.36) 0.32 (0.37) 0.31 (0.34) 0.45 (0.42) 0.49 (0.37) 0.16 (0.11)
Table 7.7: Average degree of cooperation and standard deviations
work with the degree of cooperation though. Presenting the data by degrees
of cooperation has the advantage that results become comparable across
different experiments (cf. the R&D experiments reported in the chapter
6 and oligopoly experiments reported in section 7.3 of this chapter) and
across the scenarios with negative and positive externalities. An analysis
in terms of degrees of cooperation gives exactly the same results as an
analysis in terms of (transformed) choices.
The degree of cooperation of pair k in round t is (as in previous chapters)
deﬁned as follows:
ρkt =





When pair k chose on average to maximise individual proﬁt in round t
then ρkt = 0, while with joint proﬁt maximisation, ρkt = 1.
Figure 7.9 gives the evolution of the average degree of cooperation
in the different treatments across all rounds, and table 7.7 provides av-
erages of the degree of cooperation based on different subsets of rounds.
Standard deviations only refer to cross-sectional variability. We include
an average based on the ﬁrst round, motivated by the suggestion of Ca-
merer (2004) that differences in behaviour are sometimes driven by ﬁrst-
round play. We also include an average based on the ﬁnal round, because
there exist important end-effects.
The ﬁgure and the table show that in the ﬁrst round of the experiment
the average degree of cooperation is roughly at the same level in SUBST-
NEG, COMPLNEG and COMPLPOS. In SUBSTPOS there is somewhat
less cooperation, on average, in the ﬁrst round. In the ﬁrst ten rounds the
degree of cooperation declines somewhat in the substitutes treatments,
compared to the ﬁrst rounds. Moreover, a gap is starting to appear be-
tween the treatments with strategic substitutes and the treatments with


















Figure 7.9: Evolution of average degree of cooperation
strategic complements, in the sense that with complements the degree of
cooperation seems to increase more than with substitutes.
After the ﬁrst ten rounds, the average degree of cooperation also in-
creases in the substitutes treatments, but not enough at all to become as
high as in the complements treatments.
End-effects have occurred in all treatments, which is not uncommon
in social dilemma and related experiments (see e.g. Ledyard, 1995; Pot-
ters et al., 2004). End-effects occur when players are experienced and
suggest that cooperation during the experiment is at least partly due to
strategic considerations (Selten and Stoecker, 1986). Some subjects realise
that they can gain more by cooperating, and when the end is in sight,
cooperation breaks down25. Although end-effects have occurred in all
treatments, even in the ﬁnal round, the average degree of cooperation is
still higher with complements than with substitutes.
25The end-effect is mainly due to pairs that succeed in making JPM-choices during
many rounds and return to a noncooperative choice at the end of the experiment (see the
discussion of ﬁgure 8.3(a) in chapter 8).
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7.6.2 Nonparametric analysis
In this section we test whether differences between treatments are statis-
tically signiﬁcant using Mann-Whitney-U tests26. In a ﬁrst series of tests
we test whether the type of externalities has a signiﬁcant effect on the
degree of cooperation deﬁned as in equation 7.6.1. Table 7.8(a) provides
test results for the scenarios of strategic substitutes and strategic comple-
ments.
Since classical game-theory predicts Nash behaviour in each round of
the ﬁnitely repeated static game, irrespective of the type of externalities,
nodifferenceshouldbeobservedbetweenscenariosofnegativeandposi-
tiveexternalities. Therefore, conclusionsrelatedtotheeffectofthetypeof
externalities on the degree of cooperation should be based on two-tailed
tests. One may argue that one-tailed test results can be used because pre-
vious experiments have found more cooperation in games with positive
than in games with negative externalities (cf. sections 7.2 and 7.3). Yet, a
recent study of Brandts and Schwieren (2004) puts in doubt that coopera-
tion is more likely in games with a public good frame than the equivalent
public bad version.
The test statistics in table 7.8(a) indicate that the degree of cooperation
is generally not signiﬁcantly different between treatments with negative
and with positive externalities. This goes for both scenarios of strategic
interaction. With strategic substitutes, there is a marginally signiﬁcant
difference in degree of cooperation in the ﬁrst ten rounds in favour of the
negative externalities scenario, but the signiﬁcance was present in the
ﬁrst round and disappears after the ﬁrst ten rounds.
Thus, our experimental evidence does not support the conclusion
launched by Andreoni (1995b) that there is more cooperation when ac-
tions have positive externalities compared to when actions have negative
externalities.
Table 7.8(b) provides results of Mann-Whitney-U tests of differences
between strategic substitutes and strategic complements. Given that no
signiﬁcant difference in degree of cooperation exists between negative
and positive externalities, results without distinguishing on the basis of
the type of externalities are provided. Separate results for negative and
positive externalities are also provided.
Classicalgame-theorypredictsSPNbehaviour, irrespectiveofwhether
26All tests have been performed in SPSS 12.0.
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2-tailed sig. 0.519 0.667
round 1
U 78a 92a
2-tailed sig. 0.542 0.795
rounds 1-10
U 56.5a 97a
2-tailed sig. 0.094 0.982
rounds 11-20
U 84a 82.5a
2-tailed sig. 0.756 0.454
rounds 21-30
U 80a 94b
2-tailed sig. 0.616 0.874
round 30
U 75b 66.5b
2-tailed sig. 0.450 0.151
aH1 : ¯ ρNEG
>
 = ¯ ρPOS; bH1 : ¯ ρPOS
>
 = ¯ ρNEG;
(b) of type of strategic interaction
all NEG POS
N 55 27 28
rounds 1-30
U 245 63 60
2-tailed sig. 0.025 0.185 0.085
round 1
U 317.5 79.5 82.8
2-tailed sig. 0.313 0.590 0.489
rounds 1-10
U 236 76 46.5
2-tailed sig. 0.016 0.480 0.016
rounds 11-20
U 269 62.5 72
2-tailed sig. 0.067 0.173 0.246
rounds 21-30
U 277.5 61 70.5
2-tailed sig. 0.092 0.155 0.210
round 30
U 112.5 23 32.5
2-tailed sig. 0.000 0.000 0.002
H1 : ¯ ρCOMPL
>
 = ¯ ρSUBST
Table 7.8: Treatment effects on the degree of cooperation
actions are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This pleads for
the use of two-tailed tests to draw conclusions about the effect of the type
of strategic interaction on the degree of cooperation. Therefore, signiﬁ-
cance levels in the table are two-tailed. On the other hand, all experimen-
tal evidence that we are aware of seems to indicate that cooperation is
easier or better sustained with strategic complements than with substi-
tutes (cf. section 7.3 and the previous chapter). The use of one-tailed tests
where H1 : ¯ ρCOMPL > ¯ ρSUBST may be justiﬁed on this ground.
Table 7.8(b) conﬁrms previous experimental evidence and intuition
because the degree of cooperation is overall higher with strategic com-
plements than with strategic substitutes with a two-tailed signiﬁcance
level of 2.5%. The difference is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst ten rounds, but
not in the ﬁrst round. This eliminates the possibility suggested by Ca-
1807.7 Conclusion
merer (2004) that differences in ﬁrst-period play determine differences in
overall experimental choices. The signiﬁcance of the difference reduces
somewhat in the ﬁnal ten rounds, but the p-value does not fall beyond
9.2%. Moreover, the difference is strongly signiﬁcant in the ﬁnal round.
When analysing the data separately for the scenarios of negative and
positive externalities, the test statistics based on all rounds point in the
same direction, provided that for negative externalities a one-tailed test
is used. With negative externalities, the difference between complements
and substitutes based on one-tailed tests only becomes signiﬁcant after
the ﬁrst ten rounds. With positive externalities, on the other hand, the
signiﬁcance of the difference that exists in the ﬁrst ten rounds disappears
afterwards. But both for negative and positive externalities, in the ﬁnal
round there is signiﬁcantly more cooperation with complements.
Summarising, whenactionsexhibitstrategiccomplementarities, there
is signiﬁcantly more cooperation than when actions are strategic substi-
tutes. Furthermore, the type of externalities is less important than the
type of strategic interaction in inﬂuencing the degree of cooperation27.
7.7 Conclusion
TheexperimentalevidencethatunderBertrandcompetitionthedegreeof
cooperation is often higher than under Cournot competition (see section
7.3), that with β = 1 there is more tacit R&D cooperation than with β = 0
(see chapter 6), and that in a number of public good games there is more
cooperation than in the equivalent public bad game, may be summarised
as follows: When actions in a dominance-solvable game with a Pareto-
inferior Nash equilibrium are strategic complements and/or have posi-
tive externalities, it is easier to reach optima that are Pareto-superior to
the Nash equilibrium than when actions are strategic substitutes and/or
have negative externalities.
Motivated by these experimental ﬁndings, in this chapter we have
set up a general experiment based on this type of game, with the aim to
disentangle the effects of the type of strategic interaction and of the type
of externalities on the degree of cooperation. We ﬁnd that the type of
strategic interaction is decisive in inﬂuencing the degree of cooperation
compared to the sign of externalities. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the degree
27We refer to section 8.5 in chapter 8 for a more detailed analysis of behaviour in the
experiment.
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of cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher when actions exhibit strategic com-






Standard noncooperative game theory fails to provide a rationale for
the laboratory ﬁnding that players of dominance-solvable games with
unique Pareto-inferior Nash equilibria cooperate more when actions ex-
hibit strategic complementarities than with strategic substitutes. Indeed,
in this type of game, standard game theory predicts (subgame perfect)
Nash behaviour, irrespective of the type of strategic interaction.
However, if players move sequentially, standard game-theoretic pre-
dictions differ between games of strategic substitutes and complements.
In section 8.2 we discuss consequences of sequential moving and the pos-
sible relation to behaviour in the experiments of chapters 6 and 7.
In the following two sections of this chapter we discuss two theoret-
ical approaches that may explain (part of) the above ﬁnding based on
laboratory experiments. In section 8.3 we show that the notion of rela-
tive proﬁt maximisation may account for part of the experimental results
obtained in chapters 6 and 7. The concept of relative proﬁt maximisa-
tion is based on evolutionary considerations and assumes that in order to
maximise survival chances, ﬁrms must do better than their competitors.
The indirect evolutionary approach, which is discussed in section 8.4,
obviously has also evolutionary roots. The aim of this approach is to ex-
amine whether a population of players having the same cooperative pref-
erences can resist a minority of invading players having less cooperative
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preferences. We show that behaviour predicted by the indirect evolu-
tionary approach is closer to observed behaviour in the experiments than
predictions of relative proﬁt maximisation.
Section 8.5 provides an overview of behavioural considerations that may
be associated with incentives to cooperate and the difference in degree of
cooperation between strategic substitutes and complements. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
8.2 First- and second-mover advantages
The aim of this subsection is to draw attention to differences in standard
game-theoretic predictions that would arise between games of strategic
substitutes and of strategic complements, of the kind discussed in chap-
ters 6 and 7, if players move sequentially. We focus on games with two
players.
Inasequentialgame, standardgame-theorypredictsaleader-follower
outcome by backward induction (see e.g. Gibbons, 1992). This implies
thattheﬁrstmover(inquantitygamescalledtheStackelbergleader)makes
a choice so as to maximise its own payoff, given that the second mover
follows according to its reaction curve. Gal-Or (1985) has shown that
in (symmetric) games of strategic substitutes, there is a ﬁrst-mover ad-
vantage, in the sense that the ﬁrst mover earns more than the follower.
The follower not only earns less than the leader, but earns less than if
both would play according to the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-
moves game. Games of strategic complements, on the other hand, are
characterised by a second-mover advantage. In this case, the second
mover gains more than the ﬁrst mover.
Experimental evidence provided by Huck et al. (2002), M¨ uller (2005)
and Fonseca et al. (2005) indicates that (Stackelberg) leader and follower
roles rarely emerge endogenously, even when theory predicts them to emerge
and experimental conditions are such that leader-follower behaviour is
possible1. M¨ uller (2005) suggests that this may be due to, amongst others,
coordination problems and aversion of the followers to disadvantageous
differences in proﬁt. In a (ﬁnite repetition of a) symmetric simultaneous-
moves game apparent leader-follower type of behaviour therefore would
1In experiments where the order of moves is determined exogenously, there exists
some evidence for Stackelberg behaviour (see e.g. Huck et al., 2001; K¨ ubler and M¨ uller,
2002).
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seem incongruous, the more so because in games of strategic substitutes,
the second mover would have a lower payoff than in the Nash equilib-
rium and a lower payoff than the ﬁrst mover.
Yet, one may think of a scenario where both players of a symmet-
ric simultaneous-moves game simultaneously choose to act as a virtual
leader. In other words, players may both choose to strategically pre-com-
mittoanactionthatmaximisesownproﬁtgiventhat theotherplayeracts
according to its reaction curve. We emphasize that this play is no equi-
librium play. However, this does not exclude the possibility that some
subjects may have acted as Stackelberg leaders in a certain round of the
experiments discussed in chapters 6 and 7.
Suppose that both players act as leaders. In that case they both end
up to be worse off than in the Nash equilibrium, if the game is one of
strategic substitutes, and better off, if the game is one of strategic com-
plements2 (Eaton, 2004). Thus, if both players in a pair act as if they are
leaders, the outcome will be Pareto-dominated by the Nash equilibrium in
games of strategic substitutes. With strategic complements, however, the
outcome will Pareto-dominate the Nash equilibrium.
Thus, if both players in a pair act as if they are leaders or ﬁrst-movers,
one would expect a priori that the degree of cooperation in games of
strategic substitutes is lower than in games of strategic complements.
8.3 Relative profit maximisation
8.3.1 Framework
IthasbeensuggestedbyVega-Redondo(1997)thatinsteadofmaximising
absolute proﬁts—a typical assumption of standard game theory—ﬁrms
may maximise relative proﬁts. This gives the following maximisation





i, j = 1,2; j  = i, (8.1)
where zi stands for the action of player i (e.g. price, quantity, R&D invest-
ment). Huck et al. (2000) show that solving this maximisation problem
2With negative externalities, this implies that actions will be higher (lower) than in
the Nash equilibrium in games of strategic substitutes (complements). With positive
externalities, actions will be lower (higher) than in the Nash equilibrium in games of
strategic substitutes (complements).
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i, j = 1,2; j  = i. (8.2)
The idea of relative proﬁt maximisation is based on evolutionary consid-
erationsandcanbesummarisedasfollows: inordertomaximisesurvival
chances, ﬁrms must do better than their competitors.
Vega-Redondo (1997) and Rhode and Stegeman (2001) show that rel-
ative proﬁt maximising actions are the unique stable outcomes of a dy-
namic process where in each period players imitate the most successful
player of the preceding period3. Vega-Redondo delivers a proof for this
in the context of a Cournot oligopoly with homogenous goods and linear
demand and costs, and Rhode and Stegeman in the context of a general
class of symmetric two-player games.
The authors further show for ﬁrms in oligopoly that relative proﬁt
maximisation yields the same outcome for price and quantity competi-
tion and induces more competitive actions (lower prices and higher quan-
tities), compared to the traditional Cournot- and Bertrand-Nash predic-
tions.
8.3.2 Applications
8.3.2.1 Cournot/Bertrand experiments revisited
Given the background in section 8.3.1, Huck et al. (2000), Davis (2002)
and Altavilla et al. (2003) argue that subjects may maximise relative prof-
itsintreatmentswheredetailedinformationonotheroligopolymembers’
proﬁt is provided (EXTRA treatments discussed in section 7.3 of the pre-
vious chapter). The authors calculate relative proﬁt maximising (RPM)
actions (imitation equilibria) for their experimental designs. Imitation
and relative proﬁt maximisation are less relevant in BASIC treatments
because no information about competitors’ proﬁt is provided in this case.
Without information on the others’ proﬁt, it is difﬁcult to estimate the
others’ success and to maximise relative success.
Table 8.1 provides an overview of RPM prices and quantities and
gives the RPM actions in terms of degrees of cooperation (ρ as deﬁned
3The outcome is also referred to as imitation equilibrium (see e.g. Selten and Ostmann,
2001).
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pRPM qRPM ρRPM ρNash ρJPM ¯ ρBASIC
T − 4 to T ¯ ρEXTRA
T − 4 to T (a)
HNO
Cournot 31.8 89.4 -0.60 0 1 0.00 (0.04) -0.44 (0.15) 0.156
Bertrand 31.8 89.4 -0.07 0 1 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.031
Davis
Cournot 52.2 57.6 -0.60 0 1 0.13 (0.58) -0.51 (0.10) 0.125
Bertrand 52.2 57.6 -0.07 0 1 -0.05 (0.06) -0.04 (0.03) 0.063
ALS
Cournot1 52.2 57.6 -2.00 0 1 -0.65 (0.67) -2.19 (0.57) 0.000
Cournot2 52.2 57.6 -4.00 0 1 -1.00 (0.62) -1.91 (0.57) 0.000
Bertrand 52.2 57.6 -2.00 0 1 0.34 (0.39) -0.33 (0.23) 0.000
(a) p-values of Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of H0 : ¯ ρEXTRA
1 to T = ρRPM
Table 8.1: RelativeproﬁtmaximisingactionsforCournot/Bertrandexperiments
in section 7.3). For the sake of clarity, the table includes the standard
SPN and JPM degrees of cooperation. Furthermore, it includes average
degrees of cooperation (and standard deviations) in BASIC and EXTRA
treatments of the experiments and p-values for the null hypothesis of
RPM behaviour in EXTRA treatments4.
Clearly, for the HNO and Davis experiments, relative proﬁt maximi-
sation may provide a rationale as to why the degree of cooperation in
Cournot markets signiﬁcantly decreases in EXTRA treatments compared
to BASIC treatments. In EXTRA treatments, subjects got detailed infor-
mation about proﬁts of other players in the same oligopoly and were thus
able to imitate the most successful player. Table 8.1 also makes clear why
such an effect is much less obvious in Bertrand markets: the degree of
cooperation of RPM players is—as opposed to the Cournot setting—very
close to 0, which stands for SPN behaviour5.
However, there are some convincing arguments in favour of viewing
relative proﬁt maximisation and imitation only as a partial explanation
for the observation that the degree of tacit collusion is generally higher
in Bertrand than in Cournot markets:
4See table 7.1 for more details on the standard theoretical benchmarks and table 7.2 for
an overview of average degrees of cooperation in all treatments of the Cournot/Bertrand
experiments.
5We thank Doug Davis for an inspiring e-mail conversation on this topic.
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1. The imitation theory cannot explain the ﬁnding based on the BASIC
treatments of the duopoly and triopoly experiments of Fouraker
andSiegel(1963)thatthedegreeofcooperationissigniﬁcantlyhigh-
er in the Bertrand settings compared to the Cournot settings (see
section 7.3.3 of the previous chapter). Indeed, under BASIC infor-
mation conditions, a player does not get detailed information on
payoffs of the competitor(s). This makes it impossible to determine
which player is most successful, such that the strategy of imitating
the most successful player can be ruled out.
2. The imitation theory cannot explain the ﬁnding based on the BASIC
treatments of the ALS experiments that the degree of cooperation is
signiﬁcantlyhigherintheBertrandsettingscomparedtobothCour-
not settings (see section 7.3.3 of the previous chapter but also table
8.1). Again, imitation of the most successful player is impossible
under BASIC information conditions.
3. Relative proﬁt maximisation cannot explain the ﬁnding based on
the EXTRA treatments of the ALS experiments that the degree of
cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher in the Bertrand setting compared
to the Cournot setting with homogenous goods (Cournot1) because
RPM actions are the same for both settings. The RPM degree of
cooperation in the Bertrand and Cournot1 treatments is: ρRPM =
−2.00.
4. Imitation and relative proﬁt maximisation cannot fully explain the
level of cooperation observed in the EXTRA treatments of the Bert-
rand settings of the HNO and Davis experiments and in all EXTRA
treatments of the ALS experiment: p-values for H0 : ¯ ρEXTRA
T − 4 to T =
ρRPM are below 6.3%. Therefore, the null hypothesis that actions
in the ﬁve ﬁnal rounds of these treatments are at the RPM level, is
rejected.
5. In the experimental Cournot duopolies with ﬁxed partner design
of Mason and Phillips (1997), information facilitates tacit collusion,
which suggests that other forces than imitation have played a role.
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8.3.2.2 Experiments in chapters 6 and 7 revisited
In this section we examine whether relative proﬁt maximisation may ac-
countfortheexperimentalﬁndingsofchapters6and7thatcooperationis
easier with strategic complements (including R&D with high spillovers)
than with strategic substitutes (including R&D without spillovers). It
may be relevant since in all treatments full information is provided on
proﬁts of the competitor.
Solving the equation deﬁned by 8.2 for the games underlying the non-
cooperative R&D experiments of chapter 6 and the general experiment
of chapter 7 provides the RPM actions in terms of the parameters of the






3bδ − 2γ2 if β = 0
xRPM=0 if β = 1.
(8.3)
In the games described in chapter 7 relative proﬁt maximising choices are
equal to 
          






















Table 8.2 gives an overview of the calculated RPM actions and de-
grees of cooperation for the parameterisations used in the experiments.
Average degrees of cooperation (and standard deviations) per treatment
are also included in the table, as are Wilcoxon signed-ranks statistics for
H0 : ¯ ρT − 4 to T = ρRPM.
Clearly, RPM degrees of cooperation are again lower with strategic
substitutes (including β = 0) than with strategic complements (including
β = 1). If a number of subjects, randomly distributed across all treat-
ments, have used a strategy of imitating the best, or of maximising rel-
ative proﬁts, different degrees of cooperation may arise between treat-
ments with strategic substitutes and strategic complements. Therefore,
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x/choiceRPM ρRPM ¯ ρT − 4 to T (a)
Experiment I in chapter 6
β = 0, baseline 9.0 -1.14 0.18 (0.48) 0.063
β = 0, signaling 9.0 -1.14 -0.07 (0.16) 0.063
β = 1, baseline 0.0 -0.88 -0.12 (0.35) 0.063
β = 1, signaling 0.0 -0.88 0.77 (0.78) 0.063
Experiment II in chapter 6
β = 0, baseline 25.6 -1.30 0.13 (0.49) 0.000
β = 0, signaling 25.6 -1.30 0.20 (0.43) 0.002
β = 1, baseline 0.0 -0.57 0.13 (0.26) 0.000
β = 1, signaling 0.0 -0.57 0.50 (0.39) 0.004
Experiment in chapter 7
SUBSTNEG 25.8 -1.03 0.16 (0.57) 0.000
SUBSTPOS 2.2 -1.03 0.18 (0.56) 0.000
COMPLNEG 18.4 -0.38 0.37 (0.39) 0.000
COMPLPOS 9.6 -0.38 0.46 (0.32) 0.000
(a) p-values of Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of H0 : ¯ ρT − 4 to T = ρRPM
Table 8.2: Relative proﬁt maximising actions
relative proﬁt maximisation may provide at least a partial rationale as to
why cooperation is easier with strategic complements.
Although relative proﬁt maximisation results in differences in de-
gree of cooperation between strategic substitutes and strategic comple-
ments, it cannot explain the levels of cooperation in the different treat-
ments, as is shown in table 8.2. Wilcoxon signed-ranks test results of
H0 : ¯ ρT − 4 to T = ρRPM show that behaviour in the experiments signiﬁ-
cantly differs from relative proﬁt maximisation. Given that the signiﬁ-
cancies of the differences between actual behaviour in the experiments
and theoretical RPM behaviour are strong, it is hard to ascertain whether
relative proﬁt maximisation may have caused the observed difference be-
tween strategic substitutes and strategic complements.
Moreover, relative proﬁt maximisation cannot explain why signaling
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possibilities have increased the degree of R&D cooperation only when
β = 1 and not when β = 0 in the experiments in chapter 6.
And ﬁnally, RPM choices in the treatments with strategic substitutes
in chapter 7 yield negative proﬁts, so it is unlikely that behaviour in this
experiment stabilises at the level of RPM choices.
8.4 Indirect evolutionary approach
8.4.1 Framework
Following an indirect evolutionary approach (IEA), where the concept
of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as deﬁned by Smith (1982) is
applied to preferences instead of to strategies, it can be shown that—
under some assumptions—cooperative preferences are only evolution-
arily stable when actions are strategic complements (see e.g. Bester and
G¨ uth, 1998; Bolle, 2000; Possajennikov, 2000)6. The assumption of clas-
sical game-theory that players choose their actions rationally is main-
tained, but it is assumed that players’ preferences evolve endogenously.
The experiments discussed in chapters 6 and 7 are based on symmet-
ricduopolygameswithauniqueandsymmetricNashequilibriumwhich
is Pareto-dominated. In what follows we consider a game of this type
where players belonging to a large population interact in pairs. Deﬁne a
player’s material utility as πi(zi,zj) where zi ≥ 0 is the action of player i
for i, j = 1,2 and i  = j. If subjective preferences of player i are deﬁned as
follows:
Vi(zi,zj) = πi(zi,zj) + λiπj(zj,zi) (8.5)
then the extent to which player i prefers to cooperate can be measured by
λi. We assume that −∞ < λi ≤ 1 and as such allow for envy because λi
can be negative (see also Bolle, 2000). The assumption that λi ≤ 1 implies
6Note that we follow Bester and G¨ uth (1998) and Bolle (2000) to a great extent in this
section, although we deﬁne subjective preferences in a similar but slightly different way
(see also Possajennikov, 2000). We further prefer not to use terms as altruism or altruistic
preferences. We are not convinced that in the games discussed in the previous chapters
of this thesis (R&D game, Cournot and Bertrand games, etc.) players cooperate out of
pure altruism since by cooperating one can earn more proﬁt than by not cooperating.
Moreover, the(tobedeﬁned)cooperative(oraltruistic)preferenceparameterispositively
related to the deﬁnition of the degree of cooperation we use in many chapters of this
thesis. Using the term altruistic preferences would thus be confusing.
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that player i cannot give more weight in her preference function to the
proﬁt of player j than to her own proﬁt7.
If both players choose their actions so as to maximise their subjective
preferences8, the equilibrium actions of both players are deﬁned in terms
of the players’ preference parameters and other parameters of the proﬁt
function. We represent the equilibrium action of player i by z∗
i (λi,λj).
Thecooperativepreferenceparameterofaplayeraffectsequilibriumplay
of the other player, and not only equilibrium play of herself. An under-
lying assumption of the IEA is that a player can form a correct idea of the
cooperative preference of the other player. This assumption may hold
for the signaling treatments of chapter 6 where players could signal a
willingness to cooperate in R&D by sending cooperative intervals9. It is
less obvious that this assumption holds in treatments without signaling
possibilities (the baseline treatments in chapter 6 and all treatments in
chapter 7), although an idea on the cooperative preferences of a player
can e.g. be formed on the basis of the actions chosen in the ﬁrst rounds of
the experiments (see e.g. Clark and Sefton, 2001, for related experimental
evidence).
As is shown by Bester and G¨ uth (1998) the sign of the strategic effect
of the cooperative preference of a player on the other player’s action de-
pends on the sign of the externalities and the strategic properties of the



















If both (externalities and strategic properties) have the same sign (neg-
ative externalities and strategic substitutes or positive externalities and
strategic complements), a player is induced to select a higher action ,the
more cooperative the other player’s preferences are. If both have an op-
posite sign (positive externalities and strategic substitutes or negative
externalities and strategic complements), a player is induced to select
a lower action, the more cooperative the other player’s preferences are.
7Allowing for λi > 1, as is done by Possajennikov (2000), would not change IEA-
predictions for the experiments of chapters 6 and 7 since actions (R&D decisions or
choices) are restricted to be positive and λ∗ > 1 are not evolutionarily stable.
8We assume that Vi(zi,zj) is concave in zi.
9See Cardenas et al. (2005) for a discussion of behaviour in social dilemma experi-
ments with communication possibilities, and the relation with the IEA.
1928.4 Indirect evolutionary approach
With strategic complements, cooperative preferences of a player are thus
helpful in increasing her proﬁt because with positive (negative) external-
ities the other is induced to choose a higher (lower) action, thereby rais-
ing her own success. With strategic substitutes, cooperative preferences
are harmful because with positive (negative) externalities the other is in-
duced to choose a lower (higher) action, thereby reducing own success10.
It should be acknowledged though that—as long as the signs of the
strategic interaction and the externalities are strictly positive or strictly
negative such that reaction curves are not ﬂat—a population of coopera-















with λ = λi = λj > 0 (Proposition 1 in Bester and G¨ uth, 1998). On the
other hand, if only two players interact, the player with the higher coop-
erative preference is less successful (earns less) than the less cooperative













for all λi < λj.
(8.8)
The IEA consists of examining whether a population of players hav-
ing the same cooperative preference parameter λ∗ can resist a minority
of invading players having a different preference parameter. In other
words, it consists of examining whether λ∗ is evolutionarily stable. De-
ﬁne Πi(λi,λj) as player i’s proﬁt (success) in terms of the preference pa-








A preference parameter λ∗ ∈ (−∞,1] is evolutionarily stable if11
Π(λ∗,λ∗) ≥ Π(λ,λ∗) for all λ ∈ (−∞,1] (8.10)
and
Π(λ∗,λ) > Π(λ,λ) when Π(λ∗,λ∗) = Π(λ,λ∗). (8.11)
10A similar mechanism is at work in the model of Rotemberg (1994).
11The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is based on Smith (1982).
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8.4.2 Applications
InthissubsectionweexaminewhethertheIEAhaspredictivepowerwith
respect to the noncooperative R&D experiments of chapter 6 and the gen-
eral experiment of chapter 7. We calculate the evolutionarily stable λ∗ for
the games underlying these experiments on the basis of the procedure




= 0 with respect to λi and putting λ∗ = λi = λj






In the R&D game the evolutionarily stable λ∗ is unique and equal to

   
   
λ∗=




3bδ(9bδ − 8γ2) + 16γ4
4γ2 for β = 0
λ∗=
9bδ − 4γ2 − 3
 
bδ(9bδ − 8γ2)
4γ2 for β = 1.
(8.12)
In the games described in chapter 7 the evolutionarily stable λ∗ is also
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We compare the evolutionarily stable λ∗s with the cooperative pref-
erences observed in the experiments of the two previous chapters. Let us
make clear how these preferences are calculated by including indices re-
ferringtotheduopolyandtheroundinthesubjectivepreferencefunction
Vi(zi,zj) deﬁned in equation 8.5.
Vikt(zikt,zikt) = πikt(zikt,zikt) + λiktπikt(zikt,zikt) (8.14)
is the subjective preference function of subject i of duopoly k in round t
where i, j = 1,2 and i  = j. Deﬁne z∗
ikt(λikt,λjkt) as the action of player i
12Most algebraic calculations are straightforward but expressions are mostly long and
not elegant. Therefore only the ﬁnal results are provided.
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that maximises this preference function and assume that the experimen-
tal decision of subject i of duopoly k in round t (e.g. an R&D decision as
in chapter 6 or a ‘choice’ as in chapter 7) equals this action. If any asym-
metry in actions within duopolies is ignored, which implies that actions
are assumed to be symmetric such that z∗
ikt(λikt,λjkt) = z∗
jkt(λjkt,λikt) for
i, j = 1,2 and i  = j, then λikt = λjkt = λkt. Then λkt may be viewed as
a representative preference parameter of duopoly k in round t and can





For the R&D game of the experiment in chapter 6, where the proﬁt




9bδ + 2γ2(β2 − β − 2)
 
− 2γ(a − α)(2− β)
2γ(2β − 1)(a − α + ¯ xktγ(1+ β))
(8.15)
with ¯ xkt =
∑i=1,2 xikt
2
and xikt is the R&D decision of subject i of duopoly
k in round t.
For the games of the experiment in chapter 7, where proﬁt functions
are respectively deﬁned by equations 7.10, 7.17, 7.25 and 7.35, λkt is de-
ﬁned as follows for the four different scenarios:

            
            
λkt =
¯ xkt(2d − f) − b
¯ xkt(2e + f) + c
for COMPLPOS
λkt =
¯ ykt(2d′ − f ′) − b′
¯ ykt(2e′ + f ′) − c′ for COMPLNEG
λkt =
¯ xkt(2δ + ζ) − β
¯ xkt(2ǫ − ζ) + γ
for SUBSTPOS
λkt =
¯ ykt(2δ′ + ζ′) − β′
¯ ykt(2ǫ′ − ζ′) − γ′ for SUBSTNEG.
(8.16)
Table 8.3 gives an overview of the evolutionarily stable λ∗ calculated
on the basis of section 8.4.1 and averages across duopolies of ¯ λ for the
different treatments in the experiments of chapters 6 and 7. We chose to
report data from the ﬁve ﬁnal rounds given that subjects have required






ily stable cooperative preferences based on Bester and G¨ uth (1998), who
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λ∗ λ∗
BG ¯ λT − 4 to T (a) (b)
Experiment I in chapter 6
β = 0, baseline -0.08 0.00 0.18 (0.48) 0.313 1.000
β = 0, signaling -0.08 0.00 -0.06 (0.15) 0.625 0.438
β = 1, baseline 0.04 0.04 -0.14 (0.40) 0.438 0.438
β = 1, signaling 0.04 0.04 0.73 (0.76) 0.125 0.125
Experiment II in chapter 6
β = 0, baseline -0.26 0.00 0.15 (0.47) 0.006 0.839
β = 0, signaling -0.26 0.00 0.23 (0.42) 0.006 0.223
β = 1, baseline 0.14 0.14 0.13 (0.32) 0.946 0.946
β = 1, signaling 0.14 0.14 0.51 (0.43) 0.039 0.039
Experiment in chapter 7
SUBSTNEG -0.22 0.00 0.17 (0.56) 0.027 0.455
SUBSTPOS -0.22 0.00 0.18 (0.55) 0.009 0.426
COMPLNEG 0.43 0.43 0.37 (0.48) 0.903 0.903
COMPLPOS 0.43 0.43 0.52 (0.32) 0.358 0.358
(a) p-values of Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of H0 : ¯ λT − 4 to T = λ∗
(b) p-values of Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of H0 : ¯ λT − 4 to T = λ∗
BG
Table 8.3: Evolutionarily stable and experimental cooperative preferences
restrict λ∗ to be in the interval [0,1] (referred to as λ∗
BG). Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test results of H0 : ¯ λ = λ∗ and H0 : ¯ λ = λ∗
BG are included in the
table.
As the table shows, some degree of cooperation is evolutionarily sta-
ble in scenarios with strategic complements, while the evolutionarily sta-
ble cooperative preference parameter in scenarios with strategic substi-
tutes is strictly negative if not restricted to be positive. With respect to
experiment I of chapter 6, evolutionarily stable cooperative preferences
are not so different for β = 0 and β = 1. Therefore, statistical compar-
isons of actions in experiment I with IEA-predictions are not as valuable
as for the other two experiments. Indeed, evolutionarily stable coopera-
tive preferences differ much more between β = 0 and β = 1 in experi-
ment II of chapter 6 and between strategic substitutes and complements
in chapter 7.
For most treatments where actions are strategic substitutes, including
β = 0, calculated cooperative preferences are signiﬁcantly higher than
the unrestricted evolutionarily stable λ∗. This is most obvious for experi-
ment II of chapter 6 and for the experiment of chapter 7. In the signaling
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treatment of experiment I, observed cooperative preferences do not sig-
niﬁcantly differ from λ∗. On the other hand, for none of the treatments
with strategic substitutes, observed cooperative preferences signiﬁcantly
differ from 0, which is the evolutionarily cooperative preference when
restricted to be positive (λ∗
BG = 0).
With strategic complements, calculated ¯ λ are not signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from evolutionarily stable λ∗ in all treatments without signaling pos-
sibilities. With signaling possibilities, there is signiﬁcantly more cooper-
ation in experiment II than what the IEA predicts, while in experiment I
the difference is not signiﬁcant13.
Thus, when actions are strategic substitutes, the unrestricted evolu-
tionarily stable cooperative preference generally underestimates the ob-
served cooperative preferences. Yet, when restricted to be positive, ob-
served cooperative preferences do not signiﬁcantly differ from the prefer-
ence parameter predicted by IEA. With strategic complements, observed
preferences do not signiﬁcantly differ from what the IEA predicts, for any
of the experiments, provided that no signaling possibilities are available.
With signaling possibilities, there may be more cooperation than what
the IEA predicts.
Clearly, the IEA provides a theoretical rationale for the laboratory
ﬁnding that cooperation is easier when actions are strategic complements
than when actions are strategic substitutes, and predicts the levels of co-
operationinthe ﬁnalﬁveroundswell. Yet, the IEA isnot fullyconvincing
as a theory to represent behaviour in the experiments because:
1. The IEA only performs well in predicting cooperative preferences
in treatments with strategic substitutes when it is a priori assumed
that spite or envy cannot occur on average so that λ∗ ∈ [0,1]. This
is a strong assumption since the possibility of envy is artiﬁcially ex-
cluded (see Bolle, 2000). Moreover, experimentally observed duo-
poly-andperiod-speciﬁcdegreesofcooperationaresometimesneg-
ative, especially when actions are strategic substitutes.
2. The IEA cannot explain why in experiment II signaling possibilities
have increased the degree of R&D cooperation only when β = 1
and not when β = 0.
13Note that the test results for experiment I are only based on ﬁve independent obser-
vations per treatment, which reduces the maximum signiﬁcance.
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3. In the treatments with signaling possibilities in experiments I and
II, the assumption that a subject can perfectly observe the cooper-
ative preference of the other subject in the duopoly is most plau-
sible. Therefore it may be argued that the IEA should best predict
behaviour in these treatments. Yet, it does not in experiment II with
β = 1.
8.5 Behavioural considerations
This section highlights some aspects of behaviour observed in the experi-
mentdiscussedinchapter7thatarenotcoveredbythetheoriesdiscussed
in this chapter but may be related to mechanisms that underlie these the-
ories. Our aim is to further explore the data gathered in the experiment
discussed in chapter 7, and to search for behavioural differences between
games of strategic substitutes and games of strategic complements that
may be related to differences in degree of cooperation. We focus on the
experiment of chapter 7 because it is the only experiment that provides a
‘clean’ comparison of behaviour between strategic substitutes and strate-
gic complements, in the sense that all standard theoretical benchmarks
coincide (see section 7.4 in chapter 7).
Given the ﬁnding in chapter 7 that the type of externality has no sig-
niﬁcant impact on the degree of cooperation observed in the experiment,
we do not distinguish between scenarios with positive and negative ex-
ternalities in what follows14. Moreover, for reasons of comparability, de-
cisions with negative externalities are, whenever necessary, transformed
into decisions with positive externalities using the linear transformation
xi = m − yi = n − yi = 28.0 − yi for i = 1,2 where xi and yi are the
decisions of i when externalities are respectively positive and negative.
This transformation does not affect any of the results as the scenarios
with negative externalities are deﬁned to be a perfect mirror image of the
scenarios with positive externalities.
14Overall, there are few signiﬁcant behavioural differences between scenarios with
negative and positive externalities. Whenever there are signiﬁcant differences, we ex-
plicitly refer to it.
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interval substitutes complements
1 [0 , 4) RPM = 2.2
2 [4 , 8)
3 [8 , 12) IEA = 11.4 RPM = 9.6
4 [12 , 16) Nash = 14.0 Nash = 14.0
5 [16 , 20) IEA = 17.4
6 [20 , 24)
7 [24 , 28] JPM = 25.5 JPM = 25.5
Table 8.4: Categories of pairs’ choices and theoretical benchmarks
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Figure 8.1: Frequency distribution of pairs’ choices
8.5.1 Seven categories
In many of the descriptive analyses that follow, average pair choices are
divided into seven categories of which some contain a (standard or non-
standard) theoretical benchmark. Table 8.4 provides an overview of the
different categories and the theoretical benchmarks15. Frequency distrib-
utions of all pair choices across the seven categories are in ﬁgure 8.1.
The distributions for strategic substitutes and complements both re-
15The theoretical IEA benchmarks can be derived from equation 8.16.
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Figure 8.2: Frequency distribution of pairs’ choices (assumption: one choice in
same interval during entire experiment)
semble a multimodal distribution. With strategic substitutes, frequencies
in the Nash interval and in the JPM interval are relatively high. With
strategic complements, there is an additional high frequency in the IEA
interval.
If part of the pairs’ choices are in different intervals during the exper-
iment and part are in the same interval, these distributions give a biased
picture of the number of choices used in the experiment. Typically, if
a pair succeeds in cooperating, by making JPM choices, for instance, it
often sticks to cooperation for several rounds. Consider e.g. a pair that
chooses an action in the JPM interval during the entire experiment. In
that case the JPM interval is counted 30 times. The frequency distribu-
tions in ﬁgure 8.2 correct for this bias because these are based on data
where the same interval is counted only once for a pair. With respect to
the above example of the cooperating pair, this would imply that the JPM
interval is only counted once. In ﬁgure 8.2, M stands for the total number
of different intervals observed across pairs and rounds in the experiment.
In ﬁgure 8.2 the multimodal structure of the distributions disappears
both for strategic substitutes and complements and the distributions be-
come more symmetric. The distribution for strategic complements lies
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roughly one interval to the right of the distribution for strategic substi-
tutes. With complements, choices in the IEA interval are most often made
while with substitutes, choices in the Nash interval (or the IEA interval
when cooperative preferences are restricted to be positive).
However, the most important lesson to learn from ﬁgure 8.2 is that,
with strategic substitutes, a pair’s choice is on average distributed across
more intervals (on average across 4.9 intervals) than with strategic com-
plements (on average across 3.1). Thus, with substitutes, pairs switch
on average more often to another interval—which may imply that play is
less stable—than with complements. This brings us to the following step.
8.5.2 Types of play
As ﬁgure 8.2 has shown, many pairs change intervals during the experi-
ment. In order to analyse further why pairs change intervals, and in or-
der to identify mechanisms why such changes are more pronounced with
strategic substitutes than with complements, we have studied subject-
and round-speciﬁc choices in more detail. There is lots of variability in in-
dividual behaviour, but it is possible (and as will later become clear, also
useful) to make a rough distinction of the types of behaviour of subjects.
Subjects’ behaviour in the experiment falls into one of the following cat-
egories: (1) cooperative or cooperation-inducing behaviour and (2) other
behaviour. Examples of other behaviour are (noisy) best response, follow
the cooperation induced to some degree possibly combined with cheat-
ing, some form of imitation, follow the exemplary subject16, undercutting
the other, etc. or a sequence of different rules.
This logically implies that the following combinations of behaviour can
be and are observed in pairs, in a not further speciﬁed number of rounds
in the experiment:
1. cooperative or cooperation-inducing behaviour by both players,
2. a combination of cooperation-inducing behaviour and another be-
haviour, and
3. a combination of other behaviour.
In what follows, we will refer to this categorisation of combinations of
behaviour of subjects as to the type of play of a pair. We emphasise that we
16See Offerman et al. (2002).
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are not dealing with types of players here, but with types of combinations
of play of pairs. It is also important to note that it is not our aim to classify
each of the pairs into one of these categories. Indeed, a pair can be in one
category in part of the experiment and in another category in another
part of the experiment.
The ﬁrst type of play is typical for pairs of which both subjects are or
havelearnedtobe(conditionally)cooperative. Ifsuchsubjectsarepaired,
choices close to the JPM level are mostly made, at least as soon as the sub-
jects realise that the other is also cooperative. With strategic substitutes
and complements, respectively 6 out of 27 and 10 out of 28 pairs make
choices in the JPM interval during at least 15 rounds, and 3 and 7 pairs
during at least 20 rounds. Some pairs gradually evolve to cooperation
and only make JPM choices in the second half or even towards the end
of the experiment. Whether differences in the degree of cooperation be-
tween games of strategic substitutes and games of strategic complements
are driven by a difference in the number of JPM choices, is dealt with in
section 8.5.3.
Many pairs’ play was, at least during part of the experiment, of type
2 or 3. In the second type of play one subject tries to induce cooperation
and the other subject uses any other type of play. It is observed a number
of times that pairs consist of one subject trying to induce cooperation by
making choices above the Nash level in the ﬁrst round or by gradually
increasing her choices in the ﬁrst rounds, and a subject using other rules.
Otherrulesare, forinstance, (noisy)bestresponse, followthecooperation
induced to some degree possibly combined with cheating, some form of
imitation, follow the exemplary subject17, undercutting the other, etc. or
a sequence of different rules.
The third type of play is a residual category consisting of other com-
binations of play of which none can be identiﬁed as being cooperation-
inducing. Examples are a combination of choices in the Nash interval
and a combination of two imitating players.
When looking at the subject- and round-speciﬁc data in more detail,
it is observed a number of times that pairs switch between play of type
2 and type 3. Consider, e.g., a pair’s play in a certain round that is clas-
siﬁed into type 2, where one subject tries to induce cooperation. Under
this construction, if after one or more rounds no cooperation is reached,
17See Offerman et al. (2002).
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it is often observed in the experiment that the cooperation-inducing sub-
ject punishes the other by decreasing her choice, often undercutting the
other subject’s choice in the previous round. ‘Low’ choices are often
made as part of punishment behaviour or out of frustration. As such,
play changes from type 2 to type 3. In some cases the former cooperation-
inducingsubjectretriestoinducecooperationandinsomecasesshegives
up. Figure 8.2 makes clear that with complements, none of the 28 pairs’
average choices are below 8. With substitutes, on the other hand, average
choices of 9 out of 27 pairs are below 8 in at least 5 rounds. This suggests
that there is stronger punishment or more frustration with substitutes
than with complements.
Consider as an example of the second type of play, a pair consisting of
one subject gradually wanting to induce cooperation and the other sub-
ject playing best response against the action of the other in the previous
period. Table 8.5 provides simulations for 15 subsequent periods of the
choices of both subjects and other variables for this scenario. Subject 1 is
the cooperation-inducer and it is assumed that she starts with making a
choice of 15, which is slightly above the Nash equilibrium. It is further as-
sumed that she tries to induce cooperation by increasing her choice with
0.5 every two periods. Subject 2 plays best response against x1t−1 accord-
ing to the best response functions 7.26 and 7.11 for strategic substitutes
and complements, respectively.
Other variables included in table 8.5 are:
• proﬁts of subjects 1 and 2 in period t: π1t and π2t,
• the change in proﬁt of subject 1 in period t compared to period 1:
π1t − π11,
• the change in proﬁt of subject 2 in period t compared to period 1:
π2t − π21,
• theabsolutedifferencebetweenthechoiceofsubject1andthechoice
of subject 2 in period t: |x1t − x2t|, and
• the absolute difference between proﬁt of subject 1 and proﬁt of sub-
ject 2 in period t: |π1t − π2t|.
Fromthetableitbecomesclearthatforthistypeofplaytherearesome
important interrelated differences between the scenario with substitutes
and the scenario with complements.
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t x1t x2t π1t π2t π1t − π11 π2t − π21 |x1t − x2t| |π1t − π2t|
strategic substitutes
1 15.0 14.0 27.62 30.20 1.0 2.58
2 15.0 13.7 26.91 30.21 -0.72 0.01 1.3 3.30
3 15.5 13.7 26.81 31.48 -0.81 1.28 1.8 4.67
4 15.5 13.7 26.81 31.48 -0.81 1.28 1.8 4.67
5 16.0 13.6 26.33 32.77 -1.30 2.57 2.4 6.45
6 16.0 13.4 25.98 32.77 -1.65 2.57 2.6 6.80
7 16.5 13.4 25.81 34.08 -1.82 3.87 3.1 8.27
8 16.5 13.3 25.46 34.08 -2.16 3.88 3.2 8.62
9 17.0 13.3 25.26 35.40 -2.37 5.19 3.7 10.14
10 17.0 13.1 24.92 35.40 -2.71 5.20 3.9 10.48
11 17.5 13.1 24.67 36.73 -2.95 6.53 4.4 12.06
12 17.5 13.0 24.34 36.73 -3.29 6.53 4.5 12.40
13 18.0 13.0 24.05 38.08 -3.57 7.88 5.0 14.03
14 18.0 12.8 23.72 38.08 -3.90 7.88 5.2 14.36
strategic complements
1 15.0 14.0 27.43 30.19 1.0 2.76
2 15.0 14.3 28.21 30.21 0.78 0.01 0.7 2.00
3 15.5 14.3 27.89 31.48 0.46 1.28 1.2 3.59
4 15.5 14.3 27.89 31.48 0.46 1.28 1.2 3.59
5 16.0 14.4 27.84 32.77 0.42 2.57 1.6 4.92
6 16.0 14.6 28.26 32.77 0.83 2.57 1.4 4.51
7 16.5 14.6 27.68 34.07 0.26 3.87 1.9 6.39
8 16.5 14.7 28.11 34.08 0.69 3.88 1.8 5.97
9 17.0 14.7 27.41 35.39 -0.02 5.19 2.3 7.98
10 17.0 14.9 27.85 35.40 0.42 5.20 2.1 7.55
11 17.5 14.9 27.02 36.73 -0.41 6.52 2.6 9.70
12 17.5 15.0 27.48 36.73 0.05 6.53 2.5 9.26
13 18.0 15.0 26.52 38.08 -0.91 7.87 3.0 11.56
14 18.0 15.2 26.99 38.08 -0.44 7.88 2.8 11.10
Table 8.5: Simulation of cooperation-inducer and best-response player
First, with strategic substitutes, subject 1’s proﬁt declines in each pe-
riod compared to period 1 by inducing cooperation, while with strategic
complements, subject 1’s proﬁt increases in periods 2 to 8 and in periods
10 and 12 compared to period 1. Subject 2’s proﬁt, of course, increases in
each period, to the same extent in games of strategic substitutes as with
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strategic complements18.
The mechanism is closely related to the mechanism underlying the
IEA19. Indeed, subject 2’s decrease in choice with strategic substitutes
(according to the best-response function) may be interpreted as a decline
in her cooperative preference. The IEA predicts that subject 1 should
respond to a decline in cooperative preference of subject 2 by increasing
her choice (see equation 8.6), thereby reducing her own success. Clearly,
the pair’s decisions move in the opposite direction and will not stabilise
at a higher level than the Nash choice.
With strategic complements, on the other hand, the increase in subject
2’s choice according to the best-response function may be interpreted as
an increase in cooperative preference. In that case, the IEA predicts that
subject 1 should raise her action (see again eq. 8.6), thereby raising her
own success. As such, the pair’s decisions move in the same direction.
A consequence of the mechanism that by inducing cooperation, sub-
ject 1 can get more successful with strategic complements, and that she
always gets less successful with substitutes, is that she may sooner give
up to induce cooperation with substitutes than with complements. One
could further also argue that it is easier to judge when cooperation-indu-
cing play is not followed with substitutes than with complements, be-
cause with complements the best-response function has the same sign of
slope (positive) as the 45◦ line containing symmetric cooperative actions.
Consider within this respect the ‘measure-for-measure’ policy in Sel-
ten et al. (1997) based on a detailed examination of strategies in a Cour-
not duopoly game. One of the main conclusions of the authors is that
many players have a cooperative goal (‘ideal point’) in mind that they
try to achieve during the main phase of the experiment. The authors
summarise behaviour of such players as follows: “A move of the op-
ponent towards the player’s ideal point usually leads to responses that
move the player’s output in the direction of his ideal point. Similarly, a
move of the opponent away from the ideal point is usually followed by a
response that shifts the output away from the ideal point.” If subject 1 in
18Differences between strategic substitutes and complements in column π2t − π21 are
due to rounding errors in the reaction of subject 2 (column x2t).
19Note that by describing the relation between the mechanism observed in table 8.5
and the IEA approach we do not claim that this mechanism is the IEA mechanism. For
the actual IEA mechanism described in section 8.4 to work, both subjects should know
the cooperative preference of the other and exactly respond to it according to equation
8.6.
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table 8.5 is considered as an example of such player, trying to achieve e.g.
JPM choices as an ideal point, her response to subject 2’s best-response
behaviour will depend on whether actions are strategic substitutes or
complements. With substitutes, subject 2’s choice in period 2 is a move
away from subject 1’s ideal point and therefore, when subject 1 follows
a measure-for-measure policy, she will react by moving away from her
ideal point. With complements, the response of subject 2 in period 2 is a
move towards the JPM choice, which makes subject 1 move in the same
direction.
A similar mechanism works when subject 1 punishes subject 2 be-
cause cooperation-inducing play is not followed. Suppose that subject 1
punishes subject 2 by undercutting the choice subject 2 made in the pre-
vious period. In that case, subject 1’s choice will always decrease more
with substitutes than with complements20. This may make it harder to
return to cooperation with substitutes than with complements.
Closely related to the above considerations is that, with strategic sub-
stitutes, the absolute difference between the choices of subjects 1 and
2 increases more than with strategic complements. In period 10 e.g.,
|x1t − x2t| = 3.9 with substitutes and |x1t − x2t| = 2.1 with complements.
Behaviourally, this larger asymmetry with substitutes may hamper coop-
eration. Whether there actually is more asymmetry in the strategic sub-
stitutes than in the strategic complements treatments of our experiment
is analysed in 8.5.4.
Further, absolute proﬁt differences between subjects 1 and 2 increase
in time or at least remain at the same level with strategic substitutes. With
strategic complements, absolute proﬁt differences occasionally decline in
time. This goes for e.g. period 2 compared to period 1 and for period 8
compared to period 7. It may be argued that if both treatments contain
a similar number of inequality averse subjects, inequality aversion may
form a larger threat with substitutes than with complements21. Whether
inequality aversion may play a role in explaining the difference in the de-
gree of cooperation between strategic substitutes and complements treat-
ments is also examined in 8.5.4.
On the basis of the above considerations, one could argue that induc-
20This mechanism is closely related to the mechanism underlying the imitation equi-
librium.
21See e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) for models of in-
equality aversion.
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ing cooperation is more difﬁcult in games of strategic substitutes, when
a cooperation-inducing player is paired with a best-response player. The
player who induces cooperation may get frustrated more than with com-
plements, which most likely also inﬂuences (perhaps destabilises) behav-
iour of the other player. In other words, one could argue that choices may
be less stable with substitutes than with complements. This is examined
in 8.5.5.
Table 8.5 provides simulationsfor a quite speciﬁc scenario, but similar
conclusions regarding these different characteristics for substitutes and
complements can be made if, e.g., subject 1 starts with choosing 14 and
gradually increases her choice, or if subject 1 chooses anything above 14
in the ﬁrst two periods.
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. We argue in
8.5.3 that it is important to distinguish between JPM and non-JPM be-
haviour. In 8.5.4 it is analysed whether within-pair asymmetry in choices
consists an important behavioural difference between strategic substi-
tutes and complements and whether inequality aversion may be impor-
tantinhamperingcooperation. In8.5.5weanalysethestabilityofchoices.
8.5.3 JPM and non-JPM choices
As previously discussed, it is possible to distinguish three categories of
types of play (see page 201). The ﬁrst type of play—(conditionally) coop-
erative or cooperation-inducing play by both players—is the most out-
spoken one. By this we mean that once players succeed in making JPM
choices or choices in the JPM interval, these choices are mostly repeated
until almost the end of the experiment22. Typically, cooperation breaks
down in the ﬁnal round(s), which is known as an end-effect in the exper-
imental literature. This end-effect suggests that these players are expe-
rienced and that cooperation is at least to some degree strategic (Selten
and Stoecker, 1986). Some subjects realise that they can gain more by
cooperating, and when the end is in sight, cooperation breaks down.
Weﬁrstanalysewhetherdifferencesindegreeofcooperationbetween
strategicsubstitutesandcomplementsmaybeassociatedwithdifferences
in number of JPM choices between the two strategic settings. As is shown
in ﬁgure 8.1, with substitutes, 23% of the choices are in the JPM interval
(188 out of 810), while with complements, 31% (260 out of 840).
22Similar conclusions can be made on the basis of experiment II of chapter 6.
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rounds 1-30 1-10 11-20 21-30
S C S C S C S C
N ∗ T 810 840 270 280 270 280 270 280
# JPM choices 188 260 29 58 68 111 91 91
N 27 28 27 28 27 28 27 28
2-tailed sig. 0.530 0.066∗ 0.303 0.955
S=SUBST; C=COMPL; ∗H1 : # JPM choicesCOMPL
>
 = # JPM choicesSUBST.
Table 8.6: Effects of strategic interaction on number of JPM choices
Table 8.6 presents total number of JPM choices in different subsets of
rounds and Mann-Whitney-U test results based on average pairs’ choices
of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in number of JPM choices
between complements and substitutes. The table shows that overall,
choices in the JPM interval were as often made with substitutes as with
complements23. In the ﬁrst ten rounds, however, marginally signiﬁcantly
more JPM choices were made with complements. These results may im-
plythat pairssucceed soonerinmaking JPM choices whenactions exhibit
strategic complementarities.
Yet, on the basis of more detailed experimental data it becomes clear
that players stick to JPM behaviour once they succeed in making JPM
choices, irrespective of whether actions are strategic substitutes or com-
plements. This cooperation always breaks down at the end of the experi-
ment, though.
Given these ﬁndings, differences in degree of cooperation between
the two strategic settings after the ﬁrst ten rounds are most likely not
driven by differences in the number of JPM choices. Table 8.7 focuses
on type 2 and type 3 play and provides degrees of cooperation based
on choices lower than 24 (non-JPM choices) and related Mann-Whitney-
U test results of H0 : ¯ ρCOMPL = ¯ ρSUBST. The test results point out that
when concentrating on choices that are not in the JPM interval, the dif-
ference in degree of cooperation between substitutes and complements is
highly signiﬁcant in all subsets of rounds. These results give even more
support to the ﬁnding that cooperation is easier with complements than
23With strategic complements, marginally signiﬁcantly more JPM choices have been
made in the middle ten rounds in COMPLNEG than in COMPLPOS with a two-tailed
p-value of 0.068.
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rounds 1-30 1-10 11-20 21-30
S C S C S C S C
¯ ρ -0.01 0.27 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.28 0.06 0.29
N 27 28 25 25 23 20 27 28
2-tailed sig. 0.000 0.008 0.021 0.000
S=SUBST; C=COMPL; H1 : ¯ ρCOMPL
>
 = ¯ ρSUBST.
Table 8.7: Effects of strategic interaction on cooperation based on non-JPM
choices
with substitutes. JPM choices have clearly blurred the signiﬁcance in the
nonparametric tests discussed in section 7.6.2 of chapter 7.
8.5.4 Asymmetry and inequality aversion
When looking at the subjects’ non-JPM choices in more detail, it is ob-
served that there is more asymmetry between subjects’ choices within a
pair with strategic substitutes than with strategic complements. More-
over, table 8.5 shows that when a cooperation-inducing player is e.g.
pairedwithabest-responseplayer, actionsbecomemoreasymmetricwith
substitutes than with complements. Clearly, these arguments are only
important for type 2 and type 3 play, i.e. non-JPM play, because most
JPM choices are symmetric.
We measure symmetry of a pair’s choice in a round by the absolute
difference between its two subjects’ choices in that round. Out of the 448
pairs’ JPM choices, 369 have an absolute difference of 0 (82%), 413 have
an absolute difference ≤ 1 (92%), 428 have an absolute difference ≤ 2
(96%) and 441 have an absolute difference ≤ 4 (98%). Thus, JPM choices
can generally be considered to be symmetric.
Figures 8.3(a) and 8.3(b) give the evolution of the average degree of
cooperation and of the average within-pair absolute difference based on
non-JPM choices for both scenarios of strategic interaction. The ﬁgures
clearly show that whereas the average degree of cooperation is higher
with complements than with substitutes, average within-pair absolute
differences are lower with complements than with substitutes. Within
the substitutes and complements treatments separately, it is not clear
whether there exists an association between within-pair absolute differ-
ences and the degree of cooperation. The intuitive idea that the lower




















(b) average absolute within-pair difference
Figure 8.3: Evolution of cooperation and symmetry based on non-JPM choices
degree of cooperation with substitutes is at least partly related to the
larger asymmetry in choices within pairs, ﬁnds statistical support. The
Spearman rank correlation between average degrees of symmetry (aver-
age absolute within-pair differences) and average degrees of cooperation
of pairs across both treatments is -0.33 (p-value = 0.015) providing ev-
idence for a signiﬁcant negative association between both. Within the
substitutes and complements treatments, rank correlations are not sig-
niﬁcantly different from 0 (-0.22 with a p-value of 0.279 and 0.21 with
a p-value of 0.273 for substitutes and complements, respectively). This
suggests that the negative association between symmetry and degree of
cooperation is mainly driven by a difference in symmetry between sub-
stitutes and complements.
Note that by only considering non-JPM choices the end-effect is much
less important because end-effects mainly occur when pairs have made
JPM-choices during many rounds (compare ﬁgure 8.3(a) with ﬁgure 7.9
in chapter 7). Our suggestion that at least part of the cooperation in the
experiment was strategic especially counts for pairs making JPM-choices.
Mann-Whitney-U test statistics reported in table 8.8 strongly support
the hypothesis that there is more asymmetry with substitutes than with
complements. H0 : |x1 − x2|SUBST = |x1 − x2|COMPL is strongly rejected
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rounds 1-30 1-10 11-20 21-30
S C S C S C S C
average |x1 − x2| 6.2 2.6 6.8 3.0 5.1 1.9 6.2 2.2
N 27 28 25 25 23 20 27 28
2-tailed sig. 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
S=SUBST; C=COMPL; H1 : |x1 − x2|SUBST
>
 = |x1 − x2|COMPL.
Table 8.8: Effectsofstrategicinteractiononsymmetrybasedonnon-JPMchoices
with two-tailed p-values close to 0.00024.
The next question we address is whether inequality within pairs mak-
ing non-JPM choices is larger with substitutes than with complements.
One of the criticisms of behavioural economists on the standard assump-
tion of rationality is that people not only care about their own proﬁt, but
also about equality and fairness (see e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000, for models of inequality aversion). We examine
whether inequality aversion may have formed a threat for cooperation,
where inequality in a pair in a round is measured by the within-pair ab-
solute proﬁt difference in that round.
Table 8.9 contains averages and statistics of Mann-Whitney-U tests
of H0 : |π1 − π2|SUBST = |π1 − π2|COMPL based on different subsets of
rounds. The statistics indicate that overall, there is more inequality with
strategic substitutes. The signiﬁcance of the difference declines in the
middle ten rounds and disappears in the ﬁnal ten rounds of the experi-
ment. The difference in inequality is clearly less signiﬁcant than the dif-
ference in symmetry discussed earlier in this subsection25.
Moreover, the Spearman rank correlation between average degrees of
inequality and average degrees of cooperation of pairs making non-JPM
choices is 0.08 and not signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.574). With substitutes,
the Spearman rank correlation is 0.01 (p-value of 0.574) and with comple-
ments, it is 0.52 and signiﬁcant with a p-value of 0.004. There is no em-
pirical, theoretical or intuitive support in favour of the hypothesis that
24In the ﬁnal ten rounds, there is signiﬁcantly more symmetry in COMPLPOS than in
COMPLNEG with a p-value of 0.002. But the degree of cooperation based on non-JPM
choices is not signiﬁcantly different between both treatments.
25Driven by the difference in symmetry, there is signiﬁcantly more inequality in COM-
PLNEG than in COMPLPOS in the ﬁnal ten rounds (p-value of 0.009).
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rounds 1-30 1-10 11-20 21-30
S C S C S C S C
average |π1 − π2| 14.90 12.82 16.86 12.45 11.78 8.50 14.83 12.11
N 27 28 25 25 23 20 27 28
2-tailed sig. 0.045 0.034 0.096 0.201
S=SUBST; C=COMPL; H1 : |π1 − π2|SUBST
>
 = |π1 − π2|COMPL.
Table 8.9: Effectsofstrategicinteractiononinequalitybasedonnon-JPMchoices
subjects rather like inequality and are as such motivated to cooperate.
The signiﬁcant positive correlation with complements is due to the fact
that absolute proﬁt differences between subjects making high choices,
which are more cooperative than the Nash choice, are a priori (theoret-
ically) larger than absolute proﬁt differences between subjects making
lower choices (cf. proﬁt tables in chapter 7). Moreover, when absolute
proﬁt differences between subjects are corrected for the pairs’ average
proﬁt, correlations are neither with complements or substitutes signiﬁ-
cant (correlation of 0.22 with a p-value of 0.256 with complements and
-0.19 with a p-value of 0.332 with substitutes26).
Summarising, during the entire experiment choices are signiﬁcantly
more asymmetric with substitutes than with complements. Moreover,
there is also more inequality with substitutes, although differences are
less signiﬁcant than differences in asymmetry and disappear in the ﬁnal
ten rounds of the experiment. Rank correlations suggest that the degree
of cooperation is positively related to the degree of symmetry, and not to
the degree of inequality.
8.5.5 Stability
A ﬁnal question we address in this section is whether there exists a dif-
ference in stability of choices between the two scenarios of strategic inter-
action. Whether a pair’s choice is relatively unstable and often changes
in time, may be related to whether cooperation is sustained.
As a measure for stability, we use a concept of rest point similar to the
one used by Offerman et al. (2002). The choice of a pair is deﬁned to be a
26The overall correlation is -0.21 with a p-value of 0.122 and thus also not signiﬁcant.
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rest point if it is in the same interval for at least two subsequent periods27.
A pair making choices in the JPM interval during the entire experiment,
e.g. has one rest point in the JPM interval. A pair can also have two
or more rest points in the same or different intervals. Consider e.g. a
pair that makes Nash choices during at least two subsequent rounds in
the beginning of the experiment, choices in the interval [20,24) during at
least two subsequent rounds in the middle of the experiment and returns
to Nash behaviour during at least two subsequent rounds at the end of
the experiment. In that case the pair has two rest points in the Nash
interval and one in the interval [20,24).
It turns out that all pairs have at least one rest point. Furthermore,
the observation that once a pair makes a choice in the JPM interval, it
keeps making JPM choices for several rounds, is reﬂected in the obser-
vation that almost all sets of JPM choices are part of a rest point. With
substitutes, 569 out of 810 choices (70%) are part of a rest point, of which
183 are in the JPM interval (32%). With complements, 755 out of 840
choices (90%) are part of a rest point, of which 254 are in the JPM interval
(34%). In the substitutes treatment, cooperation within pairs is signif-
icantly higher in rest points28. In the complements treatments, on the
other hand, the degree of cooperation does not differ within pairs be-
tween non-JPM rest points and no rest points (p-value of 0.501).
Figure 8.4 provides frequency distributions of rest points for substi-
tutes and complements across the seven intervals as deﬁned in table 8.4.
The distributions are based on the assumption that a pair can only have
one rest point in the same interval during the experiment. As such, distri-
butions are comparable to the distributions based on all choices in ﬁgure
8.2. In ﬁgure 8.2 choices in the same interval are only counted once.
27Offerman et al. (2002) look at symmetric rest points. We prefer not to restrict the analy-
sis to symmetric rest points—where symmetry is e.g. deﬁned on the basis of the absolute
difference between a pair’s subjects’ choices—as symmetry in itself is an important issue
in our analysis (see 8.5.4). However, results of analyses based on symmetric rest points
are similar to analyses based on rest points. The most important difference is that when
using symmetric rest points, many choices from the strategic substitutes treatment drop
out of the analysis.
28Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests based on 24 pairs that make non-JPM choices that are
a rest point and non-JPM choices that are no rest point give p-values of 0.013 for the
substitutes treatment.
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Figure 8.4: Frequency distribution of rest points (assumption: one rest point in
same interval during entire experiment)
Compared to the frequency distribution based on all choices in the
substitutes treatments in ﬁgure 8.2(a), by only focusing on rest points
as in ﬁgure 8.4(a), the weight of low choices—choices below the Nash
interval— and of choices in the interval below the JPM interval, has de-
creased mostly in favour of the weight of choices in the Nash and JPM
intervals and the interval above the Nash interval (category 5 based on
table 8.4). This suggests that with substitutes, low choices and choices
in category 6 are relatively unstable compared to Nash and JPM choices
and choices in category 5.
With complements, the frequency distribution in ﬁgure 8.4(b) is quite
similar to the one in ﬁgure 8.2(b). Choices in the Nash, IEA and JPM
intervals seem to be somewhat more stable than RPM choices and choices
in category 6.
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Figure 8.5: Frequency distribution of rest points (assumption: more rest points
in same interval during entire experiment)
In ﬁgure 8.4 we ignore that a pair can have several rest points in the
same interval during the experiment. In ﬁgure 8.5 the assumption that a
pair can have only one rest point in the same interval is not made. The
underlying set of choices is the same in both ﬁgures. In ﬁgure 8.5(a), and
to a lesser extent in ﬁgure 8.5(b), the weight of choices in the Nash inter-
val increases substantially compared to 8.4(a) and 8.4(b). This suggests
that when a pair has several rest points in the same interval, this interval
is often the Nash interval, especially when choices are strategic substi-
tutes. When considering only symmetric rest points—where a choice of
pair k is deﬁned to be symmetric if the absolute value of the difference
between pair k’s subjects’ choices is smaller or equal to 4—the frequency
of choices in the Nash interval is also with strategic complements more
outspoken high. This suggests that the Nash equilibrium is an important
‘attractor’ of behaviour.
From ﬁgure 8.5 one can further read that there are generally more
rest points with substitutes than with complements. This is indeed the
case, but as is shown in table 8.10, when it is taken into account how long
a pair’s choice remains a rest point—given that a pair’s choice is a rest
point—the picture changes. In other words, when analysing stability, the
length of a sequence of rounds in which a pair’s choice remains in the
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category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 tot tot non-JPM
strategic substitutes
# rest points 3 8 24 50 27 11 13 136 123
avg duration 3.5 3.1 2.3 3.7 4.1 3.2 13.8 7.6 4.1
strategic complements
# rest points 0 0 6 37 34 13 14 105 91
avg duration - - 12.1 6.3 6.0 7.6 18.0 14.0 10.2





COMPL rejected with p-value of 0.001.
H0 : durationcat 4-6
SUBST = durationcat 4-6
COMPL rejected with p-value of 0.002.
Table 8.10: Rest points, duration of rest points and stability
same interval (duration of a rest point) should also be considered. A
pair’s choice remaining at the same level (or in the same interval) during
ten subsequent rounds can be assumed to be more stable than a choice
remaining at the same level for only two rounds.
Table 8.10 provides data on total numbers of rest points and on the av-
erage duration of rest points for the seven categories of intervals (based
on table 8.4)29. Averages of the duration of rest points are higher with
complements than with substitutes in all categories. The average du-
ration with complements in category 3, representing choices in interval
[8,12), is determined by the play of two pairs showing imitation behav-
iour during 18 or 19 rounds. Mann-Whitney-U test statistics based on
pair’s averages of duration of rest points weighted for the number of rest
points in each category, of which the p-values are in table 8.10, point out
that the duration of rest points is signiﬁcantly higher with complements
than with substitutes. By only considering choices that are not in the JPM
interval (category 7) or choices in the interval [14,24) (categories 4 to 6),
p-values are not affected. In other words, choices are signiﬁcantly more
stable with complements than with substitutes30.
29Note that averages of duration given in each category are not weighted by the num-
ber of pairs’ choices in that category. The total averages are also based on unweighted
averages across pairs but each pair’s average is weighted by the number of choices in
each category.
30With strategic complements, choices having positive externalities are more stable
than choices having negative externalities. But the difference is less signiﬁcant than dif-
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rounds 1-30 1-10 11-20 21-30
S C S C S C S C
¯ ρ -0.02 0.24 -0.01 0.19 0.09 0.25 -0.05 0.22
N 24 25 24 24 22 19 18 19
2-tailed sig. 0.002 0.031 0.129 0.011
S=SUBST; C=COMPL; H1 : ¯ ρCOMPL
>
 = ¯ ρSUBST.
Table 8.11: Effects of strategic interaction on cooperation in non-JPM rest points
With substitutes, the Spearman rank correlation between the average
duration of rest points of pairs and the average degree of cooperation
in rest points based on non-JPM choices is 0.39 with a p-value of 0.058,
which points at a signiﬁcant positive association. There is no signiﬁ-
cant correlation with complements (correlation of -0.20 with a p-value of
0.330). The overall correlation is 0.24 and marginally signiﬁcant (p-value
of 0.096).
Table 8.11 provides average degrees of cooperation and Mann-Whit-
ney-U test results of H0 : ¯ ρCOMPL = ¯ ρSUBST based on rest points that are
not in the JPM interval31. The test statistics point out that also in rest
points, cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher with complements than with
substitutes. In the middle ten rounds the difference is not signiﬁcant but
in the ﬁrst and ﬁnal ten rounds it is, with signiﬁcance levels of 3.1% and
1.1%, respectively32.
8.6 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to provide a rationale for the laboratory
ﬁnding that players of a dominance-solvable game with a unique Pareto-
inefﬁ-cient Nash equilibrium, cooperate more when actions are strategic
complements than when actions are strategic substitutes. We discussed
two nonstandard theoretical approaches with evolutionary foundations
ferences between substitutes and complements (two-tailed p-value of 0.060).
31Note that choices that are not rest points are signiﬁcantly higher with complements
than with substitutes, irrespective of the subsets of rounds on which the tests are based.
32Tests on the basis of symmetric rest points yield similar statistics. Note further that
in the ﬁnal ten rounds, there is marginally signiﬁcantly more cooperation in rest points
in COMPLPOS than in COMPLNEG with a two-tailed p-value of 0.079.
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that a priori predict more cooperation in strategic complements than in
strategic substitutes treatments of the experiments of chapters 6 and 7.
We also considered behavioural aspects that may at least partly account
for the observed difference in cooperation.
First, there is the concept of relative proﬁt maximisation based on the
evolutionary idea that ﬁrms or players must do better than their com-
petitors in order to maximise survival chances. It has been shown that
a process of imitating the best player yields relative proﬁt maximising
actions. Relative proﬁt maximisation or an imitation proces necessarily
yields less cooperation in substitutes treatments than in comparable com-
plements treatments (see the experiments discussed in chapters 6 and
7). On the other hand, imitation processes cannot explain differences in
cooperation between substitutes and complements treatments where no
information on competitors’ proﬁt is given. Nor can it explain levels of
cooperation observed in substitutes and complements treatments.
The above theory and standard theories are based on the assump-
tion that subjects predict the opponent’s behaviour and react to it in an
optimising way. This assumption may be appropriate when groups are
‘large’. But when groups consist of two players, it has been observed
before that experienced subjects try to inﬂuence the opponent’s behav-
iour (see e.g. Selten et al., 1997). The mechanism that underlies this the-
ory, and that is closely related to the imitation process, may be important
when a cooperation-inducing subject punishes her best-response-playing
opponent for not following her play by e.g. undercutting the opponent’s
previous choice. With strategic substitutes, the strategy of punishment is
more aggressive than with complements.
An approach that better explains levels of cooperation is the indirect
evolutionary approach. This approach is based on the mechanism that
players in pairs adjust their cooperative preferences to the preference of
their opponent. Symmetric evolutionary stable preferences are the static
outcome of this mechanism. In games of strategic complements, evo-
lutionary stable preferences are more cooperative than with substitutes.
Themainfailureofthisapproachisthatpredictionswithrespecttostrate-
gic substitutes are close to average experimental behaviour, only if it is
artiﬁcially assumed that envy cannot occur or that players are on aver-
age not more competitive than in the Nash equilibrium. But envy does
occur in reality and players do sometimes behave more competitively.
This approach can further not explain why signaling possibilities have
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increased the degree of R&D cooperation with β = 1 and not with β = 0
in the experiments described in chapter 6.
Based on the experimental data obtained in chapter 7, we analysed
behavioural differences between strategic substitutes and complements
treatments in more detail. We argued that it is useful to analyse JPM
choices and other choices separately, because JPM choices are always
made by some pairs, irrespective of whether choices are strategic sub-
stitutes or complements, although that with strategic substitutes, it takes
somewhat longer for pairs before they succeed in making JPM choices.
This suggests that the difference in degree of cooperation between strate-
gic substitutes and complements treatments is not driven by a differ-
ence in the number of choices close to the joint proﬁt maximising choice.
Rather, the difference is driven by behaviour of pairs that do not make
JPM choices. We ﬁnd that non-JPM choices are more asymmetric and










to engage in price collusion or in other explicit or implicit agreements
that restrict output and harm consumers. On the other hand, the forma-
tion of research joint ventures or agreements that are related to coopera-
tion in R&D are not forbidden but rather encouraged by both European
and American governments because of their welfare-enhancing effects.
A theoretical underpinning for the encouragement of R&D cooperation
is provided by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992)
and many others (see chapter 2).
It is generally agreed on that R&D cooperation enhances social wel-
fare if pre-cooperative or at least post-cooperative technological spill-
overs amongst the cooperating ﬁrms are sufﬁciently high, given that in
the product market Cournot or Bertrand competition prevails.
These models assume that ﬁrms interact in an R&D stage and in the
product market, and predict that they behave according to the SPN equi-
libriumintheproductmarket, irrespectiveofwhetherthereisR&Dcoop-
eration in the ﬁrst stage. An empirically relevant question is whether the
assumption of Cournot or Bertrand competition in the product market
can be maintained if ﬁrms are allowed to cooperate in R&D, by commit-
ting to binding R&D agreements, and repeatedly interact in both stages
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(see e.g. Vonortas, 2000). Tacit collusion in the output stage may become
more appealing under these conditions, although theoretical predictions
of the two-stage one-shot game still hold. If such relation exists, it is
not obvious any more that R&D cooperation enhances social welfare for
β = 1.
In this chapter we investigate the question whether cooperation in cost-
reducing R&D translates into tacit product market collusion under experi-
mental conditions1. Using laboratory experimentation, we are able to
unambiguously focus on the simple relation between explicit R&D coop-
eration and product market collusion.
The interactions in the experiment are based on a static two-stage
duopoly model with differentiated products. We preferred a model with
productdifferentiationoveronewithhomogenousproductsbecausethen
symmetry is a natural solution under joint proﬁt maximisation in the
product market. Taking into account the remark of Holt (1995) that the
Cournot model is more mechanical because it simulates price determina-
tion mechanics (see also Tirole, 1995, at pages 223–224), we implement
Bertrand competition in the experiment. Moreover, price decisions are
intuitively more appealing for subjects than quantity decisions.
It is likely that, in reality, ﬁrms interact more than once in the R&D
stage and the product market, so that a repeated game better represents
interactions in the ﬁeld. Therefore, the static game is repeated a ﬁnite
number of times in the experiment. Repeating the game also allows
for learning and gives theoretical predictions a best chance. Further-
more, R&D decisions in the experiment remain constant for a number
of rounds, while prices may vary in each round. In this way, confusion
of subjects about effects of R&D and price decisions on proﬁt is avoided,
and subjects can learn to make price decisions, given their R&D deci-
sions. Besides, the assumption that R&D decisions have a longer-term
character than price decisions seems plausible.
Treatments where subjects have the possibility to make binding R&D
agreementsintheR&Dstagearecomparedwithbaselinetreatmentswith-
out R&D contract possibilities. In the second stage, the product market,
no binding commitments are allowed. Given the importance of the level
1This chapter is an updated version of Suetens (2003) for which I received a Young
Economists’ Award at the 31th EARIE Conference in Berlin. The experiments in this and
the following chapter have been run during my ﬁrst Marie Curie stay at CentER (Tilburg
University) in 2003.
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of technological spillovers in the noncooperative and cooperative R&D
literature (cf. chapter 2), a distinction is also made between a scenario
without and a scenario with full technological spillovers.
Relatedlaboratoryresearchhasyieldedthattacitcollusionintheprod-
uct market is facilitated by the possibility of announcing or signaling
prices (Holt and Davis, 1990; Cason, 1995; Harstad et al., 1998) and, un-
der certain conditions, by the ability to share information on demand or
cost states (Cason, 1994; Cason and Mason, 1999). Collusion is also more
likely in repeated games (Davis and Holt, 1993; Keser, 2000) and when
the number of sellers is low (Holt, 1995; Huck et al., 2004).
Examples of laboratory experiments where subjects make R&D and
price/quantity decisions are Isaac and Reynolds (1992) and Jullien and
Rufﬁeux (2001) (see also 4.2 in chapter 4). Both are dynamic experiments
and focus on the evolution of market prices in a setting where (stochas-
tic) noncooperative R&D decisions can be made. Neither of the experi-
ments contains a possibility for participants to commit to binding R&D
contracts, and neither examines whether (implicit or explicit) R&D coop-
eration facilitates tacit price collusion.
Martin (1995), Cabral (2000) and Lambertini et al. (2002) have pro-
vided a theoretical framework to investigate the question whether R&D
cooperation facilitates tacit collusion in the product market (for more de-
tails see 2.6 in chapter 2). The overall ﬁnding is indeed that R&D coopera-
tion makes it more likely for tacit collusion to be sustained in the product
market.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 9.2
the experimental design and procedure that has been followed, are de-
scribed. Section 9.3 gives an overview of the theoretical predictions of the
noncooperative and cooperative duopoly model used as a benchmark for
the experiment, and section 9.4 analyses the experimental data. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
9.2 Experimental procedure
The experiment was run from April 8 to 11 in 2003 at Tilburg Univer-
sity (CentERlab) and consisted of six computerised sessions with a total
number of 114 recruited students. The software z-Tree developed by Fis-
chbacher (1999) has been used. Students were undergraduate students
in economics, law or social sciences and had participated before in other
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BASE CON
β = 0 30 32
β = 1 22 30
Table 9.1: Treatments and number of subjects
types of experiments. Each session lasted for two hours and earnings
were between 11.5 and 30.5 EUR. Before the experiment started, instruc-
tions (see appendix C.5) were handed out and the students had the op-
portunity to ask questions. During the trial rounds, instructions were
clariﬁed.
The experiment consisted of four treatments; a baseline treatment
without contract possibilities (BASE) and a treatment with contract pos-
sibilities (CON), both for β = 0 and β = 1. The number of participants in
each treatment is in table 9.1.
The instructions made clear that the subjects represented a seller-pro-
ducer of an unspeciﬁed product in a market with two sellers of a simi-
lar, but not identical, product and that demand of consumers was sim-
ulated by the computer. They were told that (the simulated) consumers
buy more (less) of their product and less (more) of the product of the
other producer, the lower (higher) the prices of their product. In all treat-
ments the demand curve2 was qi(pi, pj) ≈ 29.34 − 0.36pi + 0.24pj. Sub-
jects knew that the other seller in their market was subject to the same
conditions.
The subjects were asked to make investment and price decisions dur-
ing 35 rounds, preceded by an additional 5 practice rounds aimed at get-
ting acquainted with the computer program. The decisions that were
made in the practice rounds were ignored when calculating ﬁnal remu-
nerations. Investment had to be between 0.0 and 50.0 and the price be-
tween 0.0 and 245.0. Investment decisions had to be made every ﬁve
rounds and remained at the same level during ﬁve subsequent rounds.
Price decisions had to be made in all 35 rounds. Investment decisions
were kept constant for ﬁve rounds, so as to allow subjects to learn to
make price decisions.
Subjects were explained that investment reduced unit production cost
2Based on an inverse demand curve of pi(qi,qj) = 245− 5qi − 3.35qj.
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by the amount of the investment (and unit production cost of the other
producer in the same duopoly in the treatments with complete spill-
overs), on the one hand, and that it introduced a cost of half of the square
of the amount (the square of the amount in the complete spillovers treat-
ments), on the other hand3. A proﬁt calculator was always available so
that own proﬁt and proﬁt of the other duopolist could be automatically
calculated if ﬁctive values of investment and price decisions were ﬁlled
in. All decisions of the previous round were also shown on the screen.
Intheinvestmentstagesofthecontracttreatmentsanadditionalframe
was shown on the screen that enabled subjects to send a symmetric con-
tract proposal to the other player. The contract was binding in the sense
that once a contract was accepted, both parties could not make another
investmentdecisionthantheoneagreedoninthecontract. Itwasstressed
that once a proposal was sent, the sender was committed to the proposal
if the other player accepted the proposal, even if new proposals were
made. All contract proposals were numbered and if a contract was ac-
cepted, the number of the accepted contract was shown on the screen.
The amount of contract proposals per round was not limited as long as
no contract was accepted yet in that round and as long as one of the two
players had not entered her R&D decision in that round.
When all investment decisions were entered, subjects were informed
about their own decision and the decision of the other duopolist and the
following stage started. When all price decisions were entered, they were
informed about the price decisions made in that round and about proﬁt
in experimental units of both. Proﬁt in experimental units was generated
following equation 9.2. Remunerations in Euro were calculated by divid-
ing the sum of all earned proﬁts during 35 rounds by 1500 and subjects
were informed about this exchange rate. Duopolies were ﬁxed during
the experiment and subjects had no knowledge of the identity of their
counterparts.
9.3 Theoretical predictions
The model that serves as a benchmark for the experiment is a modiﬁed
version of the AJ and KMZ models (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988;
Kamien et al., 1992) but gives the same theoretical benchmarks. In the
3The parameter value of γ has been set to 0.96, such that δ ≈ 1 when no spillovers are
present and δ ≈ 2 for complete spillovers. See also section 9.3.
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model two ﬁrms in duopoly compete in prices and sell differentiated
products. The ﬁrms face the following linear demand curve in period






b2 − c2 . (9.1)
The ﬁrms decide on R&D investment in period 1. It is assumed that in-
vesting in R&D reduces unit production cost and gives rise to a cost in
period 1 and in all subsequent periods. After the R&D decision, ﬁrms
make a ﬁxed number (m) of subsequent price decisions5.
This modiﬁcation to the original KMZ and AJ models may be moti-
vated by the medium- or long-term character of R&D investment deci-
sions compared to price decisions. Moreover, with the aim of using the
model as a benchmark in the experiment, it had to be taken into account
that when subjects were to make two (R&D and price) decisions in each
period, it would have been hard for them to judge whether proﬁt changes
result from changes in R&D or from changes in price decisions.
It is further assumed that technological spillovers may arise that re-
duce the unit cost of the competitor. Replacing quantities by the direct
demand curves and assuming that R&D has decreasing returns yields











where pit isthepriceofproductssoldbyﬁrmi inperiod t and xi1 theR&D
investment of ﬁrm i in period 1. β represents the spillover parameter and
lies between 0 and 1. α stands for unit production cost if no R&D is done
by neither of the ﬁrms and the last term of the proﬁt function is the R&D
cost function.
In order to obtain decreasing returns to effective R&D, xi1 + βxj1, the
suggestion of Amir (2000) to use a steeper R&D cost function has been
taken into account. Therefore, in the R&D cost function, δ = γ(1 + β),
4The inverse demand curve is pit(qit,qjt) = a− bqit − cqjt and the utility function that
is behind this set of demand curves for ﬁrms i and j in period t has a standard quadratic




(Singh and Vives, 1984; Hinloopen, 2000b), where the index 0 refers to a num´ eraire good.
5In the experiment m = 5.
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where γ is the original AJ cost parameter. By using this alternative cost
function, equilibriumR&DpredictionswillbethoseofKMZanddecision
variables in the R&D stage of the game are unit cost reductions as in AJ6.
The game is solved by backward induction. Since ﬁrms are not al-
lowed to make binding agreements in the product market, the solution
concept of each price-setting stage of the game is SPN equilibrium. Thus,
proﬁt of ﬁrm i with i = 1,2 is maximised with respect to its price in each
period t starting with the ﬁnal period m. This yields an equilibrium solu-
tion for the price of ﬁrm i in period t in terms of the R&D decisions made
in the ﬁrst period by both ﬁrms, of
pSPN
it =
(2b + c)[a(b − c) + αb] − b[(2b + βc)xi1 + (2bβ + c)xj1]
4b2 − c2 (9.3)
with i = 1,2 and i  = j.
If ﬁrms do not have the possibility to make binding agreements with
respecttotheirR&DinvestmentintheR&Dstage, thisstageisalsoplayed
noncooperatively. The solution concept is again SPN equilibrium. Filling
in equilibrium prices (eq. 9.3) in the proﬁt function (eq. 9.2) and maximis-
ing the proﬁt function in the R&D stage yields the following symmetric
R&D equilibrium for i = 1,2 in period 17:
xSPN
SPN =
2b(a − α)(2b2 − bβc − c2)
(1+ β)[γ(b + c)(2b + c)(2b − c)2 − 2b(2b2 − bβc − c2)]
. (9.4)
IfﬁrmsareallowedtomakebindingR&Dagreementsandcanassuch
reliably commit to the JPM R&D level, joint proﬁt is maximised with re-
spect to R&D. Restricting the solution to be symmetric yields the follow-
ing symmetric JPM R&D level for i = 1,2 in period 18:
xSPN
JPM =
2b(a − α)(b − c)
γ(b + c)(2b − c)2 − 2b(1+ β)(b − c)
. (9.5)
6In Amir (2000) this is proven for the case of quantity competition with homogenous
products, but it can be shown that the same conclusions are valid for the modiﬁed game
with price competition with differentiated products.
7It is assumed that the second-order condition and the stability condition suggested
by Henriques (1990) are met.
8It is again assumed that the second-order condition is met. Another assumption is
that the condition suggested by Salant and Shaffer (1998) is met such that the cooperative
R&D level is unique and symmetric.
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The cooperative R&D level is larger (smaller) than the SPN R&D level
if actions in the R&D stage are strategic complements (substitutes), i.e. if
β>(<)
bc
2b2 − c2. Proﬁt that corresponds to R&D cooperation is higher
than proﬁt under R&D competition if β  =
bc
2b2 − c2.
Finally, the benchmark case of price collusion is looked at. If the ﬁrms
collude in prices, such that joint proﬁt is maximised in the t’th price-
setting stage, the following price comes out for ﬁrm i in period t in terms




a + α − (xi1 + βxj1)
2
. (9.6)
Obviously, given the R&D decisions, the collusive price is higher than
the SPN price for all parameter values. If ﬁrms expect to collude in the
m price-setting stages, their proﬁt to be maximised in the R&D stage is
formulated in terms of the collusive prices. This yields the following
symmetric predictions for SPN and cooperative R&D levels of ﬁrms i =




(a − α)[2b − c(1+ β)]






2γ(b + c) − (1+ β)
. (9.8)
With respect to the choice of parameter values, we have tried to en-
sure that the sensitivity of proﬁt to an increase in R&D is ‘high enough’.
But it is inherent to the model that the sensitivity of proﬁt to a price
change is higher than to a change in R&D. Parameter values that were
used in the experiment are a = 245,α = 50,b = 5,c = 3.35 and γ = 0.96.
Turning from individual to joint proﬁt maximising R&D yields a proﬁt
increase of 3 to 9%, depending on price-setting behaviour and the level
of spillovers, while turning from the individual to the joint proﬁt max-
imising price yields a proﬁt increase of 29 to 39%, depending on R&D
decisions and the level of spillovers.
The theoretical benchmarks that correspond to the parameters chosen
in the experiment are in table 6.99. In the scenario without technologi-
cal spillovers, R&D cooperation yields a reduction in welfare, given that
9The parameters satisfy stability conditions (Henriques, 1990) and conditions for R&D
solutions to be symmetric (Salant and Shaffer, 1998).
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xSPN xJPM pSPN pJPM πSPN πJPM WSPN WJPM
SPN behaviour in price-setting stage
β = 0 17.4 9.5 85.3 91.2 862.6 891.0 4779.6 4614.0
β = 1 4.8 10.0 91.2 83.3 913.8 936.8 4657.5 5003.6
Collusion in price-setting stage
β = 0 28.0 13.0 133.5 141.0 1112.1 1214.2 3713.6 3723.4
β = 1 6.5 13.9 141.0 133.6 1254.6 1300.7 3804.2 4087.6
Table 9.2: Theoretical benchmarks
ﬁrms behave according to the SPN equilibrium in the second stage. On
the contrary, with complete spillovers, welfare is increased under R&D
cooperation. If ﬁrms collude in prices, welfare is always lower compared
to when they would compete.
ItisclearthattheorypredictsthatpricesaresymmetricandattheSPN
level in each period t, irrespective of whether binding agreements can be
made in the R&D stage. Additionally, theory predicts that R&D is at the
SPN level if no binding R&D agreements can be made (in BASE) and at
the cooperative level if R&D agreements can credibly be committed to (in
CON)10.
By following the backward induction rule, it is clear that ﬁnitely re-
peating the game does not change the theoretical predictions. In the ex-
periment the modiﬁed game is repeated 7 times, yielding a total number
of 7 R&D decisions and 35 price decisions or periods for each subject.
9.4 Experimental data
Our analysis focuses on comparisons of decisions between and within
treatments, although we also compare experimental decisions with the-
oretical predictions. As to get independent observations within treat-
ments, alldescriptiveandstatisticalanalysesarebasedonduopoly-speci-
ﬁc variables, such as average duopoly prices or R&D decisions. It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to explore individual-speciﬁc R&D or
pricing strategies, nor is it the aim to analyse convergence processes of
duopoly decisions in detail. We ﬁrst provide an analysis of the price de-
cisions, then of the R&D decisions and ﬁnally of social welfare.
10Note that the Friedman index for sustaining price collusion is 0.75 for β = 0 and
β = 1.
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9.4.1 Prices
9.4.1.1 Descriptive analysis
Averages and standard deviations of duopoly prices are in table 9.311.
Averages are calculated in four different ways and presented in separate
columns. The ﬁrst average is based on all observations in the experiment.
The second average is only based on the last ten rounds, as to focus on
decisions when subjects have gathered a lot of experience with making
decisions. The third and fourth averages (respectively represented by
¯ p1st and ¯ p5th) are based on the ﬁrst, respectively last rounds of each set of
ﬁve subsequent rounds with a constant R&D decision, given the cyclical
pattern of prices (see ﬁgure 9.1) and possible begin- and end-cycle effects.
Finally, we also present averages that are only based on price decisions
in the ﬁnal round (round 35) of the experiment.
Standard deviations only give an indication of cross-sectional hetero-
geneity, i.e. across duopolies, and not of heterogeneity of prices in time12.
Within the contract treatment, a further distinction is made on the
basis of whether a contract has actually been chosen or not, which is re-
ferred to by CON0 and CON113. CON1 refers to averages of prices in
rounds where R&D contracts were committed to14 and CON0 to aver-
ages of prices in rounds without R&D contracts.
With β = 0, prices in CON are higher than prices in BASE. Further,
within the contract treatment with β = 0, prices in CON1 are higher than
in CON0.
Prices with β = 1 are generally not that different between BASE and
CON. In the ﬁnal round, prices in CON are lower than in BASE. Within
the contract treatment, a similar conclusion as in the treatment without
11In 14 out of 1995 (57*35) cases, prices were chosen that yielded a negative production
quantity. These observations were left out of all descriptives tables and data analyses.
Leaving them out had no effect on any of the conclusions made.
12All averages are actually averages of average duopoly R&D decisions calculated in
different sets of rounds.
13Averages referred to by CON refer to weighted averages of CON0 and CON1 where
the weights are the number of observations in CON0 and CON1, respectively. These
averages are not necessarily the same as average (price or R&D) decisions in the contract
treatment without taking into account whether or not contracts were committed to. This
also goes for other tables with descriptive statistics.
14The calculation of averages in rounds with R&D contracts is based on all rounds of
each set of ﬁve subsequent rounds where an R&D contract has been committed to, and
thus not only on the ﬁrst.
2329.4 Experimental data
Treatment ¯ p1−35 ¯ p26−35 ¯ p1st ¯ p5th ¯ p35
β = 0
BASE 94.5 (18.9) 99.5 (23.5) 96.0 (18.7) 92.6 (18.4) 88.8 (14.2)
CON 99.5 (18.5) 103.3 (22.2) 105.0 (20.2) 95.0 (19.4) 89.9 (19.5)
CON0 88.8 (10.7) 87.2 (8.6) 93.7 (13.6) 86.5 (13.2) 79.7 (5.6)
CON1 111.0 (18.4) 114.9 (22.0) 117.2 (19.3) 104.2 (21.2) 96.1 (6.7)
β = 1
BASE 93.5 (16.0) 96.6 (14.3) 96.8 (15.5) 91.3 (15.7) 90.8 (10.2)
CON 89.0 (17.1) 90.9 (20.2) 93.8 (17.7) 85.2 (17.7) 75.2 (17.7)
CON0 81.8 (9.3) 85.5 (7.9) 84.9 (11.0) 81.5 (8.6) 86.3 (22.5)
CON1 93.3 (19.4) 93.1 (23.3) 99.2 (19.1) 87.4 (21.4) 73.5 (18.4)
Table 9.3: Average prices
spillovers can be made, although that in the ﬁnal ten rounds, the gap in
prices seems to tighten. Yet, in round 35, prices in CON1 are lower than
prices in CON0.
Theoretical SPN and collusive prices are expressed in terms of own
and other ﬁrm’s R&D. This implies that if the R&D decision of a pair
in the experiment is not at a level that corresponds to a theoretical R&D
benchmark, the theoretical prediction of the price that corresponds to this
R&D decision cannot be at any benchmark level presented in table 9.2.
It would thus be misleading to compare prices in the experiment with
the benchmark prices presented in table 9.2, without taking into account
the actual R&D decisions. Instead, the experimental price in a certain
round should be compared with the benchmarks in equations 9.3 and 9.6,
calculated on the basis of the R&D decisions made in that round. Thus,
for each combination of R&D decisions within a duopoly, a separate set
of Nash and collusive prices should be calculated.
Moreover, the main question we are interested in is whether R&D
cooperation increases the degree of price collusion. In other words, we
want to examine whether prices in the contract treatments deviate more
from the SPN price level towards the collusive price than in the base-
line treatments. Therefore, in all analyses that follow, the degree of price
collusion in each duopoly in round t is measured by
Pt =




t − ¯ pSPN
t
(9.9)


























(b) within contract treatments
Figure 9.1: Evolution of average degree of price collusion
where for each duopoly, ¯ pt is the average experimental price in round
t and where ¯ pK
t (with K = SPN, JPM) is calculated on the basis of the
experimental R&D decisions according to equations 9.3 and 9.615. As
Pt = 0(1) the average price of the duopoly in period t is at the SPN (JPM)
level.
The evolution of average degrees of price collusion is in ﬁgure 9.1.
For convenience we simply apply the notation P to indicate the degree
of price collusion. Within the contract treatment, a further distinction is
again made on the basis of whether a contract has actually been made
or not, which is again represented by CON0 and CON1. Figure 9.1(a)
represents average prices of each treatment and ﬁgure 9.1(b) represents
averages of prices within the contract treatments, where a distinction is
made between averages in rounds with and averages in rounds without
R&D contracts.
Aﬁrstobservationisthataveragedegreesofpricecollusiongradually
increase during the experiment and fall in the last round of the experi-
ment, which could be due to an end-effect. Further, the cyclical pattern
15An alternative way of measuring the degree of price collusion of a duopoly in
round t would be to calculate
∑i=1,2 φit
2
where φit can be derived from equation B.5
for i = 1,2; j = 1,2;i  = j if pit and xit are interpreted as the experimental price and
R&D decision, respectively, of subject i in round t. This would require more complicated
calculations without yielding additional insight. See also appendix B.5.
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Treatment ¯ P1−35 ¯ P26−35 ¯ P1st ¯ P5th ¯ P35
β = 0
BASE 0.21 (0.33) 0.28 (0.41) 0.23 (0.32) 0.17 (0.32) 0.07 (0.25)
CON 0.30 (0.32) 0.35 (0.38) 0.40 (0.35) 0.21 (0.35) 0.09 (0.33)
CON0 0.12 (0.19) 0.06 (0.14) 0.21 (0.25) 0.08 (0.24) -0.09 (0.10)
CON1 0.49 (0.33) 0.56 (0.37) 0.61 (0.32) 0.36 (0.39) 0.20 (0.38)
β = 1
BASE 0.20 (0.30) 0.20 (0.31) 0.26 (0.29) 0.16 (0.30) 0.06 (0.23)
CON 0.25 (0.32) 0.29 (0.35) 0.32 (0.36) 0.18 (0.31) 0.03 (0.30)
CON0 -0.03 (0.13) -0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.20) -0.03 (0.12) -0.15 (0.22)
CON1 0.41 (0.29) 0.43 (0.31) 0.51 (0.30) 0.31 (0.32) 0.06 (0.31)
Table 9.4: Average degrees of price collusion
of the series in the ﬁgure indicates that within each ﬁve rounds with a
constant R&D decision, the degree of price collusion usually declines to-
wards the ﬁnal of the ﬁve rounds. These observations closely correspond
to behaviour in earlier experiments on ﬁnitely repeated games (see e.g.
Selten and Stoecker, 1986).
Averages and standard deviations of the degree of price collusion are
in table 9.4. Standard deviations in the table only give an indication of
cross-sectional heterogeneity again, and not of heterogeneity of prices in
time.
The ﬁgure and table show that the average degrees of price collu-
sion in baseline and contract treatments closely correspond between both
spillover scenarios. A higher level of price collusion is observed in CON1
for β = 0 and β = 1. In CON0, prices are quite close to the Nash level. In
BASE, ¯ P is slightly above the Nash level. In the ﬁnal round price collu-
sion disappears in and within all treatments and prices decline towards
the Nash level.
9.4.1.2 Nonparametric between-tests
We discuss results of tests for differences in average degree of price collu-
sion ( ¯ P) between treatments. Results of Mann-Whitney-U tests of differ-
ences between treatments without and with complete technological spill-
overs (β = 0 versus β = 1) are in table 9.5. Column BASE contains the
result of a difference test between the baseline treatments with β = 0 and
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BASE CON0 CON1
Rounds 1-35
2-tailed sig. 0.938 0.266 0.534
N 26 24 28
Table 9.5: Spillover treatment effects on the degree of price collusion
β = 1, and columns CON0 and CON1 refer to the test results in the con-
tract treatments in rounds where no R&D contracts were made and in
rounds with R&D contracts, respectively. Only results based on averages
over all rounds are presented since test results based on other subsets of
rounds are the same.
Clearly, as can be read from the table, for none of the treatments sig-
niﬁcant differences in the degree of price collusion exist between β = 0
and β = 116.
We further tested whether differences in P between baseline and con-
tract treatments are statistically signiﬁcant. The between-treatment com-
parisons are based on Mann-Whitney-U tests of differences between BA-
SE and CON (without distinguishing on the basis of whether contracts
were made), between BASE and CON0 (based on rounds without con-
tracts) and between BASE and CON1 (based on rounds with contracts).
Test results are in table 9.6. We ran the test for four different sets of
rounds: all rounds, the last ten rounds, the ﬁrst and ﬁnal rounds of each
group of ﬁve rounds with a constant R&D decision and round 35 (the ﬁ-
nal round). Moreover, we present general results, without distinguishing
between the two levels of technological spillovers, as well as separate re-
sults for both spillover levels. The presentation of the general results is
justiﬁed, since Mann-Whitney-U tests do not yield signiﬁcant differences
in the degree of price collusion between β = 0 and β = 1 (see table 9.5).
TheMann-Whitney-Ustatisticsbasedonallobservationsindicatethat
a signiﬁcant difference (3.7% signiﬁcance) in degree of price collusion ex-
ists between BASE and CON, where in CON the degree of price collusion
is higher than in BASE. In other words, price collusion is facilitated by the
possibility to engage in binding R&D contracts.
16The statistics are all based on negative ranks, which implies that the sum of ranks is
always higher when β = 0 than when β = 1 such that H1 : ¯ Pβ=0
>
 = ¯ Pβ=1.
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BASE-CON BASE-CON0 BASE-CON1
all β = 0 β = 1 all β = 0 β = 1 all β = 0 β = 1
Rounds 1-35
2-tailed sig. 0.037b 0.133b 0.154b 0.100a 0.570a 0.063a 0.004b 0.040b 0.052b
N 57 31 26 49 29 20 54 28 26
Rounds 26-35
2-tailed sig. 0.073b 0.236b 0.139b 0.140a 0.478a 0.159a 0.012b 0.073b 0.052b
N 57 31 26 40 23 17 52 26 26
First rounds of groups of 5 rounds
2-tailed sig. 0.027b 0.072b 0.180b 0.245a 0.813a 0.095a 0.001b 0.004b 0.018b
N 57 31 26 49 29 20 54 28 26
Final rounds of groups of 5 rounds
2-tailed sig. 0.200b 0.527b 0.203b 0.041a 0.315a 0.074a 0.045b 0.147b 0.154b
N 57 31 26 49 29 20 54 28 26
Round 35
2-tailed sig. 0.357a 0.607a 0.533a 0.024a 0.073a 0.374a 0.968a 0.579a 0.664b
N 57 31 26 34 21 13 49 25 24
aH1 : ¯ PBASE
>
 = ¯ PCON.; bH1 : ¯ PCON.
>
 = ¯ PBASE.
Table 9.6: Contract treatment effects on the degree of price collusion
The difference is less pronounced when only considering the last ten
rounds(7.5%signiﬁcance). Whenonlytakingintoaccounttheﬁnalround
or the ﬁnal rounds of all groups of ﬁve rounds with a constant R&D deci-
sion, the statistical signiﬁcance disappears. This is not surprising, given
that prices often fall in the ﬁnal round of the experiment and towards the
end of each ﬁve-rounds-cycle. The signiﬁcance of the between-tests of
BASE versus CON also disappears when the tests are separately run for
both spillover levels.
The tests comparing BASE with CON1 provide strong evidence for
the degree of price collusion in rounds with R&D contracts in the contract
treatments (CON1) to be higher than in the baseline treatments (BASE),
also in the last ten rounds, when subjects have gained experience. Thus,
successful R&D cooperation facilitates price collusion. The difference is sus-
tained when considering the spillover treatments separately, or when
considering ﬁnal rounds of ﬁve-rounds-cycles.
The observation that engaging in binding R&D agreements increases
the likelihood of price collusion may be explained by viewing engage-
ment in binding R&D agreements as a form of nonbinding communica-
tion17. By making binding R&D agreements (contracts), social distance
17See also chapter 10. We refer to Kollock (1998) and Cardenas et al. (2005) for discus-
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may be declined and trust increased (Hoffman et al., 1996b). Entering
into R&D contracts can also be interpreted as a signal of willingness to
cooperate in general. In this way, beliefs of players about the coopera-
tive preference of others may be inﬂuenced. Finally, entering into R&D
contracts can substitute for explicit commitment in the product market.
As is shown in table 9.6 the signiﬁcance however disappears when
only considering the ﬁnal round. Thus, if one takes behaviour in the ﬁ-
nal round as representative for behaviour in a one-shot game, one could
argue that repeating the game is necessary to ﬁnd an effect of R&D co-
operation on price collusion. However, there exists no consensus at all
on whether ﬁnal-round-behaviour validly represents behaviour in a one-
shot game.
The between-comparisons of BASE and CON0 yield no signiﬁcant
differenceindegreeofpricecollusionbetweenthebaselinetreatmentand
rounds without contracts in the contract treatments. In the ﬁnal round of
the experiment or the ﬁfth rounds of the ﬁve-rounds-cycles, the degree
of price collusion is signiﬁcantly lower in CON0 than in BASE. This may
indicate that subjects sort of punish each other, and necessarily them-
selves, for not having reached a satisfactory R&D agreement by lowering
their prices even below a level that would normally have been reached
without contract possibilities. This behaviour is in line with experimen-
tal ﬁndings discussed by Fehr and Rockenbach (2003). The signiﬁcance
again disappears or is greatly reduced when considering both spillover
scenarios separately.
9.4.1.3 Nonparametric within-tests
Next, we turn to statistical test results of comparisons of ¯ P within con-
tract treatments. In other words, we now examine whether the degree of
price collusion in duopolies is higher in rounds where they committed to
R&D contracts (CON1) than in rounds without R&D contracts (CON0).
Table 9.7 contains results of Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of comparisons
between CON0 with CON1 based on exact signiﬁcancies. The tests are
based on price decisions of duopolies that switched between committing
and not committing to an R&D contract in the related subset of rounds.
Decisions of duopolies that either never or always signed a contract in
that subset of rounds, necessarily drop out of the within-analysis, which
sions of the effect of communication on tacit cooperation in social dilemmas.
2389.4 Experimental data
all β = 0 β = 1
Rounds 1-35
2-tailed sig. 0.000 0.003 0.004
N 20 11 9
Rounds 26-35
2-tailed sig. 0.008 0.250 0.063
N 9 3 6
First rounds of groups of 5 rounds
2-tailed sig. 0.000 0.001 0.008
N 20 11 9
Final rounds of groups of 5 rounds
2-tailed sig. 0.000 0.019 0.011
N 20 11 9
H1 : ¯ PCON1
>
 = ¯ PCON0.
Table 9.7: Within contract treatment effects on the degree of price collusion
explains the reduction in the number of observations (N) in the table
compared to the between-analyses. Naturally, the within-tests cannot be
performed for the ﬁnal round (round 35) of the experiment since switch-
ing between not committing and committing to an R&D contract during
one decision round could not occur.
The difference in degree of price collusion between rounds with and
without R&D contracts is overall highly signiﬁcant, irrespective of the
subset of rounds that is taken into account. Thus, the degree of price
collusion not only increases in the rounds that directly follow the actual
R&D contracting decision, but also remains at the higher level until the
end of each ﬁve-rounds-cycle, and even until the end of the experiment.
This suggests that the increase in degree of price collusion elicited by
successful R&D contracting is sustained.
When considering the spillover levels separately, the differences re-
main highly signiﬁcant for all subsets of rounds provided that there are
enough data that underlie the Wilcoxon singed-ranks test18.
18For instance for β = 0, only 3 observations underlie the Wilcoxon test in the last ten
rounds, implying that 3 out of 16 duopolies switched between choosing and not choosing
an R&D contract in the last ten rounds. This reduces of course the maximum possible
signiﬁcance.
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Summarising, onthebasisofbetween-andwithin-testsweﬁndstrong
statistical evidence in favour of the intuition that successful R&D coopera-
tion facilitates price collusion.
9.4.1.4 Comparison with theoretical predictions
Former subsections were based on between- and within-treatment com-
parisons, while in this subsection we test whether the degree of price col-
lusion signiﬁcantly differs from its theoretical benchmarks. More specif-
ically, we test whether the degree of price collusion signiﬁcantly differs
from 0 and 1, respectively corresponding to the Nash and the collusive
level, for the different treatments. Therefore, we performed Wilcoxon
signed-ranks tests to compare the duopoly averages of P taken on the ba-
sis of different subsets of rounds with SPN behaviour (0) and full price
collusion (1)19. We only present the test results of the hypothesis H0 : P =
0 because H0 : P = 1 is always rejected with a signiﬁcance level of 1%.
Results are in table 9.8.
As the table shows, prices in the baseline treatments are mostly sig-
niﬁcantly different from (above) the SPN level. The signiﬁcance reduces
or disappears in the ﬁnal round and in the ﬁfth rounds of cycles of ﬁve
rounds. In the CON treatment, H0 : P = 0 is mostly not rejected in
rounds where R&D contracts were not committed to. Only for β = 0, the
degree of price collusion averaged over all rounds is signiﬁcantly higher
than 0.
In rounds where contracts are made, on the other hand, prices are
generally signiﬁcantly different from (larger than) the SPN level, even in
the ﬁnal rounds of ﬁve-rounds-cycles with a constant R&D decision. This
suggests that although prices decline somewhat or move in the direction
of the SPN level during each ﬁve-rounds-cycle where the R&D decision
remains constant, the effect that R&D cooperation (committing to R&D
contracts) increases prices above the Nash level does not disappear at the
end of each cycle. In round 35, prices in all treatments do not signiﬁcantly
differ from the SPN prediction, irrespective of whether R&D contracts are
19Given the cross-sectional and time-series nature of the experimental data, one would
think that a pooled econometric analysis where a representative price is estimated for
each treatment, would be a more appropriate method of analysis. But since price deci-
sions and convergence processes are heterogeneous across duopolies, as shown in the
graphs in appendix B, pooled econometric estimations would suffer a lot from misspeci-
ﬁcation. Therefore we opted for a simpler but more robust approach.
2409.4 Experimental data
BASE CON0 CON1
β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1
Rounds 1-35
2-tailed sig. 0.015a 0.014a 0.017a 0.910a 0.000a 0.000a
N 15 11 14 9 13 15
Rounds 26-35
2-tailed sig. 0.048a 0.007a 0.313a 1.000a 0.002a 0.000a
N 15 11 8 6 11 15
First rounds of groups of 5 rounds
2-tailed sig. 0.012a 0.003a 0.013a 0.910a 0.000a 0.000a
N 15 11 14 9 13 15
Final rounds of groups of 5 rounds
2-tailed sig. 0.048a 0.123a 0.296a 0.496a 0.006a 0.002a
N 15 11 14 9 13 15
Round 35
2-tailed sig. 0.804a 0.966a 0.094b 1.000b 0.193a 1.000b
N 15 11 6 2 10 13
aH1 : ¯ P
>
 = 0; bH1 : ¯ P
<
 = 0.
Table 9.8: Nonparametric tests of H0 : ¯ P = 0
committed to.
To summarise, introducing R&D contract possibilities in a ﬁnitely re-
peated R&D and pricing game, yields a higher degree of price collusion
compared to a setting without contract possibilities. An important con-
dition for the degree of price collusion to increase and remain at a higher
level in the contract treatment, is that R&D contracts are actually commit-
tedto. InroundswithoutR&Dcontractsactuallycommittedto, pricesare
generally close to the SPN level and sometimes even fall below prices in
the baseline treatments. This may indicate that subjects sort of punish
each other (and necessarily themselves) for not having reached a satis-
factory R&D agreement by lowering their prices even below a level that
would normally have been reached without contract possibilities (see
also Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003).
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BASE CON CON0 CON1
β = 0
¯ x1−35 19.8 (2.5) 19.9 (5.5) 21.6 (5.0) 18.1 (5.5)
2-tailed sig. 0.843 0.193
N 31 11
β = 1
¯ x1−35 10.7 (4.7) 15.9 (7.2) 10.2 (7.1) 19.4 (4.7)
2-tailed sig. 0.003 0.004
N 26 9
Table 9.9: Average R&D decisions and nonparametric test results
9.4.2 R&D decisions
In this section we focus on R&D behaviour in the experiment. Table 9.9
presents average R&D for the whole experiment and appropriate non-
parametric test results20. Standard deviations are in brackets and again
refer to heterogeneity across duopolies. P-values of comparisons be-
tween BASE and CON come from Mann-Whitney-U tests of H0 : ¯ xBASE =
¯ xCON and p-values of comparisons within CON, that is, between CON0
and CON1, are based on Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of H0 : ¯ xCON0 =
¯ xCON1.
From table 9.9 we learn that R&D decisions without technological
spillovers do not signiﬁcantly differ between BASE and CON, nor be-
tween CON0 and CON1. The averages are somewhat above the compet-
itive R&D level, given that price competition is expected in the second
stage. Another interpretation could be that they are between the coopera-
tive and competitive level, when price collusion is expected in the second
stage.
With spillovers, R&D decisions in CON are signiﬁcantly higher than
in BASE. Moreover, with β = 1, R&D decisions are also signiﬁcantly
higher in CON1 than in CON0. In CON1, i.e. in rounds with R&D con-
tracts actually made, R&D decisions clearly overshoot any of the bench-
20We only provide averages based on all rounds because averages based on other sub-
sets of rounds do not yield more information. Moreover, averages based on the ﬁrst or
ﬁnal round of each cycle of ﬁve rounds with a constant R&D decisions are naturally the
same as averages based on all rounds since R&D decisions remain constant during each
set of ﬁve rounds.
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mark R&D levels in table 6.9. R&D decisions in BASE are at a level close
to the cooperative R&D level assuming price competition in the second
stage, or between the competitive and cooperative level assuming price
collusion in the second stage. Average R&D decisions in CON0 are close
to average R&D decisions in BASE.
It has been discussed in the previous section that prices are predomi-
nantly not at the SPN or cooperative level, which is indicated by a degree
of price collusion lying somewhere between 0 and 1, and not being equal
to 0 or 1. This has also consequences for the analysis of R&D decisions in
the sense that they cannot be simply compared to the theoretical bench-
marks in table 6.9, based on the assumption of individual or joint proﬁt
maximising pricing behaviour in the pricing stages. Finding a range of
R&D benchmarks, i.e. theoretical competitive and cooperative R&D de-
cisions, as a function of different values of the degree of price collusion
would allow us to compare the experimental R&D decisions with the cor-
rect, corresponding R&D benchmarks. This can be done by using the co-
efﬁcient of cooperation approach in the pricing stage (see appendix B.5)
and expressing SPN and JPM R&D benchmarks in terms of φt. SPN and
JPM R&D benchmarks are symmetric such that equation B.7 can be used
to transform φt into Pt, such that the SPN and JPM R&D benchmarks are
expressed in terms of Pt. In ﬁgure 9.2 the lines represent the SPN and
JPM R&D benchmarks.
Figure 9.2 further contains ellipses the centres of which represent av-
erage R&D decisions based on all rounds (¯ x1−35 in table 9.9) as a function
of average degrees of price collusion ( ¯ P1−35 in table 9.4) for BASE, CON0
and CON1. The horizontal diagonal of an ellipse represents the conﬁ-
dence interval of the average degree of price collusion and the vertical di-
agonal represents the conﬁdence intervals of the average R&D decision.
Conﬁdence intervals are calculated as the mean ± 2 standard errors.
The location of R&D decisions for β = 0 in ﬁgure 9.2 suggests that
R&D decisions in the baseline treatment (BASE) and in the contract treat-
ment in periods without R&D contracts (CON0) are very close to the SPN
prediction. In the contract treatment without spillovers, average R&D in
rounds with R&D contracts (CON1) is below the line representing the
SPN R&D level, which is in the ‘right’ direction given that cooperative
R&D is smaller than SPN R&D.
With β = 1, the R&D ellipses of the baseline treatment (BASE) and
the contract treatment without R&D contracts (CON0) are located close
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Figure 9.2: R&D decisions and benchmarks as a function of average degree of
price collusion
to the curve representing R&D cooperation. In other words, R&D in these
treatmentsis‘toohigh’comparedtothetheoreticalSPNbenchmark. That
experimental R&D behaviour in BASE and in CON0 is close to JPM be-
haviour with β = 1, and close to SPN behaviour with β = 0, may imply
that implicit or tacit R&D cooperation is easier with β = 1, which is the
main ﬁnding of chapter 6.
Furthermore, contracted R&D decisions with β = 1 (CON1 in ﬁgure
9.2(b)) overshootthe cooperative level. This could indicate that R&D con-
tracts were used to signal a willingness to collude in prices. With β = 1,
decisions in the R&D and the price-setting stage both generate positive
externalities. This implies that the joint proﬁt maximising action is higher
than the SPN action in the R&D and the price-setting stage. With β = 0,
there exists no such parallel between R&D and prices because R&D de-
cisions then have negative externalities such that joint proﬁt maximising
R&D is lower than the SPN level. Note that overshooting the cooperative
R&D level is costly. But using contracted R&D as a means to signal will-
ingness to cooperate, is less risky than choosing high prices, because rel-
ative proﬁt changes resulting from changes in R&D decisions are smaller
than those resulting from changes in prices.
Similarly, one could argue that using R&D as a signal to collude in
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prices with β = 1 has also been present in BASE, and even in CON0,
because in these treatments, R&D is also ‘too high’ compared to the the-
oretical SPN benchmarks.
9.4.3 Contracting behaviour
In this subsection we analyse contracting behaviour in the experiment in
more detail and examine whether there are differences between β = 0
and β = 1. Table 9.10 provides for β = 0 and β = 1 duopoly-speciﬁc
data on the number of rounds in which contracts are proposed, by at
least one of the subjects in a duopoly, and chosen. The data on amounts
of proposed and chosen R&D contracts are based on all R&D decision
rounds (7). Another column in the table gives the average degree of price
collusion across all rounds ( ¯ P1−35). The rows ‘avg %’ contains averages
percentages of the number of rounds with proposed/chosen contracts in
the total number of rounds.
The table shows that on average more contracts were proposed and
chosen with β = 1 than with β = 0. The differences are signiﬁcant ac-
cording to Mann-Whitney-U tests with p-values of 0.017 and 0.049 for
proposed and chosen contracts, respectively. Thus, with complete spill-
overs, subjects commit more often to an R&D contract than without spill-
overs. This may indicate that there is more explicit R&D cooperation
with β = 1 than with β = 0. This ﬁnding is somewhat in contrast with
the main ﬁnding in chapter 5 that the tendency to explicitly cooperate in
R&D does not differ between β = 0 and β = 1. Since the experimental
setting is very different here, this should not be a problem.
Another interpretation to the observed difference in amount of pro-
posed and chosen R&D contracts is related to the possibility of price col-
lusionthatiscreated. SupposethatR&Dcontractshaveindeedbeenused
by subjects in CON with β = 1 to signal willingness to collude in prices.
Given the potential proﬁt gains if such signaling actually results in tacit
price collusion, it would not be surprising that also more contracts have
been proposed and chosen than with β = 0.
Furthermore, for both spillover scenarios the average degree of price
collusion is on average greater the more contracts are proposed and the
more contracts are chosen. Spearman rank correlation coefﬁcients con-
ﬁrm this: for β = 0 the rank correlations between ¯ P1−35 and the amount
of proposed/chosen contracts are respectively 0.715 and 0.806 and have
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β = 0 β = 1
duopoly # ¯ P1−35 # ¯ P1−35
Contract proposals
1 7 0.37 7 0.50
2 7 0.82 7 0.16
3 7 0.92 7 0.20
4 7 0.48 7 0.29
5 6 0.65 7 0.74
6 7 0.23 6 -0.03
7 6 0.22 7 0.95
8 6 0.83 7 0.19
9 4 0.17 7 0.68
10 6 0.00 7 0.21
11 7 0.72 7 0.21
12 2 0.19 7 0.41
13 0 0.04 7 0.86
14 3 0.03 6 0.21
15 4 0.11 6 -0.15
16 2 0.11
avg % 73% 99%
Accepted
1 5 0.37 7 0.50
2 7 0.82 6 0.16
3 7 0.92 4 0.20
4 6 0.48 6 0.29
5 6 0.65 7 0.74
6 5 0.23 3 -0.03
7 5 0.22 7 0.95
8 5 0.83 5 0.19
9 1 0.17 7 0.68
10 4 0.00 5 0.21
11 6 0.72 7 0.21
12 0 0.19 5 0.41
13 0 0.04 7 0.86
14 2 0.03 5 0.21
15 0 0.11 4 -0.15
16 2 0.11
avg % 54% 81%
Table 9.10: Number of proposed and accepted contracts
p-valuesof0.002and0.000. For β = 1therankcorrelationsbetween ¯ P1−35
and the amount of proposed/chosen contracts are respectively 0.624 and
0.702 and have p-values of 0.001 and 0.000. Rank correlations based on
the ﬁrst ten or the last ten rounds are also positive, but not always signif-
2469.4 Experimental data
Treatment ¯ W1−35 ¯ W26−35 ¯ W5th ¯ W35
β = 0
BASE 4563.2 (316.8) 4499.5 (415.4) 4594.3 (312.5) 4680.4 (270.6)
CON 4390.8 (330.9) 4364.8 (422.2) 4535.6 (338.8) 4566.6 (350.5)
CON0 4646.2 (199.9) 4724.6 (137.6) 4686.0 (223.2) 4791.9 (94.3)
CON1 4269.9 (333.7) 4209.9 (419.0) 4373.7 (374.0) 4431.5 (381.6)
β = 1
BASE 4758.0 (313.9) 4666.1 (291.9) 4797.9 (313.5) 4715.1 (281.7)
CON 4892.9 (374.6) 4790.4 (353.7) 4967.1 (394.6) 5176.4 (400.1)
CON0 4904.3 (368.3) 4778.1 (374.6) 4921.5 (369.9) 4571.7 (76.0)
CON1 4886.0 (391.0) 4900.8 (453.3) 4994.4 (418.9) 5269.5 (340.5)
Table 9.11: Average welfare
icant.
9.4.4 Welfare
Finally, we compare total welfare, i.e. the sum of consumer and producer
surplus, between and within treatments. Given that consumer surplus is
equal to total utility minus the spent budget, U(q0,q1,q2)− p1q1 − p2q2 −
q0 and producer surplus to total proﬁt in the industry, π1 + π2, total wel-
fare is equal to the following expression21:





2) + cq1q2. (9.10)
Intable9.11averagesoftotalwelfarearegivenforBASE,CON,CON0
and CON1. With β = 0, welfare is higher in the baseline treatment than
in the contract treatment. Also, within the contract treatment, welfare
in CON1 is higher than in CON0. This corresponds to the conclusions
based on the experimental price decisions. Indeed, higher prices yield
lower welfare, given that R&D decisions are constant. With β = 1, these
conclusions cannot be made. Welfare is not lower in CON and CON1
than in BASE and CON0, respectively.
Intable9.12resultsofstatisticaltestsofdifferencesinwelfarebetween
and within treatments are presented. ‘Between’ refers to Mann-Whitney-
U tests between BASE and CON and ‘Within’ to Wilcoxon signed-ranks
21See footnote 4 for the expression of U(q0,q1,q2).
2479 R&D cooperation and price collusion without price signaling
Between Within
β = 0 β = 1 β = 0 β = 1
Rounds 1-35
2-tailed sig. 0.105a 0.551b 0.001c 0.496d
N 31 26 11 9
Rounds 26-35
2-tailed sig. 0.167a 0.337b 0.250c 0.094d
N 31 26 3 6
First rounds of groups of 5 rounds
2-tailed sig. 0.054a 0.799b 0.001c 0.910d
Final rounds of groups of 5 rounds
2-tailed sig. 0.206a 0.264b 0.001c 0.020d
N 31 26 11 9
Round 35
2-tailed sig. 0.343a 0.005b -
N 31 26 -
aH1 : ¯ WCON
<
 = ¯ WBASE; bH1 : ¯ WCON
>
 = ¯ WBASE.
cH1 : ¯ WCON1
<
 = ¯ WCON0; dH1 : ¯ WCON1
>
 = ¯ WCON0.
Table 9.12: Contract treatment effects on welfare
tests within CON, between CON0 and CON1. Differences in welfare be-
tween BASE and CON are mostly not statistically signiﬁcant. For β = 0,
welfare is signiﬁcantly lower in CON than in BASE in the ﬁrst rounds of
ﬁve-rounds-cycles with a signiﬁcance level of 5.4%.
With β = 1, welfare in round 35 in CON is signiﬁcantly higher than
in BASE (p = 0.020), which is not surprising given that prices in the ﬁnal
round are lower in CON (see table 9.3) and that R&D in CON is higher
than in BASE.
Further, the within-tests conﬁrm that with β = 0, welfare in CON1
is lower than welfare in CON0. The signiﬁcance disappears in the last
ten rounds. With β = 1, differences in welfare within the treatments are
not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, when considering all or the
last ten rounds. When considering the ﬁnal rounds of all cycles of ﬁve
rounds, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly higher welfare level in CON1. Again, the
combination of high contracted R&D and low prices yields a high level
of welfare.
With β = 0, the relation between the degree of price collusion and
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welfare is similar to the relation between (absolute) prices and welfare,
given that R&D decisions are similar in the baseline and contract treat-
ment. That is, a higher degree of price collusion yields lower welfare.
With β = 1, the relation between the degree of price collusion and wel-
fare is not that straightforward. Contracted R&D has been found to be
signiﬁcantly higher than other R&D decisions, which changes the theo-
retical benchmark prices.
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we examined whether in experimental duopoly markets,
cooperation in R&D facilitates tacit price collusion. Subjects in the ex-
periment were asked to repeatedly make R&D decisions and price de-
cisions. For two scenarios of technological spillovers, i.e. no spillovers
(β = 0) and complete spillovers (β = 1), a baseline treatment without
binding R&D contract possibilities and a contract treatment with contract
possibilities were run. In the product market there was no possibility to
engage in binding or nonbinding agreements.
For both spillover scenarios, we ﬁnd strong support for the intuition
that R&D cooperation facilitates price collusion. First, in the contract
treatments signiﬁcantly more price collusion is observed when an R&D
agreementisreachedthaninthebaselinetreatments(comparisonofBASE
with CON1). Second, within the contract treatment there is signiﬁcantly
more price collusion when an R&D agreement is reached than when it
is not reached (comparison of CON0 with CON1). Overall, prices devi-
ate more from the SPN prediction in the contract treatments than in the
baseline treatments.
When subjects in contract treatments fail to agree on an R&D level,
the SPN prediction generally performs well in predicting price decisions.
Failing to sign an R&D contract might even yield a lower degree of coop-
eration than in baseline treatments, where subjects have no possibilities
to engage in R&D contracts. This suggests that subjects sort of punish
their counterparts, and necessarily also themselves, for having failed to
agree on R&D by choosing even lower prices than they ‘normally’ would.
An additional ﬁnding is that with β = 1, R&D decisions are ‘too high’
compared to the theoretical benchmarks: R&D in the baseline treatment,
and in rounds without R&D contracts in the contract treatment, is higher
than the SPN prediction and close to the JPM R&D level, and contracted
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R&D overshoots the JPM level. This may suggest that tacit R&D cooper-
ation might have been present, and that contracted R&D may have been
used to signal willingness to collude in prices.
For public authorities that have recently shown a positive attitude
toward the formation of research joint ventures, the ﬁndings in the lab
may provide a warning. Since the experimental setting is fully anony-
mous and excludes any possibility of personal contact or price signaling,
the stimulating effect of successful R&D agreements on price collusion is
probably underestimated. It is likely that on the ﬁeld there exist many
more opportunities for representatives of ﬁrms engaged in R&D cooper-
ation to interact.
On the other hand, cooperative R&D agreements are often subsidised
bygovernmentsandinformationonthetypeofcooperationandtheiden-
tity of participating ﬁrms is thus relatively easily available, providing an
opportunity to investigate the possibility of price collusion.
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R&D COOPERATION AND PRICE
COLLUSION WITH PRICE
SIGNALING
10.1 Introduction and experimental procedure
Inthischapterwediscusstheresultsofatreatmentthatshouldbeviewed
as additional to the treatments of the experiment discussed in chapter 9
and that has been run at the same time and place. For the model and the
theoretical benchmarks we therefore refer to section 9.3 in chapter 9.
In this additional treatment subjects have binding contract possibili-
ties in the R&D stages and cheap-talk possibilities in the pricing stages.
This design incorporates an additional feature from interactions in the
ﬁeld. Indeed, in the ﬁeld it cannot be guaranteed that when R&D rep-
resentatives of ﬁrms meet because they are engaged in the same R&D
project, theydonotdiscusspricingorotherproduct-market-relatedstrate-
gies.
Nonbinding communication has previously been introduced in oli-
gopoly experiments by, for instance, Holt and Davis (1990), Cason (1995)
and Harstad et al. (1998)1. A general conclusion is that product market
collusion is at least temporarily higher with an appropriate form of com-
munication than without communication.
There exist a number of explanations for the ﬁnding that (tacit) co-
1See section 4.3.1 in chapter 4 and Holt (1995) for more details.
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operation in social dilemmas is often facilitated by communication2. It
may be the case that communication decreases the social distance among
the players and increases the level of trust, which may make coopera-
tion more likely (based on Hoffman et al., 1996b). Furthermore, com-
munication may inﬂuence the beliefs of a player about other players’
preferences by providing information on cooperative preferences. It is
easier for a player to identify whether the others prefer to cooperate, if
the others can signal their intentions. This information may increase co-
operation rates when players are, for instance, conditional cooperators.
Conditional cooperators only cooperate themselves, if others cooperate.
Yet, it is unlikely that this information changes behaviour of individually
rationalplayers(Kollock,1998). Sinceexperimentshaveshownthatasig-
niﬁcant number of people are conditionally cooperative, the information
argument may be relevant, provided that conditional cooperators actu-
ally signal their willingness to cooperate (see e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001;
Kurzban and Houser, 2005).
The following two explanations ﬁnd most support in the social psy-
chology literature (see e.g. Kollock, 1998; Cardenas et al., 2005): (1) com-
munication may act as a substitute for explicit commitment in the sense
thatplayerscanmakepromisesonhowtheywillbehave, and(2)commu-
nication may create a group identity, a property which has been shown
to increase cooperation rates. We believe that this ﬁnal argument is es-
pecially valid in public goods experiments, and lesser so in oligopoly
experiments. Contrary to oligopoly experiments, in public goods experi-
ments subjects are asked to contribute something to a public good that is
later on divided amongst the group members. The notions of group and
group identity are less important in oligopoly experiments.
From the previous chapter we know that R&D contracting has facili-
tated price collusion, irrespective of whether β = 0 or β = 1. Moreover,
no differences in degree of price collusion between, on the one hand,
β = 0 and, on the other hand, β = 1 have been found. Thus, there
do not seem to be reasons to expect different effects of including an ad-
ditional price signaling treatment on behaviour in a scenario with β = 0
and β = 1. Therefore, the additional treatment has only been run for
β = 1.
Running the additional treatment for β = 1 allows a further analysis
2These explanations have also been provided in section 6.1 in chapter 6, but are re-
peated for the sake of continuity.
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of our suggestion in the previous chapter that, with β = 1, R&D con-
tracts in CON may have been used as signals to tacitly collude in prices.
Overshooting of contracted R&D may now be replaced by costless cheap
talk in the pricing stage. If there is no overshooting of contracted R&D
any more in the additional treatment, and there is evidence that price
signaling increases the degree of price collusion, this would support our
suggestion.
The type of cheap talk implemented is similar to the signaling treat-
ment of experiment II in chapter 6. The only difference is that the number
of messages in each round was not limited.
The instructions were the same as the instructions in the treatment
CON with β = 1, discussed in the previous chapter, but included an ad-
ditionalparagraphthatreferredtothecommunicationpossibility(seeap-
pendix C.6). Participants were told that they could send nonbinding mes-
sages to their counterpart that contain information on what their price
decision would be in that round. The message consisted of an interval
where lower and upper bound could be the same.
The session had 22 participants (11 duopolies), has been run in Cen-
tERlab at Tilburg University and was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
1999). It is obvious that theoretical predictions are the same as those pre-
sented in section 9.3, because the communication in the pricing stage is
not binding. Moreover, theory predicts cooperation in the R&D stage and
SPN behaviour in the pricing stage.
In what follows we discuss the data in this treatment in comparison
with the contract treatment (CON) with β = 1, discussed in the previous




Table 10.1 gives average prices3 and standard deviations that refer to
cross-sectional variability for the whole experiment and for different sub-
sets of rounds (the ﬁnal ten rounds, the ﬁrst, respectively ﬁnal rounds of
each set of ﬁve subsequent rounds with a constant R&D decision and
3Also here, prices that yielded a negative production quantity were left out of all de-
scriptives tables and data analyses (5 out of 385 (11*35) cases).
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Treatment ¯ p1−35 ¯ p26−35 ¯ p1st ¯ p5th ¯ p35
contract treatment
CON 89.0 (17.1) 90.9 (20.2) 93.8 (17.7) 85.2 (17.7) 75.2 (17.7)
CON0 81.8 (9.3) 85.5 (7.9) 85.9 (11.0) 81.5 (8.6) 86.3 (22.5)
CON1 93.3 (19.4) 93.1 (23.3) 99.2 (19.1) 87.4 (21.4) 73.5 (18.4)
additional treatment
CON+ 99.4 (25.9) 104.8 (30.8) 102.9 (25.6) 96.1 (26.7) 86.2 (26.8)
CON0+ 93.6 (23.0) 99.9 (33.4) 88.9 (24.5) 96.4 (26.5) 90.0 (-)
CON1+ 103.6 (28.1) 106.5 (31.3) 114.1 (21.5) 95.9 (28.2) 85.8 (28.4)
Table 10.1: Average prices in contract treatments with β = 1
the ﬁnal round). For reasons of comparability we also included data for
CON, β = 1 without signaling possibilities in the table (see also table 9.3).
The table also contains averages based on rounds without and with R&D
contracts and are referred to as CON0+ and CON1+, respectively.
The table shows that prices in the additional treatment CON+ are
generally higher than in the CON, β = 1 treatment without signaling
possibilities. On the other hand, prices in CON+ are also subject to more
variability.
Within the additional treatment, average prices in rounds with R&D
contracts (CON1+) are higher than in rounds without contracts (CON0+),
as in the original CON treatment. At the end of ﬁve-rounds-cycles and in
round 35 this difference also disappears.
As discussed in 9.4.1, the experimental price in a certain round should
be compared with the benchmarks in equations 9.3 and 9.6, calculated on
the basis of the R&D decisions made in that round. Furthermore, to avoid
the inconvenience of having two different benchmarks, i.e. a Nash and a
collusive price, experimental prices are transformed, taking into account
Nash and collusive prices based on the experimental R&D decisions, into
the degree of price collusion Pkt following equation 9.9.
The evolution of average degrees of price collusion in the CON and
CON+ treatments with β = 1 is in ﬁgure 10.1(a). In ﬁgure 10.1(b) a dis-
tinction is again made on the basis of whether contracts were made.
Figure 10.1(a) conﬁrms that the average degree of price cooperation
is higher in CON+ than in CON. The cyclical pattern is also present in
CON+. Figure 10.1(b) shows that the degree of price collusion in rounds

























(b) within contract treatments
Figure 10.1: Evolution of average degree of price collusion for β = 1
Treatment ¯ P1−35 ¯ P26−35 ¯ P1st ¯ P5th ¯ P35
contract treatment
CON 0.25 (0.32) 0.29 (0.35) 0.32 (0.36) 0.18 (0.31) 0.03 (0.30)
CON0 -0.03 (0.13) -0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.20) -0.03 (0.12) -0.15 (0.22)
CON1 0.41 (0.29) 0.43 (0.31) 0.51 (0.30) 0.31 (0.32) 0.06 (0.31)
additional treatment
CON+ 0.43 (0.46) 0.46 (0.55) 0.48 (0.25) 0.38 (0.45) 0.17 (0.45)
CON0+ 0.22 (0.44) 0.17 (0.68) 0.13 (0.49) 0.28 (0.48) -0.02 (-)
CON1+ 0.58 (0.44) 0.57 (0.49) 0.76 (0.31) 0.45 (0.44) 0.19 (0.47)
Table 10.2: Average degrees of price collusion in contract treatments with β = 1
CON0+). In rounds with contracts, there seems to be more price collusion
in the additional treatment with signaling possibilities (CON1+) than in
the contract treatment without price signaling possibilities (CON1).
Table 10.2 contains averages of the degree of price collusion for the
different subsets of rounds and has a pattern similar to table 10.1, with
the difference that also in the end-of-cycle rounds, and in round 35, the
average degree of price cooperation is higher in CON1+ than in CON0+.
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2-tailed sig. 0.443
N 26






H1 : ¯ PCON+
>
 = ¯ PCON.
Table 10.3: Price signaling treatment effects on the degree of price collusion
10.2.2 Nonparametric analyses
We ﬁrst test whether differences in degree of price collusion between
CONandCON+arestatisticallysigniﬁcantusingMann-Whitney-Utests.
Test results are in table 10.3. As in previous nonparametric analyses, we
ranthetestforﬁvedifferentsetsofrounds; allrounds, thelasttenrounds,
the ﬁrst and ﬁnal round of each ﬁve-round cycle with a constant R&D de-
cision and round 35 (the ﬁnal round).
Although the descriptive analysis has shown that the average degree
of price collusion is generally higher in CON+ than in CON, nonpara-
metric tests do overall not yield signiﬁcant differences in degree of price
collusion between the treatments.
DifferencesindegreeofpricecollusionbetweenCONandCON+may
be insigniﬁcant because the increase in degree of price collusion that is
caused by any interaction within duopolies may be subject to an upper
limit. Anobviouscandidate fortheupperlimitisaperfectdegreeofprice
collusion(P = 1), butitmaybethatonaveragethe‘natural’upperlimitis
lower than 1. By this we mean that it is possible that some duopolies will
never succeed in colluding in prices, irrespective of the type of allowed
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interaction, provided that the interaction does not allow to make binding
agreements on prices.
Experimental evidence of Fischbacher et al. (2001), Brosig (2002) and
KurzbanandHouser(2005)suggeststhatasampleofplayersalwayscon-
tains a number of players who never cooperate (free-riders). If such play-
ers are paired, SPN or more competitive behaviour will be the most likely
outcome for these pairs. Therefore, one may a priori expect that a (small)
number of duopolies will never succeed in colluding in a noncooperative
game.
Furthermore, it is possible that both types of interactions (R&D con-
tracting and price signaling) are substitutes with respect to increasing the
degree of price collusion. The arguments we provided in the introduc-
tion to explain why communication is often successful in facilitating tacit
price collusion, may also be valid with respect to explicitly agreeing on
an R&D decision. By making binding R&D agreements (contracts), social
distance may be declined and trust increased. Entering into R&D con-
tracts can also be interpreted as a signal of willingness to cooperate in
general. In this way, beliefs of players about the cooperative preference
of others may be inﬂuenced. Finally, entering into R&D contracts can
substitute for explicit commitment in the product market.
10.3 Experimental R&D decisions
In this section we present data on the R&D decisions made in the exper-
iment. Table 10.4 gives average R&D decisions for all and the ﬁnal ten
rounds and standard deviations that refer to cross-sectional heterogene-
ity. Data in the additional treatment are again compared with data of the
original contract treatment.
The table suggests that, overall, R&D decisions are similar across both
treatments. The table further shows that the difference in R&D that exists
in CON, between CON0 and CON1, also appears in the additional treat-
ment CON+, between CON0+ and CON1+4. Averages of R&D based on
the ﬁnal two R&D decisions—covering the ﬁnal ten rounds—are more
different between CON and CON+: in CON+ there seems to be less
overshooting in CON1+, and less deviation from the SPN prediction in
4A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test yields that R&D in CON1+ is signiﬁcantly higher than
CON0+
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¯ x1−35 ¯ x26−35
contract treatment
CON 15.9 (7.2) 16.5 (8.3)
CON0 10.2 (7.1) 7.7 (7.1)
CON1 19.4 (4.7) 20.0 (5.9)
additional treatment
CON+ 15.8 (6.2) 13.1 (5.9)
CON0+ 11.5 (3.9) 5.3 (2.1)
CON1+ 18.9 (5.3) 15.9 (3.2)
Table 10.4: Average R&D decisions for β = 1
CON0+. In other words, it seems that average R&D in ﬁnal rounds devi-
ates less from its theoretical predictions in CON+ than in CON.
The remarks we made at page 243 in section 9.4.2 concerning the
theoretical R&D benchmarks are also valid for the additional treatment
CON+. Therefore, the average R&D decision is again presented as a func-
tion of the average degree of price collusion (see ﬁgure 10.2). In ﬁgure
10.2 the lines represent the SPN and JPM R&D benchmarks.
Figure 10.2 further contains ellipses the centres of which represent av-
erage R&D decisions based on the ﬁnal ten rounds (¯ x26−35 in table 10.4)
as a function of average degrees of price collusion ( ¯ P26−35 in table 10.2)
for CON with β = 1 and CON+. The horizontal diagonal of an ellipse
represents the conﬁdence interval of the average degree of price collu-
sion and the vertical diagonal represents the conﬁdence interval of the
average R&D decision where conﬁdence intervals are calculated as the
mean ± 2 standard errors.
When ellipses would be based on averages of degrees of price collu-
sion and R&D over all rounds, the graph for CON+ would be similar
to the graph for β = 1 in ﬁgure 10.2. Indeed, overall, there exist no
statistically signiﬁcant difference in contracted R&D decisions between
CON and CON+. Therefore, we now take averages based on the ﬁnal ten
rounds (ﬁnal two R&D decisions), when subjects have gained experience
and R&D is subject to less variation in CON+. The ﬁgures are still similar,
though, except that (1) contracted R&D is generally lower in CON+ than
in CON and the difference in contracted R&D between CON and CON+
is statistically signiﬁcant in the ﬁnal ten rounds according to a Mann-
Whitney-U test with a two-tailed p-value of 7.8%, and (2) there is more
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variability in degree of price collusion in CON+ than in CON.
The observation that there is less overshooting in R&D in CON+ is
much in line with an argument we put forward in section 9.4.2. We ar-
gued there that the ‘too high’ R&D decisions and the overshooting of
contracted R&D with β = 1 may have been a form of signaling a willing-
ness to collude in prices. Indeed, with β = 1, R&D decisions and prices
both have positive externalities. In CON+, there is an easier and costless
way for subjects to signal their willingness to collude in prices, that is,
to send an interval containing the collusive price5. Therefore, there was
no more need for subjects to signal this collusive willingness in the R&D
stage and R&D decisions are closer to the theoretical benchmarks.
ThehighervariabilityindegreeofpricecollusioninCON+, especially
in CON0+, is probably due to the price signaling option. Subjects could
not only use R&D contracting as a signal to collude in prices, but also
price signaling. This implies that the ellipse referring to CON0+ is also
based on degrees of price collusion in rounds where only the price signal-
ing option was used and no R&D contracts were made. The combination
of these relatively high, with low degrees of price collusion of duopolies
that did not succeed in optimally using the price signaling nor the R&D
contracting option, gives high cross-sectional variability.
10.4 Signaling and contracting behaviour
In this section we analyse signaling behaviour and the interaction of sig-
naling and contracting behaviour in more detail. Figure 10.3 presents
the evolution of the average degree of price collusion based on rounds
without R&D contracts or price signals, rounds with only R&D contracts,
rounds with only price signals and rounds with both R&D contracts and
price signals.
It is clear from the ﬁgure that average P in rounds without R&D con-
tracts or price signals is close to 0. This implies that SPN prices prevail
when there is no interaction at all between subjects in a duopoly. If sub-
jects interact by means of committing to contracts in the R&D stage or
by sending price signals, average P is larger than 0. The least variabil-
ity in time in degree of price cooperation is observed for duopolies that
5Overshooting of contracted R&D to signal a willingness to collude in prices is not
much more costly than sending price signals since differences in proﬁt are statistically
not signiﬁcant.
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Figure 10.2: R&D as a function of average degree of price collusion based on last
ten rounds
commit to R&D contracts and send price signals, and therefore interact in
both stages. The degree of price collusion is more variable when inter-
action takes place on only one level, i.e. either R&D contracting or price
signaling.
Next, we have a look at differences within the additional contract
treatmentwithpricesignaling. ResultsofWilcoxonsigned-rankstestsare
intable10.5. Thefollowingwithin-differencesindegreeofpricecollusion
are looked at: (1) between rounds with and without R&D contracts, (2)
between rounds where at least one subject of a duopoly sent a signal and
rounds without signals, (3) between rounds where both subjects in a duo-
poly sent at least one signal and rounds with no signals or signal(s) sent
by one subject, (4) between rounds with R&D contracts where at least
one subject of the duopoly sent a signal and rounds without any interac-
tion and (5) between rounds with R&D contracts where both sent signals
and rounds without contracts and no signals or one signal(s) sent by one
subject.
Table 10.5 shows that committing to R&D contracts signiﬁcantly in-
creases the degree of price collusion in the ﬁrst rounds of ﬁve-rounds-
cycles (p = 0.047), i.e. in the rounds where the contracts have actually
beenreached. Contrarytothewithin-treatmenteffectsinCON,discussed


















Figure 10.3: Evolution of average degree of price collusion within CON+
in chapter9, this effect of R&D contracting is not sustained until the end
of the cycles, nor throughout the entire experiment. When R&D contract-
ing is combined with price signaling of at least one subject in the duopoly,
or with price signaling of at least one subject in the duopoly alone, results
are similar. On the other hand, when R&D contracting is combined with
the sending of price signals by both subjects in the duopolies, the effect
is sustained in the ﬁnal rounds of ﬁve-rounds cycles. With price signals
by both subjects in the duopolies alone, the increase in the degree of price
collusion is only signiﬁcant in the ﬁnal and not in the ﬁrst rounds of ﬁve-
rounds cycles.
Thus, price signaling alone has similar effects on the degree of price
collusion as R&D contracting if the signal is sent by at least one subject in
the duopolies: itsigniﬁcantlyincreasespricecollusioninthebeginningof
ﬁve-rounds cycles. Signaling by both subjects in a duopoly is necessary
to have higher degrees of price collusion at the end of ﬁve-rounds cycles.
Thecombinationofbothtypesofinteractionismostsuccessfulineliciting
tacit price collusion overall.
In other words, when subjects have price signaling possibilities, en-
tering an R&D agreement only facilitates price collusion when also price
signaling possibilities are actually used by both subjects in a duopoly.
This ﬁnding can be reconciled with the arguments we provided to ex-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rounds 1-35
2-tailed sig. 0.109 0.094 0.031 0.109 0.078
N 8 6 6 8 7
First rounds of 5-rounds-cycles
2-tailed sig. 0.047 0.063 0.250 0.047 0.094
N 7 5 4 7 6
Final rounds of 5-rounds-cycles
2-tailed sig. 0.945 0.375 0.031 0.219 0.063
N 8 4 6 6 6
(1) between rounds with and without contracts
(2) between rounds with at least 1 signal and no signals
(3) between rounds with two and less than two signals
(4) between rounds with contracts and at least 1 signal, and other
(5) between rounds with contracts and two signals, and other
Table 10.5: Within treatment effects on the degree of price collusion
plain why signaling can be successful in increasing the likelihood of tacit
collusion. Indeed, subjects that enter in an R&D agreement, but do not
send price signals, do not make use of all available interaction possibili-
ties. Not using the price signaling possibility may be interpreted as cre-
ating social distance, even if an R&D agreement has been entered. It may
also be considered as extra information about the noncooperativeness of
preferences, or as a refusion to make promises about prices.
At the end of section 10.2.2 we suggested that when either R&D con-
tracting or price signaling is possible, both types of interaction may be
substitutes with respect to increasing the degree of price collusion. If,
however, R&D contracting and price signaling are possible, it seems that
both types of interaction are used as complements so as to increase the
degree of price collusion.
Further, we study the communicative content of the signals. Notethat
more than one signal could be sent by each subject. In the analyses that
follow we only take into account the most recent signal that was sent if
a subject sent more than one signal. Therefore, in each round maximum
two signals are taken into account in the analyses for each duopoly.
Remark also that it is less likely that small intervals contained either
the SPN or the cooperative R&D level, while one of the two bounds could
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duopoly = [0,245]  = [0,245] (1) (2) (3) (4) ¯ P1−35 (#)
1 0 (0%) 35 (100%) 0 0 35 0 0.99 7
2 2 (6%) 33 (94%) 3 0 25 5 0.57 5
3 9 (26%) 26 (74%) 6 2 16 2 0.62 2
4 0 (0%) 35 (100%) 0 0 35 0 0.99 7
5 15 (43%) 20 (57%) 1 0 19 0 0.99 6
6 0 (0%) 35 (100%) 11 3 17 4 0.34 5
7 0 (0%) 35 (100%) 13 0 22 0 0.59 4
8 9 (26%) 26 (74%) 4 4 4 14 0.11 4
9 32 (91%) 3 (9%) 0 0 3 0 -0.07 2
10 22 (63%) 13 (27%) 0 8 5 0 -0.23 1
11 0 (0%) 35 (100%) 0 0 35 0 0.75 7
total 89 (23%) 296 (77%) 38 17 216 25
(1) pSPN, pCOLL / ∈ interval
(2) pSPN ∈ interval
(3) pCOLL ∈ interval
(4) pSPN,COLL ∈ interval
(#) number of chosen contracts (max = 7)
Table 10.6: Descriptives on price signals and R&D contracts
still be close to either of the theoretical benchmarks. If these communica-
tive signals are ignored, the communicative extent of the signals would
be underestimated. To correct for this, the intervals were enlarged. More-
over, lower (upper) bounds were recalculated by subtracting (adding) 3
with a minimum lower bound of 0 and a maximum upper bound of 245.
Table 10.6 provides general and duopoly-speciﬁc ﬁgures on the sent sig-
nals.
For subjects that did not send a price interval in a certain round, we
assumed that the communicated interval was [0,245]. We accordingly
interpret the sending of interval [0,245] as unwillingness to communicate
inthatround. Therefore, toinvestigatethecommunicativecontentsofthe
signals, we only consider rounds where at least one subject in a duopoly
hassentanintervalnotequalto[0,245]. Inthetablethedataincolumn‘ =
[0,245]’ refer to the number of rounds where none of the pair’s subjects
has sent an interval different from [0,245], whereas ‘=[0,245]’ refers to the
number of rounds where at least one pair’s subject has communicated an
interval different from [0,245]. For each duopoly, both columns naturally
sum to 35 which is the total number of rounds in the experiment.
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In other columns of table 10.6, the rounds where communication oc-
curred by at least one subject in a pair are further subdivided on the basis
of whether the communicated intervals were actually informative and
contained the SPN or cooperative prediction. We deﬁne the following
categories: (1) rounds where the communicated interval(s) did not con-
tain the SPN nor the collusive price, (2) rounds where the communicated
interval(s)onlycontainedtheSPNprice6, (3)roundswherethecommuni-
cated interval(s) only contained the collusive price level7 and (4) rounds
where the interval(s) contained both theoretical benchmarks8. Column
¯ P1−35 provides the average degree of price collusion calculated on the ba-
sis of all rounds and column (#) gives the number of contracts chosen by
the duopolies. Note that the maximum number of chosen contracts is
seven.
The table shows that both possibilitiesof interaction to stimulateprice
collusion are often used by most duopolies. Most duopolies often estab-
lished contracts in the R&D stage and communicated in the pricing stage
with the price signals being often cooperative. Only two duopolies (9 and
10) did mostly not communicate in the pricing stage and did mostly not
succeed in committing to R&D contracts. Consequently, they also did not
succeed in colluding in prices.
Duopolies that have succeeded in signing R&D contracts and have al-
most exclusively communicated intervals containing the collusive price
(x∗∗ ∈ interval) reach an almost complete or high degree of price collu-
sion (cf. duopolies 1, 4, 5, 11). Duopolies that have less often committed
to contracts and have mostly communicated intervals containing the col-
lusive price succeed in colluding in prices to some extent (cf. duopolies 2,
3, 6, 7). Duopoly 8 that has often committed to contracts and mostly sent
intervals containing both benchmarks—thereby failing to send commu-
nicative intervals—reaches an average degree of price collusion of 0.11.
Table 10.7 provides Spearman rank correlations based on table 10.6.
Categories (1) and (4) are left out as rank correlations between these cat-
egories and other variables are all insigniﬁcant. Table 10.7 shows that the
6Including rounds where two intervals were sent of which one only contained the
SPN price and the other no or both benchmarks.
7Including rounds where two intervals were sent of which one only contained the
collusive price and the other no or both benchmarks.
8The interval(s) either contained both benchmarks, or one interval contained the Nash
and the other the cooperative benchmark.
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¯ P1−35  = [0,245] (2) (3) (#)
¯ P1−35 1.000 0.468 -0.621∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
 = [0,245] 1.000 -0.310 0.791∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗
(2) 1.000 -0.616∗∗ -0.594∗
(3) 1.000 0.862∗∗∗
∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level
∗∗ signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level
∗ signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level
Table 10.7: Spearman rank correlations for price signals and R&D contracts
average degree of price collusion ¯ P1−35 and the number of collusive price
signals (3) are signiﬁcantly positively correlated, and so are ¯ P1−35 and the
number of chosen contracts (#). Further, the number of intervals different
from [0,245] (represented by  = [0,245]) is also positively correlated with
the number of collusive price signals and with the number of chosen con-
tracts. An even higher positive correlation exists between the number of
collusive price signals and the number of chosen contracts. These cor-
relations suggest that subjects who interact by choosing R&D contracts
(sending cooperative price signals), mostly also interact by sending co-
operative price signals (choosing R&D contracts) and vice versa.
With respect to the number of SPN price signals (2) we ﬁnd negative
rank correlations with the average degree of price collusion, the number
of collusive price signals and the number of chosen contracts. Thus, con-
ﬁrming the previous suggestion, subjects that send noncooperative price
signals do generally not succeed in committing to contracts.
10.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed the results of a treatment with binding R&D
contract possibilities run for β = 1, where the interaction could con-
tinue in a nonbinding way in the pricing stage (cf. price signaling). The
main focus was on comparing the results of the additional treatment with
the contract treatment without price signaling discussed in the previous
chapter.
Based on between-treatment comparisons, we ﬁnd that the degree of
price collusion does not signiﬁcantly differ between the treatments with
and without price signaling possibilities. The reason for this observation
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may be that the increase in degree of price collusion that is caused by
any interaction within duopolies is subject to an upper limit. An obvi-
ous candidate for the upper limit is a perfect degree of price collusion
(P = 1), but it may be that on average the ‘natural’ upper limit in a non-
cooperative game is lower than 1: it is possible that some duopolies never
succeed in colluding, irrespective of the available type of signaling or in-
teraction. Furthermore, it also may be the case that both types of interac-
tions, R&D contracting and price signaling, are substitutes with respect
to increasing the degree of price collusion. However, if R&D contract-
ing and price signaling possibilities are both available, it seems that both
types of interaction are used as complements so as to increase the degree
of price collusion.
The most interesting contribution of this chapter is the ﬁnding that
overshooting of contracted R&D is less important in the additional con-
tract treatment with price signaling than in the contract treatment with-
out price signaling. This gives support to the idea discussed in the pre-
vious chapter that, with β = 1, R&D contracts may be used as a signal to
collude in prices if no price signaling possibilities are available.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we hope to have provided answers to a number of re-
search questions directly or indirectly motivated by the game-theoretic
literature on R&D cooperation and technological spillovers. This chapter
summarises the main contributions of the thesis and gives an overview
of additional ﬁndings and possible directions for future research.
11.1 Summary of main contributions
R&D behaviour of ﬁrms in oligopoly has attracted a great deal of atten-
tion of industrial organisation theorists. As we have shown in chapter
2, the issue of R&D cooperation has mainly, but not exclusively, been ex-
amined in the context of nontournament models of cost-reducing R&D.
Typically, theory predicts that R&D cooperation is preferred on social
welfare grounds if technological spillovers are sufﬁciently high. How-
ever, theory also predicts that ﬁrms will cooperate in R&D when there
are binding R&D contract possibilities and will behave according to the
subgame perfect Nash prediction when no binding engagement in R&D
is possible, irrespective of the level of technological spillovers. In other words,
ﬁrms’ incentives to cooperate in R&D do not depend on the level of tech-
nological spillovers. At least, that is what standard game-theory, strictly
speaking, predicts. It is left for empirical researchers to examine whether
this prediction holds true, and to further investigate the possible relation
between technological spillovers and private R&D behaviour.
Recently, this relation has been studied in a number of econometric
analyses based on innovation and R&D survey data (see chapter 3). In
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general, incoming spillovers are found to increase the probability of en-
gaging in R&D cooperation, while the effects of outgoing spillovers are
ambiguous. It is not surprising that empirical regularities in the rela-
tion between technological spillovers and R&D cooperation are hard to
ﬁnd, given the differences in data sets used for econometric estimation,
in estimation methods and in ways of deﬁning or computing proxies that
should represent spillovers and R&D cooperation. Moreover, economet-
ric estimation methods often suffer from measurement error and simul-
taneity problems possibly yielding biased estimations.
We have examined whether technological spillovers have an effect on the
tendency to cooperate in R&D using laboratory experimentation (research
question 1). As shown in chapter 4, this issue has not been examined in
an experiment before.
Laboratory data have a number of advantages compared to uncon-
trolled ﬁeld data and do not suffer from the above problems. Indeed,
technological spillovers, R&D decisions and R&D cooperation can be and
are implemented in the laboratory in the way deﬁned by theory. More-
over, simultaneity problems cannot arise because the ‘independent’ vari-
ables (technological spillovers in our case) are guaranteed to be actually
independent. This makes it possible to focus on the relation between
spillovers and the degree of R&D cooperation in a general and straight-
forward way.
In order to examine the ﬁrst research question, we have performed a
cooperative R&D experiment (chapter 5) and two noncooperative R&D
experiments (chapter 6).
The main question in the cooperative R&D experiment concerns the ef-
fect of spillovers on explicit R&D cooperation. The cooperative R&D ex-
periment contained contract treatments, in which the scenario of R&D
cooperation, as deﬁned in standard game-theoretic models of R&D, was
reproduced by allowing subjects to credibly commit to a certain level of
R&D investment. The experiment also had baseline treatments, serving
as a control, where no binding R&D contract possibilities were available.
Both types of treatment have been run for a scenario without and a sce-
nario with full technological spillovers.
Between-treatment comparisons for the cooperative R&D experiment
have yielded that, as predicted by theory, there was signiﬁcantly more
R&D cooperation in the contract than in the baseline treatments for both
spillover scenarios provided that (1) subjects in the contract treatments
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have had a chance to learn to propose and engage in contracts containing
the cooperative R&D level, and that (2) subjects in the contract treatments
actually engaged in R&D contracts. R&D behaviour in the baseline treat-
ment was close to subgame perfect Nash behaviour for both spillover
scenarios.
These ﬁndings, and the ﬁnding that subjects engage in R&D contracts
in both spillover scenarios, suggest that the tendency to explicitly or im-
plicitly cooperate in R&D does not differ between the spillover scenarios,
neither with nor without binding R&D contract possibilities.
This suggestion is reﬁned when considering behaviour in the fully
noncooperative R&D experiments, which perhaps have yielded more inter-
esting results (see chapter 6). In the noncooperative R&D experiments,
the aim was to examine whether implicit or tacit R&D cooperation could
be sustainable in a noncooperative context, where only nonbinding cheap-
talkispossible. Moreimportantly, wequestionedwhetherspillovershave
an effect on the degree of tacit R&D cooperation under these conditions.
For the same two spillover scenarios, behaviour in signaling treatments,
where subjects had the choice to signal their intended R&D investment
has been compared with behaviour in baseline treatments, where no in-
teraction was possible. Contrary to the contract treatments of the coop-
erative R&D experiment, there was no option to bindingly commit to a
certain level of R&D investment.
Between-treatment comparisons for the noncooperative R&D experi-
ments have yielded that, without technological spillovers, the possibility
of cheap-talk signaling was not sufﬁcient to signiﬁcantly increase the de-
gree of R&D cooperation above the level obtained in baseline treatments.
Yet, in the scenario with full technological spillovers, the signaling pos-
sibility signiﬁcantly increased the degree of R&D cooperation above the
baselinelevel. Theseﬁndingsarebasedontheﬁrstexperimentwhensub-
jects have had a chance to learn, and on overall behaviour in the second
experiment.
An examination of the content of the sent signals suggested that the
higher degree of R&D cooperation that was sustained in the signaling
treatment with full spillovers, may have been due to the fact that sig-
niﬁcantly more cooperative signals were sent in the treatment with full
spillovers than without spillovers. In the second experiment, evidence
was further provided that there was not only more tacit R&D cooper-
ation with full than without spillovers in the signaling treatments, but
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also in the ﬁrst number of rounds of the baseline treatments.
So both noncooperative R&D experiments indicate that the tendency
to tacitly cooperate in R&D in a noncooperative context is higher with full than
without spillovers. In other words, behaviour in the noncooperative R&D
experiments does not support the behavioural assumption that R&D de-
cisions are at the subgame perfect Nash level in a noncooperative R&D
game irrespective of the level of technological spillovers.
Laboratory ﬁndings of the cooperative and noncooperative R&D ex-
periments can be summarised as follows: without technological spill-
overs, subjects need more bindingness than the simple sharing of in-
tended R&D decisions so as to deviate from the subgame perfect Nash
R&D or the ‘baseline’ level towards the cooperative level. For R&D in-
vestments subject to high technological spillovers, the sending of mes-
sages containing intended R&D investment may sufﬁce for R&D invest-
ment to be elicited towards the cooperative level. Yet, commitment to
binding R&D contracts guarantees that R&D levels are or become fully
cooperative for both scenarios of spillovers.
Although we believe that, in order to draw policy conclusions, more
experimental and other empirical research on the topic is needed—it re-
mains, for instance, an open question whether the results extend to sce-
narios where groups consist of more than two players—we tentatively
provide two comments for policy purposes. First, the ﬁndings in the lab
may be interpreted as supportive of policy conclusions that are based on
the theoretical industrial organisation literature on cooperative and non-
cooperative R&D. Allowing ﬁrms to engage in binding R&D agreements
certainly helps to induce cooperative R&D levels, which might be useful
in industries with large technological spillovers where higher levels of
social welfare can be reached under R&D cooperation. Yet, the experi-
mental results make clear that it is important for policy makers to be able
to identify whether technological spillovers in industries are low or high.
Indeed, it also holds in industries characterised by low spillovers that co-
operative R&D levels are committed to if they can be committed to. This
brings us to our second point.
If there are no possibilities to engage in binding R&D agreements (as
is the case in product markets), but ﬁrms’ representatives or R&D man-
agers may communicate or meet, R&D investment only moves towards
the cooperative level in industries with high technological spillovers. In
other words, even if anti-trust laws were not permissive with respect to
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explicit R&D cooperation, or government did not intervene by stimulat-
ing and subsidising explicit R&D cooperation, behaviour would move in
the ‘right’ direction based on social welfare considerations.
If one considers (non-R&D) experiments based on Cournot and Ber-
trand games, it is possible to ﬁnd important similarities between their
properties and properties of noncooperative R&D games without and
with full spillovers, on the one hand, ´ and between experimental ﬁnd-
ings, on the other hand. To begin with, all those games have a structure
similar to a prisoner’s dilemma: the games are dominance-solvable and
their (unique) Nash-equilibrium is Pareto-inferior. In other words, in-
dividually rational actions do not yield an outcome that is best for all
players of the game. Games with this property are called social dilemmas.
The noncooperative R&D games, discussed in this thesis, and Cournot
and Bertrand games are examples of social dilemmas with a continuous
action space.
In typical Cournot games and R&D games without spillovers, actions
have negative externalities in the sense that an increase in a player’s action
reduces utility of the opponent(s). In Bertrand games and R&D games
with sufﬁciently high spillovers, actions have positive externalities imply-
ing that utility of the opponent(s) increases as a player’s action increases
.
Another similarity across both types of games is related to the way in
which a player’s choice inﬂuences marginal utility of the opponent(s). We
have referred to this property as the type of strategic interaction. Actions
in typical Cournot games and R&D games without spillovers are strategic
substitutes because an increase in a player’s action reduces marginal utility
of other players. According to standard game-theory, the best reaction
of a player to an increase (decrease) in the opponent’s action is then to
decrease (increase) her own action. In other words, the best to do for a
player is to move in the opposite direction of the other player. Actions in
typical Bertrand games and R&D games with high enough spillovers, on
the other hand, are strategic complements implying that marginal utility of
other players is increased by a player’s action. In this case, rational players
move in the same direction as their opponent(s).
From existing experiments one can learn that there is often signiﬁ-
cantly more, and never less, tacit collusion in Bertrand treatments than
in equivalent Cournot treatments. In other words, the relation between
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the sign of externalities and the type of strategic interaction, and the ten-
dency to tacitly cooperate, is similar to the one based on our noncoopera-
tive R&D experiments.
A relevant question, which we have dealt with in chapter 7 of this
thesis, is whether higher cooperation in games of strategic complements
and positive externalities is due to the type of strategic interaction or to
the sign of the externality, or to both. This was research question 2: ‘What
is the effect of the type of externality and the type of strategic interaction on the
degree of cooperation in social dilemmas?’
As to allow a ‘clean’ comparison between the scenarios with strate-
gic substitutes and complements—given the sign of the externalities—we
performed a laboratory experiment based on two general dominance-
solvable games with two players without speciﬁc frames. The games
have the same (Pareto-inferior) Nash equilibrium and the same symmet-
ric joint proﬁt maximising optimum, both yielding the same proﬁt. More-
over, the absolute values of the reaction curves’ slopes are the same, as
are incentives to cooperate in an inﬁnite repetition of the game.
For both settings of strategic interaction—strategic substitutes and
strategic complements—treatments have been run for a scenario where
choices had positive externalities and for a strategically equivalent sce-
nario with negative externalities.
There exist a variety of other applications of social dilemma games
that follow this taxonomy and do not stem from the industrial organisa-
tion literature. A common pool resource game is an example of a social
dilemma game of strategic substitutes and negative externalities. Public
good games where returns to scale or marginal utility are not constant
are other examples. More speciﬁcally, a public good game with decreas-
ing returns to scale or decreasing marginal utility of the public good is
a game of strategic substitutes and positive externalities. When returns
to scale or marginal utility are increasing, the game is one of strategic
complements with positive externalities.
Although many applications of social dilemma games, classiﬁed on
the basis of the type of strategic interaction and the sign of externalities
exist, no laboratory experiment had so far addressed the relation between
these features and the degree of cooperation.
Another ongoing debate in the experimental economics literature to
which this research is related, is the debate on effects of the sign of ex-
ternalities in public good or bad game experiments, often referred to as
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framing effects. Our experiment discussed in chapter 7 can be viewed
as an investigation of the effects of externalities on cooperation in a con-
text without framing since instructions wereexactly the sameintreatments
with positive and negative externalities.
We ﬁnd that the type of strategic interaction has a decisive inﬂuence on
the degree of cooperation. Indeed, the experimental data strongly support
the hypothesis that the degree of cooperation is signiﬁcantly higher when
actions exhibit strategic complementarities.
The sign of externalities, on the contrary, has no signiﬁcant impact on
the degree of cooperation. This suggests that earlier found differences
in behaviour between settings with positive and settings with negative
externalities are mainly due to framing effects.
Detailed analyses of the data, provided in chapter 8, suggest that this
difference is not driven by a difference in number of choices close to the
joint proﬁt maximising choice. It should be noted, however, that with
strategic substitutes, it takes somewhat longer before pairs succeed in
making joint proﬁt maximising choices than with strategic complements.
Nevertheless, the difference in degree of cooperation is driven by behav-
iour of pairs that do not make joint proﬁt maximising choices. We ﬁnd
that non-JPM choices are more asymmetric and less stable with substi-
tutes than with complements.
Contrary to part III of our thesis, the research discussed in part IV has
again been directly motivated by the game-theoretic literature on R&D
cooperation. In the cooperative and noncooperative R&D experiments,
discussed in part II of this thesis, focus was on the R&D stage. Follow-
ing the assumption that anti-trust laws work perfectly, maintained in the
majority of game-theoretic R&D models, we assumed subgame perfect
Nash behaviour in the product market. In part IV of this thesis we ques-
tioned this assumption based on the intuition that explicit cooperation in
R&D may ‘spill over’ to the product market and, as such, facilitate tacit
product market collusion. This was research question 3.
In order to answer this third research question, we ran an experiment
with binding contract possibilities in the R&D stage and no interaction
possibilities in the product market (see chapter 9). Bertrand competition
was implemented in the product market. A baseline treatment where
subjects did not have contract possibilities in the R&D stage, and a con-
tract treatment with R&D contract possibilities, were run for a scenario
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without and a scenario with full technological spillovers.
For both spillover scenarios, we found strong support for the intu-
ition that R&D cooperation facilitates tacit price collusion. First, there
was signiﬁcantly more price collusion in the contract treatments when
a binding R&D agreement was reached than in the baseline treatments.
Second, within the contract treatment, there was signiﬁcantly more price
collusion when an R&D agreement was reached than when it was not
reached.
Thus, laboratory behaviour suggests that the assumption of game-
theoretic R&D models that anti-trust laws work perfectly cannot always
be maintained in duopoly markets. It remains an open question whether
these results extend to oligopoly markets with more than two sellers
(see also 11.3.1). Nevertheless, since the experimental setting was fully
anonymous and excluded any possibility of personal contact or price sig-
naling, the stimulating effect of successful R&D agreements on tacit price
collusion may be viewed as a minimum effect. In the ﬁeld there likely
exist more opportunities for representatives of ﬁrms engaged in R&D co-
operation to interact. However, cooperative R&D agreements are often
subsidised by governments such that information on the type of cooper-
ation and the identity of participating ﬁrms is relatively easily available.
This provides an opportunity to investigate whether there is any possi-
bility of tacit price collusion between ﬁrms engaged in R&D cooperation.
11.2 Additional contributions
11.2.1 Strategic substitutes versus complements:
alternative theoretical approaches
We have shown in chapter 8 that behavioural differences between sce-
narios with strategic substitutes and complements in a noncooperative
context are a priori expected on the basis of two nonstandard theoretical
approaches.
First, there is the concept of relative proﬁt maximisation based on the
evolutionary idea that ﬁrms or players must do better than their com-
petitors in order to maximise survival chances. A process of imitating
the best player yields actions that maximise relative proﬁt. An important
property of this theory is that relative proﬁt maximising actions are more
cooperative with strategic complements than with substitutes.
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Although experimental choices mostly differ from the exact predic-
tions of this approach, the imitation process that yields lower cooper-
ation with substitutes may at least partly be important in experiments
where information on competitors’ proﬁt is provided. Indeed, when in-
formation on competitors’ proﬁt is provided, it is possible for a subject to
identify the most successful player, and to imitate her behaviour.
The main failure of this approach is that it cannot explain differences
in behaviour between scenarios of strategic substitutes and complements
in noncooperative experiments where no information of the opponents’
proﬁt is provided. Without information on others’ proﬁt, it is impossible
to identify the most successful player.
Nevertheless, a mechanism related to the imitation mechanism may
even arise in experiments without detailed information on other players’
proﬁt. Consider within this context, for instance, a subject who punishes
her best-response-playing opponent for not following her cooperation-
inducing strategy, by undercutting the opponent’s previous choice. With
strategic substitutes, the punishment will ceteris paribus be more aggres-
sive than with complements.
Second, thereistheindirectevolutionaryapproach basedontheassump-
tion that players in pairs adjust their cooperative preferences to the pref-
erence of their opponent, making the preferences evolve towards evo-
lutionary stable preferences. With strategic complements, evolutionary
stable preferences are more cooperative than with substitutes.
The indirect evolutionary approach predicts behaviour in most non-
cooperative experiments well, provided that the possibility of envy is ar-
tiﬁcially excluded, or that, in other words, it is assumed that players are
on average not more competitive than in the Nash equilibrium. This as-
sumption may be too strong, because sometimes envy emerges in reality
and sometimes players behave more competitively. The approach can
further not explain why signaling possibilities have increased the degree
of R&D cooperation with full spillovers and not without spillovers.
The predictions of the indirect evolutionary approach are in se static.
Yet, the dynamic mechanism that is behind it may also be empirically
important. Consider, for instance, a cooperation-inducing player paired
with a best-response-player: by inducing cooperation, the cooperation
inducer’s proﬁt may increase when actions are strategic complements,
while it never increases in games of strategic substitutes. This may ham-
per cooperation in games of strategic substitutes.
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11.2.2 R&D as a collusive signal
We found some evidence for the hypothesis that pre-competitive actions,
R&D in our case, may be used to signal willingness to cooperate in the
product market. Indeed, R&D decisions in the full spillovers treatment
of the experiment discussed in chapter 9 were overall ‘too high’ com-
pared to their theoretical benchmarks. Contracted R&D even overshot
the cooperative R&D level. In the contract treatment without spillovers,
however, such behaviour did not occur.
Given that with high spillovers, R&D and prices both have positive
externalities, the joint proﬁt maximising action is higher than the sub-
game perfect Nash prediction in both stages. Therefore, R&D, and es-
pecially contracted R&D, may have been used as a means to signal will-
ingness to collude in prices. Without spillovers, no such parallel exists
between R&D and prices.
OvershootingthecooperativeR&Dleveliscostlybutusingcontracted
R&D as a means to signal willingness to cooperate, is less risky than
choosing high prices. Indeed, in the model on which the experiment is
based, relative proﬁt changes resulting from changes in R&D decisions
are smaller than those resulting from changes in prices.
In the additional treatment with binding R&D contract ´ and price sig-
naling possibilities, discussed in chapter 10, the overshooting of R&D
decisions appeared to be signiﬁcantly less important than in the contract
treatment without price signaling. This gives support to the hypothe-
sis that—with full spillovers—contracted R&D decisions may replace the
explicit sending of collusive price signals, and may as such be used as a
collusive signal.
11.2.3 R&D contracts and price signaling
We have found that the degree of price collusion is overall not signiﬁ-
cantly higher when price signaling possibilities are available than when
not available, given that R&D contract possibilities are available (chapter
10). We have provided two arguments which may explain this ﬁnding.
First, we have argued that an increase in degree of price collusion caused
by any interaction within duopolies may be subject to an upper limit pos-
sibly not reaching full collusion. Second, we have argued that both types
of interactions, R&D contracting and price signaling, may be substitutes
with respect to increasing the degree of price collusion. If, however, R&D
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contracting and price signaling possibilities are both available, it seems
that both types of interaction are used as complements so as to increase
the degree of price collusion.
11.3 Suggestions for future research
11.3.1 Number of players per group
The most natural suggestion for future research is to repeat (part of) the
experiments with groups of more than two players. Previous oligopoly
experiments have shown that the likelihood of tacit collusion decreases
with the number of players (see, for instance, Huck et al., 2004). It would
be useful to examine how the number of group players affects differences
inbehaviourbetweenscenariosofstrategicsubstitutesandcomplements.
The more players in a group, the harder it is for an individual player to
induce cooperation, or to inﬂuence other players’ behaviour in general,
and the higher the likelihood that players adjust to other players’ behav-
iour. Thus, in such design, the eligibility of part of our justiﬁcation for
the observed difference between strategic substitutes and complements
may disappear.
Yet, imitation forces may become more important when the number
of players is increased, which would lead to the a priori expectation of
less cooperation in games of strategic substitutes. Moreover, with more
than two players, we can tell from the experimental literature that it is
less likely that some groups succeed in achieving the symmetric Pareto-
superior outcome of full cooperation, as was the case in the experiments
discussed in this thesis. One may therefore expect that JPM choices will
blur possible behavioural differences between games with strategic sub-
stitutes and games with strategic complements to a lesser extent than in
our experiment of chapter 7.
Nevertheless, it is largely an open question whether differences in
degree of cooperation between strategic substitutes and complements are
sustained when groups have more than two players.
It is also an open question whether R&D cooperation—or ﬁrst-stage
(explicit) cooperation in general—keeps facilitating product market col-
lusionwhenoligopoliesorgroupsconsistofmorethantwoplayers. Since
tacit collusion becomes less likely the larger the groups get, one may ar-
gue that effects of ﬁrst-stage (explicit) cooperation on product market col-
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lusion diminish the larger the groups get.
However, an assumption which is more difﬁcult to maintain when
oligopolies consist of more than two ﬁrms, is related to the deﬁnition of
explicit R&D cooperation. With more than two ﬁrms, it is less realistic
to assume that the symmetric cooperative R&D level can be bindingly
committed to by all ﬁrms in the industry.
11.3.2 Information conditions
It would be interesting to examine differences in degree of cooperation
between scenarios with strategic substitutes and complements where the
possibility of imitation behaviour is excluded. In other words, the experi-
ment discussed in chapter 7 could be run under other information condi-
tions. When no information is provided on the opponent’s proﬁt, imita-
tion of the most successful player becomes unlikely because the most suc-
cessful player cannot be identiﬁed1. Such an experiment would allow to
test more explicitly for predictions of the indirect evolutionary approach.
Furthermore, it would also allow to test for our suggestion that punish-
ment may be more aggressive in games of strategic substitutes than in
games of strategic complements.
11.3.3 Does 1st-stage explicit cooperation
facilitate 2nd-stage implicit cooperation?
The R&D model used as a benchmark in the experiment on R&D cooper-
ation and product market collusion has two special features which could
be excluded in a new experimental design to examine the effects of ﬁrst-
stage explicit cooperation on second-stage implicit cooperation in gen-
eral. First, in the R&D model on which the experiment in chapter 9 is
based, proﬁts are much more sensitive to differences in second-stage ac-
tions (prices) than to differences in ﬁrst-stage actions (R&D decisions).
Second, theoretical benchmarks of second-stage actions (prices) are de-
ﬁned in terms of the ﬁrst-stage actions (R&D decisions).
If both features are left out of the experimental design, a simpler
two-stage game would be played in each round of the experiment: both
stages would be independent dominance-solvable games with Pareto-
1Another way to rule out imitation behaviour is to apply a game where the Nash
equilibrium is a corner solution.
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dominated Nash equilibria. On a ﬁrst stage, it would be possible to
explicitly engage in cooperation, while on a second stage not. Such an
experiment would answer the question whether ﬁrst-stage explicit coop-
eration facilitates second-stage implicit cooperation.
In this design, the use of ﬁrst-stage actions to signal willingness to
tacitly cooperate in the second stage can be made more costly and one
could further examine whether this type of signaling still occurs under
these conditions. Within this respect, the combination of types of strate-
gic interaction (strategic substitutes versus complements) in the ﬁrst and
second stage is an important factor.
11.3.4 Random matching
An open question is whether there is also more cooperation in games of
strategic complementsthan ingames of strategic substitutesif playersare
randomly matched. In other words, one may question whether there ex-
ist interaction effects between the matching design (ﬁxed versus random)
and the obtained difference in degree of cooperation between substitutes
and complements.
With random matching, it is impossible for a subject in a pair to exert
inﬂuence on her opponent’s behaviour, as the opponent changes in each
round. Moreover, if no nonbinding signaling possibilities are available,
a subject is unable to have information on the opponent’s cooperative
preference before making a choice. Thus, in such design, part of our jus-
tiﬁcation for the observed difference between strategic substitutes and
complements would not be valid anymore.
On the other hand, the imitation mechanism may still work if infor-
mation on the opponent’s proﬁt is provided. And even if no information
on the opponent’s proﬁt is provided, our suggestion that punishment
may be more aggressive in games of strategic substitutes than in games
of strategic complements may still be valid.
Similarly, random matching may be applied in a general experiment
on the effects of ﬁrst-stage on second-stage cooperation (see 11.3.3). As
such, reputation effects inherent to a ﬁxed partner design are excluded





(mainly based on Davis and Holt, 1993; Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Ca-
merer, 2004)
• (Laboratory) Experiment: an empirical scientiﬁc research tool to
investigate certain propositions under controlled conditions (in an
environment designed for scientiﬁc purposes). It consists of a col-
lection of sessions covering one or more treatments to evaluate one
or more related propositions.
• Game: a formalised description of the crucial features of a situation
where several players (e.g. persons or ﬁrms) interact and where the
decision of one player affects utility (e.g. payoff) and decisions of
others.
• Round: one repetition of a static game played by subjects in a re-
peated-game-experiment.
• Session: the interaction of a group of subjects in a single meeting
as part of an experiment.
• Subject: a participant in an experiment.
• Treatment: acombinationofexplanatoryvariables(factors)assigned
to a subject by the experimenter.
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PROOFS
B.1 Stability condition in benchmark R&D model
of chapters 5 and 6
The R&D game is stable or R&D reaction functions intersect in a mean-
ingful way when (Henriques, 1990)
 





   
  < 1,
or,  
   
 
2γ2(2− β)(2β − 1)
9bδ − 2γ2(2− β)2
 
   
  < 1.
For β = 1/2 the numerator is 0 such that the condition is always
satisﬁed. For β  = 1/2 the condition may be rewritten as
9bδ > 2γ2(2− β)2 + 2γ2(2− β)|2β − 1|,
where
2γ2(2− β)2 + 2γ2(2− β)|2β − 1| > 2γ2(2− β)2
since
2γ2(2− β)|2β − 1| > 0.
B.2 Condition for symmetry under R&D cooperation
in benchmark R&D model of chapters 5 and 6
To set up the condition for symmetry under R&D cooperation we follow
Salant and Shaffer (1998).
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Suppose that the second-order condition 9bδ > 2γ2(1 + β)2 is valid
and that at the same time bδ < 2γ2(1 − β)2. In this case any other than
the symmetric allocation of the same total investment between the two











x2 by k − x1 where k is a positive constant. This yields the following
expression for joint proﬁts:
K +
x1(x1 − k)(2γ2(1− β)2 − bδ)
b
where K only contains exogenous parameters. The second derivative of
this joint proﬁt function with respect to R&D investment of ﬁrm 1 is
2(2γ2(1− β)2 − bδ)
b
and is strictly positive under the above conditions. Thus, under these
conditions joint proﬁts are strictly convex in terms of ﬁrm 1’s R&D in-
vestment.
Therefore, for the symmetric combination of R&D decisions to be op-
timal, it must hold that
bδ > 2γ2(1− β)2.
B.3 More on the different conditions in
benchmark R&D model of chapters 5 and 6
The following are conditions which should be satisﬁed for the conclu-
sions of the AJ model to be valid, given that ﬁrms compete in the product
market:
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(2− β)2 + (2− β)|2β − 1|
 
, (B.3)
4. the Salant and Shaffer (1998) condition for symmetry in the cooper-
ative R&D game:
bδ > 2γ2(1− β)2. (B.4)
Condition B.1 is dominated by condition B.3 for β  = 1/2 since:
2
9γ2(2− β)|2β − 1| > 0 for β  = 1/2.
Condition B.1 is dominated by condition B.2 for β > 1/2 since:
(1+ β)2 > (2− β)2 for β > 1/2.
Condition B.2 is dominated by condition B.3 for β < 1/2 since:
(2− β)2 + (2− β)|2β − 1| > (1+ β)2 for β < 1/2.
Condition B.3 is dominated by condition B.2 for β > 1/2 since:
(1+ β)2 > (2− β)2 + (2− β)|2β − 1| for β > 1/2.
Condition B.4 is dominated by condition B.2 for β > 1/2 since:
1
9(1+ β)2 > (1− β)2 for β > 1/2.
Condition B.3 is dominated by condition B.4 for β < 1/2 since:
(1− β)2 > 1
9
 
(2− β)2 + (2− β)|2β − 1|
 
for β < 1/2.
Thus, for β < 1/2 condition B.4 is the strongest and for β > 1/2
condition B.2.
B.4 Conditions for symmetry under cooperation
for the general framework in chapter 7 (7.4)
To set up the conditions for the joint proﬁt maximising choices in the
games discussed in section 7.4 of chapter 7 to be symmetric, we use the
sameprocedureasinappendixB.2. Weonlyprovidetheproofsforgames




Replace in the expression of joint proﬁts ∑i πi where
πi = a + bxi + cxj − dx2
i + ex2
j + fxixj i, j = 1,2;i  = j,
xj by k − xi. k is a positive constant. This yields the following expression
for joint proﬁts:
k2(e − d) + k(b + c + 2xi(d − e + f)) + 2
 
a − x2
i (d − e + f)
 
.
The second derivative of this joint proﬁt function with respect to xi is
−4(d − e + f),
and is strictly positive when d > e − f. Given that this condition is
weaker than the condition d > e + f, which needs to be satisﬁed for the
JPM action to be positive, joint proﬁt is always concave in xi. Thus, JPM
actions are always symmetric in the strategic complements scenario.
B.4.2 Strategic substitutes
Replace in the expression of joint proﬁts ∑i πi where
πi = α + βxi + γxj − δx2
i + ǫx2
j − ζxixj i, j = 1,2;i  = j,
xj by k − xi. k is a positive constant. This yields the following expression
for joint proﬁts:
k2(ǫ − δ) + k(β + γ + 2xi(δ − ǫ − ζ)) + 2
 
α − x2
i (δ − ǫ − ζ)
 
.
The second derivative of this joint proﬁt function with respect to xi is
−4(δ − ǫ − ζ),
and is strictly positive when δ > ǫ + ζ. This condition dominates the
condition δ > ǫ − ζ which needs to be satisﬁed for the JPM action to be
positive. The JPM actions are thus not symmetric in the strategic substi-
tutes scenario for ǫ − ζ < δ < ǫ + ζ.
Note that for the parameter values chosen in the experiment (see page
170), JPM actions are symmetric as δ > ǫ + ζ.
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B.5 The coefficient of cooperation approach
(section 9.4.1 in chapter 9)
By applying the coefﬁcient of cooperation approach, where a ﬁrm maxi-
mizes its own proﬁt and a part φit of the other ﬁrm’s proﬁt, to the proﬁt
maximisation problem in the price-setting stage (see e.g. Martin, 2001),
we are able to provide a measure for the degree of price collusion of the
duopoly in period t. Solving the following maximisation problem for




yields a price for i expressed in terms of xi1, xj1, φit and φit:
pit = pit(xi1,xj1,φit,φjt). (B.5)
φit is clearly a measure for the degree of price collusion of ﬁrm i in
period t. When φit = 0, pit is equal to equation 9.3 which is the SPN price
level that maximizes individual proﬁt, and when φit = 1, pit is equal to
equation 9.6 which is the collusive price level that maximizes joint proﬁt.
For 0 < φit < 1 it is clear that pit lies between both benchmarks. The
degree of price collusion representative for the duopoly can e.g. be mea-
sured by φt =
∑i=1,2 φit
2
for i = 1,2; j = 1,2 and i  = j.
The following expression is another but related measure for the de-
gree of price collusion of a duopoly in period t:
Pt =




t − ¯ pSPN
t
(B.6)








with K representing SPN or
JPM. As Pt = 0(1) the average price of the duopoly in period t is at the
SPN (JPM) level.
When R&D decisions and collusion preferences are symmetric such
that xi1 = xj1 and φt = φit = φjt for i = 1,2; j = 1,2;i  = j, we get the
following relation between both measures of degree of price collusion in
period t by ﬁlling in eq. B.5 in eq. 9.9:
Pt =
2φt(b − c)
2b − c(φt + 1)
(B.7)
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where for any value of φt, Pt is strictly increasing in φt, as long as b > c,






C.1 Experiment of chapter 5
Note that the instructions are translated from the originals in Dutch and
that additional instructions for the treatment with complete technological
spillovers are in brackets and in bold. The computer screens for the base-
line treatments were the same as in C.2 but the screens did not contain a
chat box.
General
You are participating in an economic experiment that contains aspects of
the decision-making processes of producers. During this session you are
asked to make a number of simple investment decisions. The amount
that you earn depends on your own decisions and on decisions of other
participants. The instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully
and take the right decisions, you have a larger chance of gaining money.
The information on the screen in front of you, should only be used by
you and cannot be communicated to other participants. To guarantee
good results for you and for the research, do not communicate with other
participants during the experiment (unless it is explicitly permitted as
part of the experiment).
In the experiment you are all sellers-producers that take decisions that
inﬂuence some market parameters: the selling price, the sold quantity
and production costs. The economy is divided in several markets with
two producers being active in each of these markets. Decisions taken by a
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certain producer only inﬂuence conditions in the market of this producer,
and not conditions in other markets.
Specific
Each producer, and thus also yourself, has to make an investment de-
cision, which we call X from now on. This X has to be a real number
between 0 and 25 and decimal fractions are permitted. Your decision X
decreases your unit production cost [ and—to the same degree—the unit
production cost of the other producer in your market, ] and induces also
a cost for you [ (not for the other producer) ]. Next to this, your decision
and the decision of the other producer in your market, inﬂuence selling
price and production quantity in your market. The other producer in
your market is faced with the same situation and the same conditions as
yourself.
The screen that will be shown to you is on the ﬁnal page (cf. ﬁgure C.1).
The ﬁrst line on the screen informs you about your producer and market
number. This information is not changed during the experiment. The
second line indicates the period; it starts at 0 and ends at 26.
In the frame ‘Simulatie’ your production quantity, your return per unit,
your unit production cost, your total cost of X and your proﬁt are calcu-
lated automatically on the basis of amounts that you enter in the boxes
‘eigen X’ and ‘X van andere producent uit deelmarkt b’ [‘Own X’ and ‘X
of the other producer in market b’]. Suppose that you ﬁll in the amounts
x and y in the boxes ‘eigen X’ and ‘X van andere producent uit deelmarkt
b’ and push on the button ‘Maak berekeningen’ [‘Make calculations’],
then the mentioned variables are calculated. It is obvious that in the ac-
tual experiment x and y should be numbers. In each period you can use
this feature as many times as you wish. The calculations that are carried
out, are based on simulations and are only aimed to help you with taking
your decision X in each period. Thus, they do NOT represent the ﬁnal
decision in each period. Your ﬁnal decision should be entered in the box
‘Beslissing X’ [‘Decision’]. This decision is ﬁnally entered by clicking on
‘Invoeren’[‘Import’]withyourleftmousebutton. Onceyouenteredyour
decision, you are either asked to wait for a moment or you go to the next
period.
You have the possibility to commit to a contract with the other producer
in your market in the frame ‘Contracten’ [‘Contracts’]. You can propose a
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contract to the other producer by ﬁlling in an X under ‘contractvoorstel’.
The other producer can also propose contracts to you. You ﬁnd the con-
tractproposal(s)oftheotherproducerunderthetitle‘Contractvoorstellen
van de andere producent uit je deelmarkt’ [‘Contract proposals of the
otherproducer’]andyourownproposal(s)underthetitle‘Eigencontract-
voorstellen’ [‘Own contract proposals’]. If you want to commit to a pro-
posed contract, you select one of the proposals of the other producers and
push the button ‘Ik wil het geselecteerde contract aangaan’ [‘I want to
commit to the selected contract’]. The other producer has the same possi-
bilities regarding your contracts. Once you proposed a contract, you are
committed to it if the other producer selects it. Once a contract has been
made, you and the other producer in your market are both committed
to it, which implies that your decision X and the other’s decision should
be equal to the contracted decision. You ﬁnd the number of the chosen
contract on the bottom left of your screen under ‘Nummer van gekozen
contract’ [‘Number of chosen contract’]. As long as no number appears,
or the number is 0, no contract has been committed to.
In the next period, a screen as in ﬁgure C.1 reappears, including infor-
mation on the decision you made in the previous period, the previous
decision of the other producer in your market and your total proﬁt in the
previous period. In the new period, the same procedure should be fol-
lowed. The experiment takes 26 periods. To participate in the experiment
you receive 2.5 EUR. Anything you earn on top of this, is calculated on
the basis of total proﬁt you earned during the 26 periods. Period 0 is a
test period and is not taken into account when calculating proﬁts. Each
period takes 2 minutes.
C.2 Experiment I of chapter 6
Note that the instructions are translated from the originals in Dutch and
that additional instructions for the treatments with complete technologi-
cal spillovers and the treatments with signaling possibilities are in brack-
ets and in bold. In the baseline treatments there was no chat box on the
computer screen.
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Figure C.1: Computer screen
General
You are participating in an economic experiment that contains aspects of
the decision-making processes of producers. During this session you are
asked to make a number of simple investment decisions. The amount
that you earn depends on your own decisions and on decisions of other
participants. The instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully
and take the right decisions, you have a larger chance of gaining money.
The information on the screen in front of you, should only be used by
you and cannot be communicated to other participants. To guarantee
good results for you and for the research, do not communicate with other
participants during the experiment (unless it is explicitly permitted as
part of the experiment).
In the experiment you are all sellers-producers that take decisions that
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inﬂuence some market parameters: the selling price, the sold quantity
and production costs. The economy is divided in several markets with
two producers being active in each of these markets. Decisions taken by a
certain producer only inﬂuence conditions in the market of this producer,
and not conditions in other markets.
Specific
Each producer, and thus also yourself, has to make an investment de-
cision, which we call X from now on. This X has to be a real number
between 0 and 25 and decimal fractions are permitted. Your decision X
decreases your unit production cost [ and—to the same degree—the unit
production cost of the other producer in your market, ] and induces also
a cost for you [ (not for the other producer) ]. Next to this, your decision
and the decision of the other producer in your market, inﬂuence selling
price and production quantity in your market. The other producer in
your market is faced with the same situation and the same conditions as
yourself.
Figure C.2 presents the ﬁrst screen that will be shown to you. The ﬁrst
line on the screen informs you about your producer and market number.
This information is not changed during the experiment. The second line
indicates the period; it starts at 0 and ends at 26.
In the frame ‘Simulatie’ your production quantity, your return per unit,
your unit production cost, your total cost of X and your proﬁt are calcu-
lated automatically on the basis of amounts that enter in the boxes ‘eigen
X’ and ‘X van andere producent uit deelmarkt b’ [‘Own X’ and ‘X of the
other producer in market b’]. Suppose that you ﬁll in the amounts x and
y in the boxes ‘eigen X’ and ‘X van andere producent uit deelmarkt b’
(as in the screen in ﬁgure C.2) and push on the button ‘Maak berekenin-
gen’ [‘Make calculations’], then the mentioned variables are calculated.
It is obvious that in the actual experiment x and y should be numbers.
In each period you can use this feature as many times as you wish. The
calculations that are carried out, are based on simulations and are only
aimed to help you with taking your decision X in each period. Thus, they
do NOT represent the ﬁnal decision in each period. Your ﬁnal decision
should be entered in the box ‘Beslissing’ [‘Decision’]. This decision is ﬁ-
nally entered by clicking on ‘Invoeren’ [‘Import’] with your left mouse
button. The decision on the screen in ﬁgure 1 is 123456 (imaginary num-
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Figure C.2: First screen
ber!!).
[ Further, on the screen you ﬁnd the box ‘Bericht’ (‘Message’) with ac-
companying buttons ‘Verstuur’ and ‘Hernieuw’ [‘Send’ and ‘Renew’].
Before making your decisions, you should communicate with the other
producerinyoumarketusingthechatpartofthescreen. Tosendames-
sage to this other producer, you enter your message in the box ‘Bericht’
and you click on the button ‘Verstuur’ with your left mouse button.
To receive a message you click on ‘Hernieuw’. You should only send
an interval containing your intended decision in that period. This in-
terval can be a number or any interval between 0 and 25 (incl. 0 and
25). Communicating an interval is done as follows: ‘between ... and ...’.
Your ﬁnal decision can differ from what you have communicated. The
other producer in your market gets the same instructions as you, so in
each period 2 messages are sent: 1 by you and 1 by the other producer.
All messages are registered. ]
After having entered your decision, a screen as in ﬁgure C.3 appears with
the information ‘Je beslissing voor periode 0 is 123456’ [‘Your decision for
period 0 is 123456’] and the possibility to start the next period by clicking
on ‘Naar de volgende periode’ [‘To the next period’]. If this screen does
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not appear, you did NOT enter your decision. Starting the next period is
only possible when the leader of the experiment gives permission.
Figure C.3: Second screen
In the next period, a screen as in ﬁgure C.2 reappears, including infor-
mation on the decision you made in the previous period, the previous
decision of the other producer in your market and your total proﬁt in the
previous period. In the new period, the same procedure should be fol-
lowed. The experiment takes 26 periods. To participate in the experiment
you receive 100 BEF (about 2.5 EUR). Anything you earn on top of this,
is calculated on the basis of total proﬁt you earned during the 26 periods.
Period 0 is a test period and is not taken into account when calculating
proﬁts. Each period takes 2 minutes.
C.3 Experiment II of chapter 6
Note that instructions were in English. Additional instructions for the
treatmentswithcompletetechnologicalspilloversandthetreatmentswith
signaling possibilities are in brackets and in bold.
You are participating in an economic experiment on decision-making of
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producers and will be asked to make a number of investment decisions.
Please follow the instructions carefully.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other partici-
pants. If something is not clear, raise your hand and someone will help
you.
In the experiment you are one of two producers who are active in
a market. Both of you sell and produce the same products. The other
producerinyourmarketisinthesamesituationwiththesameconditions
asyou. Inwhatfollowswewillrefertotheotherproducerinyourmarket
as ‘the other’. The other remains the same during the whole experiment.
In the experiment you should make 20 investment decisions that are
between 0.0 and 50.0. Your investment reduces your [ and the other’s ]
average production cost and also involves a direct cost [ (only for you)
]. The proﬁt table in appendix gives information about your proﬁt in ex-
perimental units for some different combinations of your and the other’s
investment.
To calculate how other combinations of investment decisions affect
proﬁt, you can use the PROFIT CALCULATOR (on the left side of the
screen). The proﬁt calculator enables you to calculate your proﬁt by ﬁll-
ing in hypothetical values for your and the other’s investment. By using
this proﬁt calculator you cannot enter your ﬁnal investment decision, it
only helps you to make your decision.
[ In each period you have the possibility to send one message to the
other (MESSAGES, on the right side of the screen). A message consists
of an interval (lower and upper bound) that contains your planned in-
vestment decision. The lower and upper bound of the interval are al-
lowed to be the same. The messages are not binding, so you are not
obliged to invest what you communicated. ]
You enter your ﬁnal investment decision under DECISION ENTRY
by clicking on ‘Enter’. In each period you have 1.5 minutes to make your
decision.
After each period you are informed about the proﬁt you and the other
made in that period, and the other’s investment decision.
Your total earnings in EUR are calculated by dividing the average
proﬁt you make in experimental units from period 1 onwards by 30. The
ﬁrst period is a trial period and does not count when calculating your
earnings.
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             Own investment       ® ® ® ® 
     0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50
0  336.1  443.2  520.0  566.5  582.8  568.8  524.4  449.9  345.0  209.9  44.4 
5  277.8  373.8  439.4  474.9  480.0  454.9  399.4  313.8  197.8  51.5  -125.0 
10  225.0  309.9  364.4  388.8  382.8  346.5  280.0  183.2  56.1  -101.3  -288.9 
15  177.8  251.5  295.0  308.2  291.1  243.8  166.1  58.2  -80.0  -248.5  -447.2 
20  136.1  198.8  231.1  233.2  205.0  146.5  57.8  -61.3  -210.6  -390.1  -600.0 
25  100.0  151.5  172.8  163.8  124.4  54.9  -45.0  -175.1  -335.6  -526.3  -747.2 
30  69.4  109.9  120.0  99.9  49.4  -31.3  -142.2  -283.5  -455.0  -656.8  -888.9 
35  44.4  73.8  72.8  41.5  -20.0  -111.8  -233.9  -386.3  -568.9  -781.8  -1025.0 
40  25.0  43.2  31.1  -11.3  -83.9  -186.8  -320.0  -483.5  -677.2  -901.3  -1155.6 







50  2.8  -1.3  -35.6  -100.1  -195.0  -320.1  -475.6  -661.3  -877.2  -1123.5  -1400.0 
 
Figure C.4: Proﬁt table for β = 0
             Own investment       ® ® ® ® 
     0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40  45  50
0  336.1  373.8  364.4  308.2  205.0  54.9  -142.2  -386.3  -677.2  -1015.1  -1400.0 
5  400.0  443.2  439.4  388.8  291.1  146.5  -45.0  -283.5  -568.9  -901.3  -1280.6 
10  469.4  518.2  520.0  474.9  382.8  243.8  57.8  -175.1  -455.0  -781.8  -1155.6 
15  544.4  598.8  606.1  566.5  480.0  346.5  166.1  -61.3  -335.6  -656.8  -1025.0 
20  625.0  684.9  697.8  663.8  582.8  454.9  280.0  58.2  -210.6  -526.3  -888.9 
25  711.1  776.5  795.0  766.5  691.1  568.8  399.4  183.2  -80.0  -390.1  -747.2 
30  802.8  873.8  897.8  874.9  805.0  688.2  524.4  313.8  56.1  -248.5  -600.0 
35  900.0  976.5  1006.1  988.8  924.4  813.2  655.0  449.9  197.8  -101.3  -447.2 
40  1002.8  1084.9  1120.0  1108.2  1049.4  943.8  791.1  591.5  345.0  51.5  -288.9 







50  1225.0  1318.2  1364.4  1363.8  1316.1  1221.5  1080.0  891.5  656.1  373.8  44.4 
 
Figure C.5: Proﬁt table for β = 1
C.4 Experiment of chapter 7
Note that instructions were in English.
You are participating in an experiment on economic decision-making
and will be asked to make a number of decisions. If you follow the in-
structions carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. At
the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings in private and
299C Instructions
in cash.
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other partici-
pants. If something is not clear, please raise your hand and one of us will
help you.
Your earnings depend on your own decisions and on the decisions
of one other participant. The identity of the other participant will not
be revealed. The other participant remains the same during the entire
experiment and will be referred to by ‘the other’ in what follows.
The experiment consists of 30 periods. In each period you have to
choose a number between 0.0 and 28.0. The other also chooses a number
between 0.0 and 28.0. Your earnings in points depend on your choice and
the other’s choice. The table attached to these instructions gives informa-
tion about your earnings for some combinations of your choice and the
other’s choice. The other gets the same table.
You can calculate your and the other’s earnings in more detail (for
choices that are no multiples of 2 for instance) by using the EARNINGS
CALCULATOR on your screen. By ﬁlling in a hypothetical value for your
own choice and a hypothetical value for the other’s choice you can calcu-
late your and the other’s earnings for this combination of choices.
You enter your decision under DECISION ENTRY by clicking on ‘En-
ter’.
In each period you have about 1 minute to enter your decision.
After each period you are informed about the other’s choice and your
and the other’s earnings in that period. A history of your and the other’s
past choices and earnings is available at the bottom right of your com-
puter screen.
The ﬁrst period is a trial period and does not count when calculating
your earnings. Your total earnings in points are the sum of your earnings
in points over the 30 periods. Your earnings in points will be converted
into EUR according to the following rate: 100 points = 1 EUR.
C.5 Experiment of chapter 9
Note that the instructions are translated from the originals in Dutch and
that additional instructions for the treatments with complete technologi-
calspilloversandthetreatmentswithcontractpossibilitiesareinbrackets
and in bold.
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You are participating in an economic experiment on decision-making of
producers. During this session you will be asked to make a number of
decisions. The amount of your earnings depends on your decisions and
decisions of another participant. The instructions are simple. If you care-
fully follow them and make good decisions, the probability of earning
more money is larger. During the experiment you are not allowed to
communicate with other participants.
In the experiment, the economy is divided into a number of indus-
tries. In each of these industries two sellers-producers are active who sell
and produce similar products. Each of you represents a seller-producer
in a speciﬁc industry. The other producer in your industry (henceforth
your counterpart) is in the same situation with the same conditions as
you. Each producer, including you, has to take an investment decision
ﬁrst and then a price decision. The customers who eventually buy your
products are simulated by the computer. The rule is: the higher the price
of a certain variation of a product compared to another variation, the less
products are bought of the ﬁrst variation and the more of the other vari-
ation.
What you will earn, depends on your and your counterpart’s invest-
ment and price decisions. Under the title ‘Winstsimulatie’ [‘Proﬁt simula-
tion’] you always have the possibility to calculate your and your counter-
part’s proﬁt. If you ﬁll in hypothetical values of your own and your coun-
terpart’s investment, and of your own and your counterpart’s prices, you
can calculate your and your counterpart’s hypothetical proﬁt by clicking
the button ‘Bereken’ [‘Calculate’]. By using this proﬁt simulator you can-
not input you ﬁnal investment or price decision, it only serves as an aid
with making your decisions.
Your investment decreases your [ and your counterpart’s ] unit pro-
duction cost (with the amount of the investment) on the one hand and
presents a cost equal to the square of the amount of investment. Your
ﬁnal investment decision should be ﬁlled in under the title ‘Finale in-
vesteringsbeslissing ingeven’ [‘Enter ﬁnal investment decision’]. Each
time you made an investment decision, it will remain constant for 5 sub-
sequent periods. You have 200 seconds to take each investment decision.
The investment should be between 0,0 and 50,0.
[ In the investment stages you have the possibility to engage in a
contract withyourcounterpart under the title called ‘Contracten’ [‘Con-
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tracts’]. Youcansendher/himaproposaltobothinvestacertainamount
(ﬁll in the proposal in the appropriate space and send it by clicking on
‘Zend contractvoorstel’ [‘Send contract proposal’]) and he/she can also
send proposals. From the moment you sent a contract proposal, you
are bound to invest what you proposed, if your counterpart has agreed
with your proposal. Your own and your counterpart’s proposals are
shown on the screen. You can accept a proposal of your counterpart by
selecting it and clicking on the button called ‘Dit contract aanvaarden’
[‘Accept this contract’]. If a contract is committed to, you (and your
counterpart) are obliged to invest the contracted amount. You can ﬁnd
the number of the chosen contract on your screen. ]
When all investment decisions are made, a second screen shows up,
where you again have the possibility to calculate your and your coun-
terpart’s proﬁt on the basis of hypothetical decisions [‘Winstsimulatie’].
Information on your and your counterpart’s investment decision in that
period is given on your screen. In this second stage, you have to de-
cide on the selling price of your products. Under ‘Winstsimulatie’ you
can e.g. ﬁll in the investment decisions in that period, and hypothetical
prices, as to calculate the corresponding proﬁt. Your ﬁnal price decision
should be given in under the title ‘Finale prijsbeslissing ingeven’ [‘Enter
ﬁnal price decision’]. You have 100 seconds take each price decision. The
price should be between 0,0 and 245,0.
When all price decisions are made, a screen shows up with informa-
tion on the decisions made in that period by you and your counterpart.
Information on the proﬁt earned in that period is also shown. You can
continue by clicking on ‘Ga door naar de volgende periode’ [‘Continue
to the following period’].
As already mentioned, your investment decision remains constant
during 5 subsequent periods. In the periods without investment deci-
sions, only price decisions are to be taken. Information of the previous or
the same period is always shown on the screen.
The experiment contains 40 periods which implies that eventually 8
investment and 40 price decisions will have been taken. The ﬁrst 5 peri-
ods are practice periods and do not inﬂuence your ﬁnal earnings. Your
ﬁnal earnings in Euro are calculated by dividing the total proﬁt you made
in the experiment (from period 6 to 40) by 1500. The experiment will take
about 2 hours.
302C.6 Signaling treatment of 10 in chapter 9
C.6 Signaling treatment of 10 in chapter 9
The following paragraph was added to the instructions in appendix C.5.
In the pricing stage you have the possibility to send an interval con-
taining your price in that period under the title ‘Berichten’ [‘Messages’]
(ﬁll in minimum and maximum and click on ‘Zend’ [‘Send’]); minimum
and maximum may be the same). These messages are not binding which
means that your ﬁnal price decision may be outside a communicated in-
terval. Intervals sent to you by your counterpart are on the screen under
‘Berichten van medespeler’ [‘Messages from counterpart’].
303APPENDIX D
PARAMETER CHOICES OF FS,
HNO, DAVIS AND ALS
Parameter choices of FS in the Cournot duopoly and triopoly experi-
ments were a = 2.4, b = 0.04, θ = 1, c = 0 and C = 0. In the Bertrand
experiments parameter choices were A = 56, B = 8, c = 0 and C = 13 for
a producer who actually produced and C = 25 for a producer who did
not produce.
Parameter choices of HNO were a = 300, b = 1, θ = 2/3, c = 2 and
C = 0 for all treatments.
Parameter choices of Davis were a = 225, b = 1, θ = 2/3 and C = 0
for all treatments, c = 33 for all Bertrand treatments and the EXTRA
Cournot treatment and c = 1 for the BASIC Cournot treatment.
Parameter choices of ALS were a = 24, b = 1/2, θ = 1 and c,C = 0
for the Cournot treatment with homogeneous products (C1), a = 24, b =
2/3, θ = 1/2 and c,C = 0 for the Cournot treatment with differentiated
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328SAMENVATTING
(SUMMARY IN DUTCH)
Sedert tientallen jaren zijn economen en beleidsvoerders het er over eens
dat de markt dikwijls te weinig drijfveren biedt voor bedrijven om te
investeren in onderzoek en ontwikkeling (O&O). Onvolledige toe-eigen-
baarheid, onzekere uitkomsten en hoge startkosten zijn voorbeelden van
factoren die ertoe leiden dat O&O-inspanningen van bedrijven lager lig-
gen dan sociaal gewenst. Het promoten van samenwerking op het vlak
van O&O tussen bedrijven vormt een van de beleidsinstrumenten om te-
gemoet te komen aan deze kloof tussen gerealiseerde en sociaal gewens-
te O&O-inspanningen, naast bijvoorbeeld octrooien en O&O-subsidies.
Het mededingingsbeleid gevoerd door Westerse landen laat onder be-
paalde voorwaarden inderdaad ruimte voor dergelijke samenwerking in
de priv´ e-sector (denk bijvoorbeeldaan de National Cooperative Research
and Production Act voor de VS en artikel 81(3) van het Verdrag voor de
EU).
In de theoretische literatuur rond industri¨ ele organisatie wordt sinds
enige tijd veel aandacht besteed aan het identiﬁceren van omstandig-
heden waarin O&O-samenwerking een verbetering zou betekenen voor
de sociale welvaart waarbij O&O-samenwerking gedeﬁnieerd wordt als
het co¨ ordineren van O&O-inspanningen met het oog op het maximalise-
ren van de totale industriewinst. Het wordt bijvoorbeeld algemeen aan-
vaarddatO&O-samenwerkingtussengelijkaardigebedrijvenvandezelf-
de grootte een verbetering vormt voor de sociale welvaart in een land als
er voldoende kennisstromen (zogenaamde technologische spillovers) tus-
sen de samenwerkende bedrijven bestaan ´ en als de samenwerking zich
niet vertaalt in collusie in de goederenmarkt.
Dezelfde (speltheoretische) modellen geven aan dat de tendens van
bedrijven om zich te engageren in O&O-samenwerking niet afhangt van
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de grootte van de kennisstromen. Inderdaad, als er geen mogelijkheden
voorhanden zijn voor de bedrijven om bindende O&O-overeenkomsten
af te sluiten zullen winstmaximaliserende bedrijven subgame perfect Na-
sh (SPN) gedrag vertonen, onafhankelijk van de grootte van de technologische
spillovers. Als er wel bindende O&O-overeenkomsten kunnen afgesloten
worden, voorspelt de theorie dat O&O-samenwerking tot stand komt,
weerom onafhankelijk van de grootte van de technologische spillovers.
Deze modellen zijn vergelijkbaar met een gevangenendilemma waar
de theorie voorspelt dat bedrijven zich gedragen volgens het SPN-even-
wicht, terwijl ze meer winst zouden maken moesten ze samenwerken.
Bij voldoende hoge spillovers betekent O&O-samenwerking dat bedrij-
ven hun krachten bundelen om de oversijpeling van kennis te interna-
liseren zodat ze als dusdanig meer in O&O investeren dan wanneer ze
niet zouden samenwerken. In het geval van lage spillovers genereert
de O&O-investering van een bedrijf een negatieve externaliteit door een
competitief voordeel te cre¨ eren ten opzichte van de concurrent. O&O-
samenwerking kan onder deze omstandigheden tot stand komen om de
negatieve externaliteit te internaliseren. Uiteindelijk wordt er door sa-
men te werken minder in O&O ge¨ ınvesteerd.
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift wordt onder meer een over-
zicht gegeven van deze speltheoretische literatuur en van de verschillen-
de vlakken waarop de oorspronkelijke modellen verbeterd werden (zie
hoofdstuk 2). Ondanks de interesse van theoretici om nieuwe, meer rea-
listische modellen te ontwerpen blijkt empirisch onderzoek naar de ver-
onderstellingen en voorspellingen van de basismodellen vrij schaars te
zijn. Recent zijn er in de literatuur een aantal econometrische studies
verschenen over het effect van technologische spillovers op de graad van
O&O-samenwerking, doch de resultaten ervan leveren soms tegenstrij-
dige conclusies op (zie hoofdstuk 3).
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift stellen we ons de vraag of be-
paalde gedragsveronderstellingen die gemaakt worden in de speltheo-
retische O&O-modellen correct zijn. We vragen ons meer bepaald af of
de theoretische voorspelling dat technologische spillovers geen invloed
hebben op de mate van O&O-samenwerking tussen bedrijven wel juist
is.
Onderzoeksvraag 1 Wat is het effect van technologische spillovers op de mate
van O&O-samenwerking?
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Op basis van laboratoriumexperimenten trachten we een antwoord
te geven op deze vraag. Deze methodologie heeft in vergelijking met
econometrisch onderzoek op basis van O&O-statistieken en dergelijke
het voordeel dat de aandacht exclusief kan uitgaan naar het effect van
spillovers op de mate van O&O-samenwerking zonder dat andere eco-
nomische variabelen het verband kunnen verstoren. Verder is het met
name mogelijk om de strategische kenmerken van O&O-investeringen
zoals gedeﬁnieerd in de achterliggende theorie accuraat over te nemen
in het lab. Bovendien kunnen er ook geen simultaniteitsproblemen ont-
staan omdat spillovers volledig exogeen zijn.
Het onderzoek in het tweede deel bestaat uit een co¨ operatief O&O-
experiment (hoofdstuk 5) en twee nietco¨ operatieve O&O-experimenten
(hoofdstuk 6). In beide experimenten wordt enkel het O&O-gedrag be-
keken en wordt er zoals in de theoretische modellen verondersteld dat
eventuele O&O-samenwerking niet kan resulteren in samenwerking in
degoederenmarkt. Metanderewoorden, weveronderstellenSPN-gedrag
in de goederenmarkt.
In het co¨ operatieve O&O-experiment ligt de nadruk op het onderzoe-
ken van het effect van technologische spillovers op de mate van explicie-
te O&O-samenwerking. Dit experiment bestaat enerzijds uit contractbe-
handelingen, dewelke het scenario van O&O-samenwerking zoals gede-
ﬁnieerd in de theorie zo nauw mogelijk reproduceren, en anderzijds uit
controlebehandelingen, dewelke dienen als vergelijkingsbasis. In de con-
tractbehandelingen hebben subjecten de mogelijkheid om bindende con-
tractenaftesluitenwaarinO&O-beslissingenkunnenwordenvastgelegd
en in de controlebehandelingen niet. Zowel de contract- als de controle-
behandelingen werden uitgevoerd voor een scenario zonder technologi-
sche spillovers en een scenario met hoge technologische spillovers.
Het co¨ operatief O&O-experiment geeft aan dat de mate van explicie-
te O&O-samenwerking dezelfde is voor beide scenario’s van technologi-
sche spillovers, althans na leereffecten en op voorwaarde dat contracten
wel degelijk worden afgesloten. Met andere woorden, spillovers blijken
geen effect te hebben op de mate van expliciete O&O-samenwerking.
De nietco¨ operatieve O&O-experimenten hebben als doel om te on-
derzoeken of impliciete O&O-samenwerking tot stand kan komen in een
scenario waar enkel een minimale vorm van (nietbindende) communica-
tie mogelijk is, dus om het effect na te gaan van technologische spillovers
op de mate van impliciete O&O-samenwerking. Beide experimenten be-
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staan uit behandelingen waar de mogelijkheid bestond om signalen be-
treffende de geplande O&O-beslissing te sturen naar de concurrent en uit
controlebehandelingen die dienen als vergelijkingsbasis.
Het voornaamste resultaat van de nietco¨ operatieve O&O-experimen-
ten is dat er—enkel in het scenario van hoge technologische spillovers—
signiﬁcant meer O&O-samenwerking wordt vastgesteld in de behande-
lingen waar communicatie mogelijk was dan in de controlebehandelin-
gen. In het scenario zonder spillovers heeft de communicatiemogelijk-
heid geen signiﬁcant effect op de mate van O&O-samenwerking. Opval-
lend is ook dat er in het scenario van hoge spillovers meer co¨ operatieve
signalen verstuurd werden dan in het scenario zonder spillovers. Op
basis van deze bevindingen besluiten we dat de mate van impliciete O&O-
samenwerking groter is wanneer er veel spillovers zijn dan wanneer er geen
spillovers zijn.
Samengevat leren zowel het co¨ operatief experiment als de nietco¨ ope-
ratieve experimenten ons dat wanneer er geen spillovers zijn, enkel bin-
dende afspraken de mate van O&O-samenwerking kunnen verhogen in
vergelijking met het ‘standaardgedrag’ (d.i. het gedrag in de controle-
behandelingen of SPN-gedrag). Wanneer er hoge spillovers zijn, kan een
minimalevormvancommunicatievolstaanommeerO&O-samenwerking
te verkrijgen. Een beleidsimplicatie zou kunnen zijn dat het O&O-gedrag
evolueert in de sociaal gewenste richting wanneer een overheid niet tus-
senkomt om O&O-samenwerking te stimuleren. Het spreekt voor zich
dat er meer empirisch onderzoek nodig is om deze implicatie hard te
maken.
In het derde deel van dit proefschrift vragen we ons af welke facto-
ren er aan de basis liggen van het gedrag dat werd geobserveerd in de
hierboven besproken nietco¨ operatieve O&O-experimenten.
De nietco¨ operatieve O&O-modellen zijn voorbeelden van sociale di-
lemmas waarbij de spelers een continu¨ um aan beslissingen/keuzes voor-
handen hebben. In een sociaal-dilemmaspel leidt individueel rationeel
gedrag tot een situatie die sociaal suboptimaal is voor de spelers. Een
prisoner’s dilemma is een typisch voorbeeld van een sociaal-dilemma-
spel waarbij de spelers slechts twee keuzemogelijkheden (samenwerken
ofnietsamenwerken)hebben. Cournot-hoeveelheidszetting-enBertrand-
prijszettingspelenzijnanderetypischevoorbeeldenvansociale-dilemma-
spelen uit de industri¨ ele-organisatieliteratuur.
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Cournot- en Bertrand-spelen vertonen—naast hun sociaal-dilemma-
karakter—anderegelijkenissenmetdenietco¨ operatieveO&O-spelenwaar-
op de experimenten uit hoofdstuk 6 gebaseerd zijn. Zo genereren de
beslissingen van spelers in typische Cournot-spelen en in O&O-spelen
zonder technologische spillovers negatieve externaliteiten. Dit betekent dat
wanneer een speler beslist om meer te produceren of om meer in O&O te
investeren, en als dusdanig haar beslissing verhoogt, het nut (de winst in
dit geval) van de andere speler(s) daalt. In Bertrand-spelen en in O&O-
spelen met voldoende hoge spillovers zijn er positieve externaliteiten en
stijgt het nut of de winst van de andere speler(s) bij een verhoging van de
beslissing van een speler (prijs of O&O-investering).
Een andere gelijkenis betreft het effect van een beslissing van een spe-
ler op het marginaal nut van andere speler(s). Deze eigenschap noemen
we het type van strategische interactie. Typische Cournot-spelen en O&O-
spelen zonder technologische spillovers zijn spelen van strategische sub-
stituten wat impliceert dat een verhoging van de beslissing van een speler
het marginale nut van de andere speler(s) reduceert. In een dergelijke si-
tuatie voorspelt de speltheorie dat een rationele speler zijn beslissing ver-
laagt (verhoogt) naarmate anderen hun beslissing verhogen (verlagen).
Zo zal, als een bedrijf in een Cournot-model met lineaire vraag en substi-
tueerbare goederen haar productie opvoert, het andere bedrijf reageren
door haar productie terug te schroeven. Reactiecurves hebben dus een
negatieve helling. In een spel van strategische complementen verhoogt een
beslissing van een speler het marginaal nut van de andere speler(s) en
hebben reactiecurves een positieve helling. Het Bertrand-duopoliemodel
met imperfect substitueerbare goederen en lineaire vraag- en kostenfunc-
ties is een voorbeeld van dergelijk spel: winstmaximaliserende bedrijven
volgen prijsverhogingen (-verlagingen) van hun concurrent. Een gelijk-




stelling worden gedaan: collusie (tacit collusion of impliciete samenwer-
king) komt gemakkelijker tot stand in een Bertrand- dan in een Cournot-
omgeving. Als deze bevindingen naast de bevinding gebaseerd op de
nietco¨ operatieve O&O-experimenten uit hoofdstuk 6 gelegd wordt, blijkt
dat het volgende geldt: in spelen van strategische complementen en po-
sitieve externaliteiten komt (impliciete) samenwerking gemakkelijker tot
333Samenvatting
stand dan in spelen van strategische substituten en negatieve externali-
teiten.
Een relevante vraag die we ons stellen, en die we trachten te beant-
woorden in deel III van dit proefschrift, is of de grotere mate van samen-
werking in spelen van strategische complementen en positieve externa-
liteiten bepaald wordt door het teken van de externaliteiten of door het
type van strategische interactie, of door beide.
Onderzoeksvraag 2 Wat is het effect van het teken van externaliteiten en
het type van strategische interactie op de mate van samenwerking in sociale-
dilemma-spelen?
Met het oog op het beantwoorden van deze vraag voerden we een
laboratoriumexperiment gebaseerd op sociale-dilemmaspelen met twee
spelersuitwaarvanhetopzetenderesultatenwordenbesprokeninhoofd-
stuk 7 van dit proefschrift. Het laboratoriumexperiment is zo opgezet dat
het een ‘zuivere’ vergelijking toelaat tussen de vier mogelijke scenario’s
gebaseerd op het teken van de externaliteiten (negatief versus positief) en
het type van strategische interactie (strategische substituten en comple-
menten). Onderstaande ﬁguur maakt duidelijk wat we hiermee bedoe-
len. Onderliggende nuttigheids- of winstfuncties zijn zo opgesteld dat de
Nash-evenwichten, de Nash-winsten en de winsten bij volledige samen-
werking dezelfde zijn voor de vier scenario’s. Verder is de co¨ operatieve
keuze dezelfde bij strategische substituten en complementen gegeven het
teken van de externaliteiten, zijn de defectie-winsten dezelfde, alsook de
absolute waardes van de helling van de reactiecurves. In de instructies
wordt bovendien geen gebruik gemaakt van een speciﬁek kader, wat im-
pliceert dat de instructies exact hetzelfde zijn in de vier scenario’s. Enkel
de winstfuncties zijn verschillend.
Elk scenario vormt een afzonderlijke behandeling in het experiment
waarbij keuzes volledig anoniem worden gemaakt en geen enkele vorm
van communicatie mogelijk is.
Naast de genoemde toepassingen in de industri¨ ele-organisatie-litera-
tuur kunnen er in de economische literatuur meerdere vari¨ eteiten van
sociale-dilemmaspelen worden teruggevonden ingedeeld op basis van
het teken van externaliteiten en het type van strategische interactie (bij-
voorbeeld in de disciplines internationale economie, publieke economie







































Figuur E.1: Reactiecurves, Nash- en volledig co¨ operatieve keuzes in de vier sce-
nario’s
is een spel van strategische substituten met positieve externaliteiten. Als
er stijgende meeropbrengsten zijn of bij toenemend marginaal nut van
het publiek goed, is het spel er een van strategische complementen en
positieve externaliteiten.
Het is duidelijk dat de speltheorie geen verschillen in gedrag voor-
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spelt tussen de vier scenario’s/behandelingen. Ze voorspelt meer be-
paalddatspelerszichgedragenvolgenshetPareto-inferieurNash-evenwicht
endaterdusgeenimpliciete(Pareto-superieure)samenwerkingtotstand
komt: spelers maximaliseren hun eigen nut gegeven het nut van de an-
dere spelers.
In tegenstelling tot wat de standaard-speltheorie voorspelt, vinden
we dat de mate van samenwerking signiﬁcant groter is in behandelingen met
strategische complementen dan in behandelingen met strategische substituten.
Het teken van externaliteiten heeft geen signiﬁcant effect op de mate van
samenwerking.
In hoofdstuk 8 bespreken we enerzijds een aantal niet-standaard the-
orie¨ en waarvan de voorspellingen in de lijn liggen van dit experimenteel
resultaat en gaan we anderzijds dieper in op verschillen in gedrag tussen
de behandelingen met strategische substituten en deze met strategische
complementen. Verdere gegevensanalyse leert ons dat in de behande-
lingen met strategische substituten beslissingen meer asymmetrisch en
minder stabiel zijn dan bij strategische complementen.
In tegenstelling tot het derde deel in dit proefschrift, is het onder-
zoekdataanbodkomtindeelIVopnieuwrechtstreeksverbondenmetde
speltheoretische literatuur rond O&O-samenwerking. Zoals eerder reeds
aangehaald, gaan de O&O-modellen ervan uit dat de mededingingswet-
geving perfect functioneert en dat eventuele O&O-samenwerking dus
niet resulteert in samenwerking in de goederenmarkt, een veronderstel-
ling die we in deel II trouwens ook maakten. We kunnen ons nochtans
voorstellen dat wanneer bedrijfsleiders of O&O-managers van verschil-
lende bedrijven overeenkomen in het kader van een gezamenlijk O&O-
project, het best mogelijk is dat ze ook andere politieken, zoals bijvoor-
beeld de prijspolitiek, bespreken en hieromtrent geheime afspraken ma-
ken. Vertaald naar de theoretische modellen zou dit betekenen dat expli-
ciete O&O-samenwerking impliciete collusie in de goederenmarkt in de
hand kan werken.
Onderzoeksvraag 3 Werkt expliciete O&O-samenwerking impliciete collusie
in de goederenmarkt in de hand?
In het vierde deel van dit proefschrift bespreken we duopolie-labora-
toriumexperimenten die deze onderzoeksvraag trachten te beantwoor-
den. In een deel van de behandelingen is er de mogelijkheid om binden-
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de O&O-overeenkomsten af te sluiten en een ander deel van de behande-
lingenheeftdezemogelijkheidnietendientalscontrole(ziehoofdstuk9).
In geen enkele van de behandelingen is het mogelijk om bindende prijs-
afspraken te maken (in de extra behandeling besproken in hoofdstuk 10
is een minimale vorm van nietbindende communicatie over prijzen wel
toegestaan).
We vinden dat er signiﬁcant meer prijscollusie tot stand komt wan-
neer er expliciete O&O-samenwerking mogelijk is dan wanneer dit niet
mogelijk is, en dit zowel voor een scenario zonder spillovers als voor een
scenario waarbij spillovers groot zijn. Verder geven de experimentele
resultaten ook aan dat er signiﬁcant meer prijscollusie is wanneer expli-
ciete O&O-samenwerking werkelijk tot stand komt dan wanneer ze niet
tot stand komt.
Kort samengevat vinden we dus duidelijk steun voor de intu¨ ıtie dat
expliciete O&O-samenwerking impliciete prijscollusie in de hand werkt. Dit
kan betekenen dat er kanttekeningen geplaatst dienen te worden bij het
theoretische resultaat dat O&O-samenwerking de sociale welvaart ver-
hoogt bij voldoende hoge spillovers, althans voor wat betreft duopolie-
markten. Het blijft een open vraag of deze conclusie ook geldt voor
oligopolie-markten met meer dan twee bedrijven. Anderzijds kan het
gevonden effect van O&O- op prijssamenwerking ook ge¨ ınterpreteerd
worden als een minimumeffect: de experimentele omgeving is namelijk
volledig anoniem en er is geen enkele vorm van interactie mogelijk in de
goederenmarkt.
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